SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 12, September 24, 2012

AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	USA

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The Future at Risk
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On September 16, 2012, four US troopers were killed by an Afghan Policeman at a remote checkpoint in the Mizan District of Zabul Province. A day earlier, an Afghan Policeman killed two UK soldiers in Helmand Province. In both incidents, the attackers were killed in return of fire. In the latest such attack, on September 17, an Afghan soldier opened fire on an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) vehicle in Helmand, injuring at least one US soldier. The attacker was captured immediately thereafter. A total of 112,579 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led ISAF personnel from 50 countries are currently deployed across Afghanistan.

According to data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, at least 116 ISAF personnel have been killed in 69 “Green on Blue” or “insider attack” incidents since January 1, 2009 (all data till September 21, 2012). More worryingly, there has been a steep rise in such incidents over the recent past. There were just six "Green on Blue" incidents, and 10 ISAF fatalities, in 2009. In 2010, six incidents occurred, with 20 fatalities. In 2011, the number rose to 21 incidents and 35 ISAF deaths. 2012 has already recorded 36 such incidents and 51 ISAF fatalities. 31 attackers have also been killed in these attacks since 2009.

Of 67 "Green on Blue" attacks recorded, 15 were major (resulting in three or more fatalities). The most prominent among these included:     

September 16, 2012: An Afghan Policeman opened fire in the Mizan District of Zabul Province, killing four US soldiers. The attacker was killed in return fire. The Taliban later claimed that the attack had been carried out with the aid of seven Afghan Policemen who were retaliating against the film "Innocence of Muslims."

August 28, 2012: An Afghan soldier shot and killed three Australian soldiers in an attack at a base in the Baluchi Valley of Uruzgan Province. Two more Australian soldiers were wounded in the attack. On September 16, the Taliban put up a picture of the attacker, Sergeant Hikmatullah, a recent recruit, on Twitter. Hikmatullah is yet to be captured.

August 10, 2012: Three US soldiers were killed in an attack by an Afghan Policeman in Sangin District in Helmand Province. The attacker fled after the attack.

January 20, 2012: An Afghan soldier killed four French soldiers and wounded another 15 at their base in Kapisa Province. One of the injured soldiers died later. The attacker was apprehended.

April 27, 2011: An Afghan Air Force pilot opened fire inside a NATO military base in Kabul, killing eight NATO troops and a contractor. The shooter jumped out of a window after the attack, injuring his leg, and was captured.

April 16, 2011: An Afghan soldier blew himself up at Forward Operating Base Gamberi in Laghman Province, killing five NATO troops and four Afghan soldiers. Another eight Afghans were wounded, including four interpreters.

November 29, 2010: An Afghan Border Police trooper killed six ISAF soldiers during a training mission in Pachir Agam District of Nangarhar Province. The attacker was killed in the incident.

November 4, 2009: An Afghan Policeman named Gulbuddin shot and killed three UK Grenadier Guards and two members of the UK Royal Military Police at a checkpoint in the Nad-e-Ali District of Helmand Province. The attacker escaped on a motorcycle.

The term “Green on Blue” originated from NATO symbolism which uses blue to identify ‘friendly’ forces, red for ‘enemy’ and green for ‘neutral’ forces. Such attacks are not limited to killing foreigners alone. At least 53 Afghan National Security Force [ANSF, comprising the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Local Police (ALP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Air Force (AAF), etc.] personnel have been killed in 35 separate attacks in 2012 [these attacks are distinct from the 35 "Green on Blue" attacks in 2012 above]

Analysts and authorities have put forward various grounds for the increasing trend in "Green on Blue" attacks, including personal enmity, cultural differences, violent society, an increasing distrust towards ISAF, the segregation at military bases, stress levels within the ANSF, and the self-radicalization of a section within ANSF, among others. Talking of personal enmity and cultural difference, Major Hasanzada of the ANA argued, “I understand why our men are shooting US and NATO soldiers. I too have been personally hurt by the way American forces behave towards my soldiers, our villagers, our religion and culture. Too many of them are racist, arrogant, and simply don’t respect us.” Alarmed by the role of cultural differences in such attacks, the Afghan Defense Ministry, in a Pamphlet, noted, “Even minor cultural differences can create misunderstandings and rows... Coalition troops may ask about the women in your family. Do not take offence; they just want friendly relations with you…. If you or your coalition partner gets angry, stay away from each other until the situation becomes normal…” Indeed, the new strategy of “mentoring” which was replaced by “partnering” after the 2009 surge of US troops in 2009, increased the mixing of ISAF and ANSF personnel, 24 hours a day, escalating cultural clashes.

