Irreconcilable Differences | Odisha: Expanding Maoist Front | South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 10.15
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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 15, October 17, 2011

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT


AFGHANISTAN
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Irreconcilable Differences
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

Evidently, these are colossal challenges, and the temptation to lapse into the make-believe of aid-driven development, democratization, 'peace processes', 'negotiated settlements', and deals with the 'good Taliban' will be great. But these are precisely the contours of past failure. Unless the hard core of Pakistan's 'enduring pathologies', its risk of state failure, and the cumulative consequences of these, are directly addressed, policy initiatives, including Obama's AfPak, will secure nothing of enduring value.

On November 3, 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had stated, “we call on our Taliban brothers to come home and embrace their land." In sharp contrast, in a videotaped speech released by his office on October 1, 2011, he ruled out further attempts to negotiate peace with the Taliban, declaring,

Their messengers are coming and killing … So with whom should we make peace? I cannot find Mullah Mohammad Omar. Where is he? I cannot find the Taliban council. Where is it? Mullah Omar doesn't have an address ... their peace emissary turns out to be a killer, whom should we talk to? The Afghan nation asks me who's the other party that you hold talks with? My answer is, Pakistan... The only solution, which is also the demand of all people, is that talks be held with the Pakistani side, since all the sanctuaries and safe havens of the opposition are located in that country...

On October 7, 2011, he elaborated, further,

We have not said we will not talk to them (the Taliban). We've said we don't know who to talk to. We're not dealing with an identifiable individual as a representative of the Taliban, or a place that we can knock on and say, ‘Well, here we are. We want to talk to you.’ Until that place emerges – an address and a representative – we will not be able to talk to the Taliban because we don't know where to find them.

He, however, again stressed that only Pakistan held the key to making peace with insurgents and must, consequently, do more to support reconciliation. He asserted that the Taliban were being propped up by Pakistan, and that, "Definitely, the Taliban will not be able to move a finger without Pakistani support."

In a span of under two years, Karzai has evidently lost the addresses of the Taliban leadership, though he appears to have discovered that the group can only be traced back to Pakistan and nowhere else. On October 6, 2011, US President Barack Obama confirmed this suspicion, noting that Pakistan was "hedging its bets" by maintaining ties to militant groups trying to undermine the Afghan Government. Obama observed, "The fact is the Taliban were and are stationed, in terms of their political headquarters and operational headquarters, in Pakistan. We all know that. The Pakistanis know that. We know that."

For years, Karzai has sought to placate Islamabad in the hope that conciliation and appeasement might make the Generals and their proxies in Pakistan diminish their hostility towards Kabul. Karzai’s position hardened only after the assassination of former Afghanistan President and head of the High Peace Council (HPC) Burhanuddin Rabbani in a suicide bomb attack at his home, close to the American Embassy in Kabul, on September 20, 2011. Four of Rabbani's bodyguards also died. Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA, Islamic Society of Afghanistan), one of the oldest among the major political parties in the country, was killed by a suicide bomber, who had feigned a desire to reconcile with the Government. The bomber had kept the explosives in his turban. Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, HPC Secretariat chief and the head of a reintegration program for mid and lower-level Taliban militants into Afghan society, was also wounded in the attack. 

Appointed by President Hamid Karzai in October 2010, the 70-member HPC, including eight women, was intended to broker peace with the Taliban. The Council included jihadi leaders, Government officials and some former members of the Taliban and of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami (HeI, Islamic Party). Arsalan Rahmani Daulat, a former Taliban Deputy Higher Education Minister; Habibullah Fawzi, a former Taliban diplomat in Saudi Arabia; Sayeedur Rahman Haqani, a former Taliban Deputy Minister for Mines and Industries and, later, for Public Works; and Faqir Mohammad Khan, another former Taliban leader, are some of the prominent members of the Council. These four leaders are among 14 former Taliban members removed from the UN Sanctions List on July 15, 2011, as part of the move to induce the armed group into talks with the Afghan Government to secure a ‘peace deal’. Earlier, Afghan officials had said they were seeking the de-listing of about 20 people from the UN Sanctions List.

