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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 49, June 11, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT


INDIA
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Odisha: Malkangiri: Profile of Failure
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management,
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On May 27, 2012, a day ahead of the visit of Union Rural Development (URD) Minister Jairam Ramesh to Odisha’s Malkangiri District to review different developmental programmes and meet the newly-elected panchayat (local village self-government) body members, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres triggered a landmine blast at Kanaguda under the Kalimela Police Station limits in the District, injuring three personnel of the Special Operation Group (SOG). When Ramesh visited Malkangiri the next day, he restricted himself to the District Headquarters town of Malkangiri, shelving earlier plans to visit Janbai, Sikhapalli and Malkangiri Village (MV)-16 villages. Though Janbai is far off, Sikhapalli and MV-16 villages are just 15 to 20 kilometres from Malkangiri town. Senior District officials, however, pleaded that the situation was “quite bad” and that they “could not take the risk” of a VIP visit.

Malkangiri, is one of the two Districts worst affected by Maoist activities in Odisha, the other being Koraput, bordering it to the north. Located in the southern part of the State, Malkangiri also shares its borders with Sukma District (recently carved out of Dantewada) in Chhattisgarh; and Khammam, East Godavari and Vishakhapatnam Districts in Andhra Pradesh. Its dense forests, hilly terrain, substantial tribal population, poverty, underdevelopment, very poor road-network, dismal governance and, above all, strategic location – flanked by Chhattisgarh, the worst affected State to one side and Andhra Pradesh, the Maoists’ ideological and leadership base, to the other – make it a perfect area for guerrilla warfare. The Maoists, on their part, have worked systematically to consolidate their base and capacities in the District.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, Maoist related fatalities have been continuous, though uneven, with a sharp peak in 2008, when just two incidents resulted in the death of 55 Security Force (SF) personnel.

Fatalities in Malkangiri District: 2005-2012
Years
Violent Incidents
Civilians
SFs
LWE/ CPI-Maoists
Total
2005
5
4
0
1
5
2006
13
3
1
9
13
2007
29
2
2
6
10
2008
32
8
56
3
67
2009
46
8
0
0
8
2010
61
9
5
4
18
2011
47
7
1
1
9
2012*
13
3
5
0
8
Source: SATP, * Data till June 10, 2012 .

Some of the major incidents in Malkangiri include: 

February 10, 2012: Four personnel of the Boder Security Force (BSF), including commandant Jeevan Ram Khaswan, were killed in an ambush by the cadres of the CPI-Maoist in Malkangiri District, when the BSF personnel were on their way to Chitrakonda from the BSF camp at Balimela.  

November 4, 2010: Four cadres of the CPI-Maoist were killed in a gun battle with the Police in a forested area near Karlakuta village in Malkangiri District. 

November 13, 2009: Three Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, including Deputy Commandant Bhupinder Singh, were killed in a landmine blast triggered by Maoists in the MV-66 village area of Malkangiri District.  

July 16, 2008: CPI-Maoist cadres killed 17 personnel of the SOG in a landmine blast in the MV-126 area in Malkangiri District.  

June 29, 2008: Thirty-eight SF personnel, including 36 belonging to the elite anti-Maoist Greyhounds from Andhra Pradesh, were killed in the Chitrakonda reservoir of Malkangiri District, close to the Andhra Pradesh border. CPI-Maoist cadres atop hills sprayed bullets on the 68-member Andhra Pradesh-Odisha Police party, which was returning after conducting combing operations. Heavy fire from sophisticated weapons sunk the motorised boat in the reservoir, drowning most of the SF personnel. Some who swam ashore were reportedly shot by the Maoists. 

Fatalities, however, provide a poor index of Maoist dominance in Malkangiri, as, indeed, do other statistics on violence. In addition to the fatalities, for instance, since 2008, the Maoists have blown up at least 14 Panchayat offices, set ablaze 14 mobile towers, attacked three Police Stations and enforced bandhs (total shutdowns) on 24 occasions.  

