SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 49, June 11, 2012
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
Malkangiri: Profile of Failure
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management,
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute
for Conflict Management
27, 2012, a day ahead of the visit of Union Rural Development
(URD) Minister Jairam Ramesh to Odisha’s Malkangiri District
to review different developmental programmes and meet
the newly-elected panchayat (local village self-government)
body members, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
cadres triggered a landmine blast at Kanaguda under the
Kalimela Police Station limits in the District, injuring
three personnel of the Special Operation Group (SOG).
When Ramesh visited Malkangiri the next day, he restricted
himself to the District Headquarters town of Malkangiri,
shelving earlier plans to visit Janbai, Sikhapalli and
Malkangiri Village (MV)-16 villages. Though Janbai is
far off, Sikhapalli and MV-16 villages are just 15 to
20 kilometres from Malkangiri town. Senior District officials,
however, pleaded that the situation was “quite bad” and
that they “could not take the risk” of a VIP visit.
is one of the two Districts worst affected by Maoist activities
in Odisha, the other being Koraput, bordering it to the
north. Located in the southern part of the State, Malkangiri
also shares its borders with Sukma District (recently
carved out of Dantewada) in Chhattisgarh; and Khammam,
East Godavari and Vishakhapatnam Districts in Andhra Pradesh.
Its dense forests, hilly terrain, substantial tribal population,
poverty, underdevelopment, very poor road-network, dismal
governance and, above all, strategic location – flanked
by Chhattisgarh, the worst affected State to one side
and Andhra Pradesh, the Maoists’ ideological and leadership
base, to the other – make it a perfect area for guerrilla
warfare. The Maoists, on their part, have worked systematically
to consolidate their base and capacities in the District.
to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database,
Maoist related fatalities have been continuous, though
uneven, with a sharp peak in 2008, when just two incidents
resulted in the death of 55 Security Force (SF) personnel.
in Malkangiri District: 2005-2012
SATP, * Data till June 10, 2012 .
the major incidents in Malkangiri include:
10, 2012: Four personnel of the Boder Security Force (BSF),
including commandant Jeevan Ram Khaswan, were killed in
an ambush by the cadres of the CPI-Maoist in Malkangiri
District, when the BSF personnel were on their way to
Chitrakonda from the BSF camp at Balimela.
4, 2010: Four cadres of the CPI-Maoist were killed in
a gun battle with the Police in a forested area near Karlakuta
village in Malkangiri District.
13, 2009: Three Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel,
including Deputy Commandant Bhupinder Singh, were killed
in a landmine blast triggered by Maoists in the MV-66
village area of Malkangiri District.
2008: CPI-Maoist cadres killed 17 personnel of the SOG
in a landmine blast in the MV-126 area in Malkangiri District.
2008: Thirty-eight SF personnel, including 36 belonging
to the elite anti-Maoist Greyhounds from Andhra Pradesh,
were killed in the Chitrakonda reservoir of Malkangiri
District, close to the Andhra Pradesh border. CPI-Maoist
cadres atop hills sprayed bullets on the 68-member Andhra
Pradesh-Odisha Police party, which was returning after
conducting combing operations. Heavy fire from sophisticated
weapons sunk the motorised boat in the reservoir, drowning
most of the SF personnel. Some who swam ashore were reportedly
shot by the Maoists.
however, provide a poor index of Maoist dominance in Malkangiri,
as, indeed, do other statistics on violence. In addition
to the fatalities, for instance, since 2008, the Maoists
have blown up at least 14 Panchayat offices, set
ablaze 14 mobile towers, attacked three Police Stations
and enforced bandhs (total shutdowns) on 24 occasions.
has had an engagement with Left Wing Extremism (LWE) since
the ‘spring thunder’ of 1967, during which the ‘Naxalites’
in the Orissa formed the Orissa State Coordination Committee
(OSCC) on March 14, 1968, with D.B.M. Patnaik as convenor.
Soon after, one of the leading members of the OSCC, Nagabhusan
Patnaik, as head of the Chitrakonda Labour Movement, led
some 5,000 labourers in an attack on the Chitrakonda Police
Station and looted all the arms and ammunition there.
In 1969, the OSCC was dissolved and the ‘revolutionary'
regions of southern Odisha [Koraput and Ganjam] merged
with the Srikakulam Regional Committee [Andhra Pradesh].
