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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 15, October 25, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Bloody and Uncertain
Peace
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, The Sunday Times, Colombo
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
says that nothing but its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA)
should be discussed at the negotiating table. The Government
insists that parallel talks on a final solution should also
be discussed. The stalemate continues amidst a fragile ceasefire
and a tottering economy, the revival of which largely depends
on the resumption of the talks.
The situation
is so desperate that even a minor LTTE compromise is hailed
as a major breakthrough.
The talks between the United National Front government of
Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE broke down in April last
year with the rebels accusing the then government of not
honouring its pledges with regard to rehabilitation and
reconstruction in the war-ravaged North and East. Many an
attempt was made to kick-start or push-start the peace process,
but the LTTE held on to its position. A breakthrough came
when, in October 2003, the LTTE made its ISGA proposals
known.
Though the proposals were too suicidal for the Government
to adopt in toto, it agreed to discuss them. Both
the government and the LTTE were set for talks, but then
President Chandrika Kumaratunga struck. She took over three
key portfolios, including Defence, setting off a political
crisis which culminated in the dissolution of Parliament
and a new coalition Government being elected to office.
Since then, much blood has flowed under the bridge and many
an attempt has been washed away by political undercurrents
- with a split in the LTTE further complicating the search
for peace.
Six months after the election victory that failed to give
the new United People's Freedom Alliance Government a clear
parliamentary majority, the Government is faced with a situation
where, on the one hand, it has to cope with a factional
war, a fragile ceasefire and a faltering peace process and,
on the other, has to grapple with a worsening economic crisis
and plummeting public confidence.
With the world oil prices reaching 55 US dollars, the Government
is wilting under public pressure created by the spiralling
cost of living. It is the economic factor that is pushing
the Government to brush aside threats from its coalition
partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and go for
peace talks and celebrate this as a major breakthrough to
win international aid. Whether the talks end in success
or failure does not matter. What matters is the resumption
of talks - a sort of publicity photo-op with the government
and the LTTE delegations shaking hands. That, the Government
believes, will pave the way for the international community
to release at least a part of the aid it promised at the
Tokyo conference in 2003.
This appears to be the strategy of the Government, which
now enjoys a majority in Parliament after the Ceylon Workers
Congress, a kingmaker party representing the estate population,
aligned itself with the ruling coalition.
The President appears to be playing her cards close to the
chest and placing her aces one by one on the table. She
wants to tell her southern constituency that hers is not
a policy of 'peace at any cost' while sending a message
to the LTTE that she is willing to compromise.
Her first card was the formation of the National Council
for Peace and Reconciliation (NCPR) - which was supposed
to be an all-party body, but could not be called that because
the main opposition - the United National Party (UNP), the
Tamil National Alliance and the Buddhist monks' party the
Jathika Hela Urumaya - boycotted the inauguration on October
4. The LTTE dismissed the NCPR as a time-buying gimmick
or a delaying tactic.
However, the President was unfazed. She breathed an air
of success or a sigh of relief because the hardline JVP
made its presence felt in a big way in the new peace body.
The once-bitten-twice-shy UNP, which appeared to have adopted
a policy of mistrust towards Kumaratunga after she went
back on her promise and threw it out of office, however,
pledged to support the Government's peace moves.
Addressing the inaugural session of the NCPR, the President
had reiterated her Government's commitment to end the 20-year-old
conflict by peaceful means and invited the LTTE to resume
talks on establishing a federal state. She said her Government
was ready to negotiate on the setting up of the ISGA - but
there should be parallel talks on a final deal. "We require
a commitment from the LTTE that the interim administration
as well as the final solution would be based on the Oslo
declaration, which stipulates that a federal solution should
be sought within a united Sri Lanka," she said, giving an
indication of the shape of her Government's counterproposals,
about which very little is known.
Government spokesman Mangala Samaraweera would only say
that the counterproposals are ready and waiting. But those
in the know say the Government's counterproposals are nothing
but a position paper that spells out what the LTTE wants
and the Government's response to such demands.
With the LTTE insisting on its pound of flesh over its ISGA
proposal even after the President's NCPR speech, the Government
was disappointed, if not desperate. In the eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation that ensued, the first to blink was the LTTE.
