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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 42, May 2, 2005

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

 

 

INDIA
NEPAL

Inexplicable Volte Face
Guest Writer: Deb Mukharji
Former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Bangladesh.

For the past week there have been statements, comments and speculation on India's policy towards Nepal - more specifically the present regime - which have not always been illuminating. After his meetings with ('having received in audience', as Kathmandu put it) External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on April 23 at the sidelines of the Bandung Asian-African Summit at Jakarta, King Gyanendra revealed that India had agreed to resume arms supplies to Nepal. The Indian Prime Minister's guarded comment, that the issue would be seen in the 'proper perspective', was in keeping with the presumed confidentiality of his discussion, but became inadequate in view of King Gyanendra's bald declaration. Since then events have moved rapidly.

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A Strategy of Failure -- Suman Pradhan
The More Things Change… -- P.G. Rajamohan

Initial assessments, in the absence of any clear statement of position by India, were that Delhi had agreed to resume arms supplies, or at least unspecified quantities of those in the pipeline, in return for assurances that the regime would permit Nepal to return to the path of democracy. The alleged front-loading of the understanding caused unqualified public dismay in India as it became uncertain whether the King's regime would, indeed, pursue any road map towards democracy. As seen from Kathmandu, in an influential weekly: "As the defence and foreign policy establishments in New Delhi locked horns, there was confusion about who was really directing policy towards Nepal. King Gyanendra came out of this looking like he had run circles around the Indians and exposed their rift. In addition, the Indian about turn on arms blew a sizeable hole in the US-UK-India alliance on Nepal". Following within days of the Jakarta meeting, a former Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, was arrested in the early hours of April 27, with a show of force clearly intended to demonstrate the awesome authority of the state. Also arrested were other senior politicians and activists. It cannot escape notice that those arrested under the orders of the Royal Corruption Control Commission or other devices were actively engaged in trying to bring about a long-overdue understanding among political parties to deal with the current political situation.

These arrests have elicited welcome statements from the Indian Government, providing some measure of clarity. The foreign office spokesman expressed concern at the widespread arrests as "contrary to the assurances conveyed to us", adding that "these developments would further complicate efforts for a reconciliation between political parties and the constitutional monarchy in Nepal". While expressing his reservations about the arrests, the Minister for External Affairs clarified in Parliament that the King had promised to release prisoners, lift censorship, permit telecast of Indian channels and gradually go in for elections. He just needed time.

Approaching the weekend, the Emergency in Nepal stands terminated. There is considerable discussion and comment on the 'lifting' of the Emergency, and perhaps an air of satisfaction that this has been due to pressures exerted by India and others. This is, at best, only partially true because, constitutionally, the Emergency could not go beyond three months unless the Nepali administration chose to be publicly defiant of internal and international opinion and engage in convoluted constitutional procedures, now more awkward in the absence of a Parliament. It was thus 'expiry' rather than 'lifting' of the Emergency, for which undue credit is being both given and taken. Kathmandu's intent is not reflected in what could turn out to be only a cosmetic measure, while harsh and restrictive steps are taken by other means. Only the coming weeks can show if there is any honest desire for dialogue and restoration of the suppressed political processes and freedom of expression. Any celebration of the ending of the Emergency is presently premature.

The firmness of purpose and clarity of vision that India has displayed in recent times in the pursuit of her national goals and interests has the appearance of being less in evidence with regard to Nepal. Dealing with neighbours is always fraught. This becomes vastly more so when there are numerous close associations at many levels of society and layers of almost catechistic fervour and conviction. At a time of grave national crisis in Nepal, it is important that India's understanding and vision remain unclouded.

It is a measure of the closeness and goodwill that has traditionally existed between the Indian Army and the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) that their Chiefs are Honorary Chiefs of the other Army on a reciprocal basis. However, given reports of the aerial bombings which could be killing innocent civilians, as well as other indiscriminate measures in Nepal, one must wonder if the Chief of the Indian Army would currently wish to be so 'honoured'. A recent chief of the RNA was prone to describing Nepal's relations with India and China as being in the ratio of 60:40. One must also wonder how the royal coup of February 1, carried out obviously with the collaboration of the RNA, came as a complete surprise to India. Further, the argument that the absence of material assistance from India would bring other players into critical prominence is one assiduously fostered by Nepal over the years. In the past, Nepal has cultivated China, and even Pakistan, to promote this illusion in India. But the facts of life and geography point in quite a different direction. As the Minister of External Affairs said in Parliament, India has all the leverages in her unique relationship with Nepal; only, these have not been used so far.