The Council was set up on the proposal of the Consultative Peace Jirga held by Afghan Government between June 2 and 4, 2010, with the participation of 1,600 tribal elders. In the meantime, the international community also held conferences in London and Kabul on January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, respectively, to put their support and weight behind an Afghan-led ‘reconciliation process’.

The reconciliation process, in fact, was initiated soon after President Obama entered the White House. Under pressure because of new developments at home, Obama, in a media interview aboard Air Force One on March 6, 2009, admitted that the US was not winning the war in Afghanistan and opened the door to a reconciliation process. He asked Karzai to take the initiative, differentiating between the “Good Taliban” and “Bad Taliban”. He, however, acknowledged that the outreach may not yield the same success as in Iraq. “The situation in Afghanistan is, if anything, more complex. You have a less governed region, a history of fierce independence among tribes. Those tribes are multiple and sometimes operate at cross purposes, and so figuring all that out is going to be much more of a challenge.”

By June 18, 2011, Karzai was claiming, “Peace talks have started with [the Taliban] already and it is going well. Foreign militaries, especially the United States of America, are going ahead with these negotiations.” A day earlier, the UN Security Council split the UN sanctions list for Taliban and al Qaeda figures into two separate categories. US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice explained the move, “The United States believes that the new sanctions regime for Afghanistan will serve as an important tool to promote reconciliation, while isolating extremists," arguing that the move sent "a clear message to the Taliban that there is a future for those who separate from al Qaeda, renounce violence and abide by the Afghan constitution."

As expected, however, Obama’s apprehensions were clearly not misplaced. The HPC made little progress. So far, it has only managed to ‘reintegrate’ about 2,000 of the estimated 25,000-40,000 insurgents in Afghanistan. However, even individuals who had ‘reconciled’ were not found to be reliable, as was evident from the April 1, 2011, attack on a UN compound in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, in which at least eight foreign UN workers and four others were killed. Reports indicate that some of ‘reconciled’ elements incited the locals to attack the UN compound.

Conspicuously, no substantive peace talks have yet taken place between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. In fact, the Taliban have shown no signs of interest in responding to Kabul’s blandishments and have repeatedly rejected the HPC, calling it “a trick to deceive public opinion” and demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. They have accused Karzai of betraying the national interests, since “decisions on Afghanistan are made in Washington and London, while the announcements are made in Kabul.” Reacting on September 6, 2011, days before his assassination, Rabbani had argued, “the movement by the name of Taliban creates tragedy and disaster, recruit children and claim to be religious students [sic].”

On April 30, 2011, the Taliban had announced the launch of their 2011 military offensive, Operation Badr, in which the insurgents sought to “attack foreign troops, members of their spy networks, high-ranking Government officials, and members of the Cabinet and Parliament.” A Taliban-issued statement reproduced by The Long War Journal indicated that the tactics of Operation Badr would consist of "utilizing all proven military tactics – including the usage of advanced weapons against the air and ground forces of the invaders, hit-and-run attacks, group offensives, city attacks, advanced explosive attacks, and effective group and martyrdom seeking attacks by our warrior Mujahedeen".

Since then, Taliban has carried out many high profile attacks, the most prominent of which include:

July 12: Ahmad Wali Karzai head of the Provincial Council of the Kandahar Province and younger brother of President Hamid Karzai was assassinated by one of his guards at his residence. The Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.

July 13: A suicide bomber blew himself up inside Sara Mosque in Kandahar city, where people had gathered to pay homage and pray for Ahmad Wali Karzai, killing Mawlawi Hekmatullah Hekmat, the head of religious council of Kandahar, and four others.

July 17: Jan Mohammad Khan, a senior advisor to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and Hashim Watanwal, a Member of the Afghan Parliament, were killed when two assailants stormed Khan's house in the capital city of Kabul.

July 27: A suicide bomber blew himself up killing the Mayor of Kandahar city Ghulam Haider Hamidi, and one civilian.

August 6, 2011: A US Chinook Transport Helicopter shot down by the Taliban in the Wardak Province of eastern Afghanistan. 30 US troops, including 22 Navy SEALs from the elite Team 6 – the unit that neutralised Osama bin Laden in the Abbottabad raid – six Afghan National Army (ANA) commandos, and one civilian interpreter, were killed in the incident.