The Government was jubilant when LTTE 'spokesman', Daya
Master, told Associated Press that the LTTE was willing
to discuss the Government's counter proposals. The Colombo-based
media ran banner headlines, describing the LTTE's softening
of its stance as a major breakthrough. In Government quarters
this was welcomed as a dramatic breakthrough. But the jubilation
was short-lived when the LTTE's 'political wing' leader
S. P. Thamilselvan, who is visiting European nations on
a study tour of forms of federalism, made a hurried call
to protest the remarks Daya Master had made and resumed
the eyeball game. This time the LTTE wants the Government
to blink.
Although, the LTTE has gone back to its nothing-but-ISGA
position, the Daya Master-slip-of-the-tongue remark gave
an indication that the rebel leadership was ready to hear
any Government response or proposal when ISGA was being
discussed. This was exactly what Norway's special peace
envoy, Erik Solheim, has conveyed to the Government. Solheim
said the LTTE's demand for ISGA was not a "take it or leave
it position." It is, however, a demand it insists should
be discussed.
One UPFA source said: "Agreeing to talk on the ISGA does
not mean the Government accepts the proposal in toto.
It only means the Government will give ear to what the LTTE
has to say on the proposals and give its own position. What
is good and acceptable will be given. That again would have
to be within the parameters spelt out by President Kumaratunga."
It is against this backdrop that the Government is now planning
to come out with another strategy, brushing aside fears
that the ISGA would lead to a separate state and threats
by the JVP to the President that it would leave the Government
if the talks are based only on ISGA. President Kumaratunga
is expected to consult the NCPR this week and outline an
elaborate policy framework to take the peace process forward.
She is likely to spell out her formula in an address to
the nation either before she leaves for India early next
month or after her return.
Adding strength to her position is the international support
for the peace process and the world community's pressure
on the LTTE. During meetings with officials of Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Jurists,
the touring Thamilselvan delegation was pushed to the ropes
and forced to defend the LTTE when these groups urged the
LTTE to stop
political killings and child recruitment.
But the LTTE has mastered the art of weathering international
criticism. It has proved it is a 'good boy' because it has
not resumed the war. It has also mastered the art of violating
the ceasefire agreement and still claiming that it is committed
to the truce. In effect, it is holding the Government to
ransom and incrementally obtaining what it wants. The UPFA
Government, which accused the previous UNF regime of conceding
too much to the LTTE, is now forced to follow its predecessor's
policies. The so-called prisoner swap which took place in
Trincomalee last week was a case in point. The two homeguards
who were arrested and detained by the LTTE were released
only after the Government acceded to the LTTE's demands
and released ten Tiger cadres from a Government jail. The
de jure position is that the detainees have been released
on bail - the Government court acted in the case of the
LTTE detainees and the LTTE court in the case of the homeguards.
A flip side of this episode brings forth a silver lining
to the dark cloud, demonstrating that both the Government
and the LTTE can do business together.
But what is complicating the issue is the challenge from
the 'Colonel' Karuna group, which has struck an alliance
with the Eelam National Democratic Liberal Front, a group,
which was once said to have been backed by the Indian intelligence.
The challenge to the LTTE also came from T. Anandasangaree,
the sidelined vice president of the Tamil United Liberation
Front. Anandasanagaree, in an open letter to Prabhakaran,
urged the Tiger leader to stop the fratricidal war and to
be pragmatic with regard to his ISGA proposals.
The Karuna group, which in a recent statement announced
its entry into mainstream politics, called on the Tamil
people to unite to defeat Prabhakaran's dictatorship and
terrorism. It may be the case of one tiger accusing the
other tiger of cannibalism, while both are cannibals. In
any case, the situation in the East, especially in the Batticaloa
and Ampara districts, has been worsening. With neither faction
of the LTTE yet able to hold sway, the tit-for-tat political
killings continue. The LTTE is perturbed that the Karuna
group is emerging as a strong force with substantial public
support in the East. Irked by this reality, the Tiger leadership
has asked the Tamil National Alliance Members of Parliament
in the two districts to intensify their campaign aimed at
drawing the people away from the Karuna faction. The LTTE
knows that its bargaining power will be weakened if it loses
control of the East.
The Northeast:
Islamist Shadow
Bibhu Prasad Routray,
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
The real identity of the terrorist group behind the twin
blasts in Nagaland on October 2, 2004, in which 27 persons
were killed, will probably never be known. Each day unfolds
different and confusing leads indicting different outfits.