The District has had an engagement with Left Wing Extremism (LWE) since the ‘spring thunder’ of 1967, during which the ‘Naxalites’ in the Orissa formed the Orissa State Coordination Committee (OSCC) on March 14, 1968, with D.B.M. Patnaik as convenor. Soon after, one of the leading members of the OSCC, Nagabhusan Patnaik, as head of the Chitrakonda Labour Movement, led some 5,000 labourers in an attack on the Chitrakonda Police Station and looted all the arms and ammunition there. In 1969, the OSCC was dissolved and the ‘revolutionary' regions of southern Odisha [Koraput and Ganjam] merged with the Srikakulam Regional Committee [Andhra Pradesh]. Later, among the factions of Communist Party of India- Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML), People’s War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh became dominant in the region and violence increased in Malkangiri since the PWG formed the Andhra-Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) in 2001. [The AOBSZC then covered the four north coastal Districts of Andhra Pradesh – East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Vijayanagaram and Srikakulam; and the five Districts of southern Odisha – Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati and Ganjam.] In the early stages of this reorganisation, on July 30, 2003, PWG cadres killed 10 SF personnel and injured another eight in a landmine blast triggered near Bhijengiwada village under the Kalimela Police Station of Malkangiri. On the same day, SFs were able to repulse another attack on the Motu Police Station.  

Though the Maoists now dominate virtually the entire District, the ‘cut off area’ – 150-odd villages of Kudumulu Gumma Block separated from the rest of the Block by the Balimela Reservoir – deserves special mention. This area, sandwiched between the Reservoir on one side and a hill tract on the other, is highly inaccessible. An approach from the Reservoir is possible only by motorised boats, and is highly exposed (as evidenced by the June 29, 2008, attack that killed 38 SF personnel). The circuitous route from the other side is made even difficult by the absence of a bridge over the Gurupriya River at Janbai; and the Maoists have thwarted every attempt to construct a bridge at Janbai. URD Minister Ramesh thus noted, “12 years ago, Chief Minister (CM) Naveen Patnaik laid the foundation stone of Gurupriya Bridge. Till date, it’s incomplete. We can fire Agni missiles from Balasore, but can’t build a kilometre-long bridge.” 

Even before Naveen Patnaik, his predecessor CM J.B. Patnaik had laid the foundation stone for the bridge. Tenders for the bridge have been cancelled at least seven times, as no contractor turns up for the work. Recently, with the BSF setting up a camp in Janbai on January 22, 2012, construction work was expected to begin under their direct protection. While setting up their camp, the BSF also brought down a Maoist memorial there, and built a sentry post over it, as a stamp of authority. Unfortunately, however, the Maoists struck back quickly, and the BSF Commandant was killed on February 10, 2012. The work on the bridge is yet to commence. 

The Maoists have also extended protection to widespread ganja (marijuana) cultivation, as a measure to generate finances in an area otherwise devoid of revenues because of its acute impoverishment and absence of industry. According to the Justice P.K. Mohanty Commission Report, ganja is illegally cultivated in Malkangiri and some other naxal-infested Districts of Odisha, and is smuggled through Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh to the rest of the country. With an acre of ganja plantation fetching over INR 10 million, it is alleged that naxals are raising huge funds from the drug trade, with plantations particularly concentrated in Chitrakonda and Kalimela. Anup Kumar Sahoo, then Sub-divisional Police Ofiicer (SDPO), Malkangiri, had stated on February 4, 2009, “ganja trade being a lucrative trade, once they enter into this business obviously they would generate huge funds. Since the Excise Department is ill equipped to deal with this issue and the Police are busy with the operational part, there is no one to stop the ganja trade”. Excise inspector, Malkangiri, Bijay Kumar Mishra, adds, "I only have nine staff for the entire District. With this manpower it is impossible to control the trade. We are helpless."  

The Maoist support base in Malkangiri is not confined to any particular tribe or area, though the Koya tribe remains a mainstay. However, the two primitive tribes living in the District – the Bonda and Didayi – have generally remained aloof from the Maoists. However, there have been some indicators of Maoist efforts to make inroads into the Bonda tribe. Two Bonda youth – Chandra Kichipadia and Arjun Dora – were arrested in April and November 2010 in connection with the Govindpalli Ghat Road landmine blast case of April 4, 2010, in which 11 SOG personnel were killed on the Koraput side of the Malkangiri District border. Under interrogation, Kichipadia and Dora confirmed that at least 20 Bonda youth had taken training under the Maoists. Sources are sceptical of this claim, insisting that the Bondas are too reclusive to interact with outsiders. Nevertheless, Maoist activity in the Ankadeli, Macchakund, Gavindpalli and Lamtaput area – the bordering area between Malkangiri and Koraput where Bondas have their presence – have been noted to be on the rise. Further, it was recently discovered that Maoists had been using the route along Chintapalli (Andhra Pradesh), Padua (Koraput), Ankadeli (Koraput), Bonda Hills (Malkangiri, but very near the Koraput border), Chitrakonda (Malkangiri), quite frequently. This confirms the strategic importance of the Bonda Hills and the Bonda tribe for the Maoists.    

