SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 30, January 28, 2013

PAKISTAN

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Sindh: Deepening Crisis
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 17, 2013, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA), Syed Manzar Imam, was killed, along with three of his guards, by six militants at Hyderi Chowk in the Orangi Town area of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh.

On January 1, 2013, militants had attacked an MQM rally in Karachi, killing four persons and injuring another 50.

Claiming responsibility for both the attacks, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ‘spokesman’, Ehsanullah Ehsan, in a statement from an undisclosed location, declared, on January 17, 2013, that TTP cadres had targeted the MQM workers and that more attacks were likely to follow.

Though the MQM has lost at least 222 activists in Sindh in terrorism related violence in the last two years (87 in 73 incidents of killing in 2011 and 135 in 2012 in 116 incidents), there was no direct claims by the TTP preceding the January 2013 attacks. These two attacks, consequently, are to be assessed against the backdrop of the TTP’s November 3, 2012, decision to ‘deal with’ the MQM and free the people of Karachi of its ‘suppression’. Significantly, on November 2, 2012, MQM chief Altaf Hussain had called for a countrywide referendum against the TTP. The MQM’s media centre stated that the party was going to ask a simple question to Pakistanis on the ballot paper, “Do you want a Pakistan of Quaid-e-Azam or a Pakistan of Taliban?” The MQM is in an alliance with the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in the Provincial Government.

While the MQM’s open declaration has earned the TTP’s wrath more recently, Awami National Party (ANP) activists in Sindh continued to face the brunt of TTP’s violence through year 2012. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, the total number of ANP cadres killed over the past two years stood at 38 in 2012 and 43 in 2011, with TTP as the prime suspect in all these killings. However, there is an altogether different reason for TTP’s ire against ANP. The surge in attacks against the ANP in Karachi can be traced back to the Army’s operations in Swat (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, KP) in 2009. It was under an ANP regime in KP that the SFs had expelled TTP militants from Swat Valley. Recently, after the killing of Bashir Ahmed Bilour, Senior Minister for Local Government and Rural Development in KP and also a senior ANP leader, on December 22, 2012, the TTP ‘spokesman’ for Dara Adamkhel and Khyber Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Mohammad Afridi, had warned that ANP and MQM were the prime targets of his group.

Meanwhile, Karachi, as in the previous years, bore the brunt of heightened terrorist activity in Sindh. Partial data compiled by SATP indicates that, out of 1,553 terrorism-linked fatalities in the Province, including 1,318 civilians, 118 Security Force (SF) personnel and 117 militants, in 1,105 incidents of killing the Province witnessed in 2012, only 23 fatalities (all civilians) in eight incidents of killing took place outside Karachi. [According to the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (a civic organization that works in partnership with the Karachi Police) report of January 8, 2013, 2,124 people were killed in Karachi in 2012.] In 2011, out of the 1,211 fatalities, including 1,082 civilians, 61 SF personnel and 117 militants, in 496 incidents of killing, only three fatalities (all civilians) in two incidents of killing took place outside Karachi.

There was an increase of 28.24 percent in terms of overall fatalities in 2012 as compared to 2011. However, a spike of 93.44 percent was registered in the SFs category, while terrorist and civilian killings went up by 72.05 and 22 percents respectively in Sindh. 

Sindh witnessed as many as 38 major incidents (each resulting in three or more fatalities), including three outside Karachi, in 2012, as against 29 in 2011 (all in Karachi). Three suicide attacks (all in Karachi) were recorded in 2012, the same as in 2011 (all in Karachi); however, the resultant fatalities decreased from 17 in 2011 to 12 in 2012. Similarly, though the number of incidents of explosion increased from 46 in 2011 (31 in Karachi alone) to 77 in 2012 (59 in Karachi alone), the resultant fatalities registered a decline, from 62 in 2011 (all in Karachi) to 42 in 2012 (40 in Karachi alone).

