SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 11, September 27, 2004

 

INDIA	PAKISTAN

Summitry in New York
Guest Writer: G. Parthasarathy
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Spin doctors who accompany Indian Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers on visits abroad routinely use terms like 'breakthrough' and 'historic' to describe meetings that their bosses hold. This is particularly true when summit meetings take place either in the White House, or with Pakistani leaders. When India's youngest Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met Pakistan's youngest Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad in 1989, there was no dearth of hangers-on in Rajiv Gandhi's entourage gushingly telling him how good the two young Prime Ministers looked on television and how the new generation of leaders would set aside the mindsets of the past and usher in a new era of eternal friendship. Barely a few months after this Summit, Pakistan's leaders were fomenting insurrection in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) with shrill calls for "Azadi" (Freedom). A decade later, Prime Minister Vajpayee embarked on his now famous bus journey to Lahore, only to find his dreams of a 'breakthrough' shattered on the high hill tops of Kargil. What India's Pakistan-obsessed media and bleeding-heart liberals failed to understand was that both in 1989 and in 1999, elected Indian Prime Ministers were dealing with counterparts in Pakistan who had little say in influencing the policies that Army Chiefs like Generals Aslam Beg and Pervez Musharraf were controlling - policies aiming to 'bleed India with a thousand cuts'. Unlike sentimental Indians, the Pakistani military establishment conducts its policies towards India not out of any sentimentality, but on the basis of prevailing domestic and international power dynamics.

Also Read The Chasm between Rhetoric and Reality -- G. Parthasarathy Balochistan: A Rising Insurgency -- Kanchan Lakshman

What were the prevailing domestic and international factors influencing Musharraf when he met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on September 24? Domestically, he was finding a lack of adequate support for his plans to continue as Army Chief beyond December 31. While he could quite easily stage another bogus 'referendum' and announce that he had secured public support for his plans, this route could further expose his lack of democratic and constitutional legitimacy. Secondly, with two four star generals scheduled to retire on October 7, he could never be sure of the unquestioned loyalty of an officer at least seven years his junior, who would become Army chief, if he decides to go the constitutional way, and relinquish his job as Pakistan's Army Chief. Musharraf knows better than anyone else, that political power in Pakistan grows out of the barrel of a gun. Things would become infinitely more complicated for him, if he became internationally isolated and lost the support of the Americans. The Americans, in turn, do not want him to get embroiled in tensions with India, but rather to focus his attention on stabilizing the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where around 70,000 Pakistani troops are now deployed, fighting remnants of the Al Qaeda and its supporters.

Adding to Musharraf's complications is the fact that his favourite jihadis from groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) are now targeting him personally. The other hot Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) favourite, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is now a house divided, with the leadership of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed being called into question and a senior leader, Maulana Ibrahim Salfi, assassinated in broad daylight. Within Kashmir, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) remains another house divided, despite attempts by diplomats like Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri and Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokar to bring them together, under the tutelage of Syed Ali Shah Geelani. It is interesting that even as Musharraf was meeting Manmohan Singh in New York, the 'moderate' APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was said to be busy meeting the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) leader Sardar Qayyum and ISI Chief General Ehsan-ul-Haq in Saudi Arabia. Failure to re-establish a united fifth column like the Hurriyat would be a setback for Pakistan's efforts to keep the pot boiling in the Kashmir Valley. Given these developments, it is only logical for Musharraf to buy time by continuing the dialogue process with India, while making it clear to his domestic audience that he still remains committed to the ISI's larger strategic objective of weakening India from within. Musharraf played his cards very well in New York, telling his domestic audience that he had not forsaken larger objectives, while persuading the international community that he was a changed man, fully opposed to terrorism.

Not surprisingly, the statement that Musharraf read out after his meeting with Manmohan Singh was worded to lend itself to different interpretations. This is going to be controversial, especially as Delhi's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government has been less than pro-active in focusing domestic and international public and media attention on the details and implications of Pakistan sponsored terrorism. The Government has also not effectively rebutted Pakistan's charges of human rights violations, or exposed the gross violations of human rights in PoK. Musharraf made it clear that there could be no improvement in economic relations till the Kashmir issue was resolved to his satisfaction. He had earlier described Indian allegations of Pakistani support for terrorism as being 'hackneyed'. Dr. Manmohan Singh, however, subsequently asserted: "Terrorism did come up in our discussions and I mentioned unambiguously to President Musharraf that the starting point of the whole dialogue process is the commitment given by Pakistan in the January 6 statement, that territory under Pakistan's control will not be used for terrorist activities." For good measure Dr. Singh added: "We cannot discuss substantive issues and Confidence Building Measures if terrorist activities are not controlled. Therefore, there is no doubt that this is the pre-condition to moving forward."

