SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 24, December 17, 2012

INDIA

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West Bengal: Maoists on the Mat
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

In 2010, when Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamool Congress (TMC) had formed a covert alliance with the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in the run-up to the State Assembly elections to unseat the then ruling Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-Marxist) Government, Maoist violence in West Bengal had peaked. With 425 Maoist-linked fatalities, the State secured the dubious distinction of recording the highest insurgency-linked killings in the country in that year. Fatalities had mounted continuously since 2008, when Banerjee’s mischievous alliance with the Maoists commenced, before which West Bengal was, at worst, a State only marginally afflicted with Left Wing Extremist (LWE) violence. Fatalities dropped precipitously after Banerjee was sworn in as Chief Minister, after the TMC swept the elections, and a collusive arrangement with the Maoists was put in place, resulting in the suspension of operations against the rebels by the State Police.

Unsurprisingly, the arrangement did not last, as the Maoists quickly began to target TMC cadres in their areas of dominance, and Banerjee was forced to order the resumption of operations against the Maoists after a succession of high profile killings of TMC leaders. The Security Forces (SFs) delivered a body blow against the Maoists, with the killing of Maoist politburo member Mallojula Koteswara Rao aka Kishanji, on November 24, 2011. As the SFs followed through with a number of other successes, including key arrests and surrenders, Maoist violence in West Bengal ground to a near complete halt, with just four fatalities recorded in the partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), through 2012 (till December 16), including two civilians and two Maoist cadres. 53 persons (41 civilians, two SF personnel and 10 Maoists) were killed in the State in 2011. The State has not recorded any major incident (involving three or more fatalities) in 2012, as against three such incidents in 2011.

All fatalities in Maoist-related violence in 2012 have been reported from West Midnapore District. Among the civilians killed was Girish Sahis (42), a supporter of ruling TMC, whose bullet-riddled body was found on September 28, beside the road near his village of Kismat Jambera in the Jhargram area, amidst handwritten Maoist posters demanding the withdrawal of the Joint Security Forces from Jungal Mahal. The second civilian was also a TMC supporter from Jhargram, and was killed by suspected Maoists on January 29, 2012. Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data, however, claims that, up to November 30, 2012, West Bengal recorded no civilian or SF fatalities, while one Maoist was killed. Significantly, other patterns of Maoist violence, such as explosions, arson and abductions, have also dropped to insignificance.

The reason behind the low level of Maoist violence in West Bengal is not far to seek. Kishanji’s killing was not just the neutralization of a top Maoist leader who had directly supervised the rise of the movement in Lalgarh, and its eventual spread across adjoining areas in Jungal Mahal; it was the killing of the ecosystem that kept him afloat. The pre-election hobnobbing with TMC helped intelligence penetrate Kishanji’s network, including his personal security cover. In July 2012, eight months after Kishanji’s killing, Police admitted that it was Suchitra's squad – who Kishanji trusted blindly – that played a key role in trapping him. Significantly, while Suchitra Mahato surrendered on March 9, 2012, along with her newlywed husband, another seven of her squad members surrendered on March 23. Suchitra Mahato was the wife of slain Maoist leader Shasadhar Mahato, one of the prime accused of the Salboni blast. All together, at least 19 Maoists have surrendered in 2012.   

This intelligence breakthrough was backed by another crucial development that helps resolve the jigsaw of the sudden Maoist collapse in West Bengal. By March 2012, cadres of the Maoist-backed People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) had started joining the ruling TMC, ostensibly to seek protection against arrest, as most of them had criminal cases pending against them. Three prominent PCPA leaders from West Midnapore — Manoj Mahato, Shyamal Mahato and Loso Hembram — were among those who joined the ruling party with several hundred followers. An unnamed TMC leader conceded, “A vast area covering more than 1,600 villages had been a free-zone for the PCPA since 2008-end as no mainstream political party could carry out activities there. We won seven seats in Jungal Mahal because Maoists did not call for a poll boycott and the PCPA campaigned for us. So the PCPA’s strength can be useful for us to strengthen our base in Jungal Mahal before the rural elections.” Further, TMC sources argued that PCPA workers joining TMC would also help in building an “intelligence network” to track Maoist movements in the area, as they knew the faces of the Maoist leaders active in the area. Not surprisingly, the CPI-Marxist sees the process as a confirmation of the “nexus between the party (TMC) and the Maoists”.