In the panchayat elections of February 2012, 15 sarpanchs (village heads) backed by the Maoists were elected unopposed. So alarmed was the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), that it directed the State Government to countermand the elections of such candidates. The State Government, however, chose to ignore the ‘advice’ on the grounds that the existing law provides no grounds for such an action. The UMHA, thereafter, asked the Ministry of Rural Development to block funding to panchayats where representatives were elected unopposed, but was, again, explicitly rebuffed.  

The Maoist influence in Malkangiri can be gauged by the near total bandhs (shutdowns) observed every time the Maoists give such a call. Maoist Central Committee (CC) member Akkiraju Hargopal alias Ramakrishna alias RK, as the ‘secretary’ of the AOBSZC, is in the overall charge of Maoist activity in the Malkangiri District. Below this level, the Malkangiri ‘division’ is headed by ‘Ganesh’. Bille Narayan Swamy alias Azad alias Damodar, who headed the ‘division’ till recently has reportedly been transferred. The ‘division’ has three ‘area committees’ – Papuluru, Motu and Kalimela – and other local squads, besides a few platoons. In addition, the Maoists are said to have another ‘Koraput-Malkangiri division’, which is active along the border of the two Districts.  

Significantly, Jal, Jungle, Zamin (water, forests and land), are not the issues in Malkangiri, despite Maoist polemics. Nor is Malkangiri like Abujmaad – an un-surveyed region beyond the ken of the Administration. It is decades of sheer administrative apathy that have virtually offered up this strategically critical area to the Maoists for their guerrilla base.  

Recent attempts to salvage the situation generate little confidence. The District is one of the 78 Districts brought under the Integrated Area Plan (IAP), the flagship programme of the UMHA, under its ‘two pronged approach’ to tackle the Maoist problem along the ‘security and development’ matrix. In addition, URD Minister Ramesh has come up with an INR 3 billion Special Area Development Plan to be implemented in Malkangiri and the adjoining Sukma District of Chhattisgarh over a period of two years. It may be noted that Sukma District Collector, Alex Paul Menon, was abducted this year, while the District Collector of Malkangiri, Vineel Krishna, was abducted last year.  

The real question, however, is whether the State has the capacity to implement these plans. The fate of the bridge at Janbai is dramatic evidence to the contrary. The URD Minister would be aware that the District has been able to spend just 35 per cent of its allocated funding under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY, the Prime Minister’s Village Road Plan) as a result of the failure of contractors to take up work, under Maoist threat. The Minister has even suggested that, if the situation continues, the onus may be shifted to the gram panchayats to find men to carry out the road construction work under PMGSY – though it is not clear how the panchayats are going to succeed where the might of the ‘emerging global power’ has failed. Indeed, the ‘developmental’ thrust has failed even in Districts far less afflicted by Maoist activities. For instance, in its performance audit [Audit Report (Civil)], of the Works Department, for the year 2010-11, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) observed, with regard to the construction and maintenance of State Highways (SH-3,687 kilometres) and District Roads [Major District Roads (MDR) – 4,057 kilometres], and Other District Roads (ODR – 6,813 kilometres) across Odisha:

  • The projects taken up in 2006-07/2007-08 under loans from NABARD through Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) and targeted for completion by March 2011 had progressed only up to 55 per cent.

  • Government, while advancing general reasons, viz., strikes by left wing extremists, delay in acquisition of land, difficulty in well sinking of bridge works and non-response to tenders, for the slow progress in RIDF projects stated (February 2012) that the EEs (Executive Engineers) have been instructed to take action as per clause 2 of the contract [providing levy of LD (liquidated damages)] for slow moving works. Action, however, is yet to be taken. Further, none of the projects test checked by audit is in worst affected left wing extremist districts of the State and hence the reason furnished that the works are delayed due to strike by left wing extremist is not tenable. [Emphases added].

