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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 21, December 6, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Hardening Lines
Guest Writer: Keshab Poudel
Managing Editor, Spotlight Weekly Magazine, Kathmandu
As violence escalates across the country, the prospects
for peace talks appear increasingly uncertain. At a time
when the Government's High Level Peace Committee members
are discussing fresh initiatives to invite the Communist
Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M)
for talks, the Maoists have already called a number of general
strikes aimed at disrupting Nepal's main east-west highway.
Immediately after the Dashain festival between October
20 and 28, the Maoists launched a new phase of violence,
indicating that there would be more bloodshed in coming
months.
Amid the
escalation of violence, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba
has set a final deadline for peace talks. In his press meeting
on November 25, Deuba asked the Maoists to come to the negotiation
table by January 13, 2005, or face 'severe action'. "After
I was appointed prime minister, I have already appealed
twice to the Maoist to come for talks," Deuba said, "Now
I am going to formally appeal to them for the third and
final time. If they don't accept, the government will have
to go for elections to give continuity to the democratic
process."
The Maoists, however, rejected his offer and trashed the
talk of polls. "Parliamentary elections would not address
our demands. If at all elections are to take place, it should
be for the constituent assembly," said Krishna Bahadur Mahara,
'spokesman' of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). "There
will be a blood bath in case of elections. We want result-oriented
talks. Past experiences have shown that holding dialogues
with Governments that do not have full authority does not
bear fruit."
Maoist leaders continue to press for their demands, including
elections for a Constituent Assembly, a Round Table political
meeting, and credible international mediators like the United
Nations, as the essential bases for resumption of peace
negotiations.
Conflict experts hold the view that neither of the warring
side is convinced of the urgency of resuming the peace process
just yet. "I don't see any possibility of holding peace
talks in the near future," said Bishnu Raj Upreti, President
of Friends of Peace and a conflict management expert. "Both
sides appear aggressive. The Government is talking about
peace talks only as rhetoric, because they cannot afford
to be seen as opposing talks."
Others are still optimistic about the resumption of peace
talks. "Prime Minister's fixing of date is not being seen
as a deadline." said Padma Ratna Tuladhar, human rights
activist and former mediator in Government-Maoist talks.
"The time has come for the government to decide whether
it accepts the Maoist demand for a constituent assembly
or not. Maoist leaders have not categorically said that
they are not interested in peaceful talks. Since they are
rebels dying for their cause, it is not easy for them to
accept the offer without analyzing it."
Widening political differences between the Deuba Government
and four agitating parties is also disturbing the prospects
of negotiations. Knowing the weakness of the Government,
and its lack of a strong backing from the country's major
political parties, the Maoists have repeatedly rejected
Prime Minister Deuba's calls. Following a ten-day suspension
of hostilities (from both sides) during the Dashain festival
in October, the Government has been repeatedly calling for
peace talks. However, Girija Prasad Koirala, the Nepali
Congress (NC) President and former Prime Minister who is
leading the four agitating parties, contends, "How can this
Government fulfill Maoist demands as it does not have a
legitimate mandate? Only after the reinstatement of the
dissolved House of Representatives will it have legitimate
right to negotiate with the Maoists."
The Government, on the other hand, claims that it is 'broad
based' and consequently able to hold enter the peace process.
"We want to settle the Maoist problem through peace talks
and negotiations. This is a first-of-its-kind All Party
Government, which has the mandate to decide on any political
issue," asserts Deputy Prime Minister Bharat Mohan Adhikary.
"If they agree to come to the negotiation table, we will
guarantee their safety and security."
The Maoists, however, remain adamant. A week ago, Deuba
indicated he could discuss 'any issue', including the constituent
assembly, if the Maoists came to the table. Deuba made his
call in the presence of King Gyanendra at the inaugural
ceremony of the World Buddhist Summit held recently at Lumbini,
400 kilometers west of Kathmandu. Using the occasion, Deuba
added, "I would like to formally request Maoist leaders
to come to the negotiation table from the land of the birthplace
of Lord Buddha. The Government is ready to talk on every
issue and it will guarantee safety and security of Maoist
leaders." Deuba had held the first unsuccessful peace talks
with the Maoists back in 2001.