Whatever the social and economic causes of the Maobaadi (Maoist) movement in Nepal, there cannot be much disagreement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's observation: "There is no place for violence and extremism of any kind in a democratic, rule-based society". But the emphasis here has to be as much on 'violence and extremism' as on a 'democratic, rule-based society'. And this aspect of India's policy towards the current regime in Nepal seems often to be missing in the debate over arms supplies. Over the past several years, India has remained wholly committed to assisting Nepal in combating the Maobaadi insurgency. The question must arise whether it can continue to do so if the authority of the state itself is taken away from the people of Nepal, and where state sponsored brown-shirt equivalents seem no less adept at terrifying and terrorizing than the Maobaadis. It is understood by all that there is no military solution to the problem and at the end of the tunnel light can only come through negotiations. This can be credible, indeed possible, only through the agency of the representatives of the people. We must heed the muted voice of Nepali civil society; as one commentator expressed it, "Nearly two months after the royal take-over of 1st February, it becomes quite clear that the regime change conducted by King Gyanendra was an attempt to bring back authoritarian rule on the pretext of tackling the Maobaadi rebellion".

It is true that, over the decades, India's relations with Nepal have been considerably influenced by the interaction and the inter-connectivity of feudal and political elites and military connections. At the same time, there is in Nepal, as indeed among our other neighbours, an undercurrent of respect for India and the traditions she is supposed to stand for, a strength India scarcely recognizes. With regard to Nepal, it lies with India to show the way to the international community. If she falters or sends conflicting signals, it would be an encouragement to others to indulge in their little games as well. It would alienate and dishearten all those in Nepal who do not want regression. India's self-interest must lie in promoting the interests of the beleaguered people of Nepal. And these interests cannot even be addressed if the state is taken away from them. Nor should India quite forget the decades when 'anti-Indianism' was actively equated with Nepali nationalism at a time when the democratic process was buried in Nepal.

India cannot afford a Hamlet-like to-be-or-not-to-be attitude. Indeed, the debate should be enlarged beyond the scope of only arms supplies from India. It is important to stay the course. Even in an age when compromises and making deals in international affairs has primacy over principles, it must be clear that India's actions at least serve the country's national interests, which happen, here, to coincide with those of the people of Nepal.

PAKISTAN

War and Peace in Waziristan
Guest Writer: Amir Mir
Senior Assistant Editor, Monthly Herald, Dawn Group of Newspapers, Karachi

The American Commander of the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno stated on April 18 that terrorists were infiltrating into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Islamabad had been asked to begin a fresh operation against remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda presently hiding in the Waziristan region of Pakistan.

  Also Read
The Centre Cannot Hold… -- Amir Mir
Schooling for Terror -- Amir Mir

However, Peshawar Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain was quick to dismiss Barno's claim on April 20, describing it as a highly irresponsible remark: "Lt. Gen. Barno should not have made that statement. It was a figment of his imagination. There is no bloody operation going on until we have the right intelligence", Safdar said, while ruling out joint military operations with the US-led coalition forces, adding, "My strategy is to achieve the end goal without firing a shot".

The Peshawar Corps Commander's statement was followed by Director General Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan's rejoinder, claiming, "no such military operation is being launched, and we decide for ourselves what needs to be done and when and where". Barno made his statement during a meeting of Tripartite Commission of the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan that was held in Islamabad on April 18.

According to Pakistani media reports, the US General claimed during the meeting that the remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda were planning to stage some high visibility attacks over the next six to nine months, which would get them back on the scoreboard after suffering major strategic reversals. "The coming spring would therefore see a fresh operation in North Waziristan to nip their planned offensive in the bud", Lt. Gen. Barno was quoted as saying.