Indeed, a deep malaise afflicts the State administrative machinery, and this is enormously amplified in Malkangiri. Key positions in the District administration have been lying vacant over extended periods, and, as in mid-February this year, 569 posts in the civil offices of the Districts were vacant. These vacancies included 70 in the Panchayati Raj Department; 113 in the Revenue Department; 160 in the Health and Family Welfare Department; 53 in the SC & ST Development Department; 60 in the Agriculture Department; 13 in the Women and Child Development Department; 50 in the Fisheries and Animal Resources Development Department; two in the Information and Public Relation Department; 11 in the Horticulture Department; five in the Labour and Employment Department; 15 in the Excise Department; nine in the Works Department; six in the Industry Department; and two in the Food Supplies and Consumer Welfare Department. At the senior level, four posts of Deputy Collector at Malkangiri were vacant.   

In an apparent effort to improve the situation, five battalions of the BSF have been deployed in the Koraput and Malkangiri Districts since April 2011. The strength of the State Police however remains far below sanctioned levels. 

The Maoists have extended their influence essentially into areas of non-governance, where the presence of even the SFs is marginal and ineffective. Pumping large quantities of money into these areas can have little impact on their developmental profile, or on the course of the Maoist insurgency, and feeds, essentially, into cycles of corruption, with at least a proportion of the funds being channelled to the Maoists. There is little in either the State’s or the Centre’s plans that suggests that things in Malkangiri – or indeed, in any of the worst afflicted Districts along the Maoist ‘Red Corridor’ – are going to change any time soon.

INDIA
MYANMAR
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Merging Perceptions
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

According to a May 30, 2012, report, the Myanmar Government has ordered insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast like the Manipur-based insurgent groups such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), to shut down their camps and training facilities and leave Myanmar by June 10, 2012. Sources in the Indian Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) added, in New Delhi, that the Myanmar Army’s order was issued on May 24, 2012. There are an estimated 12 to 15 insurgent camps of these groups across the Indo-Myanmar border, where over 2,000 armed cadres take shelter. The militants make frequent forays into Manipur to carry out subversive activities and attacks, and cross back into Myanmar to escape action by Indian security agencies. Government officials in India are hopeful of the Myanmar Army sending a similar message to other North-eastern militant groups in the near future. 

Meanwhile, on May 31, 2012, India sought the custody of militants from its Northeast, in case they were captured in Myanmar. Union Home Minister (UHM) P. Chidambaram stated, “Our concerns are two-fold. First, we don’t want any part of Myanmar territory to be used as camps by the insurgent groups. Secondly, if the Government of Myanmar manages to apprehend any of the leaders, we would like them to hand (them) over to India”.  

Significantly, Indian Prime Minister (PM) Manmohan Singh made a three-day visit (May 27-29, 2012) to Myanmar, to become the first PM, since Rajiv Gandhi to visit the country since December 1987. On May 29, 2012, Manmohan Singh indicated that India and Myanmar were likely to carry out joint operations in order to flush out Indian militants operating from Myanmar, and added that Myanmar had sought information from India on the insurgents groups hiding out there. According to PM Singh, “Myanmar President Thein Sein has assured (us) that no Indian militant outfit will be allowed to hide and operate from Myanmar soil. Myanmar has given us a green signal to carry out operations against insurgent outfits hiding along the Indo-Myanmar border, while Myanmar will also carry out similar operations from their side.” During the meeting both the countries asserted that they would work out a joint strategy to tackle terrorism and insurgency. They also emphasized the need for enhanced cooperation between Security Forces (SFs) and border guarding agencies, in order to secure peace, security and stability in the border areas. 

Earlier, India and Myanmar had commenced joint initiatives to check the drug money inflow to various anti-Indian insurgent outfits that were “spending their funds for buying weapons to intensify their terror campaign against India” following Union Home Secretary R.K. Singh’s visit to Myanmar in January 2012. During the visit, India presented documentary evidence in support of the fact that at least two Manipur based outfits, PLA and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), were engaged in poppy cultivation in Myanmar under the full protection of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K).  

