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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments
& Briefings
Volume 5, No. 3, July 31, 2006
|
Data and assessments
from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence
Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal |
HUJI:
Lengthening Shadow of Terror
Bibhu Prasad
Routray
Research Fellow,
Institute for Conflict Management
Very
little is known about Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh
(HuJI-B)'s
operations in Bangladesh other than the fact that it was
formed in 1992-with ideological guidance and financial support
from Osama bin Laden. It is also known that the outfit maintains
close contact with its counterpart in Pakistan, with the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and with other jehadi
organisations operating from Pakistani territory, including
particularly the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).
HuJI-B maintains about 700 trained cadres in at least six
training camps in the Chittagong Hills, and also trains
many youth from the Rohingya community along with some volunteers
from Thailand. The organisation, however, is not known to
have engaged in too many terrorist operations within Bangladesh,
except for its plots to assassinate Awami League (AL) leader
Sheikh Hasina twice in July 2000 and the quiet role it played
in the August 17, 2005, country-wide blasts largely attributed
to the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).
Nothing links HuJI-B, at an organisational level, with India
except for the fact that Mufti Abdul Hannan, HuJI-B's Operations
Commander, who been trained in Peshawar in Pakistan and
fought in the 'jihad' in Afghanistan and was accidentally
arrested in Dhaka on October 1, 2005, had, spent six years
in the Deoband madrassa (seminary) in Uttar Pradesh (UP).
What is, however, increasingly a worrisome affair is HuJI-B's
increasing involvement in terrorist attacks in Indian urban
centres in recent years. Investigations into these incidents,
which date back to the late 1990s, have revealed the ability
of the ISI to successfully exploit Bangladeshi territory
and its porous and unmanaged borders with India, to penetrate
deep into the Indian heartland and execute hits, which terrorists
operating in Jammu & Kashmir, and earlier, in Punjab, could
not achieve. Investigators also underline the expanding
ability and the growing challenge of collaboration between
militant groups.
Among the first incidents of HuJI-B's operations in India
to come into the limelight was the August 1999 arrest of
four persons at Guwahati. The arrested persons were identified
as Muhammad Faisullah Hussaini of Hyderabad in Pakistan's
Sindh province, Muhammad Javed Wakhar of Karachi, Maulana
Hafiz Wakhar of Kupwara in Kashmir, and Qari Salim Muhammad
of Muzaffarnagar in UP. Interrogations revealed that all
four had arrived in Dhaka from Karachi and had crossed over
into India through the Karimganj border. They left behind
a consignment of explosives in a mosque in Bangladesh for
collection later, to be used for future operations in India.
Intelligence sources used a decoy to bring this consignment
into India. It consisted of 34 kilograms of RDX, nine timer
devices and 30 detonators. They further revealed that the
HuJI-B had recruited and sent a number of young immigrant
Muslims from Assam to Pakistan via Bangladesh. Assam Police
subsequently arrested Muhammad Muslimudeen, the Chief Organiser
of the HuJI. Investigations also led to the finding that
the Naib Amir (Deputy Chief) of HuJI-B in India, Muhammad
Fakruddin, was an immigrant Bengali Muslim from Goalpara
District in Assam and was based in Pakistan.
HuJI-B's direct involvement also came to light in the terrorist
attack on January 22, 2002, at the American Center in Kolkata.
An early morning attack by a group HuJI cadres left five
policemen dead on the spot. Both Kolkata police and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated the incident,
responsibility for which was claimed by two organisations,
HuJI-B and the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF).
In fact, the ARCF was an adjunct of the HUJI, formed and
manned largely by Bangladeshi migrants in India and some
experienced HUJI-B cadres in India who were trained at ISI-
backed training camps in Pakistan. It was formed in the
third week of December 2001 at a village, 15 kilometres
from the Habibpur town, populated by illegal Bangladeshi
migrants in the Malda District of West Bengal, following
a meeting of middle-ranking HuJI-B leaders and Students
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
activists, who chalked out plans to float an affiliate of
the outfit for local operations.