On her part, Chief Minister Banerjee has made at least three visits to the Jungal Mahal area, which had been neglected by the earlier Chief Ministers. She has announced several welfare schemes and carried out a special recruitment drive for tribal youth in the area for posts of 10,700 Junior Police Constables and National Voluntary Force (NVF). So huge was the response to the recruitment drive that many relatives of Maoist cadres filled out the application forms, despite a specific Maoist diktat prohibiting this. There is a further proposal to recruit another 5,000 to the NVF / Homeguards in a second phase. On December 12, 2012, the Chief Minister announced in Kolkata, that the State would deploy “village police” in every village of the Maoist-affected Jungal Mahal region.

The penetration of the ruling TMC in Jungal Mahal has helped intelligence gathering, and facilitated a succession of arrests, including several of high profile leaders, including Arnab Dam alias Bikram, a Maoist State Committee member and secretary of the Bihar-Jharkhand- Odisha Border Regional Committee (BJOBRC), who was arrested at the Biramdih Railway Station in Purulia District late in the night of July 16. An AK-47 rifle, some rounds of ammunition and some Maoist literature were recovered from him. Bikram’s arrest was touted as the biggest achievement of the Joint SFs after Kishanji’s elimination, as he was one of the most important leaders in charge of operations in West Bengal since Kishanji’s death.

Another significant success was the arrest of Sadanala Ramakrishna aka RK aka Techie Anna, a member of the Maoist Central Technical Committee, in Kolkata on February 29. His arrest was part of simultaneous raids in Kolkata and Mumbai, leading to the arrest of nine Maoists (five in Kolkata and four in Mumbai).  The arrests blew the lid off an ambitious Maoist arms manufacturing project. 

A succession of arrests, including some in Guwahati (Assam), New Delhi, Kolkata and Siliguri in West Bengal, and the Ganjam District in Odisha, between February and August 2012, of cadres of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), an insurgent formation operating in the Northeastern State of Manipur, which has formalized linkages with the CPI-Maoist, and Maoist facilitators, helped unravel the PLA-Maoist network, including its manifestations in West Bengal.

Another key arrest was that of Abhishek Mukherjee, secretary of the Maoists’ Kolkata City Committee on September 11, 2012. Abhishek was thought to have been killed in the Hathilot forest encounter on March 25, 2010, where Kishanji was believed to have been seriously injured. Indeed, the Maoists had put up his name and photograph on their “martyrs list” in an information bulletin, in an effort to mislead the Police.

Other significant arrests in 2012 included Tota Hembram, a top Maoist squad leader; Ranjan Tudu, a trusted Kishanji aide; Mohan Vishwakarma (60), a senior member of the Technical Research and Arms Manufacturing (TRAM) unit. According to SATP data, a total of at least 40 Maoist arrests have been made in West Bengal through 2012.   

Despite these reverses, Maoist efforts to regain lost ground continue. On the evening of November 24, 2012, some 50 CPI-Maoist sympathisers gathered at a community hall in Kolkata to observe the first death anniversary of Kishanji. Sources indicate that “a similar programme was held in Jungal Mahal, where several (Maoist) leaders participated.”

Media reports indicate that the Maoists have taken disciplinary action against former Bengal State Committee chief, Akash, and the Bengal State Committee has been dissolved. A State Organising Committee has been formed, which is working under BJOBRC. There have been periodic reports of Maoists trying to regroup, especially in the Jhargram area, which borders Jharkhand.

Further, while a large number of members of the Maoist-backed Jana Jagaran Mancha defected to the TMC after it came to power, a residual group started regrouping under the identity of the Rashtriya Janadhikar Suraksha Party (RJSP) during the latter half of 2011. The TMC Member of Parliament (MP) from Tamluk, Subhendu Adhikari, described the RJSP as a front of some banned outfit: "Some of the banned outfits are trying to strike back. It is they who have floated a panel under the garb of human rights organizations. We are keeping a keen watch on them and won't spare them if they engage in anti-national and subversive activities."

Maoist sympathisers have also reportedly set up a new formation, the Janaganer Samabay (Peoples’ Co-operative) to regain public sympathy in pockets of the Jungal Mahal area, after Kishanji's death. The Peoples Co-operative has already held several meetings in the area, and are said to be urging people to fight the ruling TMC by sending village youth to the adjoining Jharkhand state for arms training. Intelligence reports also indicate that the Maoists are trying to spread their influence across the industrial zone, specifically in collieries, in the Asansol-Durgapur area in West Bengal.

There are also troubling suggestions that some CPI-Maoist front organizations in West Bengal have developed a nexus with elements of the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which has close links with Pakistan’s covert intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). These elements have held several meetings jointly in four Districts of West Bengal, (Murshidabad, West Midnapore, Purulia and Bankura), staged protests against alleged violation of human rights, and have been instigating people against the Government. This information was shared by the State Director General of Police (DGP) with the MHA during the DGP-level meet on October 18, 2012. However, the MHA on December 5, 2012, informed Rajya Sabha that “no concrete inputs are available to indicate that Naxals have forged direct ties with the Pakistani Intelligence Agency ISI.”