Ten days later, on April 28, Lt. Gen. Barno in an interview to The New York Times (NYT) stated further: "The Americans have been training Pakistanis in night flying and airborne assault tactics to combat foreign and local fighters in the tribal areas of Pakistan near the Afghan border." Significantly, this was the first time the American military acknowledged the training. Barno further admitted that the presence of American troops in Pakistan was regarded as extremely delicate, adding that he had visited the Special Services Group headquarters of the Pakistan Army at Cherat, near Peshawar recently, where he watched a display by the units trained by the Americans in their new Bell 4 helicopters.

However, the NYT report also quoted ISPR Director Maj. Gen. Sultan as saying that there were no American military trainers at Cherat and that Barno had probably been referring to joint military exercises between the two countries. He told the newspaper in a phone interview, "The Pakistan Army has been training with many countries of the world. We have also been conducting joint military training with the US Army many a time earlier. They benefit from each other's experience. They learn from each other. That's what has been happening, and nothing else." Yet, contrary to the claims of the Pakistani Generals, the report stated that the Pakistan Army was gearing up to go into the last redoubts of al-Qaeda and foreign fighters - the tribal areas of North Waziristan near the border with Afghanistan.

In all likelihood, Lt. Gen. Barno's statement was not a 'figment of his imagination'; he just made public something General Safdar and his superiors did not want the Pakistani people to know. The Pakistan Army has been fighting the invisible enemy in Waziristan without much success, often giving an impression of failure. Whatever the truth, statements and counter statements by American and Pakistani Generals clearly indicate that the troubles in Waziristan are far from over. Since the military authorities have banned the entry of newsmen into the region, nobody knows what is actually going on in Waziristan. The only available source of information is the ISPR spokesman, whose claims are always contested by the Opposition and the media in public.

US intelligence sleuths stationed in Pakistan evidently believe that the country continues to be a potential site of militant recruitment and training, and al-Qaeda's 'operational commander' Abu Faraj al-Libbi, presently hiding in Pakistan's tribal belt, continues to hire local recruits to bolster up his terrorist organisation's manpower, which continues to grow in strength despite the capture of over 500 of its operatives from within Pakistan over the past two years. According to intelligence sources, most of the al-Qaeda fugitives on the run from Afghanistan are being sheltered by the heavily armed populace on the Pak-Afghan border, where they are being trained in terror.

US intelligence findings indicate specifically that some of the al-Qaeda training camps have already been reactivated along the southeastern side of the Pak-Afghan border. These reports further suggest that Osama Bin Laden, and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, may also be in the region. Meanwhile, General Pervez Musharraf also confirmed that Osama Bin Laden is not only alive, but is residing in the Pak-Afghan tribal area. "Osama is alive and I am cent percent sure that he is hiding in Pak-Afghan tribal belt", stated during an April 22, 2005, interview with CNN. Similarly, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Special Presidential Envoy and Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, have repeatedly alleged that terrorists continue to operate against Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Lt. Gen. Barno's apprehensions that "the Taliban and al-Qaeda can launch their big offensive from North Waziristan in next nine months", consequently, appears to carry weight and belies repeated claims by Pakistan that the Waziristan area has returned to normalcy after successful Army operations. As a matter of fact, the Peshawar Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Hussain, had declared in January 2005 that the 'back of the terrorists has been broken' and that only a few of them had survived, "roaming around in small batches". The Corps Commander's statement came two years after the Pakistan Army started operations in South Waziristan in January 2003. The Army had to launch the operations after being alerted by the Americans to the presence of Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in the Waziristan region. Lt. Gen. Hussain had further announced in January 2005 that out of the 6,000 foreign terrorists, 600 had already been captured and another 150 killed. He also admitted that, during the operations, 200 Pakistan Army personnel had been killed at the hands of the terrorists.

