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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 5, No. 3, July 31, 2006

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

INDIA
BANGLADESH

ASSESSMENT


 

 



HUJI: Lengthening Shadow of Terror
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

Very little is known about Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B)'s operations in Bangladesh other than the fact that it was formed in 1992-with ideological guidance and financial support from Osama bin Laden. It is also known that the outfit maintains close contact with its counterpart in Pakistan, with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and with other jehadi organisations operating from Pakistani territory, including particularly the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). HuJI-B maintains about 700 trained cadres in at least six training camps in the Chittagong Hills, and also trains many youth from the Rohingya community along with some volunteers from Thailand. The organisation, however, is not known to have engaged in too many terrorist operations within Bangladesh, except for its plots to assassinate Awami League (AL) leader Sheikh Hasina twice in July 2000 and the quiet role it played in the August 17, 2005, country-wide blasts largely attributed to the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).

Nothing links HuJI-B, at an organisational level, with India except for the fact that Mufti Abdul Hannan, HuJI-B's Operations Commander, who been trained in Peshawar in Pakistan and fought in the 'jihad' in Afghanistan and was accidentally arrested in Dhaka on October 1, 2005, had, spent six years in the Deoband madrassa (seminary) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). What is, however, increasingly a worrisome affair is HuJI-B's increasing involvement in terrorist attacks in Indian urban centres in recent years. Investigations into these incidents, which date back to the late 1990s, have revealed the ability of the ISI to successfully exploit Bangladeshi territory and its porous and unmanaged borders with India, to penetrate deep into the Indian heartland and execute hits, which terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir, and earlier, in Punjab, could not achieve. Investigators also underline the expanding ability and the growing challenge of collaboration between militant groups.

Among the first incidents of HuJI-B's operations in India to come into the limelight was the August 1999 arrest of four persons at Guwahati. The arrested persons were identified as Muhammad Faisullah Hussaini of Hyderabad in Pakistan's Sindh province, Muhammad Javed Wakhar of Karachi, Maulana Hafiz Wakhar of Kupwara in Kashmir, and Qari Salim Muhammad of Muzaffarnagar in UP. Interrogations revealed that all four had arrived in Dhaka from Karachi and had crossed over into India through the Karimganj border. They left behind a consignment of explosives in a mosque in Bangladesh for collection later, to be used for future operations in India. Intelligence sources used a decoy to bring this consignment into India. It consisted of 34 kilograms of RDX, nine timer devices and 30 detonators. They further revealed that the HuJI-B had recruited and sent a number of young immigrant Muslims from Assam to Pakistan via Bangladesh. Assam Police subsequently arrested Muhammad Muslimudeen, the Chief Organiser of the HuJI. Investigations also led to the finding that the Naib Amir (Deputy Chief) of HuJI-B in India, Muhammad Fakruddin, was an immigrant Bengali Muslim from Goalpara District in Assam and was based in Pakistan.

HuJI-B's direct involvement also came to light in the terrorist attack on January 22, 2002, at the American Center in Kolkata. An early morning attack by a group HuJI cadres left five policemen dead on the spot. Both Kolkata police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated the incident, responsibility for which was claimed by two organisations, HuJI-B and the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF). In fact, the ARCF was an adjunct of the HUJI, formed and manned largely by Bangladeshi migrants in India and some experienced HUJI-B cadres in India who were trained at ISI- backed training camps in Pakistan. It was formed in the third week of December 2001 at a village, 15 kilometres from the Habibpur town, populated by illegal Bangladeshi migrants in the Malda District of West Bengal, following a meeting of middle-ranking HuJI-B leaders and Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) activists, who chalked out plans to float an affiliate of the outfit for local operations.

Three years and nine months later, on October 12, 2005, a suicide bomber walked into the Special Task Force (STF) office of the Hyderabad Police and detonated a pressure-activated bomb carried in a backpack. It was the eve of the Hindu Dussehra festival, and the office was almost empty. Consequently, just one home guard on duty was killed along with the suicide bomber and a second policeman was seriously injured. It was the first time that a suicide bomb attack had been carried out in the City. Investigations pointed to a joint operation by cadres of the JeM, HuJI and LeT.