Meanwhile, following a Kolkata High Court order allowing the status of political prisoners to PCPA leader Chhatradhar Mahato and six Maoists booked under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, the MHA had written to the State Government on October 8, 2012, asking the latter to amend the West Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992. The MHA told the State Government to move the Supreme Court and amend the Act, as the August 8, 2012, High Court order had “pan-India implications” and would provide grist to the CPI-Maoist propaganda machinery. The State Government is learnt to have agreed to amend the West Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992.

The wildfire growth of the Maoists in West Bengal in 2009-10 was a function of unprincipled electoral politics and of cynical collusion by a mainstream political formation, the TMC. With the end of these collusive arrangements between the TMC and the Maoists, the latter have, inevitably, lost ground in the State. Their efforts to restore some influence, nevertheless, continue, and will have to be countered by sustained operational pressure on the part of the intelligence and SF apparatus.

INDIA

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Nagaland: Hope and War
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On December 16, 2012, in a fresh spurt of factional violence, six militants belonging to the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) and NSCN-Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-KK) were reportedly killed in two separate incidents in Kiphire and Phek Districts. Early in the morning, two NSCN-K militants, identified as ‘lieutenant’ Among of Anatonger village and ‘2^nd lieutenant’ Tholo Pochury of Phongkhuri village, were shot dead by NSCN-KK cadres in Kiphire District. In a retaliatory act, the same afternoon, militants of the ‘Mobile 5’ unit of NSCN-K, led by ‘colonel’ Kuruchu, killed four NSCN-KK militants, including ‘major’ Isur, at Meluri in Phek District.

Earlier, on December 5, 2012, two NSCN-KK cadres were killed in Longkhim town in Tuensang District after an altercation between cadres of the NSCN-KK faction and those formerly with the outfit, who had defected to the NSCN-K.

Previously, on December 3, 2012, NSCN-K militants had killed two NSCN-KK militants, identified as “2^nd lieutenant” Sheye Konyak and “sergeant major” Wochamo Ezung, at Murgi Patti in Dimapur District.

Fratricidal rivalry among the Nagas has persisted since the formation of the NSCN-K and NSCN-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM), following the split of the original NSCN on April 30, 1988. More recently, turf wars between Naga groups have resulted in escalating violence with the further split of both the NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K. The NSCN-KK, a splinter group of NSCN-K, was formed on June 7, 2011; and the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), a Manipur based Naga group, split from the NSCN-IM on February 25, 2011. Within Nagaland, fratricidal clashes in 2012 have occurred only between NSCN-K and NSCN-KK.

There were 40 incidents of fratricidal clashes between these two Naga groups within the State, through 2012. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, annual fatalities in the State have risen from just three in 2010, to 15 in 2011, and, dramatically, to 58 in 2012.

Outside Nagaland, the worst fratricidal clash between Naga groups was the fierce gun battle between ZUF and NSCN-IM cadres, which erupted in the evening of September 25, and continued late into the night of September 26, leaving six persons dead and one civilian injured. The incident occurred inside a forest near Wairangba village in the interior Tamenglong District of Manipur.

Nagaland has also witnessed an increasing trend in incidents of extortion and other violent acts. Though the numbers on record are tiny (SATP data registers 11 incidents of extortion in 2012, while 12 such incidents were reported in 2011, as against nine in 2010; only three incidents of abduction was reported in 2012 while, six such incidents were recorded in 2011, as against two in 2010; recorded incidents are likely to be a fraction of actual incidents, most of which go unreported, and are met with total compliance), the reality of extortion and intimidation by armed militant formations is endemic across the State and in areas of their dominance outside Nagaland as well.

The State recorded a total of 90 militant arrests in 2012 as against 56 in 2011 and 76 in 2010. In an important development, on November 25, 2012, Security Forces arrested NSCN-IM 'lieutenant major' Clinson, the Dima Hasao District 'commander’ from a Naga-dominated village of Lungmung in Dima Hasao District (Assam). NSCN-IM is also strengthening its position in the neighbouring State of Assam.

The sharp escalation in fatalities in Nagaland comes in the wake of a precipitate decline since 2008, following the signing of the Covenant of Reconciliation (CoR) by top leaders of the NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, and the ‘Federal Government of Nagaland’ / Naga National Council (FGN/NNC), on June 13, 2009, after a Naga Reconciliation meet held in Chiang Mai in Thailand from June 1 to June 8, 2009. The Covenant was reaffirmed by the three groupings on September 18, 2010.