Later, among the factions of Communist Party of India-
Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML), People’s War Group (PWG) of
Andhra Pradesh became dominant in the region and violence
increased in Malkangiri since the PWG formed the Andhra-Odisha
Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) in 2001. [The
AOBSZC then covered the four north coastal Districts of
Andhra Pradesh – East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Vijayanagaram
and Srikakulam; and the five Districts of southern Odisha
– Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati and Ganjam.]
In the early stages of this reorganisation, on July 30,
2003, PWG cadres killed 10 SF personnel and injured another
eight in a landmine blast triggered near Bhijengiwada
village under the Kalimela Police Station of Malkangiri.
On the same day, SFs were able to repulse another attack
on the Motu Police Station.
the Maoists now dominate virtually the entire District,
the ‘cut off area’ – 150-odd villages of Kudumulu Gumma
Block separated from the rest of the Block by the Balimela
Reservoir – deserves special mention. This area, sandwiched
between the Reservoir on one side and a hill tract on
the other, is highly inaccessible. An approach from the
Reservoir is possible only by motorised boats, and is
highly exposed (as evidenced by the June 29, 2008, attack
that killed 38 SF personnel). The circuitous route from
the other side is made even difficult by the absence of
a bridge over the Gurupriya River at Janbai; and the Maoists
have thwarted every attempt to construct a bridge at Janbai.
URD Minister Ramesh thus noted, “12 years ago, Chief Minister
(CM) Naveen Patnaik laid the foundation stone of Gurupriya
Bridge. Till date, it’s incomplete. We can fire Agni missiles
from Balasore, but can’t build a kilometre-long bridge.”
Naveen Patnaik, his predecessor CM J.B. Patnaik had laid
the foundation stone for the bridge. Tenders for the bridge
have been cancelled at least seven times, as no contractor
turns up for the work. Recently, with the BSF setting
up a camp in Janbai on January 22, 2012, construction
work was expected to begin under their direct protection.
While setting up their camp, the BSF also brought down
a Maoist memorial there, and built a sentry post over
it, as a stamp of authority. Unfortunately, however, the
Maoists struck back quickly, and the BSF Commandant was
killed on February 10, 2012. The work on the bridge is
yet to commence.
have also extended protection to widespread ganja
(marijuana) cultivation, as a measure to generate finances
in an area otherwise devoid of revenues because of its
acute impoverishment and absence of industry. According
to the Justice P.K. Mohanty Commission Report, ganja
is illegally cultivated in Malkangiri and some other naxal-infested
Districts of Odisha, and is smuggled through Chhattisgarh
and Andhra Pradesh to the rest of the country. With an
acre of ganja plantation fetching over INR 10 million,
it is alleged that naxals are raising huge funds from
the drug trade, with plantations particularly concentrated
in Chitrakonda and Kalimela. Anup Kumar Sahoo, then Sub-divisional
Police Ofiicer (SDPO), Malkangiri, had stated on February
4, 2009, “ganja trade being a lucrative trade,
once they enter into this business obviously they would
generate huge funds. Since the Excise Department is ill
equipped to deal with this issue and the Police are busy
with the operational part, there is no one to stop the
ganja trade”. Excise inspector, Malkangiri, Bijay
Kumar Mishra, adds, "I only have nine staff for the
entire District. With this manpower it is impossible to
control the trade. We are helpless."
support base in Malkangiri is not confined to any particular
tribe or area, though the Koya tribe remains a mainstay.
However, the two primitive tribes living in the District
– the Bonda and Didayi – have generally remained aloof
from the Maoists. However, there have been some indicators
of Maoist efforts to make inroads into the Bonda tribe.
Two Bonda youth – Chandra Kichipadia and Arjun Dora –
were arrested in April and November 2010 in connection
with the Govindpalli Ghat Road landmine blast case of
April 4, 2010, in which 11 SOG personnel were killed on
the Koraput side of the Malkangiri District border. Under
interrogation, Kichipadia and Dora confirmed that at least
20 Bonda youth had taken training under the Maoists. Sources
are sceptical of this claim, insisting that the Bondas
are too reclusive to interact with outsiders. Nevertheless,
Maoist activity in the Ankadeli, Macchakund, Gavindpalli
and Lamtaput area – the bordering area between Malkangiri
and Koraput where Bondas have their presence – have been
noted to be on the rise. Further, it was recently discovered
that Maoists had been using the route along Chintapalli
(Andhra Pradesh), Padua (Koraput), Ankadeli (Koraput),
Bonda Hills (Malkangiri, but very near the Koraput border),
Chitrakonda (Malkangiri), quite frequently. This confirms
the strategic importance of the Bonda Hills and the Bonda
tribe for the Maoists.
panchayat elections of February 2012, 15 sarpanchs
(village heads) backed by the Maoists were elected unopposed.