Sectarian violence recorded a steep hike in 2012. While there were 13 fatalities (12 in Karachi alone) in 12 incidents of sectarian violence in 2011 (11 in Karachi alone), 2012 saw 151 fatalities (145 in Karachi alone) in 91 incidents of sectarian violence (88 in Karachi alone).

Summing up the deteriorating security scenario of the city and TTP’s role, Zohra Yusuf, stated, on January 3, 2013:

The TTP used to come to Karachi for R and R or to get treated in the hospitals here... or maybe for fundraising. But now they've got a foothold and they want to entrench themselves and take over here.

Despite this unabated violence in the Province, centred around Karachi, the authorities remain in denial. Indeed, Sindh Chief Minister (CM) Syed Qaim Ali Shah stated, on January 20, 2013, that “one or two target killings in a big city like Karachi were not an issue”. Claiming further that the situation in Karachi is not as bad as portrayed by the media, he pointed out that murders in Karachi were on the rise over “different other issues” (sic). The CM it seems was unaware that Karachi had the unfortunate distinction of being the worst-affected District in the terror-riven country. Indeed, fatalities in Karachi alone are just under the total fatalities for the Provinces of Balochistan (954) and KP (656), combined.

In fact, 25 key al Qaeda and TTP-linked terrorist outfits have literally taken this port city hostage. These include five factions of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) [LeJ-Al Alami (International), Qari Zafar group, Qari Shakeel group, Akram Lahori group and Farooq Bengali group]; three factions of TTP [‘Commander’ Waliur Rehman group (from South Waziristan), Badr Mansoor group (from North Waziristan) and Mullah Fazlullah group (from Swat)]; Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP); Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP); Sunni Tehreek (ST); Daawat-e-Islami (DeI); Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM); Harkat-ul-Mujahideen – Al Alami (HUMA); Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM); Jamaat ul Furqaan (JuF); Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI); Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM); Jundallah; Tehrik-e-Islami Lashkar-e-Muhammadi (TILM); Lashkar-e-Islami (LeI); Mehdi Militia (MM); Hezbollah; Kharooj; Tawheed Brigade (TB); Al Mukhtar Group; and Punjabi Mujahideen.

Most of these groups generate funds through extortion and kidnapping for ransom. According to the Karachi Police, 1,160 incidents of kidnapping/abduction were reported in 2012, as against 1,035 in 2011. 53 cases of abduction for ransom were reported in 2011, rising to 72 in 2012. [For both the years, the data is for the period between January 1 and September 15, and likely reflects significant under-reporting, since silent compliance is often the rule in most such cases].

Apart from these terrorist formations, a number of local criminal gangs, affiliated to these outfits, have also been involved in extortion. The failure of the Police and administration to curb these groups has made Karachi a playground for extortion. The most feared of all such criminal groupings is the Lyari Gang, led by Uzair Baloch, operating in Karachi’s Lyari area. Islamabad launched a ‘grand operation’ against gangs in Lyari area on April 27, 2012, but reports suggest comprehensive failure of the initiative. The Lyari Gang continues to control the areas of its dominance till date. The Gang reportedly has the covert support of the ruling PPP, and the operation was just an eye-wash to control the political ambitions of the People’s Aman Committee (PAC), the political face of the Lyari Gang.

Bank robberies have also extensively been used by both terrorist and criminal formations for revenue generation. According Sindh Police and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), TTP was found to be involved in 131 bank robberies since 2008 [till November 9, 2012] in Sindh. Terrorist formations were involved in at least 28 bank robberies in Karachi alone, between 2009 and 2011. Khurram Bari, Superintendent of Police (SP), Special Interrogation Unit (SIU), which interrogates suspects linked to terrorism or terror-financing cases, disclosed, on May 12, 2012, “Several activists of TTP ... have confessed to Police that they have committed bank robberies to provide money to the organisation.”

SF action is, moreover, vehemently opposed. Senior Superintendent Police (SSP) of the Anti-extremist Cell of CID, Chaudhary Aslam noted, “The CID has