A rash of lesser attacks pushed fatalities up in all categories. A total of 1,068 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) personnel were killed over the entire period since 2001 till January 19, 2009 (when Obama took over the US Presidency). Between January 20, 2009, and October 16, 2011, ISAF fatalities have risen by 1,699 (till October 16, 2011), with 486 of these in 2011 alone. Civilian deaths have also recorded a sharp increase. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 1,523 civilian fatalities were recorded in 2007; these increased to 2,118 in 2008; 2,412 in 2009; and 2,777 in 2010. Till June 15, 2011, 1,462 civilians had died. By comparison, 1,271 deaths had been reported in the first half of 2010. Reports also indicate that, since 2007, 2,234 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops and 3,273 Afghan Police personnel have died in the conflict. The number of suicide attacks by Taliban cadres has also increased dramatically. 1,231 persons died in 421 suicide attacks between 2001 and 2008; the fatalities shot up to 2,571 in 329 attacks since January 1, 2009 (data till October 15,, 2011).

Clearly, that the ‘reconciliation process’ has failed to deliver. Reports indicate that there have been serious differences of opinion between Afghanistan and the US regarding whom to talk to. Though recent media disclosures indicated that the US had tried to approach the Haqqani Network, Muhammad Amir Rana of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies claimed, “The Americans are only interested in talks with Mullah Omar.” The Americans are, in fact, convinced that they are more targeted by the Haqqani Network than by the Quetta Shura Taliban. Unsurprisingly, the September 13-14, 2011, incident which killed 27 people — 11 civilians, 11 militants and five Police officers—after a 20-hour battle following Taliban attacks on the National Directorate of Security (NDS) office, the US embassy, NATO Headquarters and some Government compounds in Kabul, was attributed by the Americans, including US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan C. Crocker, and former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, to the Haqqani Network.  Subsequently, Janbaz Zadran, who was accused of helping the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on foreign troops in Kabul and south-eastern Afghanistan, was killed in a drone attack on October 13, 2011, in Miranshah in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.

Rana argues, further, that “Karzai thinks that, if he doesn't negotiate with Haqqani, he won’t have security.” This, indeed, is the reasoning that underlies Karzai’s line that the ‘solution’ to Afghanistan’s interminable problems lies in Pakistan, since Pakistan has long regarded the Haqqani Network as a ‘strategic asset’. The contours of any such ‘solution’, however, will remain impossible to define, as long as Pakistan’s current strategic projections, and Islamabad’s quest for ‘strategic depth’ in a crippled Afghanistan in the wake of a premature Western withdrawal, remain unchanged. Indeed, Pakistan has repeatedly made it abundantly clear that negotiations with any Taliban faction can only be successful through Islamabad’s ‘good offices’, and will be quickly scuttled by terrorist attacks or the neutralization of ‘renegade’ elements who seek peace, if any direct contacts are initiated.

The wayward ‘reconciliation process’ in Afghanistan has only fed greater chaos and made Kabul increasingly vulnerable to infiltration by double-dealing elements linked to the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence, whose unrelenting hostility to stability in Afghanistan should, by now, have been more than evident to all concerned. Unfortunately, as the costs and pain of the unending war in Afghanistan enlarge, the seduction of make believe has a parallel proclivity to rise alongside.

INDIA
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Odisha: Expanding Maoist Front
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

In the early hours of September 19, 2011, a group of about 15 to 20 Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres dragged Narayana Duan (33), a forest guard, from his house at Jaipur village, located in the foothills of Gandhamardan hill under the Boden Police Station in Bargarh District, and killed him nearby. A letter left by the Maoists claimed that Duan was a ‘Police informer’, and was ‘punished’ as such. It was the first killing of a Government employee by the Maoists in the District.

Earlier, in the night of August 14, a group of nearly 60 armed Maoists dragged a local Biju Janata Dal (BJD, the ruling party in the State) leader, Raj Kishore Panda, from his residence in Telenpali village under Khaparakhol Block (administrative division) in Bolangir District, and shot him dead, again claiming he was a ‘Police informer’. Panda was the block nominee of the BJD Lok Sabha [Lower House of Parliament] Member Kalikesh Narayan Singhdeo, for supervising developmental works in the area. This was the first incident of civilian killing by Maoists in the District, though a Maoist fatality had been recorded earlier, on June 21, 2011, in the District.