It was a pity that the security establishment in the city had chosen to ignore the trends available to them, indicating that Hyderabad was becoming a hotbed and possible target for the HuJI. Previously, in August 2005, police had arrested Mohammad Ibrahim, a resident of Hyderabad, who revealed details of his travels in Bangladesh in 2004, his meetings with Ghulam Yazdani, the person involved in the Hiren Pandya murder in Gujarat on March 23, 2003, and his encounters with several HuJI terrorists from India and Pakistan. Four months before his arrest, in April 2005, Ibrahim had been sent to Karachi on a Bangladeshi passport, from where he was taken to an ISI camp in Balochistan. He and five other Bangladeshis underwent a 21-day training programme in handling arms and explosives, and timers and remote controlled devices. They then returned to Bangladesh and were assigned targets in India. Evidently, his very significant revelations did not register adequately within the security establishment in Hyderabad.

The liquid explosive used in the Hyderabad suicide attack had been smuggled in by HuJI-B militants from Dhaka, while other parts, such as insulation wires, a voltmeter, a 9-volt battery and other articles, which were required to assemble the bomb, were bought from local markets in Hyderabad. The entire operation had, in fact, been finalised in the Dhaka head office of the outfit, where militants from Hyderabad were involved in providing logistical support to the core strike team, which included a Pakistan-trained Bangladeshi fidayeen (suicide cadre) Mohtasin Billa. Subsequently, Nafiq-ul-Bishwas (who was arrested, thereafter, in November 2005 in Malda), Sharif, Mohtasin Billa and Abdul Kalim aka Arshad Khan, carrying a five-litre jerry can containing explosives, crossed over to India through the West Bengal border and reached Howrah. They boarded the Hyderabad-bound East Coast Express, but the journey was discontinued at Kakiwada as the jerry can started leaking, giving off a pungent smell. The terrorists then undertook a bus journey from Kakiwada to Vijayawada and a separate bus trip to Hyderabad. They stayed at the house of Aslam, Abdul Kalim's brother. The explosive was assembled by improvised explosive device expert, Mohtasin, who later executed the suicide attack. Arshad and Sharif escaped to Bangladesh.

Two and half month's later, on December 27, 2005, three HuJI-B militants involved in the Hyderabad attack were arrested by the Special Cell of the Delhi police. Interrogations confirmed all that Ibrahim had narrated four months earlier. All of them had been trained in an ISI-run camp in Balochistan. Among their future targets were the Bangalore Software Park, the Hyderabad Hi-tech City, certain politicians, railway stations and busy places in Delhi and other parts of north India.

HuJI-B is indeed finding local support among Muslim organisations and outfits to recruit youth in India. Officers investigating the Hyderabad STF attack came to learn about as many as 500 Hyderabadi Muslim youth who had undergone arms training at the behest of the HuJI-B in Bangladesh and Balochistan in Pakistan.

HuJI-B also executed a successful attack in collaboration with the JeM and SIMI at the Sankatmochan Temple and the Railway Station at Varanasi on March 7, 2006. On April 5, 2006, the UP Special Task Force (STF) arrested six persons, including Waliullah, the 32-year old Pesh Imam of a mosque in Phulpur near Allahabad. All of them had gone to Pakistan for arms training. Waliullah, a former SIMI cadre, was HuJI-B's area commander for eastern UP. Three Bangladeshi HuJI-B cadres, who had planted the bombs, managed to evade arrest and safely escaped to Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis had in fact stayed in Phulpur for four days (March 3-6) before arriving in Varanasi to execute the operation on March 7.

Waliullah's interrogation threw further light on the October 29, 2005, explosions at New Delhi. He revealed that one of three Bangladeshis, involved in the Varanasi attack was in fact a part of the team that carried out the blasts in New Delhi as well, along with cadres from LeT.

Further details of HuJI-B's Indian operations emerged with the November 2005 arrests of HuJI-B militants, Nafiq-ul-Biswas and Suhag Khan, at Malda in West Bengal. Suhag Khan disclosed his real identity as Hililaluddin aka Hilal, a resident of Bualia in Rajshahi, Bangladesh. Nafiq-ul-Biswas revealed that he ferried terrorists from Bangladesh to India through the porous West Bengal border. His job was also to procure explosives and raise funds by selling narcotics supplied to him. He said he had ferried Mohtasin, Arshad and Sharif - all involved in the Hyderabad suicide attack.