There have, however been two important, but unpublicized developments in recent talks with Pakistan. During discussions with Khurshid Kasuri, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh made it clear that India was concerned about the lack of representative institutions, democratic freedoms and meaningful autonomy in PoK and the Northern Areas in the PoK. It also seems that Dr. Manmohan Singh has thrown the ball back in Musharraf's court by asking him to spell out what he believes could be the basis of 'reasonable' and mutually acceptable solutions to the issue of J&K.

General Musharraf's game plan is now reasonably clear. He will not raise the level of terrorist violence beyond India's threshold of tolerance. Given the dissensions within jihadi outfits supported by the ISI, General Ehsan ul Haq will be given time to prepare new strategies to keep the pot boiling with terrorist violence. At the same time, coercive pressure and threats to their lives will be used to get the Hurriyat leaders to fall in line. In negotiations with India, the effort will be to get India to accept the gas pipeline project and agree to a pullback of its forces from Siachen. There is no dearth of people in India, including some in Manmohan Singh's Cabinet, who would like us to accept these Pakistani wishes with no quid pro quo, either on developing normal trade and economic relations, including transit rights to Afghanistan, or on ending cross-border terrorism. But it appears unlikely that Dr. Manmohan Singh will oblige them!

While it is in India's interests to press ahead with moves for demanding more democratic freedoms in PoK and suggesting measures to open the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service, much is now going to depend on how the Government manages the situation within Kashmir, so that people there realize that increasing pressure has to be put on Pakistani jihadis, by identifying their hideouts and eliminating them. No effort can be spared to demonstrate to people in J&K that playing the Pakistani game, as elements in the Hurriyat are now doing, has no future. The scope of Delhi's interlocutor in J&K, N.N. Vohra's political dialogue needs to be expanded to take into account the views of all sections of the people in the State.

Given the way that developments in Kashmir and Manipur have been handled in recent months, there is little reason to be optimistic that this task can be carried out imaginatively by the Home Ministry. Delhi will have to formulate policies to respond appropriately and pro-actively to Pakistan's efforts to destabilize the situation within India.

There is no place for sentimentality on this score.

 

NEPAL

Crouching Government, Hidden Maoists
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On September 23, 2004, the Nepal Government led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, officially invited the Maoists for peace talks to resolve the eight year old insurgency, which has already claimed more than 10,000 lives. Reacting to the Government's official call, Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) Chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, questioned the status and legitimacy of the incumbent Government, though he has not explicitly rejected the call. Prachanda had denounced Deuba's Government when it was installed by King Gyanendra in June 2004, and has now reiterated his contempt for a Government 'dominated by foreign reactionaries, feudal Palace, and Army generals.' He also demanded that the Government should clarify the King's position on the Maoists prime agenda - the 'Constituent assembly' - and has condemned military assistance received from foreign countries, especially India.

Also Read Political Pilgrimage in Search of Security -- S.D. Muni Blockade Ends, but no Signs of a Ceasefire -- Keshab Poudel

After his return from the five-day official visit to India, Prime Minster Deuba has urgently worked to restore peace talks. During his Indian tour, the magnitude and intensity of the conflict had been discussed extensively and the Indian Government had expressed concern about the Maoist insurgency, asserting that it was a 'shared threat' for both the countries. India also pledged more military assistance for the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and offered counter-insurgency training for Nepali security forces. India did, however, qualify that a purely 'military solution' could not resolve the crisis in Nepal. India's support has helped Kathmandu adopt a posture of some strength against the Maoists, but has also intensified the resolve to seek a solution through talks.

The 'All Party' Government, which was appointed by the King under Article 127 of the country's constitution, neither has the mandate, nor has it been able to define its 'bottom line' for negotiations with the insurgents. This was evident in the high-level peace committee's invitation to the insurgents for negotiations, without any clarity on the agenda of the peace process. Deuba has had a bitter experience with the Maoists during his previous tenure as Prime Minister in 2001, and is now very cautious and unwilling to take the blame for any possible future failure of the negotiations.

Meanwhile, the Government's critical ally, the Communist Party of Nepal - United Maoist Leninist (CPN-UML), has been organizing political meetings all over the country to pressurize the Government for peace process, even as it seeks to distance itself from any responsibility for possible failure. Earlier, the CPN-UML General Secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had held secret talks with the Maoists in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, shortly after the breakdown of the peace process in August 2003.