The heavy losses suffered by the Pakistan Army eventually compelled its High Command to suspend the military campaign and pursue peace pacts with the local tribes. The first such accord was signed at Shakai with Waziri warlord Nek Mohammad in April 2004. Nek Mohammad reneged and was killed by an American guided laser missile. The second agreement was signed at Sararogha in February 2005 with Baitullah Mahsud, the chieftain of the Mahsud tribe. The deal was mediated by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, at a ceremony that ended with shouts of "Death to America". Interestingly, the pact with Baitullah Mahsud did not forbid Abdullah Mahsud, the most wanted fugitive from the Mahsud tribe, from attacking the US forces across the border in Afghanistan. Despite reports of his being killed in a Pakistan Army ambush in February 2005, the fact remains that Abdullah is still alive and remains the foremost militant commander in the Waziristan area.

Interestingly, the Sararogha peace pact did not require that Abdullah surrender the foreign terrorists allegedly taking shelter with him; it simply bound him not to attack the Pakistan Army and not give shelter to foreign terrorists. It did not bind him to lay down arms or not fight across the Durand Line. The man swears allegiance to Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban ameer (chief); he moves around in a bullet-proof car and is followed by some 30 armed guards; he owns two castle-like houses in North and South Waziristan. As Abdullah Mahsud has apparently failed to honour his side of the bargain, the Pakistan Army has once again been asked by the Americans to launch fresh operations in its territory. Earlier, Lt. Gen. Barno had declared, in February 2005, after the signing of the Sararogha agreement with Baitullah Mahsud: "The foreign fighters in the tribal belt had to be killed or captured instead of being given amnesty through so-called peace accords."

Interestingly, however, both the peace accords make no mention of the Pakistan Army's previous condition that the tribal militants must produce foreigners hiding in Waziristan and ensure their registration. The Army's insistence on this condition had led to the collapse of the Shakai agreement signed between the Peshawar Corps Commander and 'Commander' Nek Mohammad's militant group, in April 2004. The militants' failure to produce the foreign militants hiding in the area had triggered a new round of fighting that ended up in Nek's death on June 19, 2004.

The February 2005 peace agreement took an intriguing turn on February 8, 2005, with Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain claiming that tribal militants demanded Rs. 170 million during the course of peace negotiations, and eventually settled for Rs. 50 million to repay debts they owed to al-Qaeda-linked foreign militants. The BBC quoted the Corps Commander as saying that the four former wanted militants had insisted they needed the money to pay back huge sums to al-Qaeda. Haji Sharif and Maulvi Abbas received Rs. 15 million each, while Maulvi Javed and Haji Mohammad Omar were each paid ten million rupees.

The disclosure fuelled speculation that the Government had been paying money to buy-off militants in South Waziristan. However, Haji Omar, on behalf of the Wana militants, denied the Corps Commander's claim and made it clear that he and the four other militants had only been paid Rs. 4.2 million by retired Colonel Inamullah Wazir and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) officials who negotiated with him and the other four militants on behalf of the Army, and this amount was for rebuilding their houses that had been destroyed during the military operations. "Each of us received around Rs. 800,000. My brother Haji Sharif and I got a total of Rs. 1.6 million, while our third brother, Noor Islam, who wasn't part of the peace agreement, didn't receive any money. This amount was far less than the losses we incurred as a result of the damage suffered by our apple orchards and demolition of our family houses plus a hospital in Kalooshah that alone was worth more than Rs. 4 million," he added.

The ongoing 'war on terror' being waged in the Pakistani tribal areas has clearly not been without its share of controversies, charges and counter-charges. This was inevitable given the difficult nature of the military operations and the enigmatic relationship of the partners involved in fighting terror. But the angry public exchange between the Peshawar Corps Commander and the Commander of the US forces in Afghanistan could easily have been avoided with a little discretion. Given the strong public sentiments against the Bush administration in Pakistan, especially in the areas bordering Afghanistan, such controversies are bound to evoke strong public reaction and embarrass the Government. These are, indeed, testing times for the Pakistan Government, the Army, the security apparatus and the people of Pakistan.

INDIA

Mizoram: An Accord for Peace
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

With the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Mizoram Government and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) on April 26, the curtain has dropped on an eight-year-old insurgency. More importantly, the INR 286.5 million financial package that comes along with the MoU, paves the way for the repatriation of nearly 40,000 Bru (also known as Reang) refugees who had made six relief camps in the North Tripura District their homes since their flight from Mizoram in October 1997.

