See no evil, hear no evil, do no good:Quetta: The Price of Sheltering Terror::South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 10.10
Show/Hide Search
  Click to Enlarge

Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 10, September 13, 2011

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


Click for PrintPrint

See no evil, hear no evil, do no good
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & SATP

On September 7, 2011, a reception area outside gate No. 5 of the Delhi High Court was targeted by a terrorist bombing, which killed 13 and injured some 89 persons. This incident comes, not as is widely being projected in the media and political discourse, as a reminder of India’s extraordinary vulnerabilities to terrorist violence (which remain unchanged), but rather of the persistence of remarkable incoherence in the discourse on terrorism, and in the design and execution of the country’s counter-terrorism (CT) responses.

The real political response to the challenge of terrorism in India has been posturing, diversion and deception. The approach has never been pragmatic, seeking, in good faith, to solve a problem which has been assessed within realistic parameters. Rather, the effort has been to politically exploit both the problem and its purported resolution, or to deflect criticism however this may be possible, in the event of visible failures.

The response to the Delhi High Court bombing on September 7, 2011, was no exception. Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram immediately sought to pin blame on the Delhi Police. However, the Home Minister has, since the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, repeatedly gone on record to state that all of India’s cities remained vulnerable. What, then, was the basis of the conclusion that the High Court bombing was a consequence, not of this vulnerability, but of specific failures on the part of the Delhi Police? There is an added irony here: the Delhi Police is directly under the Home Ministry’s control, so any failure on its part would, eventually, place the responsibility at the Union Home Minister’s doorstep.

Spokespersons for the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) have also sought to argue that terrorism can only be prevented if ‘citizens’ involve themselves in the various purportedly related tasks; and that Delhi’s vulnerabilities were increased because of the disruptive protraction of Anna Hazare’s organized protests and fast against corruption and for the Lok Pak Bill (anti-corruption legislation) between August 16 and August 28, 2011. On the other hand, critics of the Government, indeed, of the entire political class, have earned applause on the argument that common citizens have been left unprotected because an unacceptable proportion of the state’s security resources is consumed by VIP security.

All this is arrant, dishonest or misconceived nonsense.

It is not the citizen’s job to fight terrorism – though state agencies may seek citizens’ cooperation; such cooperation would be eagerly extended if the credibility of and faith in the Police and Government existed in sufficient measure. In any event, it is the primary, indeed, primal, duty of the state to protect its citizens, all other functions only follow. The state cannot shift any fraction of the blame for its own failures onto citizens.

The argument that the Police can only provide security against terrorism, or to VIPs, or to public agitations, at any one time, is also sheer garbage. The security apparatus must protect the common man against terrorism even while it shields VIPs and guarantees the constitutional freedoms of democratic protest. There is no either-or here; the state is required to do all these simultaneously.

Opposition parties have been quick to sense the susceptibilities of the ruling alliance, and have drummed up a shrill campaign to highlight the ‘failure’ to send a ‘tough message’ by hanging terrorists, or by taking ‘strong steps’ against Pakistan. This is another stream of unmitigated nonsense. The US has done everything possible, with its far greater power, down to bombing and carrying out ground operations on Pakistani soil, with or without Islamabad’s consent, to destroy the terrorist infrastructure that is inflicting daily fatalities on US, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan troops, across the border in Afghanistan, but has failed to end even what is now openly recognized as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) support to various Taliban formations operating from Pakistan. India, with its spectrum of policy options never broadening beyond the option of talks or no talks, has no ‘messages’ to deliver to Pakistani state sponsors of terrorism. As for hanging a few convicted terrorists in India – while there is certainly a strong argument for this in view of the fact that the judicial process has been exhausted and its sentences need to be implemented if any sense of the rule of law is to be maintained – there is little reason to believe that this would make potential terrorists cower with unprecedented fear. The truth is that terrorism cannot be ended by ‘sending messages’ – however strong. It will end only with a dismantling and eventual destruction of all Pakistan backed Islamist terrorist and subversive networks on Indian soil.