These various factors would certainly play a role in the increasing violence between Afghan and foreign Forces, as well as within the ANSF. Nevertheless, the most prominent factor is likely the direct role of the Taliban, who see "Green on Blue" attacks as an integral element of their strategy of dominance in the wake of the US drawdown.

Significantly, the "Green on Blue" attacks spiked after US President Barack Obama announced, on June 22, 2011, that as many as 33,000 US ‘surge forces’ would be withdrawn, at the latest, by September 2012. He also promised to end US involvement in combat operations by 2014, and to shift the burden of Afghan security to the ANSF. On September 21, 2012, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that the last of the 33,000 'surge forces' had withdrawn from Afghanistan, returning the US presence to the pre-surge level of 68,000 troops.

To offset the decline in foreign troops, there was surge in recruitment into ANSF, with 10,000 to 15,000 new recruits being brought into the Afghan Forces each month, in order to reach the target strength of 352,000 by October 2012. This has led to poor screening processes and the entry of a large number of Taliban-backed rogue elements, who hope to capture control of the Force in the aftermath of the ISAF withdrawal. President Hamid Karzai’s spokesman Aimal Faizi thus noted, "The speedy process was the result of the need that we had to build up our security forces to the number that was required. But now we are close to that number so, in a way, we are not in a hurry... The insider attacks are a reason to also bring down this number (of new recruits being vetted each month) – to take more measures and be more careful in recruiting individuals."

Mullah Omar, the leader of Taliban, in a statement released on August 16, 2012, has openly acknowledged the strategy of infiltration:

Mujahedeen have cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given to them last year [2011]. Many conscious Afghans in the rank and files of the enemy have shown willingness to help the Mujahedeen in a shrewd and astute manner after having come around to know the reality. Thanks to the infiltration of the Mujahedeen, they are able to (safely) enter bases, offices and intelligence centers of the enemy. They easily carry out decisive and coordinated attacks, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy both in life and equipment… It is more proper for you (sympathetic Afghans) to take advantage of this opportunity because the day is not far away that the invading enemy will flee Afghanistan.

He also said that the Taliban had opened a “Call and Guidance, Luring and Integration" department, "with branches ... now operational all over the country," to encourage defections in the ANSF.

Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman Zahir Azimi, on September 5, 2012, noted, "Hundreds [of ANSF personnel] were sacked or detained after showing links with insurgents. In some cases we had evidence against them; in others we were simply suspicious." The investigation, he added, was the result of the probe ordered by President Karzai at the start of 2012, following the spike in insider attacks in 2011.

Initially, the US downplayed the attacks as “sporadic incidents’, but there is now evident concern at the highest level. President Obama, on August 20, 2012, stressed, “We are deeply concerned about this, from top to bottom”, and citing reason for the spike said, “We are transitioning to Afghan security, and for us to train them effectively we are in much closer contact – our troops are in much closer contact with Afghan troops on an ongoing basis." Similarly, US Army General Martin Dempsey stated, on September 16, 2012, “We’re all seized with (the) problem. You can’t whitewash it. We have to get on top of this. It is a very serious threat to the campaign. Something has to change.”

Crucially, on August 22, 2012, President Hamid Karzai’s office, without directly naming Pakistan, asserted that foreign spy agencies were behind most of these attacks. Karzai’s spokesman, Aimal Faizi, observed, “Based on interrogations of attackers who had been detained, and other evidence like letters and records of phone calls, the Government had concluded that the main culprits in the killings had been put in place by intelligence services from neighboring countries. There is no doubt there is infiltration.”

Meanwhile, a number of corrective measures have been introduced or are under consideration, including the designation of ‘Guardian Angels’, improving vetting processes for new recruits, introducing barriers between NATO and the ANSF, suspending training of ANSF, introducing interview procedures for ANSF personnel returning from leave, improving training for counter-intelligence agents, establishing an anonymous reporting system, and establishing a joint investigation commission when insider threats occur. Some of these measures are already being assessed as ‘not feasible’ and even ‘counter-productive’.

The designation of “Guardian Angels” – a trooper who will keep his weapon locked and loaded at all times, ready to protect his comrades, during training of ANSF troopers, is expected to increase the sense of security among foreign personnel. However, improving the vetting process has been declared unfeasible. “We realistically don’t have the time to study the case of each applicant. We look them over, have short interviews, and make background checks. But who knows what is really in the young man’s heart and soul?” argues an unnamed Afghan Army Colonel. Anthony H. Cordesman, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, noted, “There are no vetting procedures that can eliminate green-blue attacks in a country where there are no real records. Vetting relies heavily on tribal and local sources, who care more about family and local politics, and where interviews and polygraphs present major language problems.”