On October 16, 2011, Myanmar had asked New Delhi to provide satellite imagery of camps of militants operating in India’s Northeast, from across the border in Myanmar. On May 29, 2012, PM Singh noted that Myanmar had sought information from India on the insurgent groups hiding in Myanmar, and it was expected that, based on information provided by India, Myanmar could soon launch operations against these groups.  

President Thein Sein had visited India between October 12-15, 2011, and the issue of terrorism and insurgents operating across border had even then been discussed Both sides agreed to enhance effective cooperation and coordination between their SFs to effectively tackle insurgency and terrorism, and underscored the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for sharing of intelligence to combat insurgency, arms smuggling and drug trafficking. In this context, they discussed measures to further strengthen border management mechanisms. President Sein and PM Singh reiterated assurances that the territory of either country would not be allowed for activities inimical to the other.  

Significantly, Myanmar had twice launched offensives within its border in 2011 – September 8 and 11 – in Sagaing Province, against various Indian militant groups who have their bases there. On September 8, 2011, heavily armed Myanmar Army units, numbering around 300 to 400 personnel, reportedly moved into an NSCN-K base area at Khamti town, where the outfit's ‘council headquarters’ are located. However, no casualty was reported. According to NSCN-K spokesperson P. Tikhak, adequate measures to prevent the advance of the Army had been taken and the ‘chairman’, S.S. Khaplang, was safe and was with a “well and highly protective group.” Confirming that its ‘joint protection group’ patrolling the area had come under attack from the Myanmar Army at noon on September 8, 2011, the NSCN-K spokesperson stated that there was no loss of life. He further noted that the Army operation was ‘not a surprise’, and that NSCN-K had been apprehensive of “this kind of attack” ever since the Government of India (GoI) started supplying arms to Myanmar in return for a crackdown on NSCN-K and other insurgent outfits in ‘eastern Nagaland’ (Myanmar).  

Again, on September 11, the Myanmar Army launched operations targeting around 250 cadres of some 10 Northeastern militant groups, including the Anti-Talks Faction of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-ATF), NSCN-K, PLA, PREPAK and UNLF, who were present in camps at Sagaing. Reports indicate that ULFA's ‘mobile headquarters’ at Sagaing had been destroyed in the attack. While ULFA-ATF’s 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah and NSCN-K chief, S.S. Khaplang, managed to escape unhurt, NSCN-K conceded, on September 14, 2011, that, at least one cadre each from NSCN-K and UNLF were killed during the operations.  

Meanwhile, Paresh Baruah, in an emailed statement on September 8, 2011, noted that GoI had been pressuring all its neighbours to flush out ULFA militants from their respective territories: "In 2003 it was Bhutan, which got Rs. 1,000 crore aid from India in reciprocation. Then came Bangladesh where India has pledged a loan of 1 billion US dollars. We have information that New Delhi has given aid of Rs. 2,000 crore to Myanmar."  

Indian rebels, including the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA-ATF, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary group (NDFB-RD), UNLF, PREPAK, PLA, the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and NSCN-K are reported to have set up a unified camp in the Taga area of Myanmar's Kachin region, bordering India. The PLA and a number of other outfits had forged an Indian Northeast-specific ‘United Front’, backed by the NSCN-K, in 2011. 

Despite joint statements and operations, however, Indian security agencies remain skeptical of Myanmar’s ability to immediately launch a Bhutan-type operation to flush out northeastern militants from the country. A June 2, 2012, news report quoted a security source stating, "Let’s see how Myanmar deals with the militants this time. Earlier, it used force against them only to extort money. We have marked the rebel hideouts. We think the militants can be driven out easily if Myanmar acts like Bhutan. We can have such an operation only if Myanmar shows the same kind of commitment…. It’s NSCN-K chief SS Khaplang who calls the shots there. ULFA and the NDFB have smaller contingents. ULFA has about 200 fighters while the strength of the NDFB is just about 100. Manipuri outfits have about 3,000 militants. The size of the NSCN-K is also quite big.”  

In 2003, Bhutan had launched Operation All Clear, using its Army, to drive out ULFA, NDFB and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) militants from its territory. It handed over a number of top-ranking militants to Indian authorities.  

Nevertheless, the Indian Army has made full preparations to check infiltration in case of operations in Myanmar after the expiry of the June 10, 2012 deadline. On June 6, 2012, Major General Vinay Punen, the General Officer commanding the Red Shield Division at Leimakhong in Senapati District (Manipur), claimed that the Manipur-Myanmar border had been sealed off. 