Little has been done over the past years since commitments to this end were made at the highest level in the wake of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008. Acknowledging the probable ‘external linkages’ of these attacks, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised, at that time, that his Government would “go after these individuals and organisations and make sure that every perpetrator, organiser and supporter of terror, whatever his affiliation or religion may be, pays a heavy price for these cowardly and horrific acts against our people.” Further, he assured the nation, “We will take the strongest possible measures to ensure that there is no repetition of such terrorist acts.”

Since then, however, what we have seen in terms of augmentation of purported CT capabilities has been no more than a focus on imitative, meta-institutional and big-budget projects – the National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), metropolitan National Security Guards (NSG) hubs, among others – which tend to create the illusion of power in agencies centralized at North Block, or in State capitals. The progress on these initiatives has, itself, been plagued by bureaucratic delays and a lackadaisical political rhythm. On the other hand, the even more urgent task of building fundamental capabilities of response at the level of the thana, the police constable, or the field intelligence operative, has substantially been ignored, or has been pursued within a time perspective that has no relevance whatsoever to the imperatives of CT.

To take an example, the former Union Home Secretary, G.K. Pillai, who has been vocal in defence of the state’s policies and response, noted, in the wake of the High Court bombing, that current deficits in the Police across the country totalled 1.8 million personnel, and, rather astonishingly, that it would take nine years to recruit these numbers. For one thing, over the coming nine years, requirements would certainly rise very substantially, creating a significant and new cumulative deficit. More importantly, however, it is not clear in which Holy Book it is written that 1.8 million personnel cannot be recruited in less than nine years. There is, of course, the perpetual lament about a deficit of training facilities, and even – perhaps more importantly – of suitable candidates for officer cadres and for an improved human resource profile in the constabulary. There is no reason why these deficiencies cannot be addressed on a war footing, creating the necessary trainers and facilities, and, where necessary, extending, intensifying and improving training programmes and curricula to create appropriate profiles, even if recruitment standards need to be diluted. There is no reason to believe that resources for these cannot be provided in a country where INR 34 billion are being sought for the proposed NATGRID, which would provide nothing more than a clearing house to 21 existing databases, most of them – including banking, credit card, visa, immigration, etc., – with peripheral relevance to terrorist operations or significant violent crime, though also including information available on Police records. The last category, however, is also the subject of a proposed Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) project and the national intelligence database to be created under the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) within the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Evidently, the country has money to throw on multiple and overlapping projects, and there should certainly be no insurmountable obstacle to allocating budgets for accelerated recruitment and training to the Police so that existing and emerging deficits can be met on a war footing.

Numbers, moreover, are not everything. There is tremendous waste, mis-utilisation and mis-direction of human resources in the Police across the country, and remarkable gains can be secured even through improved allocation, retraining, reorientation and reequipping of existing forces. To take an example, Andhra Pradesh, in 2005, was among the States worst afflicted by Naxalite violence, with all 23 of its Districts in acute crisis. A focused campaign through 2006 and 2007 decimated the Maoists, reducing the insurgency to a marginal irritant in just eight border Districts, where Maoists continue to launch occasional attacks, principally against civilian targets (there has been no Security Force fatality in the State after May 29, 2008). Crucially, the Andhra Pradesh Police-population ratio in 2006 was just 98 per 100,000, and, in 2007 had fallen to 96 per 100,000, as against an all-India average of 126 and 125, in these years, respectively. An undermanned system cannot, of course, maintain exceptional levels of efficiency indefinitely, but the Andhra Police has demonstrated what can be achieved even with severely limited manpower.

Another example helps illustrate the sleepy pace of state responses. The use of ammonium nitrate as an explosive by terrorists was noticed as far back as 1997-98, when Delhi was subjected to a succession of bomb blasts. Since then, ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) devices have been used in numberless terrorist attacks – including the Delhi High Court bombing (though traces of military grade PETN were also detected in this last case). It was only after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, that, in December 2008, the Home Ministry notified ammonium nitrate as a “special category explosive substance” under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. On July 21, 2011, the Commerce Ministry issued a further notification that “ammonium nitrate or any combination containing more than 45% of ammonium nitrate by weight including emulsions, suspensions, melts or gels, shall be deemed to be an explosive.” Ammonium nitrate fertilizers and products with higher concentrations continue to be freely available across the country, and there is no report suggesting even that their manufacture has been brought under effective regulation.