The fear of retribution following the killing of a Mizo forest guard by suspected Bru miscreants had started the massive exodus of Bru tribals, the second largest tribe in the State, from the hamlets of Western Mizoram through the Jampui Hills, and into the neighbouring North Tripura District. Since 1997, they have been settled in six relief camps in the Kanchanpur sub-division. The total number of refugees has been a matter of contention. While the Mizoram Government insisted that only about 10,000 were originally from Mizoram, the number of refugees in the camps had reached about 30,000 by 2001. Reports now suggest that the number could be close to 40,000. For long, the negotiations had foundered against the fact that the Mizoram Government was willing to take back only the 'original inhabitants' of the State, whereas the refugees insisted that all the inhabitants of the relief camps needed to be repatriated.

The BNLF's potential for violence - rooted in the relief camps and linked to the cause of the refugees - has never been sufficient to be a cause for extraordinary concern for Mizoram. Since its inception in October 1996, the high point of BNLF's militant activity remained the June 30, 2000, ambush in which seven members of the anti-terrorist Hunter Force of the Mizoram Police were killed and four others injured along the India-Bangladesh border in Mizoram's Mamit District. Since then, the outfit has been involved in odd acts of abduction for ransom, mostly in the Cachar District of Assam and the bordering areas of Mizoram.

The BNLF appeared to have started big and had even established a camp in the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region of Bangladesh, but the group's attempts at forging ties with other organisations, such as the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), died an early death. Following the signing of a 'Memorandum of Understanding' between these two groups, the relations between the Christian NLFT and the pro-Hindu BNLF quickly soured. On July 9, 2000, nearly 70 cadres of the BNLF were gunned down by NLFT militants in one of the latter's camps in Bangladesh. The BNLF chief Surajmani Reang and his deputy were taken hostage, and it took a while before they found an opportunity to flee the NLFT camp. The BNLF could never recover from this loss.

What dogged the three-and-a-half year old negotiation process, which commenced on September 7, 2001, was the BNLF's insistence on the creation of an autonomous structure of self-governance in areas where the Brus were to return. From an autonomous district council (ADC), the BNLF scaled down its demand to a regional council. However, the Mizoram Government maintained a principled stand, and refused to concede to the militants' demands. The Government's patience appeared to have paid off when, on November 28, 2004, Chief Minister Zoramthanga claimed that the protracted peace talks with the BNLF had reached a "decisive stage", with the group giving up its demand for an autonomous council to administer the Bru-inhabited areas of the State. He further said that the State Government would require at least INR 300 million to properly implement the rehabilitation package promised to the tribal community.

The State Government also linked the repatriation of the refugees to the surrender of arms by BNLF cadres. The first clause of the April 26 MoU achieved that. Even though the MoU does not fix a timeframe, the entire 150-odd BNLF cadres are expected to lay down arms within two months and would then be rehabilitated in the Tuipuibari village of Western Mizoram. According to reports, a sum of Rupees 23 million has been set aside for the rehabilitation of the militants, a fairly generous settlement for a group that has very limited nuisance value.

The success of the negotiation process was directly linked to the growing frustration among Bru refugees. Unlike other militant groups in the Northeast which have, over the years, severed their ties with their original constituencies and the causes that they represented, BNLF's existence and relevance remained intrinsically linked to the issue of repatriation of the Bru refugees and a financial package for them. Of late, the groups had been facing difficulties in keeping its flocks together, with an emerging challenge of the origin of other militant groups such as the Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM) with an analogous agenda. It consequently became necessary to 'seal the deal' even on a partial fulfilment of their demands.

The MoU, initially to be signed in the first week of April, had run into objections from an influential State students' organisation, the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP). The Government had to defer the 13th round of dialogue amidst protests from the MZP, which demanded an apology from the BNLF before the eventual repatriation of refugees. The MZP also suspected the BNLF's role in the kidnapping of a student, which the militant group denied. The issue was, however, set to rest with the public apology tendered by Surajmani Reang on April 26, in which he declared: "On behalf of the BNLF, I would like to ask for forgiveness of the Mizo and Bru people today for any wrongs that may have been perpetrated against them by the BNLF."