In response, the Maoists have questioned the credibility
of the Government. Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka
'Prachanda' recently released a statement in response to
the government's call for negotiations, clarifying that
the Maoists were ready for negotiations with the real masters
of authority and not servants - a clear indication that
he is not keen to talk with the King's puppet Government.
After the festival season ended, the Maoists have stepped
up their activities throughout the country. A Royal Nepalese
Army convoy was attacked at Dhading on the Prithivi highway
40 miles west of the capital, killing half-a-dozen Army
personnel. In another significant attack, they targeted
the armed police force at Bardiya, 700 kilometers west of
Kathmandu near the east-west highway. They also blockaded
sections of the east-west highway for a week in far western
region. A succession of sudden attacks has come amid reports
that Maoists were preparing a final assault against the
Government forces.
However, the Maoists have also received several setbacks
in recent weeks. People living in 12 village development
committee areas in the Dullu region - a heavily Maoist affected
villages 600 kilometers west of capital - revolted against
the rebels. The uprising began after the Maoists started
forcibly recruiting full-time cadres. More than 20,000 people
spontaneously organized a rally in the areas denouncing
Maoist atrocities. The United Peoples Front (UPF), another
radical communist outfit, has also been organizing rallies
against Maoist atrocities in the western districts, following
a series of physical assaults against their workers.
Security forces have recently claimed that they have seized
full control over the Maoist strategic centre in the far-west,
in the Pandaun areas of Kailali District, 700 kilometer
west of Kathmandu. Officials stated that ten security force
(SF) personnel were killed in the clash and another 18 injured.
The Divisional Commander Royal Nepalese Army in the far-western
region, Brigadier General Rajendra Bahadur Thapa estimated
that some 300 Maoists could have been killed in the incident.
According to security forces, about 2,000 armed Maoists
were present at the time of the assault.
These setbacks notwithstanding, the Maoists continue to
terrorize large populations and roam freely in the remote
areas of the country, where there is no SF presence. Since
they continue to maintain a formidable presence in rural
areas, the Maoist still seem to be in no mood to resume
the negotiations.
The impact of their activities is reverberating beyond Nepal's
borders. Since any violence and disturbance in Nepal is
certain to have spillover effects in Indian States, Nepalese
and Indian security officials, over the past months, seem
to be increasingly worried about growing contacts between
Nepalese and Indian Maoists. Indian Maoists are said to
share military and organizational experience with their
Nepalese comrades.
Nepal and India share a 1,600 kilometer long porous border
along four Indian States: Utter Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal,
Sikkim and Uttaranchal. Border Security Force (BSF) Inspector
General (North Bengal) S.K. Dutta disclosed recently that
other (non-Marxist) militant groups such as the Kamtapur
Liberation Organisation (KLO)
were trying to set up training camps in Jhapa close to the
India-Nepal border. The BSF claimed that the number of training
camps in Nepal was around 100, with each camp training some
50 Indian militants along with Nepalese Maoist cadres.
The devastations that the conflict has already wrought is
incalculable. Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) - a
human rights NGO - claims that more than 10,000 people have
already lost their lives due to the Maoist conflict in last
nine year. Thousands of others have been injured and billions
of rupees worth of property has been destroyed by the Maoists.
According to the Public Relations Directorate of the Royal
Nepalese Army, around 2,700 Maoists and 163 army personnel
have already been killed since the breakdown of the second
truce on August 27, 2003. In addition, an unconfirmed 500
Maoists are also suspected to have been killed in the same
period. 1,147 Maoists have already surrendered since the
Government introduced an amnesty package. According to Home
Ministry spokesman Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, over 6,500 Maoists
have been killed in encounters with the SFs since the start
of their 'people's war'. 1,500 police personnel lost their
lives during the same period. Likewise, over 200 personnel
of the Armed Police Force have also lost their lives. The
Royal Nepalese Army now has a presence in some 2,000 villages
out of the country's 4,000. The military presence was increased
after the declaration of a state of emergency in 2001.