However, the ‘highest level meeting’ of the Naga Reconciliation Committee, which was to be held during the visit of NSCN-IM leaders to Dimapur in March 2011, could not take place due to the sudden review of the decision by the NSCN-K. On December 5, 2011, moreover, members of the High Level Commission (HLC) of the ‘Naga Concordant’ represented by leaders from the three groups NSCN-IM, FGN/NNC and NSCN-KK, reaffirmed their commitment to the Naga Reconciliation and to remain firm in their pledge to work towards “building a shared Naga future.”  The ‘Naga Concordant’ is a joint declaration signed by all the six leaders – Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah of NSCN-IM; 'General' Khole Konyak and N. Kitovi Zhimomi of NSCN-Khole-Kitovi; and 'Brigadier' S. Singnya and Zhopra Vero of NNC, after they resolved "in principle", on August 26, 2011, to work towards the formation of one ‘Naga National Government’. 

In the most recent development, NSCN-IM did not attend the Naga reconciliation meeting initiated by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) held on May 26, 2012, in Chiang Mai (Thailand), due to ‘unwanted’ developments. The NSCN-IM noted that the ‘clarification’ given by NSCN-KK on the word ‘Nagaland’ as encompassing "all Naga lands" irrespective of national or international boundary demarcations ‘contradicts’ the statement made by 'general secretary' Kitovi Zhimomi after his group signed the ceasefire with the Government of India (GoI). On May 14, 2012, NSCN-IM, termed the move by the Khole-Kitovi group, reportedly to seek a solution within the boundary of Nagaland, as a "calculated-deliberate step to sabotage the hard-earned 14 years negotiations being held at the highest level of the GoI and the NSCN."

Against the backdrop of increasing fratricidal violence, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, on February 29, 2012, decried the rising factionalism among Nagas, observing, “Though the world and outsiders recognize Naga people, yet Naga people themselves do not recognize each other and though Nagas have ceasefire with others, they do not have ceasefire among themselves.”

Amidst escalating war, however, the hope of peace talks between NSCN-IM and GoI persists, albeit occasionally clouded by the ‘confused stands’ of the principal three Naga factions.

A high-level meeting of the NSCN-IM on October 25, 2012, at ‘Council Headquarters’ in Camp Hebron (Dimapur District), attended by top-ranking leaders of the outfit, including those of its ‘Naga Army’, reportedly decided to consult the Naga people before inking any peace accord with New Delhi. According to an unnamed NSCN-IM leader, the meeting fully backed ‘chairman’ Isak Chisi Swu and ‘general secretary’ Thuingaleng Muivah in their efforts to find an honourable solution through political negotiations with the Union Government, and further described the path chosen as the correct one.

Earlier, on October 15, 2012, a 20-member Joint Legislators Forum (JLF) team of the Nagaland Assembly, led by Assembly Speaker Kiyanielie Peseyie and including Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio met Union Minister of Home Affairs (UMHA) Sushilkumar Shinde, Union Agriculture minister Sharad Pawar, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) ‘chairman’ Sharad Yadav and the NSCN-IM collective leadership. JLF MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly) also offered to resign from the Assembly if any agreement was reached between NSCN-IM and the Union Government. JLF was formed in the year 2009.

On October 10, 2012, Shinde, reportedly hinted that a ‘solution’ to the ‘Naga issue’ was likely before March 2013, when Assembly polls in Nagaland are due to be held. The Centre is talking to Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur Chief Ministers for a consensus on steps relating to the welfare of Nagas living in the two States, before it reaches a final settlement with the NSCN-IM. Shinde disclosed, "I have been talking to the chief ministers of both Arunachal and Manipur and we are trying to reach a consensus on this.” Shinde's statement came a day after he held talks with Manipur Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh.

Anticipating a solution for the Naga issue in the near future, Assam Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi on October 20, 2012, declared that Assam would continue to oppose the NSCN-IM’s primary demand for territorial integration of Naga inhabited areas in Assam. Tarun Gogoi, however, expressed sympathy for Nagaland Chief Minister Rio's expectation of the Union Government’s nod to the 'emotional integrity' of the Naga people.

On October 18, 2012, NSCN-IM ‘general secretary’, Thuingaleng Muivah stated, “the ball is now in the court of the Government of India,” and, further, “about the solution, we cannot say, but it is sure that the progress is there and of course, the Government of India is also more serious and we are hopeful that something honourable will be achieved.”

