SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 29, January 23, 2012

BANGLADESH

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Failed Coup
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

In nearly three years of almost consistently positive news from Bangladesh, the revelation that a coup plot had been foiled by Dhaka has sent shock waves through the region, and underlined the dangers of residual Islamist extremism within the country.

On January 19, 2012, it was disclosed that the Bangladesh Army had discovered and neutralized a plot by some serving and retired Army officers, at the instigation of some Bangladeshi civilians at home and abroad, capitalizing on the sentiments of the Islamist extremists. The conspiracy was intended to overthrow the Awami League (AL) led civilian Government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed.

Revealing the details of the plot, Brigadier General Muhammad Mashud Razzaq, Director of the Personnel Services Directorate, and Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Sazzad Siddique, acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, in a Press briefing on January 19, 2012, circulated a statement saying that “around 14 to 16 mid-level officers were believed to have been involved in the bid”, which came to notice when Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Ehsan Yusuf on December 13, 2011, instigated a serving Major (not named) to join him in executing his plan. The Major revealed the plot through the chain of command. Two retired officers, Ehsan Yusuf and Major Zakir, were arrested. Another plotter, a serving Major, Syed Mohammad Ziaul Haque alias Major Zia, is on the run. Meanwhile, a Court of Inquiry was constituted on December 28, 2011, to unearth further information about the plot.

Though it will take time to unravel all the facts, the revelation that at least two plotters have already admitted their links with the banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT, ‘Party of Liberation’) has once again brought focus on Islamist fundamentalist groups that continue to maintain their strong presence in the country’s military establishment. Indeed, on January 8, 2012, HuT had circulated provocative leaflets, based on the fugitive Major Zia's internet message, throughout the country. Zia had sent out two e-mails containing imaginary and highly controversial contents, styled “Mid-level Officers of Bangladesh Army are Bringing down Changes Soon (sic)”. The Bangladesh Security Forces (SFs) on January 20, 2012, arrested another five HuT cadres in connection with the failed coup attempt.

This is the second attempt military revolt by hardliners under the Hasina Government since it came to power after the elections of December 2008. On February 25 and 26, 2009, shortly after the Government took charge, members of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), since renamed the Bangladesh Border Guards, staged a mutiny against their commanding officers, killing more than 74 persons, including 52 officers, SF personnel and six civilians, including the Director General of the BDR and his wife. The mutineers, backed by the Islamists, wanted to create a rift between the Hasina Government and the military, in order to overthrow the civilian Government. They failed in the face of an effective and concerted response by the military top brass.

Interestingly, Sajeeb Wazed, an Information Technology specialist, political analyst and advisor to Sheikh Hasina, along with Carl Ciovacco, in an article titled 'Stemming the rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh' published in the Harvard International Review on November 19, 2008, had underlined the ‘astronomical growth’ of Islamists in the military, claiming that madrassas (religious seminaries) supplied nearly 35 per cent of Army recruits. Indeed, the seminaries in Bangladesh have emerged as the principal medium for fundamentalists to propagate radical ideologies.

The radicalization process has been rooted in Bangladeshi politics since the bloody coup of August 15, 1975, which killed the country’s founding father, Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Sheikh Hasina’s father). The coup leaders used Islam as an instrument to legitimize and secure their power. Succeeding regimes have collaborated with radical and fundamentalist Islamic political organizations. Indeed, the principal political parties, in their efforts to oust the military from power, maintained tactical relationships with fundamentalist political organizations, giving them unbridled power, which radicalised society and the polity to the core. The AL was guilty of such alliances in the past, though, in its current tenure, it has acted with determination and consistency against Islamist extremist elements in the country.   

On April 2009, the AL Government blacklisted 12 extremist organisations – Harkat-ul Jihad Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hiqma (SAH), Hizbut Touhid, Islami Samaj, Ulema Anjuman al Baiyinaat, HuT, Islamic Democratic Party, Touhid Trust, Tamir-ud-Deen, Alla’r Dal. Four of these 12 groups, including HuJI, SAH, JMJB and JMB, had already been banned during the earlier Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeI) coalition regime.