With no visible indication of an early resumption of the
peace process, secret moves and countermoves persist on
both sides, to secure an advantage in the conflict.
Small wars of the
Northeast
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
Keeping count of the number of militant outfits in India's
Northeast can be a nightmarish exercise. Even though one
can safely dismiss the claims of the 'Al Jehad-e-Islam',
the non-descript outfit that claimed responsibility for
the twin explosions in Nagaland's Dimapur town, on October
2, the fact remains that, in this region of a million mutinies,
forming and sustaining a militant group is 'no big deal'.
The Annual Report of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs
(MHA) for the year, for instance, lists 18 groups, of which
13 were termed 'major insurgent groups', proscribed under
the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The
Report noted further that, in addition to the remaining
five listed groups, 'other militant groups' were 'numerous'.
The South Asia Terrorism Portal, in fact, lists some 115
groups in the region, out of which at
least 32 are categorised as 'active'. Of these, Manipur
has as many as 15 active groups, and Assam has eight.
The easy availability of small arms, the relative instability
that pervades the neighbouring countries and the 'culture
of violence' that appears to dominate the mechanics of dissent-articulation
in the region, make the transition from rag-tag and insignificant
groups to organisations with substantial capacities for
violence relatively easy. The process is helped further
by the attitudes of Governments, both at the Centre and
in the States. Administrations tend to trivialize the threat
of small groups in their formative stages, and concentrate
attention on a handful of large outfits that have reached
'maturity' and are engaged in widespread depredations. This
gives the peripheral groups large spaces for gradual consolidation,
and they eventually manoeuvre themselves into positions
of centrality, or at least acquire sufficient 'negotiating
capabilities' to force the State or Central Government to
grant concessions for their privileged accommodation in
the 'mainstream' political process.
When the Union Government proscribed the Hynniewtrep National
Liberation Council (HNLC)
and the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC)
on November 16, 2000, for instance, the decision was met
with a lukewarm response by Meghalaya's State Government,
and the then Chief Minister E.K. Mawlong said that his "Government
had not made any such recommendations, and the Centre might
have acted on its own." Despite the proscription, the State
Government's action against the group was less than vigorous,
and as days progressed, the HNLC's domination of the capital
city of Shillong was established and the ANVC's diktats
reigned supreme in the Garo Hills.
The cycle has been renewed with a twist after the signing
of the ceasefire agreement between the Government and the
ANVC on July 23, 2004. While this is expected to neutralize
one group, a number of other outfits of all sizes and character
have suddenly mushroomed in Meghalaya. At least six groups,
the Hynniewtrep National Special Red Army (HNSRA), the Hynniewtrep
National Youth Front Tiger Force (HNYFTF), the Retrieval
Indigenous United Front (RIUF), Pnar Liberation Army (PLA),
United Achik National Front (UANF) and the Hajong United
Liberation Army (HULA) are now operating in the vast areas,
which were suddenly left open for exploitation after the
ANVC's deal with the Government.
The decision to start negotiating with a particular militant
organisation has always been a political decision, guided
solely by the groups' capacities for subversion and violence.
While the State is pitted against a number of insurgencies,
its priorities have excluded the smaller groups, which manage
to stay outside its operational objectives as long as they
are engaged in sporadic violence, or calibrate their activities
to remain below the threshold that would provoke punitive
action by the state's enforcement agencies.
The State also appears to operate on the assumption that,
as these smaller groups derive their strength from the larger
outfits, the 'management' or neutralization of the latter
would result in the automatic decimation of the former.
This premise has only limited validity. Peripheral insurgencies
in the Northeast like the United People's Democratic Solidarity
(UPDS)
and Dima Halim Daoga (DHD)
in Assam did initially draw their tools of terror from larger
organisations like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM)
and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).
However, as time passed, they found their own ways of sustaining
themselves. There are now strong reasons to believe that
insurgents of the DHD and the UPDS have independently augmented
operational capacities and lethality, and can sustain themselves
locally without the support of their more powerful patrons.
