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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 5, No. 7, August 28, 2006

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT

 

 

PAKISTAN

Balochistan: Musharraf’s Pyrrhic Victory
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

A crucial pivot of the insurgency in the Balochistan province, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, was killed along with 38 insurgents during a military operation in the Chalgri area of Bhamboor Hills in Dera Bugti District on August 26, 2006. At least 21 security force (SF) personnel, including a Colonel, two Majors and three Captains, were also killed in the intense clashes. More than 24 insurgents were wounded and subsequently arrested. Disputing these numbers, a spokesman of the Marri tribe, Najeed Marri, told Dawn from Kohlu that 140 people from the Bugti and Marri tribes had been killed in the air and ground operations. He identified the area of the operation as Karmowadh, 45 kilometres from Kahan, headquarters of the Marri tribe.

The 79 year-old Nawab Bugti, leader of the dominant Bugti tribe and a former Chief Minister of Balochistan, went underground in 2005, and was since directing the armed insurgency, which has claimed more than 700 lives in 2005-06.


“Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was killed in the operation along with some family members,” Federal Minister for Information, Mohammad Ali Durrani, confirmed to the media. Senator Agha Shahid Bugti, son-in-law of Nawab Bugti also confirmed the killing. Contrary to preliminary media reports, Balaach Khan Marri, another leader of the insurgency, managed to escape. Bugti's two grandsons – leaders of the tribe and of the insurgency in their own rights – who were initially reported killed, are also believed to have escaped alive. While there has been a great deal of secrecy imposed by Islamabad on reportage from Balochistan, the news of Nawab Bugti’s death was, predictably, flashed across the media, both domestic and international.

The military has not, till the time of writing, released the dead body of Nawab Bugti. A spokesman announced in Islamabad after a high-level meeting chaired by President Pervez Musharraf that Bugti's body would be handed over to relatives for burial as soon as it could be retrieved from the rubble of the cave where he died. The delay in releasing the body is in itself is becoming a volatile issue, with some sources in Balochistan expressing apprehensions that Bugti may have been killed in custody, rather than during the operations. Given the volatile atmosphere in Balochistan, the Army would also be concerned that Bugti’s funerary rites could become the focus of massive demonstrations against Islamabad.

SFs reportedly commenced operations in the Bhambhoor area on August 24 with heavy weapons and continuous strafing by helicopter gun-ships. According to Dawn, “helicopter gun-ships targeted the Chalgri area of Bhambhoor mountains and dropped troops who took action in the area. Armed militants of Marri and Bugti tribes resisted the troops and heavy fighting was reported for several hours. Nawab Bugti and many others were killed when helicopter gun-ships dropped bombs at their hideout.” Unnamed Pakistani military officials said they traced the location of Nawab Bugti through a satellite tracking system.

In the immediate aftermath of Nawab Bugti’s death, described by some Pakistani analysts as an assassination, three streams of reaction are crystallizing. Protest demonstrations and rioting were reported from many parts of the beleaguered province. Protests, mostly violent, were also reported from the dominantly Baloch area of Lyari in Karachi. Areas bordering Balochistan in Sindh and Punjab also witnessed protests with sporadic rioting. The enraged Baloch protestors have reportedly burnt dozens of shops, banks and Government vehicles in Quetta, capital of Balochistan, and in other cities since Bugti's death was announced on August 26-evening. Suleman Sayed, Quetta's police chief, disclosed that more than 450 rioters had been arrested by the morning of August 27. One person died and six police personnel and five protesters were wounded after they exchanged gunfire in Quetta, currently under curfew. All train services to and from Balochistan have reportedly been cancelled until further notice. An alliance of four Baloch nationalist groups has announced a 15-day mourning period and declared that protests would continue across the region. At the other end, Baloch insurgents are, according to sources, preparing for an appropriate riposte and large-scale violence is predicted. "The government has pushed Balochistan into a never-ending war," said Hasil Bizinjo, a prominent insurgent leader.

