SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 7, No. 13, October 6, 2008

Assam: Orchestrated Conflagration
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

It is a new round of war over territory in Assam. In this ethnically polarised State, local politics and probable, yet unconfirmed involvement of former and active insurgent groups, is fuelling the existing schism between the two communities, the Bodos – the largest plains tribe in the State settled primarily in the north bank of the Brahmaputra river – and immigrant Muslim settlers. On last available reports at the time of writing, 32 persons from both communities had been killed in the north Assam Districts of Udalguri and Darrang, located about 100 kilometres from the State capital, Dispur.

Clashes started between the two communities on October 3 at Bhalukmari and Mohanbari villages of Udalguri District following rumours that a Bodo youth was missing. Though the youth was later traced and found to be safe, people belonging to two communities gathered at Ikrabari around 3 p.m. and each set ablaze houses belonging to the other community, gutting a total of 40 houses. Precipitating the already charged situation, a Muslim youth, Abdul Jabbar, was stabbed to death within the premises of the Deputy Commissioner’s Office in Udalguri. There was no stopping the violence after this, in spite of the initial deployment of Police personnel and their subsequent reinforcement by five companies of the para-military Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and 11 columns of Army personnel.

Since October 3, violence has affected 35 villages and led to the death of 32 persons, 17 killed in clashes between armed mobs carrying bows and arrows, spears, machetes, and even guns and the remaining 15 in Police firing. Unofficial counts however, put the toll well past 50. The wave of violence has forced almost 80,000 people from both communities to take shelter in 36 relief camps (22 in Udalguri and 14 in Darrang Districts) set up by the Government. The worst affected areas include Rowta, Dalgaon, Kharupetia, Bhakatpara and Udalguri. Fresh reports indicate that the violence was gradually spreading into the adjoining Baksa District – which has significant Bodo and Muslim populations – as well.

The violence has followed a ‘majority attacking the minority’ pattern in both the Districts. In Darrang, with over 35 percent Muslims and a far smaller Bodo presence, it was mainly Muslim mobs that attacked tribal villages. However, in Udalgiri District, which was carved out of Darrang District in 2004, has a Bodo population in excess of 50 percent and Muslim settlers are in a distinct minority. Here the Bodo population went on a rampage against the Muslims.

Ethnic violence in the Bodo heartland of Assam has a long history. The Bodo Accord of 1993, which attempted to bring end to years of arson, violence and instability led by the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), which had commenced in 1986, sought to identify areas where the Bodo population exceeded 50 percent as ‘Bodo Areas’ to be brought under the direct administration of the Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC). An unintentional result of this provision has led to recurring and organised ethnic cleansing in areas where the Bodos do not yet constitute 50 percent of the population. The willing participants in these movements have been Bodo leaders, drawn either from political or community based organisations or insurgent factions. Their targets have sometimes have been the adivasis (tribals from outside the State brought to work in the tea plantations) and sometimes, the Muslims (Bangladeshis or otherwise).

It is important to note that majority of the Muslim victims in the current spate of violence (loosely referred to as Bangladeshi Muslims by the media) are of East Bengal (which later became East Pakistan) origin. They had migrated into Assam much before the creation of Bangladesh. As per the agreements of the Assam Accord, "All persons who come to Assam prior to 1.1.1966, including those amongst them whose names appeared on the electoral rolls used in 1967 elections shall be regularised." This makes these migrant settlers bona fide Indian citizens, notwithstanding their origin.

Contrary to media reports, which have linked the violence to the overall problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh and its concomitant pressures on the native population, this spate of violence thus, needs to be analysed from the point of Bodo aspiration to secure or sustain their majority in areas in and adjoining the Bodo heartland.

Reports indicate that people of both communities are confronting each other with full preparation. Both have access to sharp weapons, bows and arrows, a fact which further reinforces the claim that it is just not an assault by a dominant group on hamlets of vulnerable migrant population, but almost an equal fight between two well-prepared communities.