Meanwhile, the notion that NSCN-K ‘Chief’ S.S. Khaplang was calling the shots in Myanmar appeared to be confirmed, as the outfit signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the Myanmar Government on April 9, 2012, for the first time. On May 14, 2012, as a result of the CFA, Myanmar granted autonomy to the NSCN-K in three Districts of Sagaing, an administrative region in the northwest of the country, bordering Nagaland and Manipur. Y. Wangtin Naga, an NSCN-K leader from India who was one of the six signatories of the April 9, 2012, bilateral ceasefire with the Myanmar Government, observed, "Nagas have autonomy in Lahe, Layse and Nanyang in Sagaing region and we are looking for self-administration in more Naga populated districts in Kachin." Khaplang cadres, who are now free to move unarmed anywhere in Myanmar, also want self-administration in the Naga areas of Mawlaik, Phongpyn and Homlin in Sagaing and Tanai (Teniang) and Shingbwiyang areas in Kachin State. There are also reports that Government of Myanmar has come up with 3-stage proposal for the Nagas of Myanmar: Ceasefire, Political negotiations and Economic development. Significantly, on May 10, 2012, India sought the details of the ground rules of the CFA inked between the Myanmar Government and NSCN-K. Meanwhile, on May 3, 2012, the NSCN-K extended its bilateral CFA with GoI for another year, five days after it last expired on April 28, 2012, reportedly on certain additional conditions. A May 5, 2012, report suggests that the GoI will "keep a close watch" on the activities and movement of NSCN-K faction leaders and cadres during the ceasefire extension period and, according to a senior UMHA official, "If they are found extending any help to any of the anti-Indian insurgent groups or indulging in factional killing, the ceasefire agreement may come to a naught." Indian Government sources indicated that the NSCN-K was categorically asked to ensure that no anti-Indian insurgent outfit or their members be allowed in the ‘eastern Nagaland’ areas of Myanmar, which NSCN-K dominates. The Government has received confirmed intelligence that the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA-ATF, as well as the Manipur-based PREPAK and PLA, move regularly across the NSCN-K dominated areas in Myanmar. Earlier on April 27, 2012, GoI had also told Myanmar to pressure the NSCN-K to stop helping other Indian militant groups. 

Further, on April 27, 2012, an NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) joint council claimed that the Naga people were "concerned" about the proposed talks between NSCN-K and the Myanmar military junta, adding that all Nagas were inseparable parts of the whole and 'Nagalim' embraces all their Naga ancestral domains. According to NSCN-IM leaders, it was under the legitimate leadership of Isak and Muivah that the Nagas had declared a "unilateral ceasefire" with the Myanmar Government years ago. 

Interestingly, on May 3, 2012, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio advocated two separate solutions to the Naga political problem – one with New Delhi and the other with Myanmar – since the Nagas were divided between the two countries by their erstwhile colonial rulers. 

Myanmar clearly has an important role to play in helping India secure a lasting peace in the region. It is expected, consequently, that, despite the odds and prevalent pessimism, the joint initiatives of the two countries will incline towards a progressive consolidation over time.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
June 4-10, 2012

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

 

Manipur

0
0
1
1

Nagaland

0
0
1
1

Left-wing Extremism

 

Bihar

3
1
2
6

Chhattisgarh

2
0
1
3

Jharkhand

2
0
1
3

Odisha

1
0
0
1

Total (INDIA)

8
1
6
15

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

26
4
20
50

FATA

2
2
71
75

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

22
2
1
25

Sindh

23
0
5
28

Total (PAKISTAN)

73
8
97
178
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

ISI continues to support terror groups, says CRS report: According to US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report the ISI continues to support terror groups. "There is ongoing conviction among US officials that sanctuaries in Pakistan have allowed Afghan militants to sustain their insurgency and that elements of the ISI continue to support them," the report said. The CRS said ISI is also regularly linked to anti-India terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), responsible for the November 26, 2008 (26/11) attack on Mumbai.. Samaya Live, June 5, 2012.

IM using Facebook for recruitment, says report: Investigations revealed that the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) operatives were trying to conduct recruitments through their Facebook accounts. They have also used other social networking websites. Rediff, June 6, 2012.