As far as Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorism is concerned, India has secured a high measure of unearned relief over the past years, as a result of Pakistan’s rising internal crises, external pressures, and preoccupations with more urgent strategic ambitions in Afghanistan. Islamist terrorist related fatalities outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) have fallen from peaks of 262 and 367 in 2006 and 2008, respectively, to 20 in 2010 and 40 in 2011 (till September 11). Even in J&K, fatalities have declined dramatically, from a peak of 4,507 in 2001, to 375 in 2010.

This is an opportunity to secure an extraordinary consolidation in India’s CT capabilities at the grassroots level. Policing in India, today, is a “broken system” reflecting high degrees of “dysfunction, abuse and impunity”. The country’s security apparatus fails to reflect her pretensions as an emerging global power. Technical and technological inputs are, of course, critical to any modern systems of intelligence and enforcement, but these will never be the outcome of technologies alone. It is the Policeman and the field intelligence operative – his training, orientation, capabilities and, crucially, mindset – that makes the difference between a modern and an obsolete enforcement apparatus. It is, consequently, the profile of these personnel – their education, training, skills and orientation, of course, but also their welfare and status in society – which must undergo comprehensive transformation. The task of this transformation has been emphasized ad nauseum by successive Government agencies, Police Commissions and independent commentaries. However, no Government, at the Centre or in most States, appears to have the will, or even the desire – given the potency and persistence of the politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus the N.N. Vohra Committee documented as far back as in 1993 – to create a modern, efficient and empowered security apparatus, answerable to the law.

In the cacophony of partisan recriminations that has followed the Delhi High Court bombing, not a single constructive policy perspective emerges. Confusion, directionless rage, opportunism and, above all, ignorance – these exhaust the spectrum of the political discourse.

For all the hysteria expended in the wake of the present attack, and those that have preceded it over the years, the reality is that, at our present state of capabilities, we can neither prevent every possible attack (if this is ever possible), nor resolve every case that occurs. Our exclusive focus on and obsession with the terrorist incidents themselves is, in fact, part of the problem. These incidents are, and will always be tragic, irrespective of their frequency or the number of fatalities. More important, in terms of our CT policy, strategy and capabilities of response, is what is done, or, more likely, not done, between incidents. It is in this respect that Governments in India continue to fail, comprehensively.

Click for PrintPrint

Quetta: The Price of Sheltering Terror
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

At least 28 persons were killed and another 60 injured in twin suicide attacks in the Civil Lines area of Quetta, the Provincial capital of Balochistan, on September 7, 2011. At 8.58 AM, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a vehicle packed with explosives near the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Frontier Corps (FC, Balochistan), Brigadier Farrukh Shehzad’s car. Five minutes later, another suicide bomber entered the DIG’s house and detonated his device. According to a Civil Defense official, about 100 kilograms of explosives were used in the twin blasts. Significant gunfire was also reported from the site of the blast. The attacks targeted the DIG, and the dead included Colonel Khalid Masood of the FC and the wife of the DIG. Shehzad was injured, but survived.

Earlier, on April 7, 2011, a suicide attack at the house of DIG (Investigations), Wazir Nasir Khan, in Quetta, killed two persons – the bomber and a Police Constable. The attacker entered the residential Police colony in an explosive laden car and rammed it into the DIG’s house. A Police constable posted at the gate died, and nine others, including the DIG and several children, were injured.

Claiming responsibility for the September 7 attacks, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan stated, “Our fidayeen (suicide bombers) have carried out this attack. It is revenge for the arrests of our brothers in Quetta. If they make more arrests then the reaction will be much more forceful.” On September 5, 2011, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) disclosed that FC personnel had arrested senior al Qaeda leader, Younis al-Mauritani, believed to have been responsible for planning attacks on the US, Europe and Australia, in Quetta on an unspecified date. He was arrested along with two other high-ranking al Qaeda operatives, Abdul Ghaffar Al Shami aka Bachar Chama and Messara Al Shami aka Mujahid Amino. On September 7, 2011, the US had imposed financial sanctions on three al Qaeda militants based in Pakistan, including al-Mauritani, as well as the Libya-born propaganda chief, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Mustafa Hajji Muhammad Khan, responsible for logistical support to al Qaeda.