The Governments' propensity to initiate 'peace processes'
with various militant groups has, far from resolving the
problem, in fact, actually compounded it, resulting in a
fissionary trend where one group that comes to terms with
the State is quickly replaced by one or more of its own
splinters, or by new organisations. Unprincipled agreements,
both on part of the state and the insurgents, only serve
transient vested interests, and leave the insurgent space
vacant for successors. Examples of this process include
the agreements with the UPDS and DHD in Assam and the Bru
National Liberation Front (BNLF)
in Mizoram. The DHD entered into a ceasefire agreement with
the Government on January 1, 2003. Within three months,
the group's 'President', Jewel Garlossa, created a separate
outfit, 'The Black Widows', which indulged in large-scale
extortion activities in the North Cachar Hills District.
Just over a year later, on June 24, 2004, Pranab Nunisa,
the former 'commander-in-chief' of the DHD and the head
of its armed wing, the Dima National Army, took over the
command of a revived DHD by ousting Jewel Garlossa.
Similarly, the UPDS split into pro-talk and anti-talk factions
in May 2002, a few months before the ceasefire agreement
with the Government came into effect on August 1, 2002.
While, the pro-talks faction remained engaged in the negotiation
process, violence in the Karbi Anglong District persisted
at significantly high levels as the rebels of the anti-talk
faction not only targeted their former colleagues, but also
continued with their insurgency. Later, the anti-talk faction,
in a bid to establish its identity, rechristened itself
as the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front
(KLNLF). A survey of incidents suggests that the KLNLF has
been responsible for at least 24 civilian deaths in 2004
in Assam, during which time it has lost seven of its cadres
to counter-insurgency operations.
Twelve rounds of negotiations with the BNLF have failed
to provide a solution to the standoff between the Mizoram
Government and the 35,000 Reang (Bru) refugees living in
the six relief camps of North Tripura District. The prolonged
negotiation process, which started in September 2001 and
still continues, appeared to have exhausted the patience
of some Reang youth, who formed the Bru Liberation Front
of Mizoram (BLFM) in 2002. While the BNLF's negotiations
with the Mizoram Government has inhibited both the BNLF
and the BLFM from committing violent acts within Mizoram,
both have remained active in the contiguous areas of Assam,
such as the Cachar District. On August 31, 2004, three contractors
and an engineer, abducted on August 23 by BNLF cadres from
the Kulicherra hamlet in the Cachar District, were released
following the payment of a ransom amount ranging between
1.4 and 1.8 million Rupees. Extortion and kidnapping for
ransom is a staple of the activities of both groups in these
areas.
The Hmar People's Convention (HPC) split into two in 1995,
the HPC and the Hmar People's Convention - Democracy (HPC-D).
Both remain active in the Hmar dominated areas of Mizoram,
Manipur (Churachandpur) and Assam (Cachar and North Cachar
Hills). Both engage in regular raids on the bordering villages,
not only to take away the agricultural produce of the unprotected
farmers, but also to abduct people who are subsequently
released against ransom. In one of the larger of recent
incidents, on June 12, 2004, HPC-D militants abducted six
persons, including officials, employees and two guards of
a private cement manufacturing company, Umrangsu Cement
Limited (UCL), in the North Cachar Hills district.
Another assortment of insurgent groups that has grown under
the shadow of the state's benign neglect is the Islamist
militants in Manipur. Even though Muslims constitute less
than 9 per cent of the State's population (2001 Census),
there are as many as four Islamist organisations in the
State: the People's United Liberation Front (PULF), the
Islamic National Liberation Front (INLF), the Northeast
Minority People's Front (NEMPF) and the Islamic National
Front (INF). Out of these, only the PULF, which was trained
and armed by the NSCN-IM at its time of its creation, is
considered to be a potentially dangerous outfit. The other
groups, with their objective of establishing an independent
Islamic State to be carved out of Manipur, remain unnoticed.
Though there are no authoritative estimates of the cadre
strengths of these groups, each of them is believed to have
access to sophisticated arms and ammunition. A partial glimpse
of their otherwise unknown linkages with subversive forces
outside India was revealed when 20 Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)-backed activists from Bangladesh were
arrested from the downtown Eastern Star Hotel in Imphal
city on February 21, 2004.