Three years and nine months later, on October 12, 2005,
a suicide bomber walked into the Special Task Force (STF)
office of the Hyderabad Police and detonated a pressure-activated
bomb carried in a backpack. It was the eve of the Hindu
Dussehra festival, and the office was almost empty. Consequently,
just one home guard on duty was killed along with the suicide
bomber and a second policeman was seriously injured. It
was the first time that a suicide bomb attack had been carried
out in the City. Investigations pointed to a joint operation
by cadres of the JeM, HuJI and LeT.
It was a pity that the security establishment in the city
had chosen to ignore the trends available to them, indicating
that Hyderabad was becoming a hotbed and possible target
for the HuJI. Previously, in August 2005, police had arrested
Mohammad Ibrahim, a resident of Hyderabad, who revealed
details of his travels in Bangladesh in 2004, his meetings
with Ghulam Yazdani, the person involved in the Hiren Pandya
murder in Gujarat on March 23, 2003, and his encounters
with several HuJI terrorists from India and Pakistan. Four
months before his arrest, in April 2005, Ibrahim had been
sent to Karachi on a Bangladeshi passport, from where he
was taken to an ISI camp in Balochistan. He and five other
Bangladeshis underwent a 21-day training programme in handling
arms and explosives, and timers and remote controlled devices.
They then returned to Bangladesh and were assigned targets
in India. Evidently, his very significant revelations did
not register adequately within the security establishment
in Hyderabad.
The liquid explosive used in the Hyderabad suicide attack
had been smuggled in by HuJI-B militants from Dhaka, while
other parts, such as insulation wires, a voltmeter, a 9-volt
battery and other articles, which were required to assemble
the bomb, were bought from local markets in Hyderabad. The
entire operation had, in fact, been finalised in the Dhaka
head office of the outfit, where militants from Hyderabad
were involved in providing logistical support to the core
strike team, which included a Pakistan-trained Bangladeshi
fidayeen (suicide cadre) Mohtasin Billa. Subsequently, Nafiq-ul-Bishwas
(who was arrested, thereafter, in November 2005 in Malda),
Sharif, Mohtasin Billa and Abdul Kalim aka Arshad Khan,
carrying a five-litre jerry can containing explosives, crossed
over to India through the West Bengal border and reached
Howrah. They boarded the Hyderabad-bound East Coast Express,
but the journey was discontinued at Kakiwada as the jerry
can started leaking, giving off a pungent smell. The terrorists
then undertook a bus journey from Kakiwada to Vijayawada
and a separate bus trip to Hyderabad. They stayed at the
house of Aslam, Abdul Kalim's brother. The explosive was
assembled by improvised explosive device expert, Mohtasin,
who later executed the suicide attack. Arshad and Sharif
escaped to Bangladesh.
Two and half month's later, on December 27, 2005, three
HuJI-B militants involved in the Hyderabad attack were arrested
by the Special Cell of the Delhi police. Interrogations
confirmed all that Ibrahim had narrated four months earlier.
All of them had been trained in an ISI-run camp in Balochistan.
Among their future targets were the Bangalore Software Park,
the Hyderabad Hi-tech City, certain politicians, railway
stations and busy places in Delhi and other parts of north
India.
HuJI-B is indeed finding local support among Muslim organisations
and outfits to recruit youth in India. Officers investigating
the Hyderabad STF attack came to learn about as many as
500 Hyderabadi Muslim youth who had undergone arms training
at the behest of the HuJI-B in Bangladesh and Balochistan
in Pakistan.
HuJI-B also executed a successful attack in collaboration
with the JeM and SIMI at the Sankatmochan Temple and the
Railway Station at Varanasi on March 7, 2006. On April 5,
2006, the UP Special Task Force (STF) arrested six persons,
including Waliullah, the 32-year old Pesh Imam of a mosque
in Phulpur near Allahabad. All of them had gone to Pakistan
for arms training. Waliullah, a former SIMI cadre, was HuJI-B's
area commander for eastern UP. Three Bangladeshi HuJI-B
cadres, who had planted the bombs, managed to evade arrest
and safely escaped to Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis had in
fact stayed in Phulpur for four days (March 3-6) before
arriving in Varanasi to execute the operation on March 7.