Leaders of major opposition parties, including Makhdoom Amin Faheem of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Hafiz Hussain Ahmed of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), expressed shock and grief over the death and restated their rejection of the use of force in Balochistan. The London-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leader Altaf Hussain condemned the Nawab Bugti killing and called for negotiations to resolve the insurgency. The Chairman of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Raja Zafar-ul-Haq, stated that the situation was similar to the obstinate and unreasonable attitude adopted by General Yayha Khan, which led to the loss of East Pakistan. Senior PPP leaders Amin Fahim and Raja Rabbani also warned against the emergence of ‘a 1971-like situation’ which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. What has alarmed the political parties in Pakistan is the fact that such a senior leader has never before been neutralized by the establishment, with the exception of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was hanged by General Zia-ul-Haq. A political realignment, consequently, appears increasingly likely and the Balochistan provincial Government could collapse. Addressing an emergency press conference in Islamabad on August 27, senior MMA leader Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haidri termed Bugti’s death a “national tragedy in the history of Pakistan… the biggest instance of cruelty and despotism” adding that his alliance was "seriously contemplating" quitting the coalition Government in Balochistan. If the MQM also decides on a similar course of action, the coalition in Sindh province could also collapse. Some of the Baloch leaders have also said that they will vote in favour of the no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in the National Assembly on August 29, thereby increasing the pressure on the military regime.

Bugti, an alumnus of the Oxford University, who oscillated between parliamentary democracy and armed insurgency, was a symbol of Baloch nationalism. While the internecine contest between the Bugti and Marri tribes has persisted for centuries, Nawab Bugti now emerges as a martyr for the Baloch at large, and this could unite the warring tribal groups, leading to a nationalist consolidation. Personal animosities between Attaullah Mengal, another Baloch nationalist leader, and Bugti, had long stood in the way of a united front, but with Bugti’s death, Baloch Ittihad (unity) becomes a greater possibility. Significantly, sources disclose that Mengal has gone underground. Whether he takes up the mantle of leadership is still uncertain, but he is no longer available at the Mengal house in Karachi.

Violence, both in the immediate and long term, can, consequently, escalate. The aged Bugti’s unnatural and violent end at the hands of the state’s forces will provoke – and already has provoked – a natural backlash. However, it remains to be seen whether massive and indiscriminate repression by Islamabad can, in fact, quell the mounting protests and resentment.

To the extent that Islamabad fails to crush the rebellion by outright carnage, Baloch violence is expected to escalate in the foreseeable future, as avenues for a political settlement shut down. The insurgency can also be expected to adapt and follow new contours. Traditionally, each Baloch tribe has sought to limit itself to defensive operations within its own area of domination, but recent months had seen several groups operating outside their own areas, albeit within Balochistan. While expansion of the movement outside Baloch areas would require a shift in the tribal mindset, Baloch guerrillas may be gradually be ‘squeezed out’ into Pakistan’s other provinces, creating alliances with other anti-state forces, and attacking state infrastructure and establishments in a much wider geographical area.

Entirely in line with past declarations, General Musharraf termed Bugti’s killing a "great victory" and congratulated the SFs for the ‘achievement’. It is ironic that a regime which is negotiating with a far more menacing terrorist movement in Waziristan chooses to take such an uncompromising hard line against insurgent groups that seek fairly limited goals within the Pakistani rubric. This may, of course, reflect a realpolitik assessment on General Musharraf’s part that, while he can win in Balochistan by purely military means, the outcome in Waziristan is far more uncertain, and the costs of confrontation too high.

If Musharraf’s repression does not succeed in Balochistan, Bugti’s death will mark the beginnings of a greater consolidation of nationalist forces and a shift in tactics, from conventional guerrilla warfare – which is much more susceptible to detection and neutralization – to more decentralized and subversive means, including the targeting of infrastructure and assets outside Balochistan, and in urban concentrations, as well as an effort to bring in other groups, such as the Sindhis, the Seraikis, the Pashtun, and other disaffected political formations, into a broader insurgency. There is a danger, moreover, that the secular-nationalist Baloch movement may also see the influence of radical Islamist parties such as the MMA, which have, till now, remained restricted to the Pashtun areas of the North, growing in the Baloch areas of South Balochistan.

In an interview to the Karachi-based Newsline in February 2005, Nawab Bugti had said: “General Sahib [Pervez Musharraf] has promised to hit us in such a way that we will not know what hit us. In one sense it is quick death that he is promising us. They could do this to a few Baloch leaders, but not the whole Baloch nation.” His promised ‘quick death’ has come, but in death, as in life, he appears poised to remain the rallying force for the Baloch.