Also, former UMHA P. Chidambaram, in his last press conference as the Union Home Minister , on July 31, 2012, had observed that the ongoing peace talks between NSCN-IM and GoI had reached a “sensitive stage” and efforts were on to iron out a longstanding solution to the Naga political issue. Chidambaram clarified, further, “first we will try to reach an agreement with NSCN-IM. Only then, we will talk with the other two groups, provided they are willing to talk. As everybody knows, one group lives outside India.”

These events have raised hopes for a solution to the Naga imbroglio before the 2013 Assembly elections. Unfortunately, however, a war of words regarding the solution continues between the three factions. Thus NSCN-KK (who reportedly wanted to settle the issue of Nagas in Nagaland alone) ‘ato kilonser‘(‘prime minister’), N. Kitovi Zhimomi, on November 22, 2012, declared that any solution that may come about between the Union Government and the NSCN-IM could not be applied beyond Manipur. He claimed that the current talks between the NSCN-IM and the Central Government were confined only to Naga inhabited areas in Manipur, since the Central Government had rejected both sovereignty and integration, and thus, the ‘alternative arrangement’ for the Nagas of Manipur had nothing to do with the Nagas of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.

NSCN-IM, ‘general secretary’, Thuingaleng Muivah, before leaving for New Delhi, on November 6, 2012, had, however, clarified that NSCN-IM had not dropped the demand for Naga integration, declaring, “Without the Naga integration, there will be no Naga solution.”

Meanwhile, NSCN-K Ministry of Information and Publicity (MIP) ‘kilonser’ (‘minister’), Y. Wangtin Naga, on November 5, 2012, noted that the ‘secret’ talk between the GoI and NSCN-IM was “still concealed and known to none”. Talking to Nagaland Post over the phone, Wangtin argued that the Nagas should be ready to face any eventuality in case the GoI and NSCN-IM’s “secret solution” was imposed on them. He asserted that any solution arrived at with NSCN-IM would be a “factional solution” and that the GoI had “no authority to force it” as the Naga solution. The NSCN-K ‘kilonser’ also recalled that the formation of NSCN in 1980 by Isak Swu, S.S. Khaplang and Thuingaleng Muivah was based on the foundation stone of “Naga sovereignty” and reasserted that the ‘Naga nation’ and its political aspiration would not perish under any circumstances.

The NSCN-K also blamed Isak and Muivah for factionalism when they not only condemned the Naga National Council (NNC) “the mandated political institution but also started killing thousands of Nagas” by accusing them of supporting the 1975 Shillong Accord; that these killings only “multiplied factions”; and that the GoI, after almost 15 years, has realised too late that there can be no Naga solution with one faction. The group urged GoI to realise that the NSCN-K, under the leadership of S.S. Khaplang, was capable of bringing a lasting solution not only to the long-standing Naga issue, but also for the entire north east. It said, there can be no solution without involvement of NSCN-K and that any solution arrived at with NSCN-IM alone “will be a mockery.”

Earlier, in July 2012, NSCN-K ‘chairman’ S.S. Khaplang had stated that his ‘government’ would reject any political solution within the Indian constitution, unless it was the “sovereignty solution”. Khaplang declared, further, that NSCN-K would not be involved in the forthcoming “forced Indian election” of 2013 in Nagaland.

In another significant development, on April 9, 2012, the Government of Myanmar and the NSCN-K signed a ceasefire agreement which granted autonomy to NSCN-K in three Districts in the country: Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun, which fall in Sagaing – a north-western administrative region of Myanmar, bordering Nagaland and Manipur to its north. The agreement also provides NSCN-K members with the freedom to move 'unarmed' across the country.

Complicating issues further is the Eastern Naga Peoples Organization (ENPO), an apex body of six Naga tribes in Nagaland, again raising the demand for the creation of a separate ‘Frontier Nagaland’ State comprising the four eastern Districts of Nagaland (Mon, Tuensang, Kiphire and Longleng), with a special status within the Indian Constitution. The demand has already been turned down by both the Centre and the State Government. Further, NSCN-KK has threatened ENPO on the issue of Frontier Nagaland. The demand was first raised in the year 2010.  ENPO has also rejected the State Government’s offer of an autonomous council, regional council and economic package, in lieu of ‘Frontier Nagaland’.

Increasing factionalism and the unabated conflict between various Naga outfits, rampant violations of the Covenant of Reconciliation, rampant extortion, abductions and violations of ceasefire ground rules have been enduring and major impediments to the Naga peace process. The rising expectations of a ‘pre-election solution’ notwithstanding, past trends have repeatedly demonstrated the vanity of such hopes. It remains to be seen whether the current round of optimism is baseless sentiment, or a reasoned assessment of the realities of the ground.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Nagaland

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

PoK

Gilgit-Baltistan

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)