The small groups appear to have followed a carefully structured
policy of keeping their activities localised. Thus the Zomi
Revolutionary Army (ZRA) operates in the Paite dominated
areas of Churachandpur district of Manipur; the Chin Revolutionary
Army (CRA) operates in parts of Manipur, Mizoram and Myanmar;
both groups simply sustain themselves through extortion,
abduction, the drugs trade, and other criminal activities.
Despite their continuous engagement in such crimes, these
groups have generally tended to avoid killings, both of
civilians and of security forces personnel - a policy which
confers at least two distinct benefits: one, the hard-pressed
security forces tend to turn a blind eye to their widespread
extortion regimes as long as there are no significant fatalities;
and second, their localised operations ensures minimal exposure
to major counter-insurgency onslaughts, making exercises
such as cadre recruitment, arsenal collection, extortion
and other 'routine' activities less cumbersome and relatively
risk-free.
The smaller insurgent groups of the Northeast have, moreover,
always functioned, and continue to function, as facilitators
in the area-domination exercises of the larger groups. The
NSCN-IM, in its hey-day, is known to have propped up a number
of such subsidiary operations in almost all the States of
the region. Executed within the broader strategy of 'bleeding
India through a thousand cuts', such 'franchises' significantly
widened the area of conflict, even as they created an expanded
network for effective fund collection for their patron organisations.
These secondary groups shared a significant proportion of
their revenues with the patron groups in return for training
of their cadres, arms and ammunition, networking, access
to safe havens, as well as operational support in times
of distress. Most of the smaller groups also provided safe
houses and transit or semi-permanent camping facilities
to their patrons. Thus UPDS and DHD provided support to
the NSCN-IM in Assam; while ANVC made similar services available
to ULFA and NDFB in Meghalaya. ULFA's absence in the Cachar
District of Assam has been offset by Muslim United Liberation
Tigers of Assam (MULTA)
cadres, who tranship and store explosives in their backyards,
for imminent strikes by ULFA.
It is crucial for the state, as it battles against the prominent
insurgent organisations in the Northeast, to keep a tab
on the peripheral groups. These latter not only facilitate
the ongoing operations of the larger entities, but have
a further potential of growing into full-blown insurgencies
in the corrosive shadow of the state's benign indifference.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
November
29-December 5, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
3
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
2
|
15
|
7
|
24
|
Left
Wing
Extremism
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
Manipur
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Meghalaya
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
12
|
15
|
11
|
38
|
NEPAL
|
4
|
13
|
19
|
36
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Islamist
outfit
threatens
to
kill
Indian
cricketers:
The
Indian
Government
on
December
5
decided
to
send
a
team
of
security
personnel
to
Dhaka
to
check
out
the
security
arrangements
made
for
the
Indian
cricket
team
due
to
begin
a
tour
of
Bangladesh
on
December
9
after
the
Indian
High
Commission
in
Dhaka
received
a
letter
from
the
"Harkat-ul-Jihad"
(Ed:
probably
the
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
Bangladesh)
stating
that
it
would
kill
the
Indian
cricketers
if
they
toured
Bangladesh.
Bangladesh
authorities
have
dismissed
the
threat
as
a
'hoax'.
The
Hindu,
Daily
Star,
December
6,
2004
INDIA
Ten
security
personnel
killed
in
IED
explosion
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
On
December
5,
terrorists
detonated
a
powerful
remote-controlled
Improvised
Explosive
Device
(IED),
hidden
in
an
underground
water
pipe,
when
a
private
vehicle
driven
by
a
civilian
driver
and
carrying
soldiers
of
Ist
Rashtriya
Rifles,
passed
over
it
one
kilometer
short
of
Naiyna
Batpora
village
in
Pulwama
district.
The
powerful
blast
reportedly
hurled
the
car
skyward
and
left
a
10-feet
(3-meter)
wide
crater
in
the
road,
killing
nine
soldiers
including
a
Major,
a
Special
Police
Officer
(SPO)
and
the
civilian
driver.
Later,
a
person
claiming
to
be
a
spokesman
for
the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
(HM)
terrorist
group
claimed
responsibility
for
the
blast
in
a
telephone
call
to
a
local
news
agency.