To begin with, one of the factions of the National Socialist
Council for Nagaland (NSCN) was suspected. That possibility
was quickly discounted after both condemned the blasts and
one faction, the Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM),
even announced a hefty reward for any information regarding
the killers. After that it was the turn of the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA).
Soon after a non-descript Islamist outfit claimed responsibility
for the attack. Police sources now suggest that even the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
or the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD)
could be involved in the attack. Most recently, the National
Socialist Council for Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K)
pointed to 'Al-Qaeda
footprints' in the attack. Some pointers also indicate possible
involvement of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),
with Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee indicating an ISI
role in the incident, though the ever-cautious Home Minister,
Shivraj Patil, decided to play it safe, declaring, on October
7, "We are neither giving the ISI a clean chit nor accusing
them."
Evidently, the investigation has a long way to go before
its throws up any credible conclusion. What is, however,
clear is that the blasts demonstrated the involvement of
a force commanding superior firepower and tactical knowledge
of explosives, which is why the first suspect was the ULFA,
in spite of the group's somewhat unconvincing denials. The
use of RDX, which the outfit has started using of late,
and the subsequent arrest of two ULFA militants living in
Dimapur, including a bomb expert, does little to quell suspicions.
In its recent attacks, the most gruesome being the series
of explosions in August in various districts of Assam, the
outfit has put the plastic explosives to effective use,
discarding the traditionally crude Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) and the less expensive gelatine sticks.
As things stand today, however, there could be more than
the ULFA's involvement in this episode. On October 15, a
non-descript Islamist outfit, the Al Jehad-e-Islam, claimed
responsibility for the explosions in Dimapur. In an e-mail
sent to a Guwahati-based vernacular newspaper, Janasadharan,
Mohammad Salim Khan, 'North East Chief' of the group, claimed
responsibility for the twin blasts. Nothing was known about
this group before it made its claim. It is not clear, moreover,
why the organisation (if it exists at all) chose a Guwahati
based vernacular paper to claim responsibility.
The Nagaland police chief has already discounted the possibility
of the involvement of this particular group on the grounds
that there is no intelligence on its activities. Such an
assessment, however, runs the danger of ignoring a potentially
significant transformation in the patterns of terrorism
in the region, and the possible escalation of the role of
external powers. As has been repeatedly emphasised, the
ULFA's capitulation to the ISI's diktats has been complete.
The Pakistan's intelligence agency, through its operatives
in Bangladesh and in coordination with Bangladesh's Directorate
General of Field Intelligence (DGFI), now directs most of
the ULFA's activities and has an overwhelming influence
on its postures and functions. According to a statement
by the Director General of Police, Tripura, on October 15,
a meeting of some six or seven militant organisations in
Dhaka preceded the strikes in Assam and Nagaland. Apart
from the ULFA, other Indian insurgent groups based in Tripura,
Manipur and Meghalaya, including the Kamtapur Liberation
Organisation (KLO)
of North Bengal, took part in the meeting, which was held
at the behest of the ISI and other anti-India forces.
ULFA's decision to join the Muttahida Jehad Council (United
Jehad Council), an umbrella Islamic organisation of various
groups engaged in militant operations in Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K), had come to the notice of security agencies in September,
following seizures made from the hideouts of a slain ULFA
militant, Lachit Rabha. Grenades recovered from the militant
killed in an encounter at Jerdoba in East Garo Hill district
in Meghalaya were found to be strikingly similar to those
used during the attack on the Indian Parliament and by the
Pakistan Army, indicating ULFA's growing proximity with
the agency that sponsors terrorism in J&K.
The shadow of this subversive alliance appears to be strengthening
over Nagaland. The State has been complaining of Bangladeshi
migrants flooding areas like Niuland and Dimapur for some
time. About a month ago, the Naga Students Federation (NSF)
launched an 'oust-Bangladeshis' campaign targeting the migrants,
after two migrants had allegedly raped a minor girl. However,
the impact of the presence of such migrants on the overall
security situation in the State is largely neglected in
the public and policy discourse. Very little has been said
or is known about possible linkages between migrants with
a track record of criminal activities and the ISI, the DGFI
and fundamentalist Bangladeshi organisations.