So alarmed was the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA),
that it directed the State Government to countermand the
elections of such candidates. The State Government, however,
chose to ignore the ‘advice’ on the grounds that the existing
law provides no grounds for such an action. The UMHA,
thereafter, asked the Ministry of Rural Development to
block funding to panchayats where representatives
were elected unopposed, but was, again, explicitly rebuffed.
influence in Malkangiri can be gauged by the near total
bandhs (shutdowns) observed every time the Maoists
give such a call. Maoist Central Committee (CC) member
Akkiraju Hargopal alias Ramakrishna alias
RK, as the ‘secretary’ of the AOBSZC, is in the overall
charge of Maoist activity in the Malkangiri District.
Below this level, the Malkangiri ‘division’ is headed
by ‘Ganesh’. Bille Narayan Swamy alias Azad alias
Damodar, who headed the ‘division’ till recently has reportedly
been transferred. The ‘division’ has three ‘area committees’
– Papuluru, Motu and Kalimela – and other local squads,
besides a few platoons. In addition, the Maoists are said
to have another ‘Koraput-Malkangiri division’, which is
active along the border of the two Districts.
Jal, Jungle, Zamin (water, forests and land), are
not the issues in Malkangiri, despite Maoist polemics.
Nor is Malkangiri like Abujmaad – an un-surveyed region
beyond the ken of the Administration. It is decades of
sheer administrative apathy that have virtually offered
up this strategically critical area to the Maoists for
their guerrilla base.
attempts to salvage the situation generate little confidence.
The District is one of the 78 Districts brought under
the Integrated Area Plan (IAP),
the flagship programme of the UMHA, under its ‘two pronged
approach’ to tackle the Maoist problem along the ‘security
and development’ matrix. In addition, URD Minister Ramesh
has come up with an INR 3 billion Special Area Development
Plan to be implemented in Malkangiri and the adjoining
Sukma District of Chhattisgarh over a period of two years.
It may be noted that Sukma District Collector, Alex
Paul Menon, was abducted this year,
while the District Collector of Malkangiri, Vineel
Krishna, was abducted last year.
question, however, is whether the State has the capacity
to implement these plans. The fate of the bridge at Janbai
is dramatic evidence to the contrary. The URD Minister
would be aware that the District has been able to spend
just 35 per cent of its allocated funding under the Pradhan
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY, the Prime Minister’s
Village Road Plan) as a result of the failure of contractors
to take up work, under Maoist threat. The Minister has
even suggested that, if the situation continues, the onus
may be shifted to the gram panchayats to find men
to carry out the road construction work under PMGSY –
though it is not clear how the panchayats are going
to succeed where the might of the ‘emerging global power’
has failed. Indeed, the ‘developmental’ thrust has failed
even in Districts far less afflicted by Maoist activities.
For instance, in its performance audit [Audit Report (Civil)],
of the Works Department, for the year 2010-11, the Comptroller
and Auditor General (CAG) observed, with regard to the
construction and maintenance of State Highways (SH-3,687
kilometres) and District Roads [Major District Roads (MDR)
– 4,057 kilometres], and Other District Roads (ODR – 6,813
kilometres) across Odisha:
projects taken up in 2006-07/2007-08 under loans from
NABARD through Rural Infrastructure Development Fund
(RIDF) and targeted for completion by March 2011 had
progressed only up to 55 per cent.
while advancing general reasons, viz., strikes
by left wing extremists, delay in acquisition
of land, difficulty in well sinking of bridge works
and non-response to tenders, for the slow progress
in RIDF projects stated (February 2012) that the EEs
(Executive Engineers) have been instructed to take
action as per clause 2 of the contract [providing
levy of LD (liquidated damages)] for slow moving works.
Action, however, is yet to be taken. Further, none
of the projects test checked by audit is in worst
affected left wing extremist districts of the State
and hence the reason furnished that the works are
delayed due to strike by left wing extremist is not
tenable. [Emphases added].
a deep malaise afflicts the State administrative machinery,
and this is enormously amplified in Malkangiri. Key positions
in the District administration have been lying vacant
over extended periods, and, as in mid-February this year,
569 posts in the civil offices of the Districts were vacant.
