SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 5, No. 6, August 21, 2006

 

PAKISTAN

Balochistan: After the ‘Triumph’
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

On July 20, 2006, the military regime of President General Pervez Musharraf claimed that security forces had broken the back of the insurgents in Balochistan and that the insurgency in the province was over. Between July 21 and August 20, 2006, there have been at least 44 incidents of violence in the province in which at least 24 people have died. Most of the attacks have, however, sought infrastructure targets, and include 17 bomb blasts, a grenade attack and five landmine explosions. There have also been seven instances in which gas pipelines, railway bridges and power transmission towers have been blown up by the insurgents. Evidently, the insurgency is not quite ‘over' .

Of Balochistan's 28 Districts, the 16 that are most strategic and important in terms of natural resources are now directly affected by the insurgency, and constitute an acute security problem for Islamabad. Contrary to General Musharraf's assertion that only three of the 78 tribal chiefs in the province were "troublemakers", insurgent attacks have left no part of the province unaffected. There has also been a continuous series of bomb and rocket attacks on gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, and communications infrastructure, as well as on military establishments and governmental facilities and enterprises over the past 12 months. According to open source information monitored by South Asia Terrorism Portal, in 624 insurgency-related incidents, at least 197 civilians, 60 security force personnel and 92 insurgents have died, and 559 people have been wounded in the Province during 2006 alone (till August 20). There have been 353 arrests in the year, thus far. However, given Islamabad's understated accounts, the suppression of the Press and erratic reportage from this poorly covered region, the actual numbers could be much larger.

Official sources claim that there have been 1,582 ‘surrenders’ by Baloch rebels till August 16. These claims are, however, yet to be corroborated by any independent media or source, since the Press and various independent agencies are being rigorously kept out of Balochistan by the military. Interestingly, 1,533 of these surrenders occurred between July 8 and August 16, coinciding with the military regime’s boast about the end of the insurgency. None of the insurgents’ leadership has surrendered, been arrested or neutralised.

Intense counter-insurgency operations did, however, bring three brigades, backed by helicopter gunships, into the Bugti and Marri areas, leading to a temporary dispersal of the insurgents into the relatively inaccessible hills, and a consequent lull in their operations. This, however, was rapidly reversed, and just a month after Islamabad’s massive military operations in the Province, the insurgents appear to have regrouped to resume attacks on a variety of state installations. Karachi-based Syed Shoaib Hasan reports that, currently, the Marri and Bugti combined strength is roughtly 25,000 with 5,000 guerrilla fighters. Reports from Kahan in Kohlu district confirm that, “Brohi tribesmen and Seraiki separatists [from south Punjab; the Seraiki people are demanding a separate Seraikistan] have arrived to supplement the Marris.”

With the Army now assuming a dominant role in counter-insurgency operations, there is the inevitable escalation of ‘collateral damage’. According to BBC, the Pakistani Air Force Chief has acknowledged that fighter jets have been used in Balochistan against ‘the insurgents’. Baloch sources claim that the weaponry being used includes helicopter gunships, fighter jets, heavy artillery and missiles, and civilian concentrations have frequently been targeted. Many innocent civilians, including women and children, have been killed or have “disappeared”. Numbers on this aspect are hard to find given the complete clampdown on reportage and information flows from Balochistan.

The Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), on August 10, released a list of more than 100 political activists allegedly detained illegally by intelligence agencies. BNP President Sardar Akhtar Mengal, a former Chief Minister of the Province, stated that the actual number of “missing political activists” was higher than the numbers given in the list. He alleged that hundreds of political workers of the BNP and other nationalist parties had been detained illegally along with their families, and nobody knew of their whereabouts. Sources indicate that large groups of extended families of insurgents have been arrested or are ‘missing’.

Among those arrested were Obaidullah and Samiullah Baloch, brothers of Sanaullah Baloch, a Senator from the BNP-Mengal. Both were arrested from the Askari area of the provincial capital, Quetta, by military police on July 16, 2006. While Obaidullah has since been released, the fate of his brother Samiullah remains unknown. Sanaullah Baloch described the arrests as “political victimisation” of innocent people, and added, “If the Government has to settle political scores with me, I should be taken in, not my innocent brothers who have no link to my political struggle.” He noted further, “Every day, intelligence agencies are picking up people in Balochistan; and it is sad that the lives of family members of Baloch politicians have been threatened.” A number of activists of the Baloch Students Organisation who had ‘disappeared’ earlier, were recently released from detention. They subsequently claimed that they had been tortured, had their feet shackled and heads covered for extended periods of time, and subjected to electric shocks. Arrests and ‘disappearances’, meanwhile, have served to unite the disparate Baloch nationalists. Joint airborne and ground operations by troops have also strengthened the popular perception that military action is not directed at the three tribal chiefs but against the entire Baloch people.