The signing of the MoU will be a matter of personal satisfaction for Chief Minister Zoramthanga. His critics at home and outside had questioned his capacity to act as a peace broker with other Northeastern militant groups - Zoramthanga, himself an ex-militant, has been seeking a mediatory role in conflicts in Nagaland, Manipur and Meghalaya - when he had failed to solve the Bru issue in his own home State. Though the new United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government in New Delhi does not attach much significance to his endeavours, given his previous political leanings, Zoramthanga has reason to be relieved at the settlement of this long-standing dispute in his State.

 

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
April 25-May 1, 2005

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

2
0
2
4

INDIA

     Assam

0
0
2
2

     Delhi

0
0
2
2

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

9
4
22
35

     Left-wing
     Extremism

9
0
0
9

     Manipur

8
2
2
12

     Tripura

0
3
0
3

Total (INDIA)

26
9
28
63

NEPAL

9
1
13
23

PAKISTAN

3
1
2
6

SRI LANKA

2
1
1
4
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

Islamic state is the 'long-term plan', says Jamaat-e-Islami chief: The Jamaat-e-Islami chief, Matiur Rahman Nizami, stated on April 29, 2005, that the party has achieved its short-term goal of coming into mainstream politics and asked party cadres to work towards achieving the long-term programme of turning Bangladesh into an Islamic state. Nizami said that the "party's short-term goal is already achieved... Now we have to make progress in achieving the long-term goal to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic state." New Age , April 30, 2005.


INDIA

USA designates the CPI-Maoist and ULFA as terrorist outfits: The United States has listed left-wing extremist (also known as Naxalite) outfit, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) as terrorist outfits. They have been mentioned in the list of Other Selected Terrorist Organisations, released by the US State Department in its 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2004' on April 27, 2005. U.S. Department of State.

Seven persons sentenced to death in American Center attack case: On April 27, 2005, a Special Court in Kolkata, the capital of West Bengal, sentenced to death Aftab Ansari and six others for the terrorist attack on the American Center. Ansari and his six accomplices, convicted by the Court on April 26, were sentenced to death under Section 121 of the Indian Penal Code for waging war against the State. They were also awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 (murder) and given seven years under Section 307 (attempt to murder). The death sentence, however, is subject to confirmation by the West Bengal High Court. They were accused in the January 22, 2002, attack on the American Centre in Kolkata, in which four police personnel were killed and 18 persons were injured. The Hindu, April 28, 2005.

Mizoram Government signs Memorandum of Understanding with the BNLF: On April 26, 2005, the Mizoram Government and Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU is expected to facilitate the repatriation of Bru refugees staying in six relief camps in the neighbouring North Tripura District. According to provisions of the MoU, the BNLF cadres will surrender along with arms and come over-ground. Sentinel Assam, April 27, 2005.


NEPAL

King Gyanendra lifts state of Emergency: A statement released by the Royal Palace Principal Secretariat on April 29, 2005, said that King Gyanendra has lifted the state of Emergency as per Article 115 (11) of the Constitution of 1990. The Emergency, declared on February 1, has been lifted two days before its statutory expiry. Meanwhile, the King said that world leaders have supported the steps he had taken against terrorism. "In the Asian-African summit, we presented our stance against terrorism and the leaders of friendly countries supported us," the King told reporters at the Tribhuvan International Airport. The King in a statement to the nation said that he got an opportunity to exchange his views on the recent steps that he has taken against terrorism in Nepal with the Chinese President Hu Jintao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The Himalayan Times, April 30, 2005.

Former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba arrested in Kathmandu: The Nepali Congress (Democratic) president and former Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, was arrested by security force personnel from his residence in the capital Kathmandu on April 27, 2005. A day earlier, the Royal Commission on Corruption Control (RCCC) had summoned Deuba to appear before them within 24 hours to inquire about a contract regarding the construction of a tunnel of the multi-billion rupee Melamchi Drinking Water Supply Project during his tenure. Deuba, however, refused to appear before the Commission challenging its constitutional and legal status. The RCCC had detained Deuba's colleague and a former minister, Prakash Man Singh, who also refused to appear before it in the same case on April 21. Nepal News, April 28, 2005.



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

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K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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