Two months earlier, in August 2008, Bodo majority areas in Assam had witnessed a similar violence, albeit of lesser intensity. At least seven people were killed and 50 injured in a series of clashes between both communities in Darrang, Udalguri and Kokrakhar and Sonitpur Districts. Violence on that occasion had started on August 14 in the Udalguri District, when two Bodo boys were killed in a clash during a 12-hour shutdown called by a little-known organisation, the Muslim Students’ Union of Assam, against the harassment of genuine Indian Muslims in the State. Nearly 5,000 people fled their homes at that time and normalcy was restored only after a fortnight.

Divisive politics in the Bodo heartland, between the erstwhile Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) cadres – both operating under ceasefire agreements with the Government – is also getting intertwined in the entire issue. The BLT, after a seven-year insurgent campaign, had settled for a peace deal with the Government of India, which led to the establishment of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in December 2003. The BTC comprises four Districts – Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri. The BTC was the second such attempt at providing the Bodos – the largest plains tribe in Assam – with an autonomous self-governing body, after the 1993 Bodo Accord between the Union and State Governments and the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), which had led to the setting up of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC). Internal divisions among the Bodos led to the collapse of the BAC.

The BLT surrendered en masse just before the establishment of the BTC in December 2003. The Bodo movement however, split into two factions, one under the leadership of Hagrama Mohillary and Chandan Brahma, who formed the Bodoland People’s Party (BPP) and took control of the BTC with the backing of the Congress; and the second faction, the Bodoland People's Progressive Front (BPPF), led by moderates Rabiram and U.G. Brahma, which was sidelined as they fared poorly in the 2006 State Legislative Assembly polls. Both factions continue to accuse each other of fomenting trouble in the area.

The other key player in the Bodo heartland, the NDFB has been 22 years in existence. On May 25, 2005, this outfit signed a cease-fire agreement, with the Union and Assam Governments. The NDFB’s over-ground status bothers the BPP to a considerable extent, not just because of the low-level violence that continues between NDFB and former BLT cadres, but also as a result of the complications the NDFB’s eventual political agreement with the Government is likely to create for Hagrama Mohillary and co. Unsurprisingly, Hagrama Mohillary, on October 4, pointed to an NDFB role in the continuing violence and asked the Assam Government to call off the ceasefire with the outfit.

The Assam Government, BPP’s political partner, echoed Mohillary’s concerns. Assam Government spokesman and Health Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, on October 5, stated that the violence in Udalguri and Darrang was "not an ethnic conflict’, but rather the result of a planned ethnic cleansing by the NDFB to drive out all non-Bodos from the area: "This is not a clash between Hindus and immigrant Bangladeshi Muslims as projected, but a systematic pogrom by the NDFB, as many of the people affected by the violence are genuine Assamese Muslims, Bengali Hindus, common Bodos, besides a few Adivasis (tea plantation tribals) as well." The Minister’s conclusion relied heavily on the "use of guns" by the attackers as he painstakingly explained that none except for the militants had access to such weapons in the area. The Minister also announced that four NDFB cadres had been arrested in this connection. On the same day, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi stated that the ceasefire agreement with the NDFB was under review in view of its participation in violence.

On the face of it, the NDFB’s capacity to initiate and sustain such a ‘pogrom’ is doubtful. A bulk of its cadres is settled in three designated camps set up by the Assam Government. Others live in their respective villages, complaining of inadequate space and facilities in the camps. Even though occasional clashes between the former BLT and NDFB cadres have taken place on several occasions, it is highly improbable that the outfit would be central to widespread violence in areas closely monitored by the BLT and also by the Assam Government. NDFB, moreover, is an outfit consisting of the minority Christian segment among the Bodos and has little antipathy towards the Muslims. Moreover, the NDFB’s top leadership, including ‘chairman’ Ranjan Daimary, is still based in Bangladesh and is unlikely to participate in any movement which targets the migrant settlers, who are alleged to be drawn from Bangladesh.