Waliullah's interrogation threw further light on the October
29, 2005, explosions at New Delhi. He revealed that one
of three Bangladeshis, involved in the Varanasi attack was
in fact a part of the team that carried out the blasts in
New Delhi as well, along with cadres from LeT.
Further details of HuJI-B's Indian operations emerged with
the November 2005 arrests of HuJI-B militants, Nafiq-ul-Biswas
and Suhag Khan, at Malda in West Bengal. Suhag Khan disclosed
his real identity as Hililaluddin aka Hilal, a resident
of Bualia in Rajshahi, Bangladesh. Nafiq-ul-Biswas revealed
that he ferried terrorists from Bangladesh to India through
the porous West Bengal border. His job was also to procure
explosives and raise funds by selling narcotics supplied
to him. He said he had ferried Mohtasin, Arshad and Sharif
- all involved in the Hyderabad suicide attack.
The December 28, 2005 attack at the Indian Institute of
Science (IISc), in which a Delhi University mathematics
professor was killed, was also attributed to the HuJI-JeM
combine. Intelligence sources indicate that Shahid, a Hyderabad
local based in Bangladesh and linked to HuJI-B and JeM,
played a key role in the IISc attack.
Despite these and other incidents, security planners appear
to be failing to take adequate note of the emerging threat
from Bangladesh, and to frame strategies for its effective
neutralization. Porous borders with Bangladesh and the increasing
population of illegal migrants in India compound a problem
that is yet to be adequately acknowledged within the realm
of Indian politics. A continuous monitoring of the support
network that the outfit thrives on will be key to HuJI's
neutralisation. In this, there is an urgent need to look
beyond the electoral opportunism that has dominated the
political orientation towards illegal Bangladeshis in India.
War
and Peace in Assam
Wasbir Hussain
Guwahati-based Political Analyst and Associate Fellow,
Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi
On
current evidence, both New Delhi and one of northeastern
India's most potent separatist groups, the United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
appear to be bent on simultaneously pursuing war
and peace. This is certainly somewhat bizarre because,
despite stepping up its promise in recent weeks
to end its 27-year-old insurrection in Assam through
a peaceful dialogue with the Government of India
(GoI), the ULFA continues to engage in activities
such as bomb attacks, extortions and weapons procurement.
Such activities, at a time when the insurgent group
is professedly in a 'peace mode' have resulted in
strong responses by the Security Forces (SFs) engaged
in counter-insurgency operations for the past 16
years, in this State of 26 million people. The fragile
peace process is, consequently, constantly confronted
with the threat of derailment even before it has
actually taken off. This threat is real, because
the ULFA appears to be against entering into a ceasefire
at the present stage, and New Delhi is not actually
pushing for a truce before the start of possible
direct talks with the group.
One recent instance underline the conundrum: On
July 28, 2006, an ULFA militant was killed and two
others wounded in a shootout with Army troopers
belonging to the 19 Kumaon Regiment in the eastern
town of Margherita, 500 kilometres from Guwahati.
According to the police, the Army received a tip-off
that an ULFA squad in the area was on the lookout
to purchase weapons. The militants then fell into
a net cast by the Army, when they met the 'arms
dealers' (actually decoys) at a small hotel in the
town and a deal was clinched. The police say that
the shootout began when the rebels wanted to snatch
the AK-47 that was shown to them. Two 0.9 mm pistols
and INR 300,000 in cash were recovered from the
militants. Details of the incident aside, what is
significant is that the ULFA was still on the lookout
for new weapons even while pressing New Delhi to
meet its conditions for the start of direct peace
talks.