On July 27, the Maoists killed a contractor, identified as Ajit Patnaik, in Kalahandi District, registering the first civilian killing in this District.

In addition to these three Districts, neighbouring Nuapada has also witnessed increased Maoist activities, with the killing of nine Policemen and three civilians in the current year, and one civilian each in 2010 and 2009. The nine Policemen, including an Assistant Superintendent of Police, belonging to the Gariyaband Police District in Chhattisgarh, were killed in a landmine blast triggered by the Maoists, 15 kilometres from Chhattisgarh border in the Sunabeda Forest in Nuapada District. They had crossed the border following reports of Maoist movement in the area.

According to SATP data, little Maoist activities were visible in these Districts prior to 2011. Only four fatalities (two civilians and two Maoists) were recorded in the six years (2005-2010) preceding, while as many as 16 fatalities [six civilian, nine Security Force (SF) personnel and one Maoist] have been witnessed in 2011. Further, at least six Maoists have been arrested in the current year in these Districts, as against none in the preceding six years.

Indeed, at the Chief Ministers’ Conference on Internal Security held in New Delhi on February 1, 2011, Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik had requested the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to include Bargarh and three nearby Districts – Kalahandi, Nuapada, and Bolangir – in the western parts of the State under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, in addition to the existing 15 Maoist affected Districts [Gajapati, Ganjam, Keonjhar, Koraput, Malkangiri, Mayurbhanj, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Sambalpur, Sundargarh, Nayagarh, Kandhamal, Deogarh, Jajpur and Dhenkanal]. Further, Chief Minister Patnaik called upon the MHA, in June, 2011, to substantially increase financial assistance for security related infrastructure, and also to deploy an additional four Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalions for the State to contain and prevent Left Wing Extremism (LWE) violence.

Increased Maoist activity in these four hitherto marginally affected Districts has, consequently, not come as a surprise. A Standing Committee of the Odisha Legislative Assembly on Home Department, which was established to recommend the creation of a Security Battalion to guard 16 jails in the CPI-Maoist-affected areas and eight other highly sensitive prisons, stated in its March, 2011 report, that the Maoist were trying to open up new fronts along the Odisha-Chhattishgarh border by expanding their activities in Districts like Nuapada, Kalahandi, Bolangir, Bargarh and Nabarangpur. Nabarangpur District, just south of Kalahandi and north of Koraput, is another District where Maoist activities were noticed just a year ago.

Despite intelligence reports suggesting intensification of Maoist activities in these Districts, the state failed to initiate adequate proactive and preventive responses, even as Maoist consolidation deepened, taking advantage of the nominal SF presence in the area.

The newly affected Districts in Odisha provide a unique strategic advantage to the Maoists, as they fill a big gap between the Maoist strong-holds in the Koraput-Malkangiri Districts of Odisha and the Bastar region in Chhattisgarh, on one end, and strong-holds in Jharkhand and West Bengal, at the other end. This ‘corridor’ includes Sambalpur, Sundargarh and Keonjhar Districts, where the Maoist influence has been on record since January 23, 2003, with the killing of Kadar Singh, former sarpanch (head of village level local self-Government) of Tampargarh in Meghapal village of the Jujumura tehsil (revenue unit) in the Sambalpur District. As a result of this further consolidation, a Maoist company from Abujhmadh in Chhattisgarh can move freely through Koraput-Nabarangpur to the depth of the Saranda forest in Jharkhand, moving across Kalahandi, Nuapada, Bolangir, Bargarh, Sambalpur and Sundargarh Districts. Such freedom of movement can create an extraordinary challenge for the anti-Maoist operations by the SFs. On October 8, 2011, for instance, the SFs engaged the Maoists in an hour-long gunbattle in the Sambalpur District, forcing the rebels to retreat and neutralising their camp at the Gaigot-Kuleijharan Hills near Gusriabahal village. There were, however, no Maoist fatalities, and such withdrawals are, at best, temporary.