In the immediate future, the clashes between the two communities are likely to reduce in intensity solely due to the large presence of Security Forces in the affected areas. However, the recurrence of violence in the near future – and periodic reverberations in years to come – cannot be ruled out.

The State Government’s knee-jerk responses are being executed at a war footing in Assam. Customary requests for rushing in CPMF companies have already been placed with the Union Home Ministry. The Deputy Commissioner of Udalguri has been transferred and the Police Chief of the District suspended. In all, the spate of violence has exposed the State Government’s lack of preparedness to deal with the sudden outburst of violence, and this is particular cause for concern in view of similar communal clashes that rocked the same Districts just two months ago. To blame it all on an outfit, 90 per cent of whose cadres are overground, is nothing less than evasive and dishonest, an attempt to cover up the utter failure of administration over several years.

INDIA

Assam: Minnows Back in the Mainstream
Sandipani Dash
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On September 30, 2008, the United Liberation Front of Barak Valley (ULFBV) came overground with the formal surrender of 305 cadres at the Indian Tea Association (ITA) Cultural Complex in Guwahati. ‘President’ Panchram Apeto led the cadres, mostly belonging to the Reang tribe of southern Assam’s Hailakandi and Karimganj Districts, thus ending an eight-year-old armed insurrection. The militants surrendered a range of weapons and ammunition, including semi-automatic rifles and small arms, including three AK-47s and one M-16 rifle; 60 12-bore guns, and grenades, mortar shells and 158 rounds of AK series ammunition.

Describing the surrender as a happy occasion for both the extremists and society at large, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi stated, "It has once again been established that the path of violence brings no gain to anyone." Appreciating the efforts of the extremists and their leaders in seeing reason, Gogoi hoped that other extremist groups would also come forward to ‘join the mainstream’, and thus bring peace and prosperity to the region. Particularly, stating that as more and more extremist groups of the State renounced violence, he anticipated that the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) too would realise the value of taking part in peaceful negotiations. He lauded the efforts of the Assam Police in helping extremists to surrender and lead normal lives.

The State Police Chief R.N. Mathur noted that, while the ULFBV had not carried out any serious act of violence, its return to peace was a welcome development. He said that his department would take suitable steps towards the rehabilitation of the surrendered cadres. Several thousand militants belonging to different outfits have surrendered in Assam over the past years, of which 8,626 have been rehabilitated through Government initiatives.

ULFBV ‘president’ Pancharam Apeto declared that the outfit had taken up arms to protest the deprivation of the Reangs and other tribal people from the fruits of development. He added that areas inhabited by these communities lacked schools, proper roads and heath care facilities. There were instances of patients dying, he explained, on their way to hospital due to dilapidated condition of the roads connecting the tribal hamlets. Apeto stated, further, that the outfit agreed to lay down arms after the State Government assured them that their demands would be considered seriously. He also expressed his hope that after the surrender of all cadres the State Government would take steps to help develop the region, which lacked even basic health care and educational opportunities. In response, the Chief Minister promised the initiation of measures for the development of backward areas.

The creation of a Zila Parishad (District Council) for the tribal communities in the Barak Valley, restoration of land to the tribal people and development of tribal-inhabited areas of Hailakandi and Karimganj Districts were the major demands for which an armed rebellion was raised by the Reang group, which was formed in 2001. The aim of the outfit was, according to the Assam Police, to protect the Reang community from alleged "atrocities of the Mizos and Muslims". The ULFBV received logistical support and training from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). Some ULFBV cadres received training in Nagaland, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The Assam Police Chief disclosed that the ULFBV had been involved in 28 insurgency-related acts of crime and violence. Further, its cadres had abducted 42 people, all of whom had either been rescued by security forces or subsequently released by the outfit. On December 31, 2007, three persons, including the son of a Congress party leader, were abducted by the ULFBV militants armed with AK-47 rifles at Kharolbasti in the Hailakandi District along the Assam-Mizoram border. The abducted persons were identified as Hussein Ahmed, Abdul Noor and Abdul Khaliq. They were campaigning for Abdul Khaliq Laskar alias Kuti, a Congress party candidate for the Baldabaldi Panchayat (Local Self Government) President post. Abdul Khaliq was later released on the same night with a note addressed to the candidate demanding INR 1,000,000 for the release of the remaining two. Earlier, on June 21, 2004, the ULFBV had reportedly served extortion notes worth INR 250,000 on three persons belonging to Betarbandh village in the Karimganj District.

