SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 44, May 16, 2005

INDIA

Summer Mayhem: The Dances of Death and Dialogue in Jammu & Kashmir
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace, Washington

Even as President Pervez Musharraf was finalising his preparations for talking peace with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last month, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) had set about realizing a rather different agenda. Late on the night of April 14, a group of LeT terrorists entered the home of Mohammad Shafi at the village of Bathoi, near Mahore in Jammu province. Shafi had opposed jihadist groups in the area; that evening, he paid for it with his life. Later that night, the terrorists made their way to the nearby home of Qmar-ud-Din, where, this time, they chose to behead their victim. Roshan Din, their third victim of the night, was also ritually decapitated.

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Last week's high-profile bomb attacks in Srinagar have punctured the post-summit euphoria, and some commentators have started to wonder if dialogue and death can coexist. Is violence, as many recent reports suggest, escalating? If so, why? Does this violence have the support of Pakistan's Government, or is it carried out by Islamists opposed to President Musharraf's efforts to make peace with India? And could the ongoing violence derail the peace process? It takes little to notice that the questions now being asked are not just the outcome of the bombings, but also of decades of mistrust: is Pakistan really willing to sever its relationship with jihadi groups, or does it still see their activities as a negotiating tool? In other words, is the peace process for real?

A simple answer exists for at least the first of these questions, whether there has been an escalation in violence: No! March, the last month of this year for which reliable data is so far available, saw 25 civilian fatalities; February, 20; and January, when no-one was speaking of high levels of terrorist violence, 40. 9 security force personnel and 62 terrorists were killed in March; 10 and 44, respectively, died in February, and 23 and 60 in January. These are the lowest figures recorded for these months since the early years of terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). By way of contrast, fatalities were almost twice as high in March 2004, and more than twice as high in February 2004. What seems to be underway now is the routine summer-time escalation of violence - a cycle linked, among other things, to the symbolically-important shift of Government offices to Srinagar, and to the melting of the snow on the mountain passes across the Line of Control (LoC).

Having said this, it is also important to note that the longer-term reduction in violence does not mean that peace has broken out, at least yet, in J&K. It is only by the exceptionally ugly standards set in the State through this decade and a half of horror that two thousand deaths a year can be described, as officials are fond of doing, as a situation approaching normality.

Where, then, do things stand? Violence in Jammu and Kashmir has been in steady decline since 2002, the year when the fallout from the terrorist attack on New Delhi's Parliament House took India and Pakistan to the edge of war. The decline has been dramatic. Where 3,505 incidents of terrorism-related violence were recorded in 2001, last year saw well below 2,000. And where 2001 had witnessed the worst-ever bloodshed in the state - 3,796 fatalities were recorded - that number was down to 2,016 in 2004. Given the early-year trends, and the fact that infiltration by terrorists across the LoC has been extremely low this year, it seems likely that 2005 will see a continuation of the declining trends witnessed since the end of the India-Pakistan 'near-war' of 2002.

Little noticed and even less commented on, though, terrorist killings continue to be an aspect of everyday life in J&K, the peace process notwithstanding. Many of the recent targets have been low-level functionaries, propelled into office by the State's moves towards bringing about village and town-level democracy. Earlier this month, for example, terrorists killed the head of the Pattan Municipal Committee, Mian Muhammad Ramzan. An opposition politician, the Awami National Conference's Muhammad Jabbar Khanday, and Itiqullah Shah, a nephew of Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, were also assassinated on May 3 and May 2, respectively. Most victims, it needs to be underlined, were just ordinary people, going about their everyday business.

In a recent interview, Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayoom Khan, the veteran politician from Pakistan-administered Kashmir, made the pithy assertion that the Kashmir "jihad has become a business now". To use Khan's metaphor, then, the jihad business is slow - but the jihad factory is up and running. At a time of India-Pakistan détente, this begs the question: why? Students of terrorist violence would have little trouble arriving at an answer. As the scholar Stephen Cohen has pointed out in his recent book, The Idea of Pakistan, terrorism serves objectives that transcend its military significance. Its principal purpose is, instead, to transform the ways in which civil society comprehends reality, through "a theatrical performance of increasingly unimaginable horror". As the India-Pakistan dialogue proceeds, jihadi groups are certain to use violence to secure representation at the negotiation table, directly or through proxy. Hard-hit by aggressive counter-terrorist operations, which have decimated their field leadership, jihadi organizations need to demonstrate that they can still wield coercive authority over civil society. With Pakistan having scaled back support to terrorist groups, it is also essential for their leadership to show signs of life to their increasingly-sceptical supporters.