Later, on March 25, 2010, the AL Government set up a special tribunal for the trial of "war criminals" of Liberation War of 1971. Five of the Jamaat's top leaders, including its 'chief' Motiur Rahman Nizami and Secretary General Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojahid, were jailed in this connection. Subsequently, on January 11, 2012, former JeI 'chief' Gholam Azam was sent to jail by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), which, on January 9, 2012, had accepted formal charges against Azam and present 'chief' Nizami for their alleged involvement in war crimes.

Further, on June 27, 2011, 666 members of the 24^th Border Guards Battalion were tried before the BDR Tribunal, a military court. All but nine were found guilty and sentenced to terms ranging from four months to seven years in prison.

In June 2011, the Government passed the Constitution (15^th Amendment) Bill, 2011, restoring secularism as a ‘fundamental pillar’ of the Bangladesh Constitution.

An extremist backlash was almost inevitable.

Meanwhile, on January 19, 2012, Prime Minister Hasina accused the "desperate" opposition of "plotting" against her Government. Criticizing the BNP, she declared, "They are desperate to spoil the democratic process. They are threatening the Government to protect the war criminals." It is widely reported that the BNP is vehemently opposing the trial of war criminals to support its ally, JeI, and some of its own leaders. Notably, a former BNP Minister Abdul Alim and a BNP lawmaker Salahuddin Qader Chowdhury, have been accused of war crimes.

Though there is no conclusive report of direct BNP involvement in the attempted coup, some developments raise a finger of suspicion.  Indeed, Abdul Hye Sikder (a former leader of the cultural wing of BNP) wrote a provocative article in Amar Desh, a vernacular daily, instigating the anti-Government sentiment of the Islamist forces within and outside the Bangladesh Armed forces. Apparently referring to BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia's remarks at a Chittagong rally on January 9, 2012, that 'even army personnel are being abducted', Brigadier Razzaq, while disclosing details of the coup plot, hinted at possible BNP involvement, stating, "Even a large political party sang along imaginary, misleading and propagandist news to bring allegations, which created unexpected and provocative debate among the Army and conscious citizens."

HuT has been gradually gaining grounds in Bangladesh, and is currently regarded as the strongest anti-state organisation in Bangladesh. Another such group, Hizbut Touhid, established in 1994 at Korotia village in the Tangail District, and led by Bayezid Khan Panni alias Selim Panni, who claims himself to be the Imam-uz-Zaman [Leader of the Age], has also extended its base. The Hizbut Touhid, which aspires to establish the ‘world leadership’ of the Imam-uz-Zaman, declares itself against democracy and democratic institutions, which it regards as ‘rules of evil’.

According to SATP data, the SFs have arrested 213 HuT cadres since March 10, 2000, (till January 22, 2012), out of which 96 have been arrested since the Hasina Government came to power in January 2009. 107 Hizbut Touhid cadres have also been arrested by the current Hasina regime. Nevertheless, these groups, in alliance with the JeI, continue to constitute a major threat for the Hasina Government, though the dangers have, in some measure, been minimised by sustained SF action.

These dangers have not, however, seized to exist, and even a group like the JMB, which was decimated in the aftermath of the serial bombings of August 2005, is reported to be exerting visible efforts to engineer a revival. Quoting Abu Talha Mohammad Fahim aka Bashar, a son of detained JMB chief Saidur Rahman, officials of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) disclosed that the reorganisation attempts under the directives of JMB’s acting 'chief' Sohel Mahfuz, were being intensified.

The failed coup is a reminder that Islamist Forces in the country, while they have weakened, have not been entirely contained. Despite the tremendous gains of the past three years, the threat of an Islamist resurgence, of coup attempts, of terrorism and of engineered political violence, will persist as long as these groupings continue to have a base in the country.

INDIA

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Meghalaya: Festering Wounds
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 19, 2012, a group of seven Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) cadres armed with AK-47 rifles and SLR rifles shot dead two civilians at Songsak village in West Khasi Hills District. Earlier, on January 16, 2012, two Garo youth, identified as Pak Momin and Engti Marak, were shot dead by GNLA militants, who suspected them to be Police informers. According to the Police, the two youth hailed from Konchikol village, and were killed near their homes under Resubelpara Sub-Division in East Garo Hills District.