 


PAKISTAN

Long War in Waziristan
Guest Writer: Amir Mir in Pakistan
Former editor of Weekly Independent now affiliated with Reuters and Gulf News

The nonstop violence in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Pak-Afghan border has become a cause of great concern for the United States and her allies in the war on terror, especially Afghanistan, given the fact that the Taliban have virtually taken over the entire North Waziristan tribal area, which could be used as a major military base to wage their resistance against the US-led forces in Afghanistan.

The ongoing fighting began in 2004, when the Pakistan Army entered the region inhabited by the Waziri tribe in search of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who were using the Waziristan area as a base for launching deadly attacks against the US-led Allied forces in Afghanistan. Since the fighting began, the Pakistani forces have suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Taliban militia due to roadside bombs and ambushes. The law and order situation in the lawless tribal border land has come to a pass where the writ of the Pakistan Government is almost non existent.

Almost three years down the road after the military operations were launched, the Taliban militia, backed by al Qaeda, has virtually established an Islamic Republic in the rugged and remote Waziristan region, with the Pakistan Army desperately trying to broker a peace deal with it. While the Army wants an assurance from the Taliban that they would not cross the Pak-Afghan border to attack the US-led coalition forces, the militants want the military authorities to release all their colleagues and pay monetary compensation for the damage caused to their property during the operations, to pave the way for the peace deal.

On July 25, 2006, the militants in North Waziristan had announced a ceasefire which they subsequently extended to September 10, 2006, as Leader of Opposition in National Assembly Maulana Fazlur Rehman joined efforts to help clear some obstacles to an agreement for restoring peace in the restive tribal region. Two of the three issues that have bedeviled the peace agreement have already been taken care of: the release of over a dozen militants and the return of seized weaponry. However, the withdrawal of the military from the North Waziristan Agency, one of the key militants’ demands, is yet to be worked out.

Despite the deployment of over 80,000 Pakistani troops along the Afghan border in the tribal areas to capture the fugitive Taliban and al Qaeda elements, the situation is far from stable in a region that is crucial to three world capitals -- Islamabad, Washington and Kabul. Waziristan, often in the news due to frequent clashes between Pakistani security forces and the Taliban militants, is now more-or-less controlled by the local Taliban, which has established a foothold in both North and South Waziristan and has opened recruiting offices these areas to hire new fighters.

As the recruitment drive started last year, many former members of Pakistani jehadi organizations belonging to the banned Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI), Laskhar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), have converged on North and South Waziristan. According to rough estimates, about 25,000 activists of several jehadi organisation had assembled in North and South Waziristan alone in 2005, with the declared determination to “fight until the last man and the last bullet”. And most of them are still siding with the local Taliban in their ongoing fight against the Pakistani security forces.

Waziristan, 11,585 square kilometers of remote mountain valleys, is historically an area that cannot easily be conquered or subjugated. Most of the Taliban active in the region are largely members of Pashtun tribes, although they include some Afghans, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs who fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. Ethnic Pashtuns, who live on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, also make up the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. This poses two major problems for Washington and Kabul. First, the Pakistani militants continue to shelter the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda fighters as they flee US-led allied forces. Secondly, Pakistani recruits are being trained to launch ambushes and suicide bombings in Afghanistan.

Several major military operations have been carried out in Waziristan since 2004, which Pakistani military authorities claimed were ‘successfully concluded’. These operations literally turned Waziristan into a war zone, yet the fight still goes on despite the use of Cobra helicopters and long-range artillery by the Pakistan Army to target the Militia. The Taliban, under the leadership of Haji Mohammad Omar, is now a force to be reckoned with in the area due to a weakening political administration. Omar had first enforced a rigid social order in Waziristan in 2004 and then declared, in December 2005, the establishment of an Islamic state in Waziristan governed by Islamic law.

Not many outside Waziristan are familiar with the name of Haji Mohammad Omar, but in Waziristan, it is a name that commands great respect and awe. Omar is the chief of the Pakistani Taliban which has put up tough resistance against the Pakistani military troops in the tribal region, to take control of large parts of Waziristan. Haji Omar, 55 had served as one of the many lieutenants of Taliban ameer Mullah Mohammad Omar until the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001. Haji Omar’s writ runs virtually unchallenged in South Waziristan while he is hopeful that his commanders would soon establish Taliban control in North Waziristan as well.

