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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 45, May 23, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Tsunami Reconstruction
and the Illusion of Peace
Guest Writer: G H Peiris
Professor Emeritus, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka
Almost five months after the Tsunami, there still remains
much uncertainty about even the most basic aspects of its
impact on Sri Lanka. The statistical debris produced by
various state sector agencies, however, makes it possible
to surmise that the death toll could have been as high as
38,000, and the number of dwellings destroyed is likely
to have exceeded a quarter of a million. Tens of thousands
were orphaned through the loss of their livelihood. Over
an area covering almost 60 per cent of the island's coastal
fringe, economic and social infrastructure was almost totally
wiped out. Emergency relief operations impelled by humanitarian
concerns that avalanched sensationally in the wake of the
disaster, soon assumed a measure of effectiveness and organizational
coherence, averting further crisis in the form of epidemics,
famine or civil unrest. Most of these operations are now
being allowed to peter out. Meanwhile, the focus has shifted
to the more formidable task of reconstruction. The investment
required for this is believed to exceed US$ 3.5 billion.
That the
main donors of aid to Sri Lanka have acknowledged the need
for a massive inflow of assistance without which such an
effort cannot be undertaken was emphatically reiterated
at the 'Sri Lanka Development Forum' - an international
conference held in Kandy, Sri Lanka, on 16-17 May, 2005.
As announced by Sri Lanka's Minister of Finance at its concluding
media briefing, the forum pledged a total of US$ 3 billion
for reconstruction of the country's Tsunami damage. This
amount, according to the minister, exceeded what was expected
by about US$ 1 billion. The ministerial statement also stressed
that about 95 per cent of the overall pledge is offered
in the form of outright grants.
Such promises of assistance for 'reconstruction' are, of
course, not unprecedented. In December 2002, a 'Sri Lanka
Peace Process Support Conference' at Oslo pledged US$ 70
million for rebuilding the war-ravaged areas of the north-east.
In Tokyo, six months later, a much larger international
forum pledged a stunning US$ 4.5 billion, conditional on
the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
resuming the stalled peace process. Since the LTTE continued
its boycott of direct negotiations, the pledge remained
frozen.
This time around the promised aid is targeted at Tsunami-damage
and not war-damage, though, as revealed in Parliament by
a prominent member of the Opposition, as much as 60 per
cent of the pledge is earmarked for the north-east. More
importantly, the conditionality attached by some of the
principal donors to the release of their inputs into the
aid package is, not tangible progress towards peace, but
the establishment of a Government-LTTE 'Joint Mechanism'
empowered with politico-administrative authority over the
proposed reconstruction effort. Indeed, among Sri Lanka's
major benefactors, India alone refrained (even implicitly)
from stipulating such a condition.
The reasoning adduced by those at the forefront of the 'Joint
Mechanism' campaign - these include representatives of Norway
and Japan, who, in turn, appear to have the backing of spokespersons
for the US, some of the EU countries, the World Bank, IMF
and the UNDP - could be summarised as follows. The north-east
coastal areas which bore the brunt of the Tsunami onslaught,
they urge, should be prioritized in the reconstruction efforts.
The north-east, they generalise, is controlled by the LTTE.
Accordingly, for reconstruction to be feasible in these
areas, securing LTTE collaboration is essential. President
Kumaratunga herself has become the most ardent campaigner
for the proposed Joint Mechanism, risking a breach in the
already strained relations between her own party and its
main partner in Government, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP - 'People's Liberation Front'), and thus, the very
survival of her regime. It is possible that she has been
guided by a belief that her electoral gains from a huge
infusion of foreign aid on the ailing economy could more
than adequately compensate for a JVP departure from the
ranks of Government and the possible losses of support resulting
from the anti-Joint Mechanism campaign.