These vacancies included 70 in the Panchayati Raj Department;
113 in the Revenue Department; 160 in the Health and Family
Welfare Department; 53 in the SC & ST Development
Department; 60 in the Agriculture Department; 13 in the
Women and Child Development Department; 50 in the Fisheries
and Animal Resources Development Department; two in the
Information and Public Relation Department; 11 in the
Horticulture Department; five in the Labour and Employment
Department; 15 in the Excise Department; nine in the Works
Department; six in the Industry Department; and two in
the Food Supplies and Consumer Welfare Department. At
the senior level, four posts of Deputy Collector at Malkangiri
In an apparent
effort to improve the situation, five battalions of the
BSF have been deployed in the Koraput and Malkangiri Districts
since April 2011. The strength of the State Police however
remains far below sanctioned
have extended their influence essentially into areas of
non-governance, where the presence of even the SFs is
marginal and ineffective. Pumping large quantities of
money into these areas can have little impact on their
developmental profile, or on the course of the Maoist
insurgency, and feeds, essentially, into cycles of corruption,
with at least a proportion of the funds being channelled
to the Maoists. There is little in either the State’s
or the Centre’s plans that suggests that things in Malkangiri
– or indeed, in any of the worst afflicted Districts along
the Maoist ‘Red Corridor’ – are going to change any time
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
to a May 30, 2012, report, the Myanmar Government has
ordered insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast
like the Manipur-based insurgent groups such as the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK),
to shut down their camps and training facilities and
leave Myanmar by June 10, 2012. Sources in the Indian
Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) added, in New
Delhi, that the Myanmar Army’s order was issued on May
24, 2012. There are an estimated 12 to 15 insurgent
camps of these groups across the Indo-Myanmar border,
where over 2,000 armed cadres take shelter. The militants
make frequent forays into Manipur to carry out subversive
activities and attacks, and cross back into Myanmar
to escape action by Indian security agencies. Government
officials in India are hopeful of the Myanmar Army sending
a similar message to other North-eastern militant groups
in the near future.
on May 31, 2012, India sought the custody of militants
from its Northeast, in case they were captured in Myanmar.
Union Home Minister (UHM) P. Chidambaram stated, “Our
concerns are two-fold. First, we don’t want any part
of Myanmar territory to be used as camps by the insurgent
groups. Secondly, if the Government of Myanmar manages
to apprehend any of the leaders, we would like them
to hand (them) over to India”.
Indian Prime Minister (PM) Manmohan Singh made a three-day
visit (May 27-29, 2012) to Myanmar, to become the first
PM, since Rajiv Gandhi to visit the country since December
1987. On May 29, 2012, Manmohan Singh indicated that
India and Myanmar were likely to carry out joint operations
in order to flush out Indian militants operating from
Myanmar, and added that Myanmar had sought information
from India on the insurgents groups hiding out there.
According to PM Singh, “Myanmar President Thein Sein
has assured (us) that no Indian militant outfit will
be allowed to hide and operate from Myanmar soil. Myanmar
has given us a green signal to carry out operations
against insurgent outfits hiding along the Indo-Myanmar
border, while Myanmar will also carry out similar operations
from their side.” During the meeting both the countries
asserted that they would work out a joint strategy to
tackle terrorism and insurgency. They also emphasized
the need for enhanced cooperation between Security Forces
(SFs) and border guarding agencies, in order to secure
peace, security and stability in the border areas.
India and Myanmar had commenced joint initiatives to
check the drug money inflow to various anti-Indian insurgent
outfits that were “spending their funds for buying weapons
to intensify their terror campaign against India” following
Union Home Secretary R.K. Singh’s visit to Myanmar in
January 2012. During the visit, India presented documentary
evidence in support of the fact that at least two Manipur
based outfits, PLA and the United National Liberation
were engaged in poppy cultivation in Myanmar under the
full protection of the Nationalist Socialist Council
of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K).
16, 2011, Myanmar had asked New Delhi to provide satellite
imagery of camps of militants operating in India’s Northeast,
from across the border in Myanmar. On May 29, 2012,
PM Singh noted that Myanmar had sought information from
India on the insurgent groups hiding in Myanmar, and
it was expected that, based on information provided
by India, Myanmar could soon launch operations against
Thein Sein had visited India between October 12-15,
2011, and the issue of terrorism and insurgents operating
across border had even then been discussed
Both sides agreed to enhance effective cooperation and
coordination between their SFs to effectively tackle
insurgency and terrorism, and underscored the need to
strengthen institutional mechanisms for sharing of intelligence
to combat insurgency, arms smuggling and drug trafficking.