A fair measure of the insecurity and fear that prevails in the province is visible in the fact that few civil administrators and police officials are willing to accept a posting there, despite generous incentives. Indeed, many such officials have reportedly resorted to political networking to get their transfer orders revoked. In one such instance, the passing of the Finance Bill by the National Assembly became captive to an officer's demands, The News reported, quoting sources in Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's office. The District Management Group (DMG) official allegedly “contacted members of the National Assembly, who in turn demanded that the transfer order be cancelled before the bill was put to vote in the National Assembly.” Aziz directed the Establishment Division to cancel the order. "The officer continues to enjoy his posting in Lahore," the newspaper stated. Reports indicate that even attractive employment incentives have failed to convince federal officials to serve in the beleaguered province, and some have even been charge-sheeted for the refusal to join duties. "Every time the Establishment Division issues transfer orders of police and DMG officers with the full backing of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, the result always remains the same: non-compliance of government orders. Barring exceptions, generally the officers either get their transfer orders cancelled or remain defiant for months and months on end," The News reported. Besides those who have already been able to get their transfer orders cancelled, “there are at least 16 DMG officers whose posting orders were issued way back in February 2005, but are yet to report to the Balochistan Government. Several of these officers are currently serving in Punjab and Sindh provinces.”

A total deadlock now prevails, with Islamabad having virtually closed the door on a negotiated political settlement. The military option is now the only manifest policy being pursued in Balochistan. Criticising “drawing room critics and pseudo intellectuals”, General Musharraf, who has eloquently advocated the ‘negotiated solution’ in other theatres, declared: “I want to tell them that security and peace is only guaranteed through force and strength, never through weakness.” He disclosed, further, that 13 Districts of the ‘B area’ in Balochistan (where the police do not operate) have been converted into ‘A area’ and the rest of the Districts would also soon be converted into ‘A area’ and the police system would be implemented so that the Government’s writ is established completely. The intensity of Islamabad's response is entirely in line with President Musharraf's earlier proclamations on a 'solution' to the 'Baloch problem'. In early 2005, he had warned the rebels, "Don't push us… It is not the '70s. We will not climb mountains behind them, they will not even know what and from where something has come and hit them."

But Islamabad continues to struggle to contain the fallout of the world’s attention focusing on the Baloch insurgency. The military regime and its political proxies have repeatedly sought to lay the blame on the 'hidden hand' and 'external actors'. India was long projected as the arch villain and agent provocateur, but official rhetoric has progressively brought in the UK and US into the circle of ‘conspirators’ seeking to destabilize the Province, positions that are finding few takers. On August 8, 2006, the British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, rejected as unfounded charges of alleged involvement of British secret agencies in Balochistan. His denial came after a delegation of British parliamentarians was questioned about the alleged involvement of British secret agencies in a closed-door meeting with members of the Senate Committee on Defence on June 3, 2006. Grant observed, “We have a great deal of interest in the stability and security of Balochistan simply because that is linked with the security of British troops deployed in Helmand across the border in Afghanistan.”

Contrary to the military regime’s braggadocio and the extravagant rush to declare victory, the ground situation in Balochistan suggests that the Province is far from quiescent. Massive military operations notwithstanding, on all conventional indicators, the insurgency is expected to retain its intransigence and vitality in the proximate future.

NEPAL

Irreconcilable Differences
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala has now declared that Parliament cannot be dissolved unless the Maoists have been fully disarmed. He has stated, further, that the King ‘should be given space in the new Constitution’ – both positions that are anathema to the Maoists.

In turn, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, the Maoist ‘supremo’, accused the Government of “conspiring to make the King active again”, and of “functioning according to directions from foreign governments”. He warned that the peace process could break down, in which eventuality, “We will not return to the jungle if we had to face a revolt again. We will bring about a republic legally staying in the cities.” Baburam Bhattarai, the Maoists’ ideologue and number two man, was more explicit: “The Government is trying to push us back to war. If the dialogue fails we will start a third revolution and that will be centered in the city.”

It is evident, to those who are willing to see, that both the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) are engaged in a tactical peace process, marked by wide divergences in fundamental positions. The process is, moreover, persistently jeopardized by Maoist threats, intimidation and coercion. Some efforts have, of course, been made to resolve ‘core issues’, and the ‘five-point agreement’ of August 9, 2006 – which builds on the Eight Point Agreement of June 16, 2006, which was an advance over the Twelve Point Agreement of November 22, 2005 . through which the parties agreed to seek the assistance of the United Nations gives the appearance of a ‘step forward’.