On the other hand, the Opposition Alliance led by the Nepali Congress (NC) has again stepped into the streets to continue their 'anti-regression' demonstrations and strikes in the country and has sought to indict the Government at every possible opportunity. The continuing political chaos and inadequate cooperation among various Constitutional forces has facilitated the consolidation of the insurgents' position, and encouraged them to escalate their demands.

Earlier, on September 2, 2004, 'Chairman' Prachanda had bluntly ruled out the possibility of talks with the Government, stating that his party would enter into a dialogue only with the "owners of the old regime", with the eventual objective of direct talks with King Gyanendra. In parallel efforts, the Maoists are trying to internationalize the issue, seeking Governmental assent for third party mediation by the United Nations or other international 'human rights' agency, on the grounds that such 'nonpartisan' intervention was necessary to hold the King and the Government to their assurances in case of talks. However, even as the Maoists urge the Government to create a 'concrete environment' for peace talks, they have continued with their campaign of violence against the Security Forces, Government officials and common civilians.

The recent success of Maoist affiliates, the All Nepal Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) and All Nepal National Independent Students Union-Revolutionary (ANNISU-R) forcing concessions on their demands after they had cut off Kathmandu through an 'economic blockade' for over a week, has demonstrated the efficacy with which the Maoists can exploit their sister organizations for disruptive activities in support of their own terror tactics. To comply with their demands, the Government released two ANTUF leaders, Resham Lama and Bishnu Bahadur Thapa Magar, and also announced the status of the detained Maoist leaders and their cadres in prison. Significantly, such campaigns of political disruption tend to avert or moderate direct condemnation by the 'international community'.

In complementary moves, the Maoist strategy of 'protracted war', which was earlier confined to the rural districts, has now rapidly begun to spread towards urban centres, including the capital Kathmandu as well. The recent economic blockade of Kathmandu, bomb attacks on hotels in the Capital and the demand for closure of 47 industries all over the country are a direct attack on the national economy, and on the regime's capacity to govern. The tourism industry, a major source of revenue - which had largely been exempted from Maoist violence in the early phases of the movement - has now been totally paralyzed. Maoist efforts are now focused on building a strong base in the 'Ring Area' region (the districts surrounding the capital, Kathmandu) to construct what would be a final challenge to the central authority.

Since the collapse of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003, the Maoists have abducted more than 19,500 people, largely teachers and students, for their 'educational training' and 'military training' programmes. At the same time, recruitment has been intensified to increase the strength of their cadres. More than 4,500 Village Development Committee (VDC) offices have been demolished and VDC secretaries across the country resigned in order to save their lives. A virtually country-wide network of extortion has been established and, the Maoists now demand 'taxes' for their 'People's Governments' from national and international NGO's, as well as money from district authorities. They now run parallel governments in 21 Districts, and recently started announcing 'economic budgets' for their stronghold areas. Separately, they reportedly conducted an 'election' at Sundarkhala in Kailali district in the Far Western Region to elect the chairman and vice-chairman of the 'Village People's Government'. It is clear that the Maoists have now either established dominance in large parts of the country, or demolished the state's authority in regions that they are still to bring under their control.

There are reports that the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM) and the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisation of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) are encouraging the Nepali Maoists to resist or reject any offer of negotiations by the Government. The survival and success of the Nepali Maoists is seen by these entities as integral to the broader enterprise of the 'peoples' war' in the entire region.

The Government is, at present, confronted not only with a crisis but also a dilemma. The Maoists insist that the regime rejects all further military aid by foreign powers - and particularly India - as a precondition to any possible peace process; they have also demanded that the 'terrorist' tag be removed from their organization, and that they be allowed to freely engage in 'political activity' without let or hindrance from the state's Forces. However, conceding these demands would simply leave the entire country open to unimpeded Maoist operations and expansion - since the Maoists have never accepted the Government's reflexive conditionality of a laying down of arms. This has been the pattern of the past, when the Maoists have used periods of negotiations for massive recruitment, training and consolidation, even as they have protested every Military operation or arrest against them as a breach of the 'peace process'.

As things stand, it is evident that the Maoists see their 'people's war' as having entered its penultimate stage, with the encirclement and collapse of the central authority appearing increasingly imminent. Under the circumstances, the rebels have little motivation - beyond the purely tactical - to negotiate an effective peace with the state. The situation in the war-torn Himalayan Kingdom could, consequently, be slated for further deterioration in the proximate future.