Is there hope? It would appear so. General Musharraf may or may not have arrived in New Delhi with a new heart - looking into people's souls is a business best left to clerics - but his actions have indeed given evidence of something more meaningful: a new pragmatic mind. The United States has placed intense pressure on Pakistan to cut back its support for the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, fearful that another crisis in South Asia might derail its objectives in Afghanistan and elsewhere. More important, Pakistan is confronted with multiple internal challenges, from both Islamists and nationalists like those fighting Pakistani forces in Balochistan. It cannot afford an external crisis as well. Even the prospect of an India-Pakistan war imposes disproportionate costs on Pakistan, and could undo the fragile economic gains General Musharraf's regime has succeeded in securing. Pakistan, then, needs peace for hard-headed reasons, and not for some emotive urge for 'reconciliation' with India.

Pakistan seems unwilling, however, to altogether demobilize its secret army. While cross-border infiltration has dropped sharply, training camps continue to exist as does much other jihadi infrastructure. The April 7 issue of the LeT affiliated magazine Ghazwa carried advertisements for a new network of schools which would give students a modern education, but "also prepare your children for jihad". The same issue also proclaimed the LeT was recruiting cadre from amongst Muslims in India, for a war it believes is not just for the liberation of J&K, but against 'Hindu' India as a whole. Although it is unlikely that General Musharraf has any real love for the Lashkar - Ghazwa, for one, attacked him in no uncertain terms for omitting the ritual credo Bismillah before the text on his official website - he cannot do without groups like it, either. For all its military influence in J&K, Pakistan has little political clout. Its most visible supporter, the Islamist leader Sayyid Ali Shah Geelani, has failed to create a significant mass constituency for his Tehreek-e-Hurriyat. Centrists in the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) have long been disenchanted with Pakistan. As such, Pakistan has little choice other than to seek representation through the jihadis.

It is not, however, a policy without risk: as the December 2001 attack on Parliament House illustrated, any level of terrorism contains within it the risk of calamity-inducing crisis. Is this a reason for India to go slow on, or pull back from, the peace process? Quite the contrary. Pakistan has long seen the jihad in J&K as a cost-free method of securing leverage - or, if nothing else, imposing costs upon its historic rival, India. After the Pokhran II nuclear tests of May 1998, Pakistani strategists came to believe this enterprise could be sustained in perpetuity at little cost. Now, it is starting to become clear, the jihadis have inflicted costs on Pakistan, too: economic, social and institutional. Constructive engagement will bring home the fact that ending violence in J&K isn't a concession to India, or even to the long-suffering people of the J&K: it is, in fact, an issue that concerns Pakistan's own future as a viable, modern nation-state.

INDIA

Maoists: Contagion in Orissa
Nihar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

In October 2004, the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) 'Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee Secretary', Kosa, had declared, "The way we made a base in Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and have been progressing in Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal, we will be able to capture 30-35 percent of India by 2010." It appears that the trajectory of Naxalite (Left Wing extremist) consolidation is going according to plan, and this is clearly evident in Orissa, where Naxalite activities have increased drastically in the southern and northern parts of the State, since the formation of the CPI-Maoist on September 21, 2004. While levels of Maoist violence in the State remain low, the pace of Naxalite consolidation has accelerated rapidly, particularly after the launch of the offensive against the rebels in Andhra Pradesh after the collapse of the peace talks there. With security forces (SF) pressure mounting in Andhra Pradesh, top Maoist leaders have shifted their base to areas in the Dandakaranya region lying in Chhattisgarh and Orissa. Orissa Chief Minister, Navin Patnaik, on April 15, 2005, disclosed in New Delhi that, "the activities of the extremists are spreading" and that 10 of the State's 30 districts were already 'affected'. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual Report 2004 - 2005 confirms this trend:

The Police in Andhra Pradesh have also indicated that Naxalites who surrendered in Warangal, Guntur and Kurnool districts revealed during interrogation that the Naxalite leadership in north Telangana and Nallamala has moved out of the forest areas in Andhra and taken shelter in 'safe zones' in the neighbouring States. The killing of 71 Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh since January 2005 in encounters with the Police, reportedly forced this decision on the Maoist leadership. Indeed, it was suspected that cadres from Andhra Pradesh were involved when suspected Naxalites blew up a police outpost at Seshkhal under Ramanaguda police limits in Rayagada district in Orissa on April 25, 2005. The blast was followed by an exchange of fire between the Naxalites and police personnel. 20 Naxalites had attacked the outpost at night and ransacked the place, after which they blew up the building using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There were, in fact, reports of diversion of some of the Andhra cadres to Orissa even while 'peace talks' were ongoing in the former. The Andhra Maoist leadership had used the opportunities of the interregnum to consolidate operations in several of the neighbouring States, including Orissa.

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At present, the CPI-Maoist has a formidable presence in six districts - Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati, Sundargarh, and Mayurbhanj - and has, more recently, spread to Sambalpur and Deogarh. The Naxalites also appear to be targeting Nabarangpur, Kalahandi, Bolangir, Phulbani, Keonjhar, Nawapada, Bargarh and Jharsuguda for an extension of their operational areas.

Thus, for instance, on February 9, 2005, some 40 suspected CPI-Maoist cadres abducted at least 19 labourers from two camps at Phulkusuma and Podanala villages in the Sambalpur District. The Naxalites also damaged construction machinery worth about INR 10 million. Following the incident, the State Police put five districts - Sambalpur, Jharsuguda, Deogarh, Sundargarh and Anugul - on alert. Again, on February 13, the Police arrested nine armed CPI-Maoist cadres from a forest under the Naktideul police station of Sambalpur District, and recovered some firearms, other weapons, black uniforms and Maoist literature. The district police chief, Susant Kumar Nath, stated that the CPI-Maoist was trying to penetrate into newer areas and was mobilizing unemployed youth to join its cadres. He disclosed, further, that families in the villages were being offered INR 2,000 per month for each young member of the house who joined the Maoists. Five schools in the Northern districts shut down for more than a month after the abduction of a schoolteacher by Naxalites in Naktideul block of Sambalpur district. A total 48 Naxalites - 31 from northern Orissa and 17 from the southern part of the State - have been arrested in Orissa since January 2005.

In Sundargarh district, the Naxalites have formed the Krantikari Kisan Committee (KKC, the Revolutionary Farmers' Committee), and Jungle Surakhya Committee (JSC, Forest Protection Committee) in villages adjacent to Jharkhand, including Bjharbeda, Kaliaposh, Tulasikani, Makaranda, Sanramloi, Badramloi, Jharbeda, Jareikel, and on the Jharkhand side, Thetheitangar, Samda, Reda, and Digha. The primary task of these 'committees' is to mobilize villagers and to recruit unemployed girls and boys. Each KKC consists of 30 members and the JSCs have 20 members. Reports of coercive recruitment to these committees have also been received, and since the presence of Government authorities and police personnel is, at best, nominal in these areas, the people have little choice but to join the Maoist fronts. Seven police stations - Bisra, Kbalanga, Banki, Koida, Gurundia, Tathikata and Tikayatpalli - in Sundargarh District, are affected by Naxalite activities. In the Mayurbhanj District, Naxalite activities have been visible in the Gorumahisani, Jharpokharia, Bangiriposi, Bisoi, and Chirang police station areas.

The military formation of the Maoist cadres is organized on the Local Regular Guerilla Squad (LRG), which consists of 15-armed cadres and, above these, the Special Regular Guerilla Squad (SRG) with 15 to 30 armed cadres. These are organized into 'military platoons' of 30 armed. Three LRG's are presently known to operate in the Sambalpur and Deogarh border areas. The cadres in these areas are known to have used liquid explosives, SLRs, AK 47s, LMGs, grenades and mortars.

Having strengthened their base in the districts along the Orissa-Jharkhand border, the Maoists shifted their attention to the districts adjoining the coastal areas of Orissa. This move became evident following a letter sent by the Naxalites to the Sukinda Police Station in Jajpur district, demanding the immediate eviction of traders from the Damodarpur Chhak (square) on the periphery of the Sukinda mines, and threatening to blow up the trading centres if this demand was not met. Over the past two months Naxalite activities have also been reported in the Kapilas Hills in Dhenkanal District. Meetings - particularly at night - have also been organized by the Maoists for the tribals in the Kantapal, Phuljhar, Balikuma, and Ekul Sekul villages under the Kamakhyanagar Block. The meetings focus on the problems of the tribals in these areas, including access to water, and health services, as well as land disputes and the various restrictions on the collection of forest products. The Naxalites exploit the tribal grievances, and have threatened forest officials against any efforts to prevent tribals from venturing into and gathering produce from the forests.