The case for a Joint Mechanism appears at first glance to
be fairly sound. About 70 per cent of the Tsunami death
toll and 62 per cent of the dwellings destroyed were reported
from the coastal areas of the north-east. If these criteria
are considered as indicators of the intensity of damage,
there is a strong case for focusing reconstruction on the
north-east. Secondly, the LTTE does possess the capacity
to "control", if not the entire north-east, at least parts
thereof, if "control" denotes the ability to disrupt civilian
life, kill opponents with impunity, destroy infrastructure,
command obedience from the bureaucracy, and rig elections
(as it did in April 2004). The LTTE, moreover, is uncompromising
in its claim for parity of status with the Government of
Sri Lanka in matters of mutual interest, and in its insistence
that it alone represents the people of the north-east.
Specific information on the composition and powers and functions
of the proposed Joint Mechanism has not been officially
released. Snippets of related news indicate, however, that
it will consist of three tiers - (a) a national committee
nominated by the Government and the LTTE, (b) a regional
authority with its area of control extending over the
Tsunami-affected coastal areas of the north-east, in which
LTTE nominees would constitute the majority, and (c) district
committees comprising political leaders and administrative
personnel. On the basis of reported LTTE responses to earlier
drafts of the mechanism design, there is reason to speculate
that, in the compromises made towards finalizing the design
for acceptance by the LTTE, the 'regional authority' (second
tier) has been vested with decisive control over funds and
other resources, subject perhaps to general direction of
the national committee.
In the context of the prolonged damage and neglect suffered
by the inhabitants of the principal venues of conflict in
the north-east, the case for a major development thrust
in these areas should certainly be strongly endorsed. There
is also the (somewhat more dubious) contention that reconstruction
could promote ethnic reconciliation, lead to a diffusion
of insurrectionary impulses, and thus weaken the LTTE. Yet,
there are many other considerations germane to the issue
of placing under LTTE authority a large amount of aid earmarked
for the north-east. Among these there is, first, the fact
that the area of authority of the proposed Joint Mechanism
is confined to a 2-km coastal strip which, in its totality
(roughly estimated) covers less than 2 per cent of the war-damaged
and economically retarded area in the north-east. Secondly,
there is the problem of matching the flow of aid to actual
reconstruction needs of the different segments of
this coastal belt, given the fact that, over certain stretches,
the population is extremely sparse and genuine reconstruction
prospects are meagre (unless one were to include in such
efforts the establishment of fortifications, bunkers, air
strips, naval bases, arsenals, and strike capability by
air and sea). Thirdly, over certain other parts of the eastern
littoral, including almost the entire Ampara coast - in
which both the need as well as the potential for reconstruction
are immense - the implications of the Tiger presence (or
control?) are marginal from reconstruction perspectives,
and are no different from those pertaining to, say, Colombo.
Surely, a 'bribe' of the proposed scale could hardly be
a safeguard against disruption. Even more persuasive as
an argument against what would tantamount to handing over
Tsunami reconstruction in the north-east to the LTTE is
that well over 50 per cent of the Tsunami victims in this
area are Muslims on whom (as documented in detail) the LTTE
has inflicted untold suffering - mass murder, eviction,
plunder and extortion - throughout the past two decades.
From the viewpoint of formal affairs of Government there
are other incompatibilities between the Joint Mechanism
idea and the logistics of reconstruction. As shown in Map,
the so-called 'Uncleared Areas' - those allowed to remain
under LTTE control by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
signed by the Government and the Tiger leadership in February
2002 - extend into only very small localities within the
2-kilometer maritime strip over which the 'mechanism' is
to function. Even within these, the LTTE hegemony has been
under challenge from its rebel group. Events reported almost
daily since the outbreak of the 'Karuna revolt' in March
2004 make it obvious that the LTTE cadres will not be permitted
to operate outside these 'Uncleared Areas' unless they are
permitted to violate the related prohibition stipulated
by the MOU.