Little is known, moreover, of the vast and isolated areas
the Bangladeshi migrants have now come to occupy in Nagaland,
and the linkages they may have developed with local and
regional militant groups or the support structure they provide
to activities of covert agencies like the ISI. It is now
probable that ISI cells have been created and are lying
low among the estimated 200,000 illegal Bangladeshi migrants
who currently reside in Nagaland, lying low till their masters
across the border ask them to execute specific operations.
Army intelligence sources now suggest, "Bangladeshis trained
in ISI camps are moving deep into Kohima, Peren and Wokha,
besides Dimapur." Their sufficiently long stay in the area
allows them the advantage of disappearing into the burgeoning
migrant population without a trace after such incidents.
Such cells within the larger migrant population can also
play host to militants who cross over to execute terrorist
strikes. As one intelligence official overseeing the investigations
in Dimapur disclosed, "We had positive information about
a group of 20 fundamentalist organisation-trained Bangladeshi
jihadis sneaking into Nagaland through the Karimganj
border. They had an agenda of carrying out large-scale violence
in the Northeast, but nobody probably realised that it would
be such a devastating attack in Dimapur."
The enormous quantities of finances required to execute
an attack of this nature and magnitude also points a finger
to active external involvement. According to preliminary
investigations, between about 4 and 5 kilograms of RDX was
used in the twin explosions, and the cost of the entire
operation would run into millions of rupees. None of the
militant groups in the Northeast, with the possible exception
of the ULFA, possesses such financial capacities, and even
the ULFA would be averse to investing so much into a single
strike unless the costs are underwritten by its supporters
in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Intelligence community.
For strange reasons, however, the dangers of Islamic militancy
do not figure among the priorities of the State Governments
in the region, despite the occasional voicing of misgivings
regarding illegal migration from Bangladesh. In April 2000,
the then Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) Government had tabled
a white paper detailing ISI activities in Assam. However,
since the election of the Congress regime in May 2001, the
issue has receded - or has been pushed - into the background.
The State's Minister of Home Affairs, Rockybul Hussain,
on August 9 this year announced in the State Assembly that
his Government had 'no evidence of ISI activity' in the
State. So great has been the political nonchalance, that
the Chief Minister himself threatened to 'speak to' the
State Police intelligence chief, who had claimed to have
substantial evidence of the ISI's role in funding militant
organisations like the ULFA, after the series of attacks
in August 2004.
Guided by the wisdom of its political masters, the Assam's
State police department has also begun to underplay potential
of Islamist militancy in the State and the role of the ISI-DGFI
combine. A senior intelligence officer boasted in an informal
conversation that he could 'finish Islamic militancy in
the State just by persuasion'. There are, however, strong
indications that such recourse to 'persuasion' has already
floundered. In many of Assam's districts, including Karimganj,
Cachar, Hailakandi, Nagaon and Dhubri, where the migrants
from Bangladesh are in numerical majority, Islamist mobilisation
and activity has seen an upsurge. The growth has followed
a relatively subtle path, not accompanied by the expected
mushrooming of the madrassas. In its latest manifestation,
amidst intelligence inputs that the ISI was planning to
use the MULTA
(Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam) to carry out
subversive activities in the Cachar district of Assam, CRPF
personnel recovered 50 foreign-made detonators from Baghehor
village in Cachar district on September 2, 2004, and arrested
one person in this connection. Reports also suggested that,
as the ULFA lacked an organisational structure in districts
like Cachar, it is effectively using MULTA cadres.
The problem that confronts the region is not just about
occasional 'security lapses' or even a sudden spurt of violence.
Indeed, violence has never ceased to torment the region
over the past decades. The real problem is located in a
curious lack of vision and ability to locate this violence
in a wider strategic perspective that accommodates all its
driving factors - including the intervention of foreign
elements. Unless the Governments in the region and New Delhi
take a hard look at broader designs of destabilisation,
incidents like the one in Dimapur can only recur with increasing
frequency.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
October
18-24, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
10
|
10
|
INDIA
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
6
|
1
|
9
|
16
|
Left-wing
extremism
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
6
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
Total (INDIA)
|
13
|
1
|
12
|
26
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
2
|
0
|
4
|
PAKISTAN
|
12
|
6
|
15
|
33
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
3
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Islamist
extremists
behind
attack
on
British
envoy
in
Sylhet,
claims
Scotland
Yard:
The
British
investigative
agency,
Scotland
Yard,
suspects
the
involvement
of
Islamist
extremist
groups
in
the
May
21,
2004,
grenade
attack
on
the
British
High
Commissioner,
Anwar
Choudhury,
at
Hazrat
Shahjalal
Shrine
in
Sylhet,
in
which
the
envoy
was
injured
and
three
others
were
killed.