Quetta witnesses high levels of violence, both by Islamist extremists and Baloch nationalists. There have already been at least 79 militancy-related incidents in Quetta in 2011 (till September 12), as against 101 in 2010, 73 in 2009, 81 in 2008, 72 in 2007, 75 in 2006, 61 in 2005, 51 in 2004 and 32 in 2003, according to the partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management. At least 136 persons, including 113 civilians, 12 Security Force (SF) personnel and 11 militants, had been killed in the current year (till September 12). Fatalities in 2010 stood at 177, including 152 civilians 20 SFs and five militants. The Balochistan Province accounted for at least 502 and 347 terrorism / militancy related fatalities in 2011 and 2010, respectively.

Terrorist violence in Quetta has had a significant sectarian overlay. In a prominent attack, at least 11 Shias were killed and another three were injured when their vehicle was attacked near a bus stop on Spiny Road in Quetta on July 30, 2011. In another attack, a suicide car bomb killed at least 11 Shias and injured 22, while they were celebrating Eid-ul-Fitr in Quetta on August 31, 2011. The bomber was apparently targeting a Shiite mosque, but could not get close enough because the road was blocked. Significantly, Federal Minister of Interior Rehman Malik on July 13 said over the past three years, 134 Punjabi-speaking people had been killed, while another 45 were killed in sectarian violence in Balochistan.

The relatively small proportion of SF fatalities, however, indicates that frontal engagements with the militants occur infrequently, suggesting a tacit understanding between the two apparently warring sides. Significantly, where a succession of major military operations have been launched (no doubt with very uncertain outcomes) in other provinces, including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and even in the Baloch rebel areas of South Balochistan, the Taliban dominated North Balochistan, including Quetta and its environs see little by way of concerted military effort to defeat the extremists. The reason is obvious, and increasingly acknowledged by security observers: as is the case in the North Waziristan agency in FATA, where the presence of the Jalaluddin Haqqani Network has prevented Pakistani Forces from even thinking of launching operations, the existence of the Mullah Mohammad Omar dominated Quetta Shura, and of senior al Qaeda leaders in Quetta, explain Islamabad’s reluctance to launch operations in this region.

The Quetta Shura, as the name suggests is a Shura (council) based in Balochistan’s provincial capital. It was formed by Taliban militants, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, who fled Afghanistan after US Forces attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001. After long denying the existence of this group, the Pakistan Government, on December 10, 2009, conceded the existence of the Shura. Defense Minister Chaudhary Ahmad Mukhtar claimed, in a media interview, that the SFs had “taken on” the Quetta Shura and had inflicted considerable damage, adding, “It no longer poses any threat.” Evidently, both the operational success claimed was vastly exaggerated, and all indicators suggest that the Quetta Shura is alive, well and quite active, even as the policy of denial has been restored. In the latest assertion to this effect, for instance, Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Muhammad Aslam Raisani on August 4, 2011, denied media reports about the existence of Quetta Shura or the presence of Mullah Omar or al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri in Balochistan.

Nevertheless, on May 16, 2011, SFs did kill five suspected al Qaeda linked militants, foiling an alleged attempt to carry out a suicide bombing in Quetta. Earlier, a person suspected of having links with the Afghan Taliban was arrested along with explosives during a search of the Quetta-bound Chaman passenger train at the Chaman Railway Station on April 8, 2011. The September 5, 2011, arrest of Younis al-Mauritani and two of his associates from the city demonstrated the presence of some top al Qaeda operatives in Quetta. Worryingly, the extremists also have a huge popular support base, and hundreds took to the streets in Quetta on May 2, 2011, to pay homage to Osama bin Laden, chanting “Death to America” and setting the US flag ablaze. The demonstrations were led by Maulvi Asmatullah, an independent Member of the National Assembly.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Malik, in a Press Conference on September 10, 2011, disclosed information that suggested that the situation in Quetta was decidedly likely to worsen. He claimed that, “The Tehreek-e-Taliban [Pakistan, TTP] leaders, who were based in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), are facing defeat at the hand of the Pakistan Army and have now moved to Quetta.”