In order to intensify their activities in the area, the Maoists have set up a ‘Bargarh-Mahasamund Divisional Committee’, to cover Odisha's Bargarh District and Chhattisgarh's Mahasamund District. According to sources, Sitanadi, Udanti and Gariba are the three principal units under the Mainpur Division [Chhattisgarh], which have been operating in the border Districts of Nuapada, Bargarh and Bolangir for the past two years.

Though SFs have intensified combing operations in Nabarangpur, especially in the areas bordering Chhattisgarh, the Maoists continue to consolidate their base in the District. Sources indicate that rebels from Chhattisgarh are keen on pushing deeper into Nabarangpur as it would give them access to other Districts of the State, including Kalahandi and Bolangir.

In addition to the strategic drive for the corridor between the Abujmaadh and Saranda forests, consolidation across the new Districts appears to have been catalyzed by some pressure exerted on the Maoists in other areas as a result of counter-insurgency operations by Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. On February 3, 2011, Odisha Chief Minister Patnaik disclosed, "During the last three months alone, the SFs have conducted as many as 214 special operations and have achieved considerable success. As many as 91 Maoists have been arrested, 24 Maoists have died in Police action and 54 weapons have been recovered.” Though the Counter insurgency operations were suspended as part of the effort to secure the release of the Collector of Malkangiri, R. Vineel Krishna, who was abducted by the Maoists on February 16, 2011, the Odisha Government took the decision to resume operation on April 27, 2011, after intelligence inputs indicated that the Maoists were regrouping and planning major operations in the State. Since then, four SF personnel and three Maoists have been killed in the State outside in their existing ‘corridor’. 41 Maoists have been arrested and another 27 have surrendered in the State outside in the ‘corridor’ area, just between April 27, 2011 and October 16, 2011 reflecting the pressure on the Maoists.

Significantly, the ‘military chief’ of the Maoists in the Andhra Odisha Border (AOB) area, Pratapareddy Ramachandra Reddy alias Anjaneyulu, was replaced in the last week of July 2011 by Gajarla Ashok alias Ranganna alias Janardhan alias Aitu, previously in-charge of the South Bastar Division in the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), to revive Maoist strength in the AOB area and lift the morale of cadres, as Anjaneyulu was seen to be progressively failing.

Both Odisha and Chhattisgarh had agreed, on June 8, 2011, on the need to undertake joint operations in view of the new front opened up by the extremists in areas adjoining both States. A senior Odisha Police official, cited in the media, noted,

We did not feel this need earlier as Odisha's border with Chhattisgarh did not witness much Maoist activities... So far we had engaged all our resources in other areas, including Malkangiri and Rayagada Districts bordering Andhra Pradesh, where the rebels had been wreaking havoc for years. But now that the Maoists have started creating trouble on the State's western side, we have started deploying Central and state forces to contain them. We have already deployed forces in strategic areas. More deployment is on the cards.

After the Gariyaband incident, the Central Government allocated five extra battalions of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to be deployed on both sides of the Chhattisgarh-Odisha border. Given Odisha’s poor Police population ratio (at 108 per 100,000), such Central deployments can have only limited impact. The State has demanded another four battalions, of which two were to be deployed in the four newly afflicted Districts, but this is yet to be accepted by the Centre. At present, seven CRPF battalions and five BSF battalions have been deployed in Maoist-hit areas of the State, in support of 50 units of specially-trained Special Operation Group (SOG) of the State Police, to combat the Maoists. On July 29, 2011, the State Government announced its decision to strengthen the SOG by raising another 35 units (each unit comprises some 30 personnel).

While limited pressure has been exerted on the Maoists, there is little reason to believe that their rampage is being successfully contained. Despite losses, the rebels continue to expand their areas of influence and violence. Odisha’s tentative steps, including joint operations with Forces from neighbouring States, have failed to neutralize Maoist advances into wider areas, and the operational challenges for the SFs can only grow, as contiguous areas are brought into an expanding corridor of rebel influence and activity.



NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
October 10-16, 2011

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

  

Assam

3
0
0
3

Jammu & Kashmir

0
0
2
2

Manipur

0
0
1
1

Meghalaya

0
1
0
1

Left-wing Extremism

  

Bihar

1
0
0
1

Chhattisgarh

0
0
1
1

Maharashtra

1
0
0
1

Total (INDIA)

5
1
4
10

PAKISTAN

  

Balochistan

4
0
0
4

FATA

1
0
31
32

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

7
0
14
21

Punjab

1
0
0
1

Sindh

6
0
0
6

Total (PAKISTAN)

19
0
45
64
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.



INDIA

RDX-laden car found in Haryana: Over 5-kilograms of explosives and detonators were recovered from a car parked outside Cantonment railway station in Ambala on October 12. Delhi Police said that the explosives-laden car found at Ambala was headed to the national capital for a terror strike. Times of India, October 13-14, 2011.

Militants' strength across LoC all time high, says Army official: With increase in the presence of militants across the Line of Control (LoC), the Army has deployed additional troops in priority areas to counter infiltration in the State ahead of snowfall. "According to Intelligence reports, strength of militants across (the LoC) has crossed all proportions. At present, opposite Shamsabari (range) and Uri, there are 600 militants," said General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Srinagar-based 15 Corps Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain on October 11. Daily Excelsior, October 12, 2011.

Intelligence reports hint at attempts to revive terrorism in Punjab: There are specific intelligence reports categorically citing attempts at revival of terrorism in the state. Recent intelligence reports have cautioned the government about renewed efforts by the ISI and Pakistan-based terror groups, including Babbar Khalsa International, to send consignment of arms, explosives, fake currency and drugs for spreading terror-incidents and drug menace in the state and disrupting its economy. Times of India, October 17, 2011.

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee sets 7-day deadline for Maoists to lay down arms: West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on October 15 gave Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) a seven-day deadline to lay down arms, saying violence would not be tolerated any more. "I am giving you (Maoists) a seven-day ultimatum to lay down guns. Think over it. We will not tolerate any more violence. Killings and negotiations cannot go hand in hand," she said. Hindustan Times, October 16, 2011.

Myanmar seeks satellite maps of NE militant camps to launch operation: Taking a step towards closer security cooperation, Yangon, the capital of Myanmar has told New Delhi to provide satellite imagery of North East (NE) militant camps based across the border in Myanmar, so that a military operation can be launched. Nagaland Post, October 17, 2011.


PAKISTAN

TTP raises funds through street crimes: The daylight raids and the subsequent attacks are carried out by the "Black Night" group, a unit of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) dedicated to raising funds through robberies, kidnappings and extortion, according to a cadre of the outfit and Intelligence Officers. The TTP draws on a network of militants and for-hire criminals that stretches from the country's north western towns, through its Punjab heartland to the commercial capital, Karachi. Daily Times, October 13, 2011.

TTP renews offer on talks: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on October 10 sent out a second feeler sounding its willingness to accept the Government's offer for talks with "militant groups" albeit with countries like Saudi Arabia playing the role of mediator. TTP 'commander' Maulvi Waliur Rehman Mehsud said, "Our shura [council] will decide whether and when can we enter into talks with the Government, with the military…but I think we will like to involve countries we trust… they are in the Arab world. Let's say Saudi Arabia." The Hindu, October 11, 2011.

IHC stays execution of former Punjab Governor Salman Taseer's assassin Malik Mumtaz Qadri: The Islamabad High Court (IHC) on October 11 stayed the execution of Mumtaz Qadri who was convicted of killing former Punjab Governor Salman Taseer. An IHC bench comprising Chief Justice Iqbal Hameedur Rehman and Justice Mohammad Anwar Khan Kasi took up an appeal of Mumtaz Qadri against his conviction. Dawn, October 12, 2011.

Islamabad maintains relations with some militant groups, says US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta: US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta on October 11 said that the US is waging 'war' in Pakistan against militants. He pointed to a "complicated relationship" between Washington and Islamabad.The two countries had sharp disagreements over "the relations they maintain with some of the militant groups in that country," added Panetta. The News, October 12, 2011.


SRI LANKA

Ambassador alleges Human Right groups to be in a hurry to vilify Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka's ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the EU Ravinatha Aryasinha, alleged that Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group were intent on pre-judging and discrediting the LLRC report even before it is released. Daily News, October 14, 2011.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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