In this context, they discussed measures to further
strengthen border management mechanisms. President Sein
and PM Singh reiterated assurances that the territory
of either country would not be allowed for activities
inimical to the other.
Myanmar had twice launched offensives within its border
in 2011 – September 8 and 11 – in Sagaing Province,
against various Indian militant groups who have their
bases there. On September 8, 2011, heavily armed Myanmar
Army units, numbering around 300 to 400 personnel, reportedly
moved into an NSCN-K base area at Khamti town, where
the outfit's ‘council headquarters’ are located. However,
no casualty was reported. According to NSCN-K spokesperson
P. Tikhak, adequate measures to prevent the advance
of the Army had been taken and the ‘chairman’, S.S.
Khaplang, was safe and was with a “well and highly protective
group.” Confirming that its ‘joint protection group’
patrolling the area had come under attack from the Myanmar
Army at noon on September 8, 2011, the NSCN-K spokesperson
stated that there was no loss of life. He further noted
that the Army operation was ‘not a surprise’, and that
NSCN-K had been apprehensive of “this kind of attack”
ever since the Government of India (GoI) started supplying
arms to Myanmar in return for a crackdown on NSCN-K
and other insurgent outfits in ‘eastern Nagaland’ (Myanmar).
on September 11, the Myanmar Army launched operations
targeting around 250 cadres of some 10 Northeastern
militant groups, including the Anti-Talks Faction of
the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-ATF),
NSCN-K, PLA, PREPAK and UNLF, who were present in camps
at Sagaing. Reports indicate that ULFA's ‘mobile headquarters’
at Sagaing had been destroyed in the attack. While ULFA-ATF’s
'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah and NSCN-K chief,
S.S. Khaplang, managed to escape unhurt, NSCN-K conceded,
on September 14, 2011, that, at least one cadre each
from NSCN-K and UNLF were killed during the operations.
Paresh Baruah, in an emailed statement on September
8, 2011, noted that GoI had been pressuring all its
neighbours to flush out ULFA militants from their respective
territories: "In 2003 it was Bhutan, which got
Rs. 1,000 crore aid from India in reciprocation. Then
came Bangladesh where India has pledged a loan of 1
billion US dollars. We have information that New Delhi
has given aid of Rs. 2,000 crore to Myanmar."
rebels, including the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA-ATF, the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary
UNLF, PREPAK, PLA, the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)
and NSCN-K are reported to have set up a unified camp
in the Taga area of Myanmar's Kachin region, bordering
India. The PLA and a number of other outfits had forged
an Indian Northeast-specific ‘United Front’, backed
by the NSCN-K, in 2011.
joint statements and operations, however, Indian security
agencies remain skeptical of Myanmar’s ability to immediately
launch a Bhutan-type
operation to flush out northeastern militants from the
country. A June 2, 2012, news report quoted a security
source stating, "Let’s see how Myanmar deals with
the militants this time. Earlier, it used force against
them only to extort money. We have marked the rebel
hideouts. We think the militants can be driven out easily
if Myanmar acts like Bhutan. We can have such an operation
only if Myanmar shows the same kind of commitment….
It’s NSCN-K chief SS Khaplang who calls the shots there.
ULFA and the NDFB have smaller contingents. ULFA has
about 200 fighters while the strength of the NDFB is
just about 100. Manipuri outfits have about 3,000 militants.
The size of the NSCN-K is also quite big.”
Bhutan had launched Operation All Clear, using
its Army, to drive out ULFA, NDFB and Kamtapur Liberation
militants from its territory. It handed over a number
of top-ranking militants to Indian authorities.
the Indian Army has made full preparations to check
infiltration in case of operations in Myanmar after
the expiry of the June 10, 2012 deadline. On June 6,
2012, Major General Vinay Punen, the General Officer
commanding the Red Shield Division at Leimakhong in
Senapati District (Manipur), claimed that the Manipur-Myanmar
border had been sealed off.