More worryingly, introducing barriers between NATO forces and the ANSF recruits they are training, is thought to be suicidal. John R. Allen, ISAF commander in Afghanistan, noted, “At this particular moment I don’t believe that we need to contemplate reducing our contact with the Afghans. The closer the relationship with them—indeed, the more we can foster a relationship of brotherhood — the more secure we are.”

On September 2, 2012, the ISAF announced that its Special Forces had suspended training for ANSF, in order to recheck the vetting status of ANSF troops. However, the most desperate measure was taken on September 19, 2012, when the ISAF announced that joint patrols and advisory work with ANSF would henceforth only be conducted at the battalion level and above, while co-operation with units smaller than the 800-strong battalions would be "evaluated on a case-by-case basis” and approved by ISAF’s Regional Commanders. Soon after, the Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed claimed, “This is the result of the mujahedeen’s operations and tactics that forced the enemy to abandon their plans. This is an achievement for the mujahedeen who have managed to create mistrust among the enemy forces and, God willing, this is the start of their overall defeat in Afghanistan.”

The Taliban, of course, is celebrating the discomfiture of their enemies. An unnamed senior Taliban commander in Kunduz Province observed:

These [insider] attacks are perhaps our most effective tool to create a golden gap between the Americans and the Afghans. We are aware that the Afghan security forces are getting stronger, so this is best way for us to weaken and divide them from the Americans. We are working like termites, eating into this already rotten wooden structure.

Afghanistan clearly stands at a crossroads, and the future is deeply uncertain. The worst-case scenario would see the ANSF simply peter out in the face of a hostile Taliban takeover after the US ‘withdrawal’ in 2014, with some troops defecting in strength to the Taliban, while others prefer to ‘melt away’ into villages and towns to avoid a confrontation. Such a situation would make the presence of the residual ISAF troops untenable, with a stronger and bolder Taliban, backed by ISAF-trained ex-ANSF troopers, targeting them. It is projected that the US envisages a residual Force of Advisors, Technical Support personnel and Special Forces at a strength of 25,000 troops in Afghanistan after 2014, at least up to 2024.

Under all circumstances, the crisis has deepened. The ‘surge’ that was aimed at beating back the Taliban to give the Afghan Government and its Security Forces the time and space to secure a firm grip on the affairs of the country, has ended without achieving its objectives. Though there has been a sharp decline in militancy related fatalities, at 3,952 in 2012, (till September 21) as compared to a total of 8,942 in 2011, the geographical spread of the Taliban influence has widened, even as their strikes become more audacious. On September 14, 2012, for instance, 15 Taliban militants, dressed in US Army uniforms, attacked Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, killing two US Marines and injuring another nine. Though all but one of the insurgents were killed in retaliatory gunfire, while one was captured, the attackers, destroyed six AV-8B Harrier fighter jets, worth about USD 30 million each, and damaged another two. They also damaged six hangars and destroyed three refueling stations. This was termed the biggest single loss in terms of military equipment for the ISAF since the beginning of the conflict.

President Obama’s premature and ill-conceived announcement of the withdrawal schedule, essentially provoked by domestic electoral considerations rather than any strategic calculus, has had natural and predictable consequences. Afghanistan’s enemies have been quick to take advantage, and despite declining fatalities and dramatic losses inflicted on the Taliban, the uncertainties of the situation have increased exponentially, dramatically eroding the limited gains of over a decade of war.

PAKISTAN

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Bajaur Agency: Reviving Terror
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The Pakistan Army on September 19, 2012, killed 29 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in the Batwar village of Salarzai tehsil (revenue unit) in the Bajaur Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Soon after, security officials announced the end of ‘targeted operations’ that were launched in the region on August 25, 2012.

Security Forces (SFs), with the help of the Salarzai Peace Militia, launched operations, using heavy artillery and helicopter gunships, after around 400 militants crossed over from the Kunar Province in Afghanistan into Pakistan to capture strategic hill tops in the region, and to take locals as hostage, on August 25, 2012. On that date, TTP 'spokesperson' Ehsanullah Ehsan also confirmed the death of Mullah Dadullah, the group’s 'chief' for Bajaur Agency, in US drone strike in the Sultan Marra Warra area of Kunar Province, during the night of August 24. Mullah Dadullah was killed along with 12 comrades, including his deputy, Mullah Abdul Rehman Ghalib. Ehsan declared, “Mullah Dadullah’s death will not dampen our morale and we will avenge his killing… Maulvi Abu Bakar has been appointed acting chief of the Bajaur chapter of TTP.” Mullah Dadullah, who had fled the 2008 military operation in Bajaur and had been living in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province since, had planned and personally led several cross-border attacks on Pakistani SF check posts.