It was on September 7, 2005, that the ULFA surprised
insurgency watchers by announcing the setting of
the People's Consultative Group (PCG), a hand-picked
11-member team comprising journalists, rights activists,
lawyers and academics. The PCG's mandate was to
clear the roadblocks and prepare the grounds for
direct talks between the ULFA and the GoI. But the
graph of violence graph from this point onwards
reflects troubling contradictions. According to
the Assam Police, between September 8, 2005, and
June 2006, ULFA militants triggered off as many
as 52 explosions, with a majority of these attacks
coming in late January and early February, 2006,
and again between June 8 and 12, 2006.
The PCG has held three rounds of talks with the
federal authorities in New Delhi so far, the first
meeting on October 26, 2005, chaired by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh. The second PCG-Government meeting
was held on February 7, 2006, and the last on June
22, 2006. As its representatives engaged in preparatory
talks with top Indian Government leaders, including
Home Minister Shivraj Patil (during the June 22
meeting), the ULFA continued with its armed campaign.
At least 41 civilians have been killed and 135 injured
in ULFA violence between September 8, 2005 and June
2006. During the same period, rebels of the group
attacked the SFs on 15 occasions, killing six and
injuring 41. On their part, the SFs engaged with
ULFA cadres on 20 occasions, in which 21 militants
were killed and 48 arrested.
What is significant is that ULFA violence during
the first six months of 2006 has actually been more
intensive and has taken a much higher toll as compared
to the same period in 2005. While only 11 civilians
were killed between January and August 2005, as
many as 29 civilians have been killed in ULFA violence
in the first six months of 2006. In 2005, the total
number of security force personnel killed by ULFA
stood at six for the entire year, while, between
January and June 2006 alone, six security personnel,
including one Bhutanese soldier, have fallen victim
to ULFA violence. A total of 134 people were injured
in ULFA-related violence in 2005 while the first
six months of 2006 saw 114 persons, including 30
SF personnel, were wounded in bomb raids and other
ULFA-triggered violence across Assam.
In 2005, the ULFA had triggered a series of explosions
in Guwahati, the seat of power in Assam, and had
targetted oil, gas, power and telecom installations.
A string of explosions also rocked the State's eastern
tea-growing districts on August 7, 2005. It continued
with its depredations in 2006, bombing markets,
oil and gas pipelines and other installations. And
the rebel group sent alarm bells ringing in the
State's industry and security establishment by slapping
an INR 5 billion (USD 112 million) extortion demand
on the state-owned Indian oil major, Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation (ONGC) in January 2006, forcing
the authorities to intensify vigil on oil and gas
installations and the company's officials. Further,
less than a fortnight after the last round of PCG-GoI
meetings (on June 22, 2006), the Reserve Bank of
India, the country's central bank, was served an
extortion demand for INR 1.5 million by the ULFA.
That was enough for New Delhi to summon top State
Government officials to review the situation and
ask the ULFA to avoid 'pinpricks' on the road to
peace.
The question that arises is obvious: why is the
ULFA carrying out subversive activities even as
it indicates its willingness to resolve its problem
through negotiations? The answer being provided
by security officials is on predictable lines. They
say that the ULFA is actually buying time by talking
of peace and is engaged in regrouping. That, as
also suggestions that the rebel group makes it a
point to demonstrate its strike potential from time
to time, however, sounds too simplistic. Another
possibility is that there are dissensions within
the ranks, with the hawks within the group, who
may not necessarily form part of the top leadership,
unwilling to join the peace bandwagon, at least
for the time being. The ULFA, of course, denies
that the group is divided over the issue of talks,
and an independent assessment of the thinking within
the outfit is not easy.
One thing is clear: had the ULFA not appointed the
PCG, one would perhaps not be talking of a possible
face-to-face meeting between the rebel group and
the Government of India. What the PCG has achieved
in three rounds of 'exploratory talks' with New
Delhi is to persuade the Government that the ULFA
was, indeed, serious about the restoration of peace
in Assam by working towards an acceptable solution
through a dialogue process. The PCG was also able
to convince the Government of the need to concede
to the ULFA demand of releasing from prison five
important leaders, all members of the group's 15-member
central committee, so they could meet and prepare
the course for the eventual direct talks with New
Delhi.