Omar’s three important commanders include Maulana Sadiq Noor, Maulana Abdul Khaliq and Maulana Sangeen Khan. US intelligence sleuths stationed in Pakistan allege that the Taliban have already lined up more than 100 suicide squads for suicide missions, with specific targets all over Afghanistan.

Three major tribes currently live in North Waziristan, which has become the principal stronghold of the Taliban outside Afghanistan: the Wazirs, the Mehsuds and the Dawar. British soldiers referred to the Wazirs as wolves and the Mehsuds as panthers of the mountains while the Dawar have traditionally been peace-loving, preferring shop-keeping to guns and towns over mountains.

The Mehsud and Wazir tribes have been arch-rivals for centuries. Traditionally, the Mehsuds have been part of the Pakistani establishment, and as recently as the past few years they supported the military's actions against the Wazir tribes, who are mostly Taliban. Things are, however changing, and traditional roles and rivalries have shifted. In North Waziristan, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq, the unbending leaders of the Taliban-led resistance, are both Dawar and, even more surprising, the Wazirs and the Mehsuds have accepted their command.

Currently, the man responsible for launching the Taliban raids into Afghanistan is Maulana Sangeen Khan, an Afghan from the neighboring Khost province. In South Waziristan, Haji Mohammad Omar, a Waziri, is the commander of the resistance movement against the Pakistani security forces, while the Afghan operations run from the area are taken care of by Abdullah Mehsud, the chieftain of the Mehsud tribe. Never before has there been such an arrangement in centuries, where Mehsuds and Wazirs have fought side-by-side, and more, under the command of the Dawars.

Since there is no clear demarcation of the Pak-Afghan border, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters sheltering in the tribal belt under the control of Wazirs, Mehsuds and Dawars easily cross the border and attack their targets on Afghan soil, using the mountain terrain to strategic advantage, and then melt into the villages located in the Pak-Afghan border areas. The result is that the al Qaeda-backed Taliban resistance movement in Afghanistan continues to gain strength in the tribal areas of Pakistan, which provide natural strategic depth to Taliban and al Qaeda fighters.

Consequently, hardly a day now goes by without Afghanistan urging Pakistan to do more to help overcome insurgency in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. The anxiety being expressed by the Karzai administration is understandable and not entirely misplaced, given the fact that much of the trouble along the border area of Afghanistan happens to be a result of the Taliban militia crossing over from the Pakistani side of the border. In the past, the Afghan mujahideen too had bases in the Waziristan region which they used as launching pads to make frequent incursions into Afghanistan to target the occupying Soviet troops.

Under these circumstances, the Musharraf regime is often blamed for whatever is happening in Afghanistan, given the quantum of activity within close proximity of the Pak-Afghan border. Many visiting US officials have stated time and again in the recent past that Islamabad should fulfill its international obligations by curtailing the movement of miscreants from its side of the border as it cannot simply absolve itself by asking Kabul to tighten control on the other side. They have made it clear that the issue is not just placing 80,000 Pakistani troops on the border, but rather how effective that force has been in accomplishing its mission objective.

On the other hand, the Army’s troops in Waziristan have apparently been bogged down by an insurgency which has proved to be more lethal and dangerous than the one in Afghanistan itself. The Taliban have turned their guns on the Pakistani forces, pro-government tribal elders and intelligence operatives. Statistically speaking, the Pakistani security forces have lost more personnel – almost three times more, since the operation was launched in 2004 – than the US has since 2001, in its ongoing war on terror in Afghanistan.

Before the ceasefire between the military and the militants in Waziristan was announced, ambushes and roadside bomb attacks against the Pakistani security forces had been as frequent as they were across the border, forcing the Army leadership to consider an out-of-the-box solution. Going by Musharraf’s own admission [in an interview with the British daily Guardian on May, 5, 2006] “Extremism in a Talibanised form is what people are now going for. Mullah Omar and the Taliban have influence in Waziristan and it is now spilling over into our settled areas”.