Security officials claim that some 120 of the 400 militants who had sneaked into the region were killed during the operation, which lasted for 27 days, while the rest of the militants fled back to their sanctuaries in Afghanistan, leaving behind the bodies of several slain fighters. 25 soldiers were also killed in the operation. At least 12 soldiers were abducted and beheaded by the TTP. In confirmation, TTP released a video on August 31, 2012, stating, “Praise be to God that the Mujahedeen in Bajaur agency have managed to kill the infidel soldiers of Pakistan. Many of them were killed by bullets, 12 of them as you see have been beheaded. You see 12 heads here, and more heads are on the way.”

On September 9, 2012, security officials claimed they had cleared the area and pushed the militants back into Afghanistan. Jehangir Azam Wazir, the top political official in the area, stated that at least 118 people, including at least 80 militants, 18 civilians, 12 anti-Taliban militiamen and eight soldiers had been killed at that stage, after 17 days of fighting.

Official sources have, of course, claimed to have ‘cleared’ the Bajaur Agency on several occasions in the past, but militant activities have quickly resumed. What SF pressure has ordinarily achieved is a strategic withdrawal by the terrorists. Earlier, on July 12, 2012, dozens of militants had attacked the village of Kitkot in the Mamond tehsil of Bajaur Agency taking dozens of villagers as hostage. All the people who were taken hostage by the militants were subsequently freed in an operation in which SFs and local militiamen killed 17 militants and forced the rest across the border into Afghanistan. The entire area was declared ‘clear’ on the morning of July 13. However, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, the ‘deputy chief’ of TTP, based in Kunar, had then announced, “Our fighters have now withdrawn to their bases. We have held one soldier hostage”. No further report is available about the abducted soldier.

The Bajaur Agency, which borders the Kunar Province in Afghanistan to the West, the Malkand District of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in the East, the Mohmand Agency of FATA in the South and the Lower Dir District of KP to the North, has been a centre of terrorist activities because of its strategic location. The hills of Bajaur overlook the plains of Kunar Province which has long been a centre of insurgency. It served as al Qaeda's main command and control hub for operations in Northeast Afghanistan, including the Kunar Province.

According to the partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the Agency has so far witnessed 3,007 militancy related deaths since January 25, 2008 (data till September 23, 2012). The database records no militancy-related fatalities in the Agency prior to this. The fatalities include 390 civilians, 101 SFs and 2,516 ‘terrorists’ (No authoritative confirmation of categorization is available. Most individuals killed in SF shelling, air operations or firing, are declared ‘terrorists’ by official sources). The overall fatalities in FATA stand at 18,821, including 3,159 civilians, 1,314 SFs and 14,348 militants, over this period.  

Fatalities in Bajaur Agency: 2008-2012

Bajaur was under the direct command of TTP’s ‘deputy Chief’ Maulvi Faqir Muhammed since early 2007. As there was no challenge to the TTP’s authority, either from the SFs or the locals, at that stage, there were no killings in 2007. The first reported fatality occurred on January 25, 2008, when unidentified militants shot dead a former Policeman, Mamoor Khan, who was on his way home from the Khar Market in Khar, the Bajaur Agency headquarters. On the same day, suspected TTP terrorists exploded a remote-controlled bomb, killing a person identified as Maulana Mursalin. The fatalities escalated dramatically once the SFs launched Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) on August 7, 2008. The Operation, which was aimed at preventing the imminent fall of Khar, headquarters of Bajaur Agency, to the TTP, ended on February 28, 2009. Some 2,744 ‘terrorists’, including 321 foreigners, were killed during the operation. The SFs also suffered 97 fatalities.

Fatalities declined dramatically thereafter, but are now registering an increase once again. The TTP militants, including its top leaders, such as Maulvi Faqir Muhammed and the recently killed Mullah Dadullah, crossed the border into Kunar, from where the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had withdrawn its troops. A deal with local militants in Afghanistan allowed them to regroup and strengthen their base. Pakistani officials claim that four to five hundred TTP militants had set up bases in Afghanistan in the areas facing the Bajaur Agency, while another six to seven hundred TTP militants had set up bases in the area facing the Mohmand Agency.