the notion that NSCN-K ‘Chief’ S.S. Khaplang was calling
the shots in Myanmar appeared to be confirmed, as the
outfit signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the Myanmar
Government on April 9, 2012, for the first time. On
May 14, 2012, as a result of the CFA, Myanmar granted
autonomy to the NSCN-K in three Districts of Sagaing,
an administrative region in the northwest of the country,
bordering Nagaland and Manipur. Y. Wangtin Naga, an
NSCN-K leader from India who was one of the six signatories
of the April 9, 2012, bilateral ceasefire with the Myanmar
Government, observed, "Nagas have autonomy in Lahe,
Layse and Nanyang in Sagaing region and we are looking
for self-administration in more Naga populated districts
in Kachin." Khaplang cadres, who are now free to
move unarmed anywhere in Myanmar, also want self-administration
in the Naga areas of Mawlaik, Phongpyn and Homlin in
Sagaing and Tanai (Teniang) and Shingbwiyang areas in
Kachin State. There are also reports that Government
of Myanmar has come up with 3-stage proposal for the
Nagas of Myanmar: Ceasefire, Political negotiations
and Economic development. Significantly, on May 10,
2012, India sought the details of the ground rules of
the CFA inked between the Myanmar Government and NSCN-K.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 2012, the NSCN-K extended its bilateral
CFA with GoI for another year, five days after it last
expired on April 28, 2012, reportedly on certain additional
conditions. A May 5, 2012, report suggests
that the GoI will "keep a close watch" on
the activities and movement of NSCN-K faction leaders
and cadres during the ceasefire extension period and,
according to a senior UMHA official, "If they are
found extending any help to any of the anti-Indian insurgent
groups or indulging in factional killing, the ceasefire
agreement may come to a naught." Indian Government
sources indicated that the NSCN-K was categorically
asked to ensure that no anti-Indian insurgent outfit
or their members be allowed in the ‘eastern Nagaland’
areas of Myanmar, which NSCN-K dominates. The Government
has received confirmed intelligence that the Paresh
Baruah-led ULFA-ATF, as well as the Manipur-based PREPAK
and PLA, move regularly across the NSCN-K dominated
areas in Myanmar. Earlier on April 27, 2012, GoI had
also told Myanmar to pressure the NSCN-K to stop helping
other Indian militant groups.
on April 27, 2012, an NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
joint council claimed that the Naga people were "concerned"
about the proposed talks between NSCN-K and the Myanmar
military junta, adding that all Nagas were inseparable
parts of the whole and 'Nagalim' embraces all their
Naga ancestral domains. According to NSCN-IM leaders,
it was under the legitimate leadership of Isak and Muivah
that the Nagas had declared a "unilateral ceasefire"
with the Myanmar Government years ago.
on May 3, 2012, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio
advocated two separate solutions to the Naga political
problem – one with New Delhi and the other with Myanmar
– since the Nagas were divided between the two countries
by their erstwhile colonial rulers.
clearly has an important role to play in helping India
secure a lasting peace in the region. It is expected,
consequently, that, despite the odds and prevalent pessimism,
the joint initiatives of the two countries will incline
towards a progressive consolidation over time.
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
data compiled from English language media sources.
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Road in the
that it was
June 8, 2012.
of al Qaeda
al Qaeda number
two Abu Yahya
a drone attack
east of Miranshah,
of North Waziristan
has been able
June 6, 2012.
to kill her:
to get her
one of the
in the country.
She said that
- was upset
with her for
role of the
in the restive
June 5, 2012.
on the presence
to be working
They are the
ones who are
who have been
June 8, 2012.
of its patience
the safe havens
"It is difficult
peace in Afghanistan
as long as
there is safe
It is very
to take steps.
It is an increasing
issue of safe
we are reaching
of our patience,"
he told reporters.
June 8, 2012.
if it stops
in J&K, threatens
HM Chief Syed
vowed to turn
the guns on
in Jammu and
who, he claimed,
war in Kashmir
and if it
the war would
June 9, 2012.
a war for
Sindh CM Syed
Qaim Ali Shah:
Ali Shah argues
that the recent
spree of targeted
it is a turf
who are out
in show of
60 to 70 per
were due to
to some extent".
and May 31,
of the HRCP,
said 107 political
In 2011, 1,715
in the city.
If the January-May
June 6, 2012;
June 6, 2012.
in the Mumbai
for the judge's
This is for
began in early
June 6, 2012.
says US State
US that sentencing
was not linked
to his help
slain al Qaeda
to be no change
in the view
of Obama administration
that 33 year
to the physician
was not justified.
We have actually
are not related
to the bin
said the official.
June 7, 2012.
of law enforcement
told a three-member
bench of the
that a joint
held to discuss
of the province.
June 5, 2012.
of vital UN
of a vital
on the war,
in the UN
Panel of Experts
as the number
due to war
in the document
to claim that
in the final
the war from
2008 and May
13, 2009 at
The UN estimated
June 6, 2012.
is a weekly
is a project