'It is impossible to bring infiltration to zero level in Kashmir Valley', says Army official: Outgoing General Officer Commanding (GOC, 15 Corps), Lieutenant General Syed Atta Hasnain, said that it is impossible to bring infiltration to zero level in Kashmir valley. "There is no force in the world that can bring the infiltration to zero level… it is never possible for us to bring the graph of infiltration level to zero level. Like the previous years, some incidents of infiltration have taken place but the number of attempts has definitely come down," said General Hasnain. He said Sopore, Baramulla, Kupwara and other areas of North Kashmir have direct impact of the infiltration attempts since they fall in vicinity of the Line of Control (LoC).

Hasnain said that 300 militants are operating in the Kashmir Valley and that most of them are operating in North Kashmir. He also said that militants are trying to regroup in South Kashmir especially in Pulwama District. He further said that militants have changed their strategy and they are using cars for planting bombs. Daily Excelsior, June 9, 2012.

Insurgency in northeast ebbing, says UHM P. Chidambaram: Union Home Minister (UHM) P. Chidambaram said the problem of left-wing extremism was affecting some eastern states in the country but most of the insurgent groups in northeast were now holding talks with the Centre. Terror incidents in northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir last year (2011) were the lowest in two decades, he said. Kanglaonline, June 5, 2012.


NEPAL

UCPN-M chairman Prachanda seeks CPN-UML chairman Jhala Nath Khanal's support to end political deadlock: The Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda held meeting with Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) chairman Jhala Nath Khanal seeking the latter's support to end the political impasse in the country. They also discussed possible way outs to end political polarization that was seen after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (CA) on May 27. Nepal News, June 8, 2012.


PAKISTAN

71 militants among 75 persons killed during the week in FATA: At least 10 people, including one security official, were killed, and 10 others injured when terrorists fired rockets at a security check post in South Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on June 10.

Nine militants, including a local Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 'commander', were killed during the clash between the volunteers of Kukikhel tribe in Tirah valley of Khyber Agency on June 6.

At least 20 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants were killed in retaliatory fire by Security Forces (SFs) when a group of militants attacked the Salala checkpost along the Af-Pak international border in Mohammad Agency on June 5.

At least six militants were killed when Kukikhel peace lashkar clashed with Tariq Afridi group of TTP in Dwa Thoe area of Tirah valley in Khyber Agency.

US drone attack killed 15 militants in Hisokhel, east of Miranshah, in North Waziristan Agency on June 4.

10 militants were killed in aerial shelling in Dwa Thoe area of Tirah valley in Khyber Agency.. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, June 5-11, 2012

26 civilians and 20 militants among 50 persons killed during the week in Balochistan: At least 23 persons, including 18 members of a militant outfit, were killed on June 8-9 in a fierce gun battle with Security Forces (SFs) in Chagai District.

Unidentified armed militants killed four a Policemen patrolling on Sariab Road in Quetta on June 9.

At least 15 people, including five children, were killed and more than 48 got injured in a remote-controlled bomb blast outside a madrassa, Jamia Islamia Miftahul Uloom, near Bank Chowk on Sariab Link Road in Quetta on June 7..

At least three people, including two militants, were killed and another was injured in a firing incident in Chaghai District. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, June 5-11, 2012

22 civilians among 25 persons killed during the week in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: At least 21 persons were killed and over 40 others injured on June 8 when a powerful bomb ripped through a bus carrying Government employees in Gulbela area on the Charsadda Road in the jurisdiction of Daudzai Police Station in Peshawar. The Intelligence reports revealed that it was a suicide attack. The News, June 8, 2012.

US confirms death of al Qaeda second-in-command Abu Yahya al-Libi in drone strike: The United States (US) said that al Qaeda number two Abu Yahya al-Libi was killed in a drone attack at Hisokhel, east of Miranshah, the headquarter of North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). "Our government has been able to confirm al-Libi's death," said White House spokesman Jay Carney. Dawn, June 6, 2012.

Human Rights activist Asma Jehangir accuses security establishment of plotting to kill her: The Human Rights activist Asma Jehangir said that the country's security establishment was planning to get her killed using one of the many jihadi (holy warrior) outfits operating in the country. She said that the military - particularly the Inter Services Intelligence - was upset with her for picking up cudgels for the Baloch people and speaking out against the role of the security establishment in the restive province of Balochistan. The Hindu, June 5, 2012.