In Southern Orissa, Naxalite activities have been noticed in the jungles of the Kalahandi District. The Naxalites active in Chhattisgarh use the forest areas of this district which lie close along the State border. In Koraput District the Maoists have given arms training to more than 500 tribal youth in the Kopadang forest on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border. Sources indicate that the training camp is headed by T. Ramesh, the 'commander' of the Jhanjabati Dalam (Squad), which operates in Malkanagiri and Koraput districts. On April 24, the Police arrested two Naxalite sympathisers in Narayanpatna village in the Koraput district, and recovered two guns from their possession. Rayagada district has also witnessed Naxalite violence, and on March 28, 2005, three suspected Maoists gunned down a shopkeeper near the Rayagada Railway Station.

Much of this, however, is lost on the Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, who, on February 12, 2005, complimented the Orissa Chief Minister, Navin Patnaik, for controlling the Naxalite menace 'very effectively': "I am happy to say that the law and order situation of the State is good and the State Government has effectively contained Naxal activities." Ironically, Chief Minister Patnaik has just requested the Centre to add Sambalpur and Deogarh to its list of Naxalite-affected districts.

Violence cannot be the only criterion to judge Naxalite presence and activities. The Maoists do not abruptly launch into 'armed struggle' or violence, but are known for gradual consolidation, including a preliminary study of local social and political conditions and the vulnerabilities of particular populations to extremist mobilisation. Tribal marginalization and grievances in Orissa create enormous opportunities for Maoist recruitment and activity, as is evident in the widespread anger against the State Government's refusal to withdraw proceedings against 156 suspected Naxalites in 34 cases, and to drop another 1,513 minor cases against over 2,000 tribals. Thus, on February 14, 2005, the Rajnaitika Bandi Mukti Committee (RBC, Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners), a newly floated Maoist political front organization, staged a rally in Bhubaneswar protesting against 'continued atrocities' against tribals in the extremist-dominated pockets of the State, and demanded immediate withdrawal of 'trumped up charges'. The displacement of tribals as a result of large scale irrigation and mining projects, with little compensation or effort for rehabilitation, has created a massive pool of resentment, which the Maoists have easily tapped into. According to one estimate, there have been as many as 149 medium and large dam projects executed in Orissa since 1901, and of these 18 are presently under construction. The administration's failure to rehabilitate the affected tribals and rural families has been the main source of discontent and consequent violence in western Orissa. For instance, the Machkund Hydro Project on Duduma River in Koraput district displaced 2,938 families, of whom 1,500 (51 percent) were tribals; 300 (10.21 percent) were scheduled castes; while the remainder were drawn from other castes. Only 600 of these families were rehabilitated (450 tribals and 150 others). Similarly, the affected people are still fighting for their rights in the areas affected by the Hirakud Dam, the Salandi Irrigation Project, the Balimela Dam, the Rengali Dam, the Upper Indravati Hydro Project, and the Upper Kolab and Titilagarh Irrigation Projects.

Regrettably, there is little scope for improvement in the foreseeable future. Civil administration has collapsed in much of rural and tribal Orissa, with endemic absenteeism and the gradual dismantling of health, public distribution system, and the infrastructure for delivery of the entire range of public goods, including security. The Orissa Police is simply too weak to tackle the problem, with very few personnel trained or equipped to handle the Maoists. Most of the police stations do not have vehicles or wireless equipment - and often lack even a telephone connection. There is an acute dearth of both weapons and personnel. Immediately after the attack on the Koraput District Headquarters on February 6, 2004, the then Deputy Inspector General of Police (Southern), Bidhubhushan Mishra, admitted that the Police administration had completely failed in combating organized Naxalite attacks. According to former Director General of Police Nimai Charan Padhi, "Many proposals to enhance security, especially in the Naxalite-prone pockets of the State had been submitted to the Chief Minister. But in vain."

At one point of time, Naxalite activities in Orissa were only regarded as a peripheral 'spillover' from neighbouring Andhra Pradesh; it is now increasingly evident that they have come to stay.