Despite a measure of stabilization, violence continues to haunt the State. Meghalaya was fast returning to peace, before the emergence of GNLA in 2009. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, insurgency related fatalities increased to 29 in 2011 (in 13 incidents of killing) as compared to 20 in 2010 (in 11 incidents of killing). More worryingly, civilian fatalities nearly quadrupled, from three in 2010 to 11 in 2011. This is the first time since 2003 that fatalities among the civilians have reached double digits. Similarly, the State recorded double digit fatalities among the Security Forces (SFs) for the first time since 2002, with 10 fatalities among SFs personnel in 2011, as against none in 2010. In fact, it was on December 7, 2008, that a trooper had last been killed in the State. On the contrary, militant fatalities declined, with eight killed in 2011, as compared to 17 in 2010. 2009 had recorded four insurgent fatalities.

Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Meghalaya, 2001-2012

The State recorded five major incidents (each involving three or more killings) in 2011, as compared to just one in 2010. Prominent among the major incidents were:  

October 31, 2011: About 12 to 15 heavily armed GNLA militants ambushed a Police patrol at Nengpatchi village in East Garo Hills District, killing four Policemen and a civilian driver before decamping with five automatic rifles.

June 4, 2011: Three Policemen were killed and two others injured in an ambush by suspected GNLA militants at Thapadarenchi village in East Garo Hills District.

Apart from the killings, the State recorded 46 incidents of violence in 2011, including explosions, firing, encounters, abductions, and reported cases of extortion, as compared to 32 incidents registered in 2010.

Recorded incidents of extortion and abduction, which has been rampant in the entire Northeastern region, escalated significantly in 2011 [data relating to these give evident underestimates, as an overwhelming proportion of incidents, particularly in the more remote areas of the State, go unreported].  The year witnessed 10 abductions in seven reported incidents, as compared to five in as many incidents in 2010. The most prominent among these was the abduction by GNLA militants, of the Block Development Officer (BDO) of Dadenggre Civil Subdivision, Prafulla Kumar Boro, in West Garo Hills District on November 21, 2011. Later, releasing Boro on December 21, 2011, GNLA ‘commander’ Jack Marak declared that, though the Government had failed to fulfill the outfit’s demand to withdraw SFs from the Garo Hills, they had released Boro, as he was an honest official.

In an incident related to extortion, the GNLA abducted two Assam-based traders from Kalchengpara village near Selsella in West Garo Hills District on November 21, 2011. The traders were released on November 30, 2011. Though they denied paying a ransom to the outfit, Police sources indicate that money to the tune of INR 300,000 may have been paid by their families for their safe release. Similarly, on October 17, 2011, GNLA militants abducted a Hindi school teacher from the border belt in South Garo Hills. The teacher was freed on October 26, 2011, after an amount of INR 200,000 was paid to the GNLA.

SATP recorded nine incidents of extortion in 2011, as against three in 2010. On December 23, 2011, SFs arrested three GNLA militants, identified as Rakim G. Momon alias Bong, Sengrang G. Momin and Namseng B. Marak, while they were extorting money from the Jangjal Market in West Garo Hills District. In a daring incident, on April 18, 2011, GNLA militants shot at several trucks and placed a demand of INR 20,000 from every trucker plying through Wahthre village, around eight kilometers from Shahlang in the East Khasi Hills District.

Formed in 2009 and led by its ‘chairman’, a former Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), Pakchara R. Sangma alias Champion R. Sangma, the GNLA rose to prominence in 2010 and further strengthened its position in 2011. GNLA was involved in all the civilian and SF killings in 2011, and also accounted for all the militant fatalities in the year. The GNLA was also involved in 33 of the total of 46 reported incidents of violence in 2011.

The Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), another prominent group in the State, was involved in five reported incidents through 2011. On August 11, 2011, heavy exchange of fire between the Jaintia Hills Police and suspected HNLC militants was reported in a jungle near Iongnoh and Chyrmang villages, a few kilometers from Jowai town in the Jaintia Hills District. Jaintia Hills Additional Superintendent of Police noted, "They (HNLC cadres) might have come from Bangladesh through the Umkiang border and were headed for Jowai to create trouble." The outfit later enforced a shutdown on Independence Day, August 15, 2011. Meanwhile, on September 15, 2011, Chief Minister Mukul Sangma admitted that an email had been received by the media from the HNLC, expressing the desire to hold talks. However, on September 20, 2011, the HNLC alleged that the Meghalaya Government was not sincere about talks and warned that it would continue its armed struggle.

On the other hand, groups like the Liberation A'chik Elite Force (LAEF) and Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) remained dormant. LAEF ‘chief’ Nikseng G. Momin had been killed on December 2, 2010, while the ANVC had entered into a cease-fire with the Government on July 23, 2004. Indeed, on October 11, 2011, the tripartite cease-fire agreement between the Centre, State Government and the ANVC was extended by another year, effective from October 1, 2011. The ceasefire was earlier extended for nine months, from January 1, 2011, till September 30, 2011. However, the GNLA on September 1, 2011, accused ANVC of ‘secret killings’ of several Garo youth. Significantly, on December 4, 2011, the ANVC issued a statement declaring, "If needed, ANVC will work with the Government to wipe out GNLA." Former ANVC leader, Sohan D. Shira, is the ‘commander-in chief’ of GNLA, and there is a bitter rivalry between the groups.

With violence rising, the SFs recorded some successes. On August 9, 2011, four GNLA militants, including the 'deputy commander-in-chief' of the outfit, Roster Marak, a Police deserter, were killed in an encounter with the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team of the State Police at Bolkengre, a village located just four kilometers from Williamnagar town of East Khasi Hills District.  Also, on October 18, 2011, Police killed a senior GNLA 'deputy area commander', Dilseng alias Bashish, on the outskirts of Nengmaldalgre village in East Garo Hills District.

The SFs also arrested 61 militants in 30 incidents in 2011, as compared to 71 militants arrested in the State through 2010. These included 33 GNLA cadre, 10 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) cadre, six National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) cadre, four each of the Rabha Security Force and HNLC, as well as four ‘unspecified’ militants. Significantly, on November 23, 2011, the State Police arrested a top GNLA militant, Jackiush A. Sangma, and five others, including three arms dealers, from different parts of the State capital, Shillong.

Feeling the heat, 34 militants surrendered in 2011, as against 17 in 2010. 27 of those who surrendered in 2011, belonged to GNLA, five to LAEF, and once each to HNLC and Anti-Talks Faction of NDFB (NDFB-ATF). In most recent surrenders, four senior cadres of the GNLA laid down arms in East Garo Hills District on September 5, 2011. Among them was Salvision R. Sangma alias Kodalok, a cousin of Champion R. Sangma, ‘chairman’ of the outfit. The most significant surrender, however, occurred when 20 GNLA militants, led by the 'chief training instructor' of the outfit, Mingran T. Sangma alias Lodrin T. Sangma, surrendered on April 27, 2011.

Meanwhile, two Combat Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) units of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and five companies of the Border Security Force (BSF) were deployed in the State on July 12, 2011, to tackle the GNLA in response to their increasing activities. This Force has been trifurcated, and a group each is based in the three District Headquarters in the Garo Hills – Tura, Williamnagar and Baghmara, with their areas of operation extending up to the West Khasi Hills District. Earlier, 500 CRPF troopers were assisting the Meghalaya Police and its SWAT commandos, to tackle the GNLA. The Meghalaya Police has a total strength of 10,064 personnel, yielding a strong Police-population ratio of 391 per 100,000. 

Despite dramatic counter-insurgency gains over the years in Meghalaya, new entrants like the GNLA have been able to strengthen their position over the past two years. Wide spaces left behind by older groups, which have been neutralized by sustained SF action, are being occupied by new entrants, and continue to provide significant opportunities for militant mobilisation. While the overall environment for militancy across the Northeast has certainly weakened over the last decade, insurgent groups do retain capacities to regroup and cause significant disruption and damage to the State.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Meghalaya

Nagaland

Left-wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Punjab

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)