The Quetta Shura-al Qaeda combine has plagued US-led forces fighting in Afghanistan. In one of the deadliest recent attacks, on August 6, 2011, Afghan Taliban militants, working under the guidance of the Quetta Shura shot down a Chinook Transport Helicopter in the Wardak Province of eastern Afghanistan, killing 30 US troops, including 22 Navy SEAL’s from the elite Team 6 – the unit that neutralised Osama bin Laden in the Abbottabad raid – six Afghan National Army (ANA) commandos, and one civilian interpreter. Reiterating Islamabad’s support to terrorist formations in Afghanistan, US Republican Senator Mark Kirk, on September 6, 2011, stated, "Let me be clear: many Americans died in Afghanistan because of Pakistan's ISI [Inter Services Intelligence]… Pakistan's intelligence service is the biggest danger to the Afghan Government. It is also a tremendous threat to the lives of American troops.”

Pakistan has also utilized the militant combine’s services in carrying out attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan. 79 persons have been killed in at least 16 attacks on Indian interests in Afghanistan since 2003. In the latest of such attacks, two Indian nationals were killed in a missile strike launched by Taliban militants on an Indian Non Governmental Organisation’s (NGO's) office in Kunar Province of Afghanistan on October 11, 2010. Earlier, on February 26, 2010, Taliban militants carried out coordinated suicide attacks at two hotels in Kabul, killing at least nine Indians, including two Major-rank Army officers. At least 10 others, including five Indian Army officers, were injured in the strike, which killed eight others, including locals and nationals from other countries. The bombers, believed to be three in number, struck at the guest houses, particularly at Park Residence, rented out by the Indian Embassy for its staffers and those linked to India’s developmental work in Afghanistan. These attacks are believed to have been directed by the Quetta Shura.

The Pakistan establishment believes that its relations with Afghanistan under the incumbent President Hamid Karzai are at odds and its perceived need for ‘strategic depth’ in the country. Consequently, Islamabad has supported Taliban formations in Afghanistan, including the Quetta Shura, believing that these will help drive its strategic interests forward in the event of a premature US withdrawal.

There is visible reluctance in the Government and the Army to take on the Quetta Shura and al Qaeda elements in and around Quetta, even as Pakistan’s SFs execute a brutal ‘kill and dump’ policy against Baloch nationalist rebels. Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) Chairman Nasrullah Baloch on August 18, 2011, claimed that more than 190 bullet-riddled dead bodies had been found during the preceding 11 months. Earlier on June 29, 2011, describing lawlessness in the Province, Zohra Yusuf, Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, confirmed that at least 140 mutilated bodies of people who had gone ‘missing’, had been recovered over the preceding year. "A very dangerous trend has emerged that those who disappeared were now found dead on roadsides. The bodies have torture marks," she noted. The disappearances and killings are widely believed to have been engineered by the Pakistan Army and its intelligence services. Meanwhile, on August 16, 2011, former Balochistan Chief Minister Mir Humayun Marri alleged that the SFs, backed by the Police, had planted arms and ammunition at his farmhouse as a part of bigger plot to kill him.

As in its other provinces, Pakistan’s dual game of targeting one set of militants / extremists, while protecting and even supporting others who are deemed to serve the country’s purported ‘strategic interests’, continues in Balochistan as well. Indeed, in order to appease the Quetta Shura-al Qaeda combine, Pakistan has even asked the US to vacate the Shamsi Air Base in the Kharan District of North West Balochistan, as it overlooks the Quetta region, and is used by the US to execute Drone operations against these groups within and outside Balochistan.

Quetta Shura and al Qaeda linked terrorists are bringing increasing chaos into the city in particular, and the Balochistan Province and the country at large. The ambivalence of the Pakistani establishment has fed, and continues to feed, their power both within the country, and across the border into Afghanistan, where they have wreaked devastation in eight Provinces, including Helmand and Kandahar, where some of the highest International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan fatalities have been recorded.


Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
September 5-11, 2011



Security Force Personnel







Left-wing Extremism






Total (INDIA)








Khyber Pakhtunkhwa





Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


Bangladesh and India agrees to draft Extradition Treaty: India and Bangladesh on September 7 agreed to draft an Extradition Treaty that will allow Bangladesh to deport Indian insurgents being held in its jails. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who met in Dhaka, said both countries would cooperate in the area of counterterrorism. Monstersandcritics, September 8, 2011.


13 persons killed in bomb blast in Delhi: 11 persons were killed and 91 persons got injured in Delhi in a bomb blast near Gate Number 5 of the Delhi High Court on September 7. Two of the injured persons died later. Times of India, September 7-9, 2011.

ULFA and NSCN-K planning to shift their camps in Myanmar following Army operation: The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) are planning to shift their camps in Myanmar amid reports of a crackdown by the Myanmarese army on them. The NSCN-K claimed that about 400 Myanmarese soldiers had moved into the area where its headquarters were located. Times of India, September 11, 2011.

LeT had planned Mumbai-style attacks in Himachal and Punjab, Wikileaks reveals: Secret intelligence reports that have come to light in leaked US diplomatic cables pointed to efforts by "Kashmiri terrorists" to conduct November 26, 2008 Mumbai (26/11)-style attacks in Himachal Pradesh and Punjab after the 26/11 attack. A classified intelligence report sent out by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in March 2009 details efforts by terrorists to "set off explosions and carry out terrorist attacks" in the two States and speculates that a terror team might have already arrived in Himachal Pradesh to carry out the attack. Indian Express, September 8, 2011.

More than 350 militants operating in Jammu and Kashmir: More than 350 militants, many of them Pakistanis, are operating in Jammu and Kashmir, the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) was informed on September 6. "With regard to terrorist organisations in Jammu and Kashmir, presently about 350-370 are assessed to be operating in Jammu and Kashmir. Out of which approximately 38 per cent are foreign militants, primarily Pakistani," Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Jitendra Singh, said in a written reply. Zee News, September 7, 2011.

CPI-Maoist recruited 1,505 cadres during 2010 and 1,458 during current year: Informing the Lok Sabha about the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) organisations, Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Jitendra Singh, on September 6 said, that LWE groups particularly the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in the recent past have been indulging in recruitment of cadre in their strongholds. "As per available inputs, the CPI (Maoist) has recruited 1,505 cadre during 2010 and 1,458 during current year," he said. Zee News, September 7, 2011.

ISI created Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front, reveals Wikileaks: The US officials knew for a very long time that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had created various terrorist groups, including those based out from Nepal, to carry out attacks in India, according to the latest US cables released by Wikileaks. The US cables clearly show that Americans also knew that Tiger Memon, the prime accused in 1993 Mumbai blast case and an aide of global terrorist Dawood Ibrahim, had tied up with the ISI. Indian Express, September 8, 2011.

ISI used Nepal as a hub for terror inside India, says Wikileaks: The Inter services Intelligence (ISI) had made Nepal a hub of anti-India terror activities from where it pushed huge quantities of RDX into the country, latest US cables released by the Wikileaks revealed. In these cables, US officials had conceded that it was the ISI which created various terrorist fronts to carry out terrorist activities in India, including the bomb blasts in the busy areas of Connaught Place, Lajpat Nagar in New Delhi and several cities across the country. Times of India, September 7, 2011.

816 Naxalites surrendered from 2008 to 2010, says Union Minister of State in MHA Jitendra Singh: Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Jitendra Singh, in a written reply to a question in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) informed on September 6 that a total of 816 Naxalites [Left-Wing Extremists (LWEs)] have surrendered from 2008 to 2010. While 400 LWEs surrendered in 2008, 150 and 266 LWEs surrendered in 2009 and 2010 respectively. PIB, September 6, 2011.