In
a
report
submitted
to
the
Bangladesh
Crime
Investigation
Department
on
October
18,
the
Scotland
Yard
said
the
grenade
used
in
the
attack
was
of
the
same
model
as
those
used
in
the
attack
on
the
Opposition
Awami
League
rally
in
Dhaka
on
August
21,
2004.
The
Hindu,
October
20,
2004
INDIA
National
Conference
senior
leadership
escapes
IED
blast
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
National
Conference
(NC)
president,
Omar
Abdullah,
the
former
Jammu
and
Kashmir
Chief
Minister,
Farooq
Abdullah,
and
a
number
of
other
senior
leaders
of
the
party
had
a
narrow
escape
when
an
Improvised
Explosive
Device
(IED),
planted
by
unidentified
terrorists,
exploded
injuring
seven
people
in
Anantnag
town
of
south
Kashmir
on
October
24.
The
NC
top
leadership
was
going
to
attend
the
Rasm-e-Chaharum
of
the
former
Minister,
Safdar
Ali
Beg,
who
had
been
killed
by
unidentified
terrorists
in
Sarnal
locality
of
Anantnag
earlier
this
week.
The
IED,
apparently
planted
in
a
sand
stack
at
the
entrance
of
the
graveyard
at
Sarnal,
exploded
at
1140
hours
(IST),
seconds
after
Omar
Abdullah
alighted
from
his
car
and
was
heading
for
Safdar
Ali
Beg's
tomb.
Daily
Excelsior,
The
Hindu,
October
25,
2004.
Peace
deal
finalised
between
Mizoram
government
and
the
BNLF:
Following
the
eleventh
round
of
peace
talks
held
last
week,
the
Government
of
Mizoram
has
reportedly
finalised
a
peace
deal
with
the
Bru
National
Liberation
Front
(BNLF).
A
senior
government
official
was
quoted
having
said
"The
peace
formula
covers
repatriation
of
the
refugees
as
well
as
proper
rehabilitation
of
both
refugees
and
BNLF
cadres."
A
formal
peace
agreement
to
this
effect
would
be
signed
by
both
the
parties
once
the
Union
Government
sanctions
the
funds
required
to
implement
the
peace
package.
North
East
Tribune,
October
24,
2004.
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
ready
for
unconditional
talks:
The
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
has
reportedly
said
it
is
ready
for
unconditional
talks
with
the
Union
Government.
The
offer
of
talks
has
come
through
Assamese
writer
and
Jnanpith
award
winner
Indira
Goswami,
who
has
offered
to
mediate
between
the
Centre
and
the
terrorist
outfit.
NDTV,
October
24,
2004
Former
National
Conference
minister
Safdar
Ali
Beg
shot
dead
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
Senior
National
Conference
(NC)
leader
and
former
minister,
Safdar
Ali
Beg,
was
shot
dead
by
unidentified
terrorists
at
a
shop,
yards
away
from
his
residence
in
Sarnal
locality
of
Anantnag
town
on
October
21.
Two
terrorists
shot
at
the
politician
minutes
after
he
had
come
out
of
the
local
mosque
after
performing
his
afternoon
prayers.
Beg's
personal
security
officer
was
also
critically
injured
in
the
attack.
Safdar
Beg
had
been
Minister
of
State
for
Revenue
in
Dr.
Farooq
Abdullah's
National
Conference
Government.
Daily
Excelsior,
October
22,
2004
Union
Government
asks
Assam
Chief
Minister
to
hold
talks
with
NDFB:
On
October
21,
the
Union
Government
asked
the
Assam
Government
to
go
ahead
with
its
plans
to
hold
talks
with
the
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB)
and
said
it
would
participate
in
due
course.
The
response
came
after
the
Assam
Chief
Minister,
Tarun
Gogoi,
met
the
Union
Home
Minister,
Shivraj
Patil,
in
New
Delhi
and
informed
him
of
the
NDFB's
offer
of
talks.