Musharraf did not mention the names of the ‘settled areas’ but the Districts falling under these areas include Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Hangu and Kohat, all in the southern North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and all very conservative and largely under the political influence of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F), led by the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, Maulana Fazlur Rahman. Yet in the same vein, Musharraf claimed quite amusingly that the war against al Qaeda had ‘almost been won’ in Waziristan. By saying so, the General contradicted none other than himself, because the increase in support for the Taliban and their leader Mullah Omar in Waziristan, as confessed by him, meant that the Osama-led organisation too would benefit from the surge in the Taliban’s popularity. Independent analysts say that al Qaeda may have suffered physical and infrastructural losses in terms of the decimation of its bases in Afghanistan and the killing and capture of its operatives, but there is no evidence to suggest that the ideology it professes has registered a decline.

Under these circumstances, it appears that the Taliban resistance movement in both Pakistan and Afghanistan will continue to gain strength until and unless Islamabad abandons its current policy which actually seeks to keep the Taliban alive in the hope of using them to retrieve its lost influence in Afghanistan.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
August 21-27, 2006

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

1
4
0
5

INDIA

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

2
2
8
12

    Left-wing Extremism

0
2
0
2

     Maharashtra

0
0
1
1

     Manipur

1
0
1
2

     Nagaland

0
0
1
1

     Tripura

2
0
1
3

Total (INDIA)

5
4
12
21

PAKISTAN

2
26
43
71
SRI LANKA
21
14
20
55
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.



BANGLADESH

PBCP-Lal Pataka kills four police personnel and a civilian in Naogaon: Extremists of the Lal Pataka faction of the Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), on August 25, 2006 killed four police personnel at Chowbaria cattle market in Naogaon and decamped with their arms and ammunition. A leader of the Jubo Dal, youth wing of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, too died during the attack. The killings are believed to be in retaliation for several incidents including the death of a top PBCP leader in ‘crossfire’ with the Rapid Action Battalion during July 2006 and 11 other outlaws in a police raid in Pabna on August 17. Police sources said that three rifles, a pistol and ammunition of the police personnel were taken away by the extremists. The PBCP-Lal Pataka subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack. The Daily Star, August 26, 2006.


INDIA

ISI continues to support terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir, says Union Home Minister: Maintaining that Pakistan has not dismantled the terrorist infrastructure existing on its soil, the Government said on August 23, 2006, that the neighbouring country’s external intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to provide "directions" and "logistics" support to terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) active in India. "We have not received any information on dismantling of terrorist training camps," Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil said in the Upper House of the Parliament (Rajya Sabha). He said information about existence of terrorist training camps was passed on to Pakistan during the Home Secretary-level talks between the two countries. According to available inputs, the ISI continues to provide directions and logistics support, including recruitment, arms training and funds, to groups like the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and Al-Badr for terrorist related activities in Jammu and Kashmir despite Government’s peace initiatives and Prime Minister’s invitation to separatist leaders for two Round Table conferences.

"Available inputs indicate Pakistan’s ISI continues to remunerate terrorists for attacks on security forces and political leaders… The serial grenade attacks on April 14 and July 11, 2006, in Srinagar city and killing of tourists are reportedly the result of directives received by the terrorist outfits from across the border," said Patil. "We have given documents pointing out to places where training is imparted to terrorists," he said, adding that Pakistan was in a denial mode. Daily Excelsior, August 24, 2006.

Suspension of counter-insurgency operations against ULFA extended: The Union Government has decided to extend the suspension of counter-insurgency operations against the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) by 15 days. A decision to this effect was taken at the meeting on August 23, 2006, between the Government and the ULFA-backed People’s Consultative Group (PCG) to decide modalities for direct negotiation with the outfit. "As of now, we have decided to extend the suspension of the Army operations against ULFA for 15 days," said the Union Home Secretary V. K. Duggal. Assam Tribune, August 24, 2006.