Jihadi fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan training militant outfits in Mali, says Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou: Niger's President Mahamadou Issoufou warned that jihadi fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan are training militant groups in northern Mali, reported Dawn. "We have information on the presence of Afghans and Pakistanis in northern Mali…They are believed to be working as instructors. They are the ones who are training those who have been recruited across various West African countries," said Issoufou. Dawn, June 8, 2012.

US losing patience with Pakistan, says Defence Secretary Leon Panetta: United States (US) Defence Secretary Leon Panetta said that Washington was reaching the limits of its patience with Islamabad because of the safe havens the country offered to insurgents in neighbouring Afghanistan. "It is difficult to achieve peace in Afghanistan as long as there is safe haven for terrorists in Pakistan. It is very important for Pakistan to take steps. It is an increasing concern, the issue of safe haven, and we are reaching the limits of our patience," he told reporters. Daily Times, June 8, 2012.

Guns would turn towards Pakistan if it stops backing jihadis in J&K, threatens HM Chief Syed Salahuddin: Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) 'chief' Syed Salahuddin vowed to turn the guns on Pakistan if it stopped backing jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) who, he claimed, were fighting "Pakistan's war". "We are fighting Pakistan's war in Kashmir and if it withdraws its support, the war would be fought inside Pakistan," said Salahuddin. Times of India, June 9, 2012.

Targeted killings is a war for territorial gains, says Sindh CM Syed Qaim Ali Shah: Sindh Chief Minister (CM) Syed Qaim Ali Shah argues that the recent spree of targeted killings in Karachi is not politically motivated; instead, he claims that it is a turf war between criminal gangs who are out to occupy each others' territory in show of might. He said that 60 to 70 per cent killings were due to personal enmity while the rest could be attributed to ethnic and sectarian divide. But he claimed that "these sectarian and ethnic killings have been controlled to some extent".

At least 740 people have been slain in targeted killings between January 1 and May 31, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) said. Zohra Yusuf, chairwoman of the HRCP, said 107 political activists were among the dead. In 2011, 1,715 people were killed in violent incidents in the city. If the January-May pace holds, this year's total will be higher, about 1,750. Zohra said people were being killed with impunity while the government seemed to have little control over the situation. Central Asia Online, June 6, 2012; Tribune, June 6, 2012.

26/11 trial judge changed for fifth time: The Anti-terrorism court judge Shahid Rafique conducting the trial of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) 'commander' Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and six other Pakistani suspects charged with involvement in the Mumbai (Maharashtra) attacks of November 26, 2008 (26/11), was changed. No reason was given for the judge's transfer. This is for the fifth time, since the proceedings began in early 2009, that the judge conducting trial has been changed. IBN Live, June 6, 2012.

No change in our stance on Doctor Shakeel Afridi despite Pakistan's clarification, says US State Department Spokesman Mark Toner: United States (US) State Department Spokesman Mark Toner said that though Pakistan has formally informed the US that sentencing of Doctor Shakeel Afridi was not linked to his help in tracing slain al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, there seems to be no change in the view of Obama administration that 33 year imprisonment to the physician was not justified. "We continue to express our concerns about his continued incarceration. We have actually gotten some clarity that the charges against him are not related to the bin Laden case apparently," said the official. Times of India, June 7, 2012.

Special committee formed on Balochistan problems, Supreme Court informed: The Supreme Court was informed that a committee comprising senior officers of law enforcement agencies was formed for issues confronting Balochistan, including the matter of missing persons, mutilated bodies and abductions for ransom. Attorney General of Pakistan Irfan Qadir told a three-member bench of the apex court, headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, that a joint meeting was held to discuss the issues of the province. Dawn, June 5, 2012.


SRI LANKA

Government demands release of vital UN report on the war: The Government is demanding the release of a vital UN report on the war, mentioned in the UN Secretary General's Panel of Experts (PoE) report on accountability issues in Sri Lanka, as the number of deaths due to war contained in the document runs counter to claim that over 40,000 people perished in the final stages of the war from January to May 2009. The vital UN report had placed the number of people killed due to fighting between August 2008 and May 13, 2009 at 7,721 including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) combatants. The UN estimated the number of wounded persons at 18,479. The Island, June 6, 2012.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

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K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


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