Daily
Excelsior,
December
6,
2004
Terrorist
infrastructure
still
intact
in
Pakistan,
says
Border
Security
Force
Director
General:
On
November
29,
asserting
that
the
terror
infrastructure
in
Pakistan
was
"intact"
irrespective
of
the
recent
thaw
in
Indo-Pak
ties,
Border
Security
Force
(BSF)
Director
General
Ajai
Raj
Sharma
said
Inter
Services
Intelligence
(ISI)-calibrated
infiltration
attempts
were
still
on
and
the
terrorists
were
being
given
special
training
to
negotiate
the
border
fence.
As
part
of
this
design,
models
of
the
fence
and
Indian
troop
positions
have
been
prepared
and
the
terrorists
are
being
provided
with
plastic
ladders
and
gloves,
wire
cutters
and
chemicals
that
have
been
specially
procured
for
the
purpose.
Sharma
added
that
infiltration
had
decreased
during
the
last
four
months,
mainly
because
of
the
vigil
by
the
Indian
forces,
but
around
300
terrorists
were
always
present
on
"launching
pads"
waiting
for
an
opportunity
to
sneak
in.
The
Hindu,
Daily
Excelsior,
November
30,
2004
Troop
reduction
in
Kashmir
could
be
reversed,
says
Defense
Minister
Pranab
Mukherjee:
Terming
the
Union
Government's
decision
to
reduce
troops
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
(J&K)
as
"substantial",
Defence
Minister
Pranab
Mukherjee
on
November
28
said
the
exercise
was
"experimental"
which
could
be
reversed
if
the
situation
demanded.
"We
made
an
experiment
which
was
very
well
received
by
the
international
community.
But
there
is
no
guarantee
on
the
situation
deteriorating.
If
need
arises
we
can
go
back
on
this,"
Mukherjee
told
reporters
onboard
an
Indian
Air
Force
aircraft.
The
Hindu,
November
29,
2004
PAKISTAN
No
troops
pullout
from
Waziristan,
says
US
State
Department:
The
US
State
Department
spokesman
Richard
Boucher
said
on
November
29
that
Pakistan
had
withdrawn
no
forces
from
Waziristan.
Earlier
on
November
26,
Lt.
Gen.
Safdar
Hussain,
Peshawar
corps
commander,
had
announced
the
removal
of
check
posts
from
all
parts
of
the
Wana
subdivision
of
the
South
Waziristan
tribal
region.
At
his
daily
briefing,
Richard
Boucher
was
asked
if
Pakistan
had
withdrawn
forces
from
Waziristan
and
was
discontinuing
the
hunt
for
Osama
Bin
Laden.
He
replied,
"Our
understanding
of
the
situation
with
regard
to
the
forces
in
Waziristan
is
it's
not
a
change
of
attitude
or
inclination
or
activity
on
the
part
of
the
Pakistanis.
They
-
Pakistani
officials,
both
publicly
and
privately
to
us
-
have
made
clear
that
there
has
been
no
withdrawal
from
Waziristan
and
that
they
remain
fully
committed
to
continuing
the
campaign
against
Al
Qaeda
and
Al
Qaeda
supporters.
We
do
expect
those
efforts
to
continue."
Dawn,
December
1,
2004.
Permanent
solution
of
the
Kashmir
issue
impossible,
says
Former
Prime
Minister
of
PoK:
On
November
28,
former
Prime
Minister
of
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK)
Sardar
Abdul
Qayyum
Khan
stressed
on
an
interim
solution
of
the
Kashmir
issue,
saying
a
permanent
resolution
of
the
problem
was
impossible
and
unlikely
to
be
accepted
by
the
parties
concerned.
"There
is
a
need
to
correct
the
perceptions
that
a
permanent
solution
of
the
Kashmir
issue
will
be
accepted
by
all
the
parties
concerned
to
the
dispute
-
India,
Pakistan
and
people
of
Jammu
and
Kashmir,"
Khan
told
the
visiting
Indian
journalists
at
a
dinner-meeting
in
Muzaffarabad.
Dawn,
The
News,
November
29,
2004
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