The December 28, 2005 attack at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), in which a Delhi University mathematics professor was killed, was also attributed to the HuJI-JeM combine. Intelligence sources indicate that Shahid, a Hyderabad local based in Bangladesh and linked to HuJI-B and JeM, played a key role in the IISc attack.

Despite these and other incidents, security planners appear to be failing to take adequate note of the emerging threat from Bangladesh, and to frame strategies for its effective neutralization. Porous borders with Bangladesh and the increasing population of illegal migrants in India compound a problem that is yet to be adequately acknowledged within the realm of Indian politics. A continuous monitoring of the support network that the outfit thrives on will be key to HuJI's neutralisation. In this, there is an urgent need to look beyond the electoral opportunism that has dominated the political orientation towards illegal Bangladeshis in India.

INDIA

War and Peace in Assam
Wasbir Hussain
Guwahati-based Political Analyst and Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi

On current evidence, both New Delhi and one of northeastern India's most potent separatist groups, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), appear to be bent on simultaneously pursuing war and peace. This is certainly somewhat bizarre because, despite stepping up its promise in recent weeks to end its 27-year-old insurrection in Assam through a peaceful dialogue with the Government of India (GoI), the ULFA continues to engage in activities such as bomb attacks, extortions and weapons procurement. Such activities, at a time when the insurgent group is professedly in a 'peace mode' have resulted in strong responses by the Security Forces (SFs) engaged in counter-insurgency operations for the past 16 years, in this State of 26 million people. The fragile peace process is, consequently, constantly confronted with the threat of derailment even before it has actually taken off. This threat is real, because the ULFA appears to be against entering into a ceasefire at the present stage, and New Delhi is not actually pushing for a truce before the start of possible direct talks with the group.

One recent instance underline the conundrum: On July 28, 2006, an ULFA militant was killed and two others wounded in a shootout with Army troopers belonging to the 19 Kumaon Regiment in the eastern town of Margherita, 500 kilometres from Guwahati. According to the police, the Army received a tip-off that an ULFA squad in the area was on the lookout to purchase weapons. The militants then fell into a net cast by the Army, when they met the 'arms dealers' (actually decoys) at a small hotel in the town and a deal was clinched. The police say that the shootout began when the rebels wanted to snatch the AK-47 that was shown to them. Two 0.9 mm pistols and INR 300,000 in cash were recovered from the militants. Details of the incident aside, what is significant is that the ULFA was still on the lookout for new weapons even while pressing New Delhi to meet its conditions for the start of direct peace talks.

It was on September 7, 2005, that the ULFA surprised insurgency watchers by announcing the setting of the People's Consultative Group (PCG), a hand-picked 11-member team comprising journalists, rights activists, lawyers and academics. The PCG's mandate was to clear the roadblocks and prepare the grounds for direct talks between the ULFA and the GoI. But the graph of violence graph from this point onwards reflects troubling contradictions. According to the Assam Police, between September 8, 2005, and June 2006, ULFA militants triggered off as many as 52 explosions, with a majority of these attacks coming in late January and early February, 2006, and again between June 8 and 12, 2006.

The PCG has held three rounds of talks with the federal authorities in New Delhi so far, the first meeting on October 26, 2005, chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The second PCG-Government meeting was held on February 7, 2006, and the last on June 22, 2006. As its representatives engaged in preparatory talks with top Indian Government leaders, including Home Minister Shivraj Patil (during the June 22 meeting), the ULFA continued with its armed campaign. At least 41 civilians have been killed and 135 injured in ULFA violence between September 8, 2005 and June 2006. During the same period, rebels of the group attacked the SFs on 15 occasions, killing six and injuring 41. On their part, the SFs engaged with ULFA cadres on 20 occasions, in which 21 militants were killed and 48 arrested.

What is significant is that ULFA violence during the first six months of 2006 has actually been more intensive and has taken a much higher toll as compared to the same period in 2005. While only 11 civilians were killed between January and August 2005, as many as 29 civilians have been killed in ULFA violence in the first six months of 2006. In 2005, the total number of security force personnel killed by ULFA stood at six for the entire year, while, between January and June 2006 alone, six security personnel, including one Bhutanese soldier, have fallen victim to ULFA violence. A total of 134 people were injured in ULFA-related violence in 2005 while the first six months of 2006 saw 114 persons, including 30 SF personnel, were wounded in bomb raids and other ULFA-triggered violence across Assam.