Additionally,
there are the more fundamental considerations of democracy
and rule of law, if not of ethics, which advocates of the
Joint Mechanism and other benefactors of the LTTE appear
to ignore. These include the fact that, since the signing
of the MOU up to the end of April 2005, the LTTE has not
abandoned terrorism, has assassinated 176 unarmed civilians
(mostly Tamils linked to non-Tiger political groups); killed
several hundreds of its former cadres who decamped or joined
Karuna's revolt, persisted with forced conscription of children
in blatant disregard of the international revulsion which
this practice evokes, and has, in fact, continued to engage
in its entire repertoire of mayhem except (significantly)
the assassination of Sinhalese politicians. Yet another
trivialized consideration is that the LTTE leader who, if
the Joint Mechanism becomes operational, will acquire not
only command over financial resources of unprecedented abundance,
but formal inter-government recognition which he has so
desperately pursued as a key ingredient of secessionism,
is a criminal convicted under the due process of the law
in Sri Lanka to 200 years' imprisonment, and whose arrest
on the charge of assassinating former Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi is being sought by the Government of India.
At the recently conducted 'Aid Forum' the address by President
Kumaratunga contained a passing reference to the possibility
that she is a target of assassination. This should probably
be understood, not as a disclosure of an imminent calamity,
but an exhibition of her piety with a poignant reminder
of the attempt on her life six years ago. It is also unlikely
that she herself believes in what she declares as a pious
expectation of the Joint Mechanism serving as a means of
drawing the Tigers into the democratic mainstream. The forum
had the usual 'five-star' splendour which recipients of
largesse in poor countries often find indispensable for
alleviating poverty. Typically, its payments on accommodation
alone were equivalent to the cost of several hundred new
housing units for Tsunami victims. But that is trivial because,
as the Minister of Finance explained, the President's address
prompted the delegates to enhance their aid package by a
billion dollars!
The only event of theatrical significance in the forum proceedings
(theatre, in fact, was what it was mainly about) was a defiant
breach of formality and protocol by Venerable Athureliye
Rathana, a leader of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU/
literally, 'Sinhalese National Heritage') Parliamentary
group. Immediately after the presidential address, the monk
offered the stunned gathering a well-argued plea for the
abandonment of the Joint Mechanism idea. The essence of
what the monk said was: "While we are grateful to you for
your generosity, we are also conscious of the diabolical
contradictions in the stances adopted by some of you towards
the terrorist menace." This, of course, is a widely held
view, not confined to the JHU, JVP and others at the vanguard
of the intensifying opposition to the Joint Mechanism. Meanwhile,
there has been an angry rejection by the Tiger leadership
of the President's claim at the forum that its endorsement
of the Joint Mechanism proposal signifies its acceptance
of Sri Lanka's sovereignty.
In the larger scenario, though there is an ominous escalation
of the LTTE-instigated violence in the east intended, no
doubt, to overawe, destabilise, suppress opposition and
provoke the security forces into retaliatory action, one
cannot discern a likelihood of the LTTE embarking on an
all-out offensive against the Government of Sri Lanka. With
the setbacks of the Tsunami and Karuna revolt, with India
increasingly alert, and in the context of the prevailing
international focus on Sri Lanka, it is not ready for that
just yet. At the same time, there could hardly be any doubt
that the LTTE would persist with its efforts to enhance
its capacity for war and terrorism (this, in the short run,
would include a concerted attempt to grab as large a portion
of the Tsunami aid package as possible), while attempting
to gain respectability in the eyes of the international
community. The so-called peace process was never more than
an illusion.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
May
16-22, 2005
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Civilian
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorist
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Total
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INDIA
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Assam
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0
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1
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0
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1
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Delhi
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1
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0
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0
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1
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
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12
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7
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13
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32
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Left-wing
Extremism
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8
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0
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3
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11
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Manipur
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3
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0
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0
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3
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Total (INDIA)
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24
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8
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16
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48
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NEPAL
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5
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10
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131
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146
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PAKISTAN
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7
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2
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0
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9
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SRI LANKA
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3
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0
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0
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3
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
One person killed and 60 injured
during bomb blasts at cinema halls in Delhi: At least one
person is reported to have died and 60 others sustained injuries
during explosions triggered by crude devices at two cinema halls
in the national capital Delhi on May 22. While the first explosion
occurred at Liberty Cinema on the G.T. Karnal Road around 8.15
pm (IST), the second one went off at Satyam Cinema in Patel
Nagar 20 minutes later. No one has claimed responsibility for
these blasts so far. The
Hindu, May 23, 2005.