NEPAL

ICDC submits draft of the interim constitution: The Interim Constitution Drafting Committee (ICDC) submitted the Draft Interim Constitution to the peace negotiating teams of the Government and Maoist insurgents on August 25, 2006. Coordinator of the ICDC and former Justice Laxman Prasad Aryal handed over the 76-page draft separately to the leader of the Government team and Home Minister, Krishna Prasad Sitaula, and coordinator of the Maoist team, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, during a function organised at the Peace Secretariat within the Singh Durbar premises of Kathmandu. The ICDC has recommended that the fate of monarchy should be decided by a referendum, which should be held along with constituent assembly election. The members of the panel decided to keep the King without any power but they are silent regarding the status of queen, crown prince and other royal family members. In the draft, the authority conferred by article 122 of the 1990 statute to the King to grant pardon and commute or remit sentences imposed by all courts and to appoint Ambassadors and to receive credentials from Ambassadors has been scrapped. There are 26 parts and 172 articles in the new statute as against 23 parts and 133 articles in the 1990 Constitution. Nepal News, August 26, 2006.


PAKISTAN

Nawab Akbar Bugti killed in military operation in Balochistan: Nawab Akbar Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe and a prominent leader of the insurgency in Balochistan, and 38 insurgents were killed in a military operation in the Bhamboor Hills of Dera Bugti District on August 26, 2006. At least 21 security force personnel also died in the clashes. “Yes, Nawab Bugti has been killed in the operation,” said Federal Information Minister Mohammad Ali Durrani. Sources indicated that Nawab Bugti’s whereabouts were established by monitoring satellite phone intercepts. “It is presumed that Akbar Bugti and a number of other terrorists have been killed,” an official statement said.

Meanwhile, at least three persons were killed on August 27 as protests against the killing spread in the Balochistan province and Baloch-populated areas in Karachi. Protesters took to the streets of Quetta, burning vehicles, banks and a petrol station. Despite a curfew imposed by the Balochistan Government in provincial capital Quetta and Noshki district and the deployment of paramilitary troops, three people were killed in an exchange of fire. In Karachi, Baloch youth torched several shops and vehicles in the Baloch-populated areas including Kalri, Chakiwara, Baghdadi, Kalakot, Shah Bagh Lane, Singho Lane, Jehangir Road, Patel Para, Old Golimar, Asho Goth, Ghazi Town, Mawach Goth and Yousuf Goth. Dawn, August 27-28, 2006.

Cease-fire extended in North Waziristan: Militants in North Waziristan have extended the cease-fire by another 15 days as Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, has joined efforts to help clear some obstacles to an agreement for restoring peace in the tribal region. “We are almost there. Everything has been decided. The story is almost finished but the Government is a bit slow in responding to certain things,” Abdullah Farhad, the militants’ chief spokesman told Dawn on phone from an undisclosed location. Dawn, August 26, 2006.

134 terrorist incidents between January-May 2006: The Interior Ministry said on August 25, 2006, that 134 incidents of terrorism had taken place in the country during the first five months of 2006. Addressing the National Assembly’s Question Hour session, Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao said that 129 people had been killed and 354 injured in terrorist acts occurring between December 2005 and April 19, 2006. Daily Times, August 26, 2006.

Clerics tell aid agencies in PoK not to employ women: Muslim clerics in the earthquake-affected Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) have reportedly told aid agencies to dismiss all local women employees or face violent protests. The threat was given to District officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Bagh on August 22, 2006. “We have told the administration that we will not allow NGOs to exploit our women and asked them to give a date suitable to them for removal of all female workers,” Syed Atta Ullah Shah, prayer leader of the Bagh central mosque, told AFP. “If our demand is not met then we will take direct action and extreme steps. There will be demonstrations and damage may be caused to public property and a law and order situation would be created in the area,” he warned. Shah claimed locals were angered by “obscene” activities at NGOs. “They hire beautiful girls and take them to Islamabad for enjoyment. They keep women in offices as decoration pieces because we know that women have no work and there is no such work that men cannot do,” Shah said. Daily Times, August 25, 2006.


SRI LANKA

Government will consider a new cease-fire if offered by LTTE chief Prabhakaran: The Sri Lankan Government stated that it would consider a new cease-fire agreement (CFA) with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) only if it was offered by their chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Government spokesperson Keheliya Rambukwella said, "The Government's position is very clear: There has to be a meaningful and effective cease-fire. Once it is put in writing by the (Tiger) leader Prabhakaran, then the Government will consider it." He added that any new CFA would need to have clear conditions written into it, such as restricting the outfit’s access to the sea. "We have areas that are very vulnerable and we cannot have them pounding our naval headquarters in eastern Trincomalee," he further added. Daily News, August 25, 2006.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

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Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


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