In 2005, the ULFA had triggered a series of explosions in Guwahati, the seat of power in Assam, and had targetted oil, gas, power and telecom installations. A string of explosions also rocked the State's eastern tea-growing districts on August 7, 2005. It continued with its depredations in 2006, bombing markets, oil and gas pipelines and other installations. And the rebel group sent alarm bells ringing in the State's industry and security establishment by slapping an INR 5 billion (USD 112 million) extortion demand on the state-owned Indian oil major, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) in January 2006, forcing the authorities to intensify vigil on oil and gas installations and the company's officials. Further, less than a fortnight after the last round of PCG-GoI meetings (on June 22, 2006), the Reserve Bank of India, the country's central bank, was served an extortion demand for INR 1.5 million by the ULFA. That was enough for New Delhi to summon top State Government officials to review the situation and ask the ULFA to avoid 'pinpricks' on the road to peace.

The question that arises is obvious: why is the ULFA carrying out subversive activities even as it indicates its willingness to resolve its problem through negotiations? The answer being provided by security officials is on predictable lines. They say that the ULFA is actually buying time by talking of peace and is engaged in regrouping. That, as also suggestions that the rebel group makes it a point to demonstrate its strike potential from time to time, however, sounds too simplistic. Another possibility is that there are dissensions within the ranks, with the hawks within the group, who may not necessarily form part of the top leadership, unwilling to join the peace bandwagon, at least for the time being. The ULFA, of course, denies that the group is divided over the issue of talks, and an independent assessment of the thinking within the outfit is not easy.

One thing is clear: had the ULFA not appointed the PCG, one would perhaps not be talking of a possible face-to-face meeting between the rebel group and the Government of India. What the PCG has achieved in three rounds of 'exploratory talks' with New Delhi is to persuade the Government that the ULFA was, indeed, serious about the restoration of peace in Assam by working towards an acceptable solution through a dialogue process. The PCG was also able to convince the Government of the need to concede to the ULFA demand of releasing from prison five important leaders, all members of the group's 15-member central committee, so they could meet and prepare the course for the eventual direct talks with New Delhi.

Where the PCG has failed is in setting the course for a ceasefire between ULFA and the Government. Actually, the PCG has chosen not to discuss the ceasefire issue, as it maintains that it is up to the ULFA and the Government to sort this out.

In the absence of a truce, however, things like the July 11, 2006, military offensive in the neighbouring Meghalaya State's Garo Hills area, which led to the death of four transiting ULFA top guns, are bound to happen. Many PCG members , however, do not think so. They argue that, had there been a clear message from the Government to the security agencies asking them to 'go-slow or restrain themselves' in the fight against the ULFA, the Mendipathar shootout could have been avoided. But, it is difficult to understand the PCG's limited mandate. A truce, after all, is a must, and hostilities will have to be put on hold from both sides if the peace process is to be carried forward.

The ceasefire, interestingly, is not among the conditions and counter-conditions articulated by either side, nor is its absence apparently threatening to derail the peace process. Initially, GoI wanted ULFA to formally name its negotiating team. ULFA responded by saying it cannot do so unless its five detained central committee members were freed. New Delhi then called for a 'firm commitment' from the ULFA on peace. ULFA responded by asking New Delhi to give a written assurance that the group's core issue of sovereignty would figure in the talks. ULFA also insisted on information on the whereabouts of 14 of its members who had gone 'missing' after the Bhutanese military assault on the rebels inside the Kingdom in 2003. There were sufficient indications to suggest that both sides were still extremely wary of each other. Despite the escalating violence, however, New Delhi has made a bid to keep the peace process on track with Home Secretary V.K. Duggal reiterating on July 27, 2006, that the Government was committed to restoring peace in Assam and calling upon the ULFA to disregard the prevailing confusion in the larger interest of the peace process.