After regrouping, in the initial phase, the TTP terrorists resorted to missile attacks, firing continuously across the border into the Bajaur Agency, causing a number of causalities and destruction of property. Between July 2011 and September 2012, eight incidents of such missile attacks were recorded, resulting in at least six fatalities and 29 injuries, according to partial data compiled by SATP.

It was, however, on June 16, 2011, that TTP cadres from across the border ventured into the Bajaur Agency in strength, for the first time after their flight in 2008. More than 300 militants TTP militants from Kunar attacked Khar, resulting in death of 15 persons. The dead included nine militants, three lashkar (tribal militia) volunteers, a soldier and two women. On July 6, 2011, Maulvi Faqir Mohammed, claiming responsibility for the June 16 attack declared, “Our fighters carried out these two attacks from Afghanistan, and we will launch more such attacks inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan.” Over the Voice of Sharia radio he said, “Don’t dare stand in the way of those who are following the path of God. We will return and enforce the golden system of Islam.”

Again, on July 8, 2011, two militants were killed and eight others received injuries as SFs and the Mamond Qaumi lashkar repulsed a cross-border attack in the Kagga area of Bajaur Agency. Between July 9, 2011 and July 12, 2012, militants resorted to a number of missile attacks, though there was no border crossing by any armed group.

Despite these operations, it is evident that the TTP has suffered significant reverses in the area. Haji Shafqat Gul, a member of the Bajaur Peace Committee noted, "At least 3,000 militants have laid down arms and expressed repentance over their association with Taliban in Bajaur Agency."

Meanwhile, the elders of the Mamond tribe on July 25, 2012, threatened to take action against TTP terrorists inside Afghanistan if cross-border attacks recurred. A statement by the elders declared, “The Afghan government should redress the issue on priority basis and take steps to stop cross-border attacks otherwise tribesmen will use their own techniques to counter the attacks. The Mamond tribesmen will target their enemies inside Afghanistan if any attack takes place in the border areas of the region in future.” Significantly, since the beginning of the militancy in the Bajaur Agency, two tribes – Salarzai and Mamond – have given offered stiff resistance and have raised armed militia against the terrorists, as a result of which they have frequently been targeted by the TTP. A total of 118 tribal militia members have fallen prey to TTP violence since 2008.

Islamabad has had a history of betrayal of the tribal leadership across FATA and KP, and this includes the trajectory in Bajaur. There was an extended period of peace after the TTP was forced out of the Province, into Afghanistan, by operations in which local tribal leaders and militia played a crucial role. However, once a measure of ‘normalcy’ was restored, the Government simply abandoned the local militias, who they had earlier encouraged to stand against the extremists. Malik Anwerzeb Khan, an elder of the Salarzai lashkar in Bajaur Agency, had stated, on March 26, 2011, “We were forced into this fight. Initially, the Government supported us with men and money. Police and paramilitary troops used to patrol the village streets alongside our volunteers to stave off Taliban attacks. But now it has deserted us. We have been left alone for this mortal combat.”

The Salarzai lashkar, which successfully countered the militant threat in the Salarzai sub-division of the Bajaur Agency, lost close to 70 volunteers in their campaign against the TTP. In a recent incident, on July 26, 2012, TTP terrorists targeted Shahabuddin, a local Salarzai tribesmen, in which nine tribesmen were killed and another 24 were injured. Shahbuddin’s family had been receiving constant threats from the TTP “who were refused sanctuary for a training camp by the family”. The attack was part of continuous TTP violence against the Salarzai tribe for their support to Islamabad’s military operations in the Agency.

On September 4, 2012, leaders of the All Bajaur Political Parties Alliance (ABPA, Bajaur Siyasi Ittehad) urged the Government to take immediate steps to ensure fulfilment of basic needs of the tribesmen affected by the war on terror in the Salarzai tehsil. They also warned of huge protest demonstrations against the Government if serious and speedy measures were not taken to resolve the problems facing tribes displaced by extended conflict in the Province.

Islamabad has tended to respond only to immediate provocation by the TTP, and to lapse into indifference once there is some relief from violence. Such a cycle will only embolden the extremists and widen their constituencies, even as it alienates tribal communities that remain allied to the state and its agencies. As the situation destabilizes further in Afghanistan in the wake of the projected 2014 ‘withdrawal’ of the ISAF, such threats can be expected to become even greater.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Left-wing Extremism

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

PoK

Azad Jammu and Kashmir

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)