The five points agreed to are:

• the Government and Maoists will continue human rights monitoring through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal;

• they will assist in the monitoring of the Code of Conduct during the cease-fire;

• on the basis of agreement to seek UN assistance in the “management of arms and armed personnel of both the sides”, qualified civilian personnel will be deployed to monitor and verify the confinement of Maoist combatants and their weapons within the designated cantonment areas. Later, modalities for all arrangements, including of arms and munitions, will be worked out among the parties and the UN;

• monitor the Nepali Army to ensure that it remains in its barracks and its weapons are not used for or against any side. The modalities will be worked out among the parties and the UN, and

• election to the Constituent Assembly will be observed in consultation with the parties.

Although, this development has brought cheer in the peace camps, the conduct of the Maoists over the past weeks have made their intentions suspect. In spite of being a party to the May 25 Ceasefire Code of Conduct, the Maoists have been blatant in their violations, and in their justifications of such violations.

Clause 10 of the Code of Conduct directs both parties, “Not to create hurdles in undertaking regular development works peacefully and other works aimed at people’s benefit.” However, reports from several Districts demonstrate systematic violation. In July 2006, Maoists obstructed the process of awarding contracts worth NPR 12.5 million by the District Development Committee (DDC), Siraha. The DDC had issued a notice asking prospective contractors to submit tenders for 32 contracts by July 16. According to DDC staffers, some dozens of Maoists forced the interested parties out of the DDC premises telling them not to submit tenders. According to the Local Development Officer, Gopi Krishna Khanal, Maoists forcibly took away tender files of 32 parties from the office. Due to the obstruction, collection of internal revenue for supporting expenses in the new fiscal year starting July 17 has become uncertain, he said, as the tenders are a major source of internal revenue for salary, electricity bills, drinking water bills, telephone bills, and stationery, among others.

Similarly, in Magdi District, the Maoists have banned construction works of all infrastructure development projects, including health, education, electricity and drinking water projects. A District Government official pointed out that projects such as the blacktopping of roads in Beni Bazaar and gravelling of the Mangalghat Road, among others, have been halted for an indefinite period due to Maoist obstruction.

Clause 15 of the code of conduct further directs: “Donation or financial assistance in cash, kind or in the form of services will not be collected or mobilised against one’s will.” Maoist extortion, however, remains endemic across the country.

In Sankhuwasabha District, for instance, the Maoists have started collecting ‘donations’ from Government and semi-Government officials, visiting each office to demand an amount equal to 60 days’ salary of each employee as “tax for people's war”, according to one Government official. Maoist District Member Rajan claimed that collecting ‘donations’ and ‘tax’ was essential to meet the needs of 725 full time members of the Party in the District

In Sarlahi District, they have reportedly set up a check post at Ranigunj Chowk of Lalbandi-Phuljor Road section on Mahendra Highway, since July 23, to collect donations from vehicles plying on the highway. Maoist cadres in combat dress collect NPR 10 from every vehicle, including passenger buses and cargo trucks, issuing receipts for money received towards “security patrol help”.

Similarly, in Bardiya District, the local Maoist leadership announced, on August 2, that they would start collecting ‘donations’ from industrialists, businessmen, employees, teachers and others in the District. The ‘district secretary’ of the Party disclosed at a Press meeting, “At least 300,000 rupees is the monthly expenses just for a battalion of the People’s Liberation Army in Bardiya”, adding further, “we are planning to launch a donation campaign which is voluntary and not forced donation.”

Responding to these reports, Maoist leader Bhattarai, while interacting with the business community in Kathmandu on August 7, explained that his Party's ‘donation’ and ‘taxation’ drive was a ‘transitional arrangement’ to raise resources to take care of its militia, and urged the business community to bear with it ‘till the political problem is solved’. “In the absence of budgetary support from the Government, we have no option but to raise money from donations. But this phase will pass off as soon as the interim Government including the Maoists is formed,” Bhattarai added. He further said that the Maoists were soon coming up with a centrally controlled donation collecting mechanism so that non-Maoists could not take advantage of the situation. “It will be a one-window system, as you businessmen prefer to say,” he disclosed.