The Barak Valley based insurgents had been targeted by the Police action in the wake of their activities. Two of its cadres were, for instance, killed in the year 2002. Later, on September 2, 2003, the outfit’s ‘commander in chief’ Pancharam Reang and his bodyguard, Dulal Singh Reang, were arrested in the Karbi Anglong District. During interrogation, Pancharam confessed that the group’s attempt to establish a nexus with the NSCN-IM for the supply of arms fell through after the latter reportedly demanded an ‘exorbitant price’. On December 14, 2003, a ULFBV hideout located at Senapunji hamlet under Kalicherra block in the Hailakandi District was neutralised and four of its cadres were arrested. Again on April 24, 2008, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel arrested four militants, including a ULFBV cadre, from Killarbak area under Jamira Police Station of Hailakandi District along the Asom-Mizoram border. Eventually, on June 7, 2008, the outfit was compelled to declare a unilateral cease-fire.

The surrender of a militant group, which is low key in its operation yet not inconsequential in the conflict dynamics of the Northeast, is part of the wider trend towards negotiated settlements currently evolving in Assam. On June 24, 2008, a unilateral cease-fire was declared by leaders of the ‘A and C companies’ of the ‘28th Battalion’ of the ULFA, a frontal militant group that has, over the decades, enormously undermined the security milieu of the State. Meanwhile, State Police Chief Mathur disclosed that the Black Widow (BW) group and Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF), which are infact anti-talk break away factions of the DHD and United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), respectively, and which entered into extended cease-fire agreements with the Government, have also expressed their willingness to engage in negotiations.

Nevertheless, the entire episode of a 305-strong group ‘joining the mainstream’ at one go has left some space for suspicion regarding the actual strength of the ULFBV at the time of its surrender, given the reality of the very small number of incidents involving the insurgent group. Following the arrest of its ‘commander-in-chief’ in the year 2003, the group’s cadre strength had been estimated at around 50. The obvious doubts surrounding the sudden increase in cadre strength are deepened by the allure of the rehabilitation package associated with the surrender. These apprehensions are the more troubling since disguised insurgents – including those who have surrendered – are frequently involved in offences such as extortion and abduction in the Northeast. Further, the act of laying down arms is not the end, but rather the beginning of the process of ‘normalisation’. Past experience suggests that subsequent rehabilitation of armed cadres in the region has been far from smooth. The issue of rehabilitating surrendered Reang militants in the neighbouring State of Mizoram is a case in point. On April 17, 2008, the former Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM) ‘foreign secretary’ Edwin Chorky, threatened that his cadres would return to refugee camps in Tripura rather than wait for their full rehabilitation in Mizoram.

The ULFBV surrender was accompanied by a six-point charter of demands, including the creation of a separate Zila Parishad for the Reangs and other tribals living in the Barak Valley, restoration of land to the tribal people, compensation and settlement of the surrendered cadres, general amnesty for cadres, and initiation of peace talks involving the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). In the past, peace deals with insurgent groups have crumbled as a result of the failure of the Government to sustain the impetus of the initial agreements and to initiate processes of implementation within a meaningful timeframe. Peace in the Barak Valley will depend on taking the event of the Reang insurgents’ surrender forward to its logical conclusion, and ensuring that official neglect does not create conditions that will militate against, and eventually neutralise, the present gains.