Where the PCG has failed is in setting the course
for a ceasefire between ULFA and the Government.
Actually, the PCG has chosen not to discuss the
ceasefire issue, as it maintains that it is up to
the ULFA and the Government to sort this out.
In the absence of a truce, however, things like
the July 11, 2006, military offensive in the neighbouring
Meghalaya State's Garo Hills area, which led to
the death of four transiting ULFA top guns, are
bound to happen. Many PCG members , however, do
not think so. They argue that, had there been a
clear message from the Government to the security
agencies asking them to 'go-slow or restrain themselves'
in the fight against the ULFA, the Mendipathar shootout
could have been avoided. But, it is difficult to
understand the PCG's limited mandate. A truce, after
all, is a must, and hostilities will have to be
put on hold from both sides if the peace process
is to be carried forward.
The ceasefire, interestingly, is not among the conditions
and counter-conditions articulated by either side,
nor is its absence apparently threatening to derail
the peace process. Initially, GoI wanted ULFA to
formally name its negotiating team. ULFA responded
by saying it cannot do so unless its five detained
central committee members were freed. New Delhi
then called for a 'firm commitment' from the ULFA
on peace. ULFA responded by asking New Delhi to
give a written assurance that the group's core issue
of sovereignty would figure in the talks. ULFA also
insisted on information on the whereabouts of 14
of its members who had gone 'missing' after the
Bhutanese military assault on the rebels inside
the Kingdom in 2003. There were sufficient indications
to suggest that both sides were still extremely
wary of each other. Despite the escalating violence,
however, New Delhi has made a bid to keep the peace
process on track with Home Secretary V.K. Duggal
reiterating on July 27, 2006, that the Government
was committed to restoring peace in Assam and calling
upon the ULFA to disregard the prevailing confusion
in the larger interest of the peace process.
It is possible that the five detained ULFA leaders-vice
chairman Pradip Gogoi, publicity secretary Mithinga
Daimary, cultural secretary Pranati Deka, adviser
and ideologue Bhimkanta Buragohain, and Ramu Mech,
a senior leader-all members of the group's central
executive committee, the outfit's highest policy-making
body, may be freed soon. But what cannot be predicted
at this stage is the impact of such a move on the
possibility of a quick start to direct talks between
the ULFA and the Government, or on the scale of
hostilities between the two sides.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
July 24-30, 2006
  |
Civilian
|
Security Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
INDIA
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
4
|
3
|
13
|
20
|
|
5
|
2
|
0
|
7
|
Assam
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Manipur
|
3
|
2
|
3
|
8
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
15
|
7
|
19
|
41
|
PAKISTAN
|
4
|
4
|
4
|
12
|
SRI
LANKA |
14
|
11
|
19
|
44
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
INDIA
Pakistani
Major killed in infiltration attempt in Jammu and Kashmir:
A Pakistani Major, identified as Mohammad Hyder Turkey
alias Abu Bilal of 9 Baloch Battalion of the Pakistan Army,
was reportedly killed along with two terrorists, Mohammad
Qasim Khan alias Abu Usman and Mohammad Ayub Khan alias Islam,
both residents of Pakistan's Punjab province, as troops foiled
an infiltration attempt at the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu
and Kashmir on July 28. The defence spokesperson Lt. Col.
V. K. Batra stated that this is possibly the first instance
of a serving Pakistani Army officer being killed in an infiltration
attempt. "The killing of the Officer in the infiltration bid
is clear evidence that the Pakistan Army is actively involved
in pushing militants into the Kashmir Valley from Across the
Line of Control," he added. Meanwhile, the Army establishment
at New Delhi, denied that a Pakistani Major was killed, stating,
"There is no Pakistani Army officer killed.