It is possible that the five detained ULFA leaders-vice chairman Pradip Gogoi, publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary, cultural secretary Pranati Deka, adviser and ideologue Bhimkanta Buragohain, and Ramu Mech, a senior leader-all members of the group's central executive committee, the outfit's highest policy-making body, may be freed soon. But what cannot be predicted at this stage is the impact of such a move on the possibility of a quick start to direct talks between the ULFA and the Government, or on the scale of hostilities between the two sides.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
July 24-30, 2006

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

0
0
3
3

INDIA

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

4
3
13
20

     Left-wing Extremism

5
2
0
7
Assam
3
0
0
3
Manipur
3
2
3
8
Nagaland
0
0
1
1
Tripura
0
0
2
2

Total (INDIA)

15
7
19
41

PAKISTAN

4
4
4
12
SRI LANKA
14
11
19
44
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.



INDIA

Pakistani Major killed in infiltration attempt in Jammu and Kashmir: A Pakistani Major, identified as Mohammad Hyder Turkey alias Abu Bilal of 9 Baloch Battalion of the Pakistan Army, was reportedly killed along with two terrorists, Mohammad Qasim Khan alias Abu Usman and Mohammad Ayub Khan alias Islam, both residents of Pakistan's Punjab province, as troops foiled an infiltration attempt at the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir on July 28. The defence spokesperson Lt. Col. V. K. Batra stated that this is possibly the first instance of a serving Pakistani Army officer being killed in an infiltration attempt. "The killing of the Officer in the infiltration bid is clear evidence that the Pakistan Army is actively involved in pushing militants into the Kashmir Valley from Across the Line of Control," he added. Meanwhile, the Army establishment at New Delhi, denied that a Pakistani Major was killed, stating, "There is no Pakistani Army officer killed. Daily Excelsior, July 29, 2006.

Five top ULFA leaders may be released, indicate sources: The Union Government is learnt to be "seriously examining" the possibility of release of five key leaders of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in an attempt to boost the sagging peace process involving the outlawed militant outfit. If ULFA gives an undertaking for direct talks with the Centre, the release may come about in August, highly placed Home Ministry sources indicated.

Meanwhile, ULFA communicated to the Home Ministry that release of the release of the five leaders - all members of the Central Committee, ULFA's highest decision-making body , jailed at Guwahati in Assam - was a precondition for direct talks with the Government. The communication to the Home Secretary Vinod Kumar Duggal was sent through noted Assamese writer Indira Goswami, who is a mediator between the ULFA-nominated People's Consultative Group and the Government. The Hindu, July 30, 2006.

Union Government assures of sealing border with Bangladesh in Assam: The Union Government gave and assurance that the land border with Bangladesh in the Assam sector would be totally sealed by December 31, 2006. This was disclosed by Joint Secretary of the Union Hom e Ministry (Border Management), B. S. Lele, after a meeting with representatives of the Assam Government and All Assam Students Union on the implementation of the Assam Accord. Stating that there was "no dispute" along the Bangladesh border, Lele said about 3,000 acres of land were in "adverse possession". Lele said the border in the Assam sector would be totally sealed after a 43 km stretch was developed. The Hindu, July 30, 2006.

Lashkar-e-Toiba may target atomic energy installations, says National Security Adviser: National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said on July 28 that Indian security and nuclear installations are under "very serious threat" from Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which may be planning a "major assault". In an interview to CNN-IBN he said, "At the moment, we have at least two or three serious threats... T here is information that maybe one of our atomic installations could be the target." He added, further, "it's (LeT's) operation... is a very serious threat. " He said that LeT was a far greater threat than Al Qaeda due to its greater reach, but noted, "LeT is an integral part of Al Qaeda but sometimes it becomes even bigger because of its contacts. We have not come across their involvement in the US but in Europe and Asia, they are very active". Narayanan said there were inputs from intelligence agencies that LeT was devoting a great deal of effort to selecting people who were educated and technology savvy. On speculation that LeT may have infiltrated the armed forces, he said "there is a concern...They are not doing small jobs but thinking of bigger jobs. So, if there is an infiltration whether it is armed forces or sensitive areas of bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern". Daily Excelsior, July 29, 2006.

Arrested Lashkar operative is a key member of LeT unit in Mumbai, indicates report: Sheikh, arrested along with his brother Muzammil on July 27 in connection with the July 11 blasts in Mumbai, was a key figure in the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) unit in the city and had undergone training at camps in Pakistan, said anti-terrorism squad (ATS) chief K.P. Raghuvanshi on July 28. He reportedly motivated young men to join the LeT training camps across the border, Raghuvanshi told reporters here: "Faizal was a motivator and used to arrange expenses for people enlisted for LeT training." Faizal is also suspected to have procured money from Pakistan and the Middle East through hawala channels, and a probe has been initiated to find out if he had received money in the period immediately prior to the July 11 attacks. Daily Excelsior, July 29, 2006.