Chhattisgarh passes Auxiliary Armed Police Force Act: Two months after the Supreme Court held that the deployment of Special Police Officers (SPOs) in the fight against Naxalites [Left-Wing Extremists (LWEs)] was illegal, the Chhattisgarh Assembly on September 8 passed an Act authorising an "auxiliary armed force" to "assist security forces in dealing with Maoist/Naxal violence" and legalising existing SPOs by inducting them as members. The Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Force Act came into force with retrospective effect from July 5, the day the apex court passed its order. Indian Express, September 10, 2011.


Nepali Congress unveils 14-pt document on peace process: The Nepali Congress (NC), which unveiled its official and latest stand on peace process on September 7, said it is seriously doubtful over the commitment of Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) to implementing the past pacts concerning peace and statute, especially given the "controversial" four-point deal with United Democratic Madhesh Front (UDMF). eKantipur, September 8, 2011.


28 persons killed in twin suicide attacks in Balochistan: At least 28 people were killed and over 60 injured in two suicide attacks targeting the residence of the Deputy Inspector-General (DIG) of Frontier Corps (FC) Brigadier Farrukh Shehzad in Quetta on September 7. The dead included a Colonel of the FC and the DIG's wife. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, September 6-12, 2011.

US sanctions three al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan: US officials on September 7 imposed financial sanctions on three al Qaeda leaders based in Pakistan, including Libya-born propaganda chief, Abu Yahya al-Libi. The two others named by the US Treasury Department were Younis al-Mauritani, who was arrested in Quetta on September 5, and Mustafa Hajji Muhammad Khan, who was identified by Treasury as a logistical supporter of al Qaeda. Dawn, September 8, 2011.

12,020 persons arrested during eight months, says Karachi Police press release: Karachi Police press release said that have arrested 12,020 accused from January 1 to September 8, 2011, during actions against criminal elements, while 26 Police Officers and Constables embraced martyrdom and 65 others injured during encounters. 12,020 accused including 5,239 dacoits, 6,427 absconders and 354 wanted accused. Police recovered 4,194 illegal weapons, including 38 SMGs, LMGs; 11 shotguns, 54 rifles, 82 repeaters, 3,648 pistols, 210 revolvers, four carbines, 22 mousers, four RPGs and 20 hand grenades from their possession. Daily Times, September 12, 2011.

30 percent of Karachi Policemen are terrorist sympathisers, says Sindh Police Chief IGP Wajid Ali Durrani: Alluding to the Supreme Court's criticism of inherent weaknesses in Police investigations, the Sindh Police Chief Inspector-General of Police (IGP) Wajid Ali Durrani confessed on September 9 that an incomplete FIR had led to exoneration of alleged attackers. IGP Wajid Ali Durrani said, "Thirty per cent of the police force sympathises with them [criminals]," he claimed. Tribune, September 10, 2011.

All political parties have armed groups, says Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry: Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on September 8 remarked that "all the political parties have formed armed groups and the current situation is very critical". The CJP further said, "If the criminal factor is eliminated from political parties, a peaceful atmosphere can be restored across Sindh, especially in Karachi." Daily Times, September 9, 2011.

ISI responsible for death of Americans in Afghanistan, says US Senator Mark Kirk: Terming Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as the biggest danger to the Afghanistan Government, US Senator Mark Kirk on September 8 said that ISI was responsible for the death of several Americans inside war-ravaged Afghanistan. "Pakistan has become the main threat to Afghanistan. Pakistan's intelligence service is the biggest danger to the Afghan government. It is also a tremendous threat to the lives of American troops," Senator Mark Kirk said. Indain Express, September 9, 2011.


Resettlement of IDPs almost complete, says Government: The Government said that Welfare camps in the Eastern and Northern provinces had been closed with over 95 percent of the quarter million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in them having returned to their homes. Resettlement Ministry officials said on September 5 that the Government was set to provide them with permanent houses. Daily News, September 6, 2011.

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

K. P. S. Gill

Dr. Ajai Sahni

A Project of the
Institute For Conflict Management

To receive FREE advance copies of SAIR by email Subscribe.

Recommend South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) to a friend.





Copyright © 2001 SATP. All rights reserved.