NEPAL
43 Maoist insurgents killed
in Udayapur district: The Army has claimed that at least 43
Maoist
insurgents were killed and over 100 injured
during an encounter at Taple in the Udayapur district on May 16,
2005. Eight dead bodies were reportedly recovered from the incident
site and 35 more bodies were found at Gobari area in the same
district. Eight soldiers and one policeman were also killed in
this incident. A day earlier, at least 50 insurgents and two soldiers
were killed during a clash in the Jaraytar area of Sindhuli district.
Kantipur
Online, May 18, 2005; The
Himalayan Times, May 15, 2005.
PAKISTAN
Five civilians
killed during US copter attack in North Waziristan: Five tribesmen
were reportedly killed during an attack by US helicopters in the
Lawara Mandai area of North Waziristan on May 21-night. Another
20 shells fired by the coalition forces from Paktika province
in Afghanistan landed near Lawara Mandai, but did not cause any
damage. Director-General of Inter Services Public Relations, Maj.
Gen. Shaukat Sultan, confirmed that several shells and rockets
fired by the coalition troops had landed near Lawara Mandai. However,
Sultan said "We don't know about the casualties." Unconfirmed
reports said that US helicopters had intruded into Lawara Mandai
up to one kilometer, and two fighter jets flying at a high altitude
also violated Pakistan's airspace. Dawn,
May 23, 2005.
Religious scholars issue edict against suicide attacks: A
group of 58 religious scholars belonging to all schools of thought
issued an edict (fatwa) at Lahore on May 17, 2005, against
suicide attacks. However, they said that the fatwa was
applicable only in Pakistan. The edict was issued by the Ruet
Hilal Committee (Moon sighting committee) Chairman, Mufti Muneebur
Rahman, at a press conference. The edict says that Islam forbids
suicide attacks on Muslims and those committing such acts at places
of worship and public congregations cease to be Muslims. The fatwa,
Mufti Rahman said, would apply only in Pakistan, while people
waging 'freedom movements against alien occupation' like in Palestine
and Kashmir, were exempted from its scope. The decree said that
killing innocent people was haram (forbidden) in Islam
and carried the death penalty, Qisas and compensation. Killing
a fellow Muslim without Islamic and legal reasons was an even
bigger crime, it added. Dawn,
May 18, 2005.
SRI LANKA
Donor representatives
pledge US$ 3 billion for Tsunami reconstruction:
The Sri Lanka Development Forum ended on May 17, 2005, in Kandy
with the international donor community making commitments and
pledges exceeding US $ 3 billion in the form of grants and moratorium
on debts for the Tsunami reconstruction process and other development
programmes initiated by the Government. Finance Minister Dr. Sarath
Amunugama announced that "Ninety five per cent of the assistance
committed at the Forum comprises outright grants. There are no
loans and there is no repayment also… There are absolutely no
conditions for the disbursement of these funds to the Government."
Daily
News, May 18, 2005.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga claims threats to life:
The Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, reportedly told
international donors on May 16, 2005, that she will enter into
an Tsunami aid-sharing deal with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)
despite threats to her life from "within and outside" her Government.
She made these remarks at the opening of a two-day aid meeting
attended by more than 125 participants including the World Bank,
Japan and the United States. "In the decisions we are called upon
to take, the lives of some of us are in extreme danger," Kumaratunga
said. While disclosing that there is a threat "from within", the
President added "Our commitment to this cause will be steadfast
despite various objections from extremists, from various groups."
Indian
Express , May 17, 2005.
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The South
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
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