Bangladesh encroaches land in Assam, says Assam Government: Assam Government is reported to have accused Bangladesh of grabbing land in at least two Districts in the State. The State's Revenue Minister, Bhumidhar Barman, while responding to a question raised on this issue in the Legislature, stated that as many as 499.83 acres of land belonging to Assam's territory had been encroached upon by the neighbouring country, from where migrants have been infiltrating into the State for decades. Giving a District-wise break-up of land encroached upon by Bangladesh, the Minister said 299.04 acres of Pallatal tea estate and 11.73 acres of Pramodnagar tea estate in Karimganj district had been lost. In Dhubri district, 189.06 acres under Mancachar revenue circle had been encroached. Telegraph July 26, 2006.


NEPAL

Maoists extend ceasefire for three more months: The Maoists on July 28 unilaterally extended their ceasefire for another three months. A press statement issued by the Maoist Chairman Prachanda said that they have decided to extend the ceasefire as per people's aspiration for peace. "The party has decided to extend the ceasefire by three more months for effective implementation of the eight point agreement and to give peaceful outlet to the country" said the statement. Nepal News, July 29, 2006.

Maoist Chairman Prachanda writes letter to UN protesting against decommissioning of arms: On July 24, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda wrote to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan protesting strongly against certain clauses in the letter the Government had sent to the UN. Taking strong exception to the Government request that the UN monitor and decommission the arms of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), Prachanda wrote, "the letter was written and sent unilaterally and secretively without consulting us in utter violation of the spirit of ongoing negotiations between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist) . Nepal News , July 25, 2006.


PAKISTAN

Taliban taking over military check-posts in North Waziristan, indicates reports: The Taliban have taken over several military check posts in North Waziristan. BBC was reported to have said on July 28 that more than a dozen check posts monitoring the highway between Kajhori and Miranshah earlier had been abandoned and the Taliban were patrolling the highway between Mir Ali and Miranshah. Daily Times, July 29, 2006.


SRI LANKA

Finland and Denmark announce withdrawal from Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission: Finland on July 28 announced that it will withdraw its observers from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), given the security situation on the ground. Finnish mission desk officer, Marita Maunola, told international media, "Based on the fact that the LTTE are not going to guarantee the monitors' safety after September 1, we will recall our observers by then." Finland is the first of three European Union (EU) countries - Denmark, Finland and Sweden - to announce a pullout from the Swedish-led SLMM. Hours later, Denmark said it would also pull out its 12 monitors. As reported earlier, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) called for the removal of monitors from EU countries after the EU listed the outfit as a terrorist organization in May, claiming these monitors can no longer observe the Sri Lankan cease-fire agreement impartially. Colombo Page, July 29, 2006.

30 LTTE cadres suspected to be killed in suicide attack in Batticaloa district: The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation reported that 30 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres were killed in a suicide attack launched by the breakaway faction led by 'Colonel' Karuna in the Vavunathivu area of Batticaloa District on July 28. The Karuna faction claimed that it had launched its first suicide attack against the outfit at a LTTE roadblock. However, the pro-LTTE websites reported only the deaths of two Karuna group cadres who were traveling in a three-wheeler from the Government-controlled territory. Meanwhile, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) confirmed that a vehicle had blown up on the outfit's front-line. The SLMM spokesperson, Robert Nielsson, stated, "The driver was in the three-wheeler when it blew up," adding that he had no details of other casualties. Colombo Page , July 29, 2006.

Eight LTTE cadres killed in air strike in Batticaloa district: Eight Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres were killed and twelve others sustained injuries in an air strike by the Sri Lanka Air Force at the outfit's Thenaham conference centre in the Karadiyanaru area of Batticaloa District on July 29. "Eight Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members - two officials and six cadres - were killed and four wounded when Sri Lanka Air Force bombed Liberation Tigers' Thenaham Conference Centre in Karadiyanaru," reported the pro- LTTE website Tamil Net.The Hindu, Tamil Net , July 30, 2006.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

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Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


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