Daily Excelsior, July 29, 2006.
Five top ULFA leaders may be released, indicate sources:
The Union Government is learnt to be "seriously examining"
the possibility of release of five key leaders of the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
in an attempt to boost the sagging peace process involving
the outlawed militant outfit. If ULFA gives an undertaking
for direct talks with the Centre, the release may come
about in August, highly placed Home Ministry sources indicated.
Meanwhile, ULFA communicated to the Home Ministry that release
of the release of the five leaders - all members of the Central
Committee, ULFA's highest decision-making body , jailed at
Guwahati in Assam - was a precondition for direct talks with
the Government. The communication to the Home Secretary Vinod
Kumar Duggal was sent through noted Assamese writer Indira
Goswami, who is a mediator between the ULFA-nominated People's
Consultative Group and the Government. The
Hindu, July 30, 2006.
Union Government assures of sealing border with Bangladesh
in Assam: The Union Government gave and assurance that
the land border with Bangladesh in the Assam sector would
be totally sealed by December 31, 2006. This was disclosed
by Joint Secretary of the Union Hom e Ministry (Border Management),
B. S. Lele, after a meeting with representatives of the Assam
Government and All Assam Students Union on the implementation
of the Assam Accord. Stating that there was "no dispute" along
the Bangladesh border, Lele said about 3,000 acres of land
were in "adverse possession". Lele said the border in the
Assam sector would be totally sealed after a 43 km stretch
was developed. The
Hindu, July 30, 2006.
Lashkar-e-Toiba may target atomic energy installations,
says National Security Adviser: National Security Adviser
M. K. Narayanan said on July 28 that Indian security and nuclear
installations are under "very serious threat" from Pakistan-based
militant outfit Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
which may be planning a "major assault". In an interview to
CNN-IBN he said, "At the moment, we have at least two or three
serious threats... T here is information that maybe one of
our atomic installations could be the target." He added, further,
"it's (LeT's) operation... is a very serious threat. " He
said that LeT was a far greater threat than Al Qaeda due to
its greater reach, but noted, "LeT is an integral part of
Al Qaeda but sometimes it becomes even bigger because of its
contacts. We have not come across their involvement in the
US but in Europe and Asia, they are very active". Narayanan
said there were inputs from intelligence agencies that LeT
was devoting a great deal of effort to selecting people who
were educated and technology savvy. On speculation that LeT
may have infiltrated the armed forces, he said "there is a
concern...They are not doing small jobs but thinking of bigger
jobs. So, if there is an infiltration whether it is armed
forces or sensitive areas of bureaucracy, it is a matter of
concern". Daily
Excelsior, July 29, 2006.
Arrested Lashkar operative is a key member of LeT unit
in Mumbai, indicates report: Sheikh, arrested along with
his brother Muzammil on July 27 in connection with the July
11 blasts in Mumbai, was a key figure in the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
unit in the city and had undergone training at camps in Pakistan,
said anti-terrorism squad (ATS) chief K.P. Raghuvanshi on
July 28. He reportedly motivated young men to join the LeT
training camps across the border, Raghuvanshi told reporters
here: "Faizal was a motivator and used to arrange expenses
for people enlisted for LeT training." Faizal is also suspected
to have procured money from Pakistan and the Middle East through
hawala channels, and a probe has been initiated to find out
if he had received money in the period immediately prior to
the July 11 attacks. Daily
Excelsior, July 29, 2006.
Bangladesh encroaches land in Assam, says Assam Government:
Assam Government is reported to have accused Bangladesh
of grabbing land in at least two Districts in the State. The
State's Revenue Minister, Bhumidhar Barman, while responding
to a question raised on this issue in the Legislature, stated
that as many as 499.83 acres of land belonging to Assam's
territory had been encroached upon by the neighbouring country,
from where migrants have been infiltrating into the State
for decades. Giving a District-wise break-up of land encroached
upon by Bangladesh, the Minister said 299.04 acres of Pallatal
tea estate and 11.73 acres of Pramodnagar tea estate in Karimganj
district had been lost. In Dhubri district, 189.06 acres under
Mancachar revenue circle had been encroached.