The
NDFB
made
a
unilateral
announcement
of
ceasefire
on
October
15.
The
Hindu,
Sentinel
Assam,
October
22,
2004
PAKISTAN
Military
operation
launched
in
South
Waziristan
to
capture
Abdullah
Mahsud:
Hundreds
of
troops
backed
by
helicopter
gunships
launched
an
operation
on
October
20
in
Spinkai
Raghzai
area
in
South
Waziristan
to
capture
Abdullah
Mahsud,
a
former
Guantanamo
Bay
prisoner
and
the
alleged
mastermind
behind
the
kidnapping
of
Chinese
engineers.
Lt.
Gen.
Safdar
Hussain,
the
Peshawar
corps
commander,
stated
that
the
area
under
attack
since
October
20
night
was
Abdullah's
political
and
military
base.
Daily
Times,
October
21,
2004
171
soldiers
killed
in
Wana
operation,
says
Corps
Commander
Lt.
Gen.
Safdar
Hussain:
On
October
19,
Corps
Commander
Peshawar
Lt.
Gen.
Safdar
Hussain
stated
that
the
Pakistan
Army
and
the
Frontier
Corps
have
lost
171
troops
during
the
military
operations
in
South
Waziristan,
while
246
terrorists,
including
more
than
100
foreign
terrorists,
were
also
killed.
At
his
maiden
press
conference,
Lt.
Gen.
Safdar
Hussain
said
579
militants
were
arrested
in
35
military
operations
launched
to-date.
He
ruled
out
the
presence
of
Osama
bin
Laden
or
any
other
senior
Al
Qaeda
figure
in
South
Waziristan.
However
he
felt
that
there
were
credible
reports
about
the
presence
of
the
Islamic
Movement
of
Uzbekistan
leader
Tahir
Yuldash
in
the
area.
www.dawn.com,
Daily
Times,
October
20,
2004
Terrorist
outfits
barred
from
collecting
donations
during
Holy
Month:
The
Federal
Government
has
directed
the
Provincial
Governments
to
take
special
measures
for
curbing
the
collection
of
Zakat,
Fitrana
and
other
kind
of
donations
by
any
proscribed
or
Jihadi
outfit
during
the
Holy
month
of
Ramazan.
The
report
said
that
special
instructions
were
issued
to
the
provinces
not
to
allow
Millat-e-Islamia
Pakistan
(erstwhile
Sipah-e-Sahaba),
Islami
Tehrik
Pakistan
(erstwhile
Tehreek-e-Jaferia),
Khuddamul
Islam
(erstwhile
Jaish-e-Mohammad),
Jamaat-ul-Fuqra
and
others
banned
outfits
to
collect
donations
during
Ramazan
and
on
the
occasion
of
Eid-ul-Fitr.
The
News
,
October
19,
2004
NEPAL
Government
stops
military
operations
against
Maoists
during
festival
period:
The
Nepal
Government
has
responded
to
the
temporary
cease-fire
announcement
made
by
the
Maoist
insurgents
from
October
20
to
28
and
has
decided
not
to
launch
any
offensive
against
them
during
the
period.
The
Government
spokesperson
and
Minister
for
Information
and
Communications,
Mohammed
Mohsin
said,
"There
will
be
no
offensive
from
our
side
but
if
there
is
any
sabotage
against
us
and
if
any
one
tries
to
disrupt
peace,
the
Government
will
be
on
high
alert
(to
maintain
peace)."
Nepal
News,
The
Himalayan
Times,
October
19,
2004
SRI
LANKA
Former
Tamil
National
Alliance
Member
of
Parliament
shot
dead
in
Batticaloa:
Suspected
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
cadres
shot
dead
former
Tamil
National
Alliance
(TNA)
Member
of
Parliament,
Kingsley
Rajanayagam,
in
the
Kalviyankadu
area
in
Batticaloa
town
on
October
19
evening.
His
personal
bodyguard,
police
Constable
Hemantha
Dissanayake,
was
also
injured
in
the
attack.
Rajanayagam
had
earlier
resigned
his
Parliament
seat
from
Batticaloa
reportedly
due
to
LTTE
threats
owing
to
his
loyalty
to
breakaway
LTTE
leader
'Colonel'
Karuna.
Daily
News,
October
20,2004
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