One of the key elements of the Ceasefire code signed was, the “Return the properties of the leaders of political parties, activists and civilians, which were seized, locked up or prohibited from being used during the period of the conflict, to concerned persons or their families.” However, the process of return of properties to displaced families has been rare and marred by ‘conditions’. In Dhangadhi District, for instance, the Maoists have asked persons whose lands and houses had been seized to submit an application to their Party. An “investigation committee” has been formed and is to be the ‘sole authority’ for giving the “final verdict” on whether and to whom seized properties are to be returned. Lekhraj Bhatta, Maoist in-charge of Seti and Mahakali declared, “We will first study whether our party seized the lands without sufficient reason or it was necessary to do so to punish those concerned.” He added further that the lands and houses of ‘feudal’ class people, ‘direct or indirect supporters of regression’ and ‘spies’ who inflicted ‘great damage’ inside their Party, would not be returned at all. Similar reports of ’conditionalities’ are trickling in from Sankhuwasabha, Dang, Salyan and other Districts.

The Maoists have not spared Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) either. In Salyan District, Maoists have stalled all NGO activities, claiming that they were not complying with the ‘People's Government’ and have started working on their own, ignoring Maoist policies, after the restoration of democracy in the country. Min Bahadur Wali, Chairman of Sharada Nepal, an NGO, states, “Maoists may have been offended because most of the NGOs, in recent times, have shown no interest in registering with the Maoists and paying tax to them.” The Maoist moves are, however, clearly against the Ceasefire Code’s clause 7 that reads, “No hindrance will be made from either side for political activists and members of social organisations to move around the country and express their views, organise meetings or engage in their organisational works”.

Of course, the question of disarming the Maoists remains the most intractable problem. Well versed in the wisdom of the ‘red book’, it is clear that Prachanda and the Maoists have no death wish and the People’s Liberation Army will not easily relinquish arms to squander away the ‘rewards’ that they have seized through the ‘barrel of the gun’. The retention of arms acquires greater urgency and significance as the Maoists come under increasing attack from splinter groups like the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM). Recently, the CPN (Maoist) declared war against this outfit, headed by Jai Krishna Goit, after its cadres killed two Maoists in Saptari District. Goit had left the Maoists to form the JTMM two years ago, demanding more autonomy for the Terai region .

Prime Minister Koirala has noted the contradiction at the heart of the present process: “While the Maoists depend on weapons as their source of power, the Parliament is the source of power for the Government. The House of Representatives cannot be dissolved unless Maoists’ arms are managed.” Unsurprisingly, the Maoist’ talks team member, Dina Nath Sharma responded, “The main issue is not arms management. It is how fast we can get rid of monarchy.” He added further that separating arms from fighters would not affect their strength since they knew how to get arms again. “So it is wrong to assume that separating arms will in any way resolve the problem.”

For the Maoists, the peace process offers an economical tactical alternative to secure the goals that they were pursuing through violence in the past. These goals remain unaltered. In a joint statement released on August 8, 2006, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and the CPN (Maoist) stated: “The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) jointly re-assert their firm commitment to proletarian internationalism, mutual fraternal relations, on the basis of MLM (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism). All tactical questions being adopted in the respective countries are the sole concern of the parties operating there. Both parties will seek to learn from the positive experiences of the other party as also the experiences of the Maoists who comprise the International Communist Movement.”

The clarity that attends the Maoist approach to negotiations is in sharp contrast to the confusion that tends to guide other parties to the process, both the SPA and international players, including the UN. As in other theatres where Governments and international intermediaries are engaged in processes of negotiation with powerful insurgent and terrorist groups, there is a radical asymmetry between the expectations and approach of importunate state and international agencies, and armed non-state actors who have mastered the art of manipulating the insecurities and fears of these agencies. Negotiations with the Maoists in Nepal will, consequently, continue to be cumbersome and frustrating for both the Government and the UN representatives, since the Maoists continue to operate as they did before the ceasefire in all aspects except the suspension of attacks on the state’s armed forces.

HuJI holds meeting in Dhaka: The Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI) reportedly held a meeting in capital Dhaka on August 18, 2006, under the banner of Sachetan Islami Janata at the north gate of the Baitul Mukarram National Mosque. Newspapers published detailed reports on the meeting, accompanied by photographs showing HuJI leaders sitting on the dais. The Government, however, has claimed ignorance about the meeting. State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar said on August 20 that he learnt about the meeting from newspaper reports on August 19. Babar further said that there is no necessity of taking any new action against HuJI. "We have already banned the organisation and we will go for immediate action upon getting any information," he said. The Daily Star, August 21, 2006.

11 PBCP-Janajuddha cadres killed in Pabna: 11 extremists belonging to the Janajuddha faction of the Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), including three ‘regional commanders’, were killed and another arrested in an encounter with the police at remote Sharirvita village of Sujanagar sub-district in the Pabna District on August 17, 2006. Police sources said the encounter occurred subsequent to a police raid on a group of 50 PBCP cadres holding a secret meeting at the village. Police recovered 10 rifles and 113 bullets from the encounter site. The Daily Star, August 18, 2006.