Telegraph July 26, 2006.
NEPAL
Maoists
extend ceasefire for three more months: The Maoists on July
28 unilaterally extended their ceasefire for another three months.
A press statement issued by the Maoist Chairman Prachanda said
that they have decided to extend the ceasefire as per people's
aspiration for peace. "The party has decided to extend the ceasefire
by three more months for effective implementation of the eight
point agreement and to give peaceful outlet to the country" said
the statement.
Nepal News, July 29, 2006.
Maoist
Chairman Prachanda writes letter to UN protesting
against decommissioning of arms: On July
24, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Chairman
Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda wrote to the
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan protesting strongly
against certain clauses in the letter the Government
had sent to the UN. Taking strong exception to
the Government request that the UN monitor and
decommission the arms of the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA),
Prachanda wrote, "the letter was written and sent
unilaterally and secretively without consulting
us in utter violation of the spirit of ongoing
negotiations between the Government of Nepal and
the CPN (Maoist) . Nepal
News , July 25, 2006.
PAKISTAN
Taliban
taking over military check-posts in North Waziristan, indicates
reports: The Taliban
have taken over several military check posts in North Waziristan.
BBC was reported to have said on July 28 that more than
a dozen check posts monitoring the highway between Kajhori
and Miranshah earlier had been abandoned and the Taliban
were patrolling the highway between Mir Ali and Miranshah.
Daily
Times, July 29, 2006.
SRI
LANKA
Finland
and Denmark announce withdrawal from Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission: Finland on July 28 announced that it will
withdraw its observers from the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM), given the security situation on
the ground. Finnish mission desk officer, Marita
Maunola, told international media, "Based on the
fact that the LTTE are not going to guarantee the
monitors' safety after September 1, we will recall
our observers by then." Finland is the first of
three European Union (EU) countries - Denmark, Finland
and Sweden - to announce a pullout from the Swedish-led
SLMM. Hours later, Denmark said it would also pull
out its 12 monitors. As reported earlier, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) called for the removal
of monitors from EU countries after the EU listed
the outfit as a terrorist organization in May, claiming
these monitors can no longer observe the Sri Lankan
cease-fire agreement impartially. Colombo
Page, July 29, 2006.
30 LTTE cadres suspected to be killed in suicide
attack in Batticaloa district: The Sri Lanka
Broadcasting Corporation reported that 30 Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
cadres were killed in a suicide attack launched
by the breakaway faction led by 'Colonel' Karuna
in the Vavunathivu area of Batticaloa District on
July 28. The Karuna faction claimed that it had
launched its first suicide attack against the outfit
at a LTTE roadblock. However, the pro-LTTE websites
reported only the deaths of two Karuna group cadres
who were traveling in a three-wheeler from the Government-controlled
territory. Meanwhile, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) confirmed that a vehicle had blown up on
the outfit's front-line. The SLMM spokesperson,
Robert Nielsson, stated, "The driver was in the
three-wheeler when it blew up," adding that he had
no details of other casualties. Colombo
Page , July 29, 2006.
Eight LTTE cadres killed in air strike in Batticaloa
district: Eight Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)
cadres were killed and twelve others sustained injuries
in an air strike by the Sri Lanka Air Force at the
outfit's Thenaham conference centre in the Karadiyanaru
area of Batticaloa District on July 29. "Eight Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members - two officials
and six cadres - were killed and four wounded when
Sri Lanka Air Force bombed Liberation Tigers' Thenaham
Conference Centre in Karadiyanaru," reported the
pro- LTTE website Tamil Net.The
Hindu, Tamil
Net , July 30, 2006.
The
South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular
data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional
warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic,
political, and social issues, in the South Asian region. SAIR
is a project of the Institute
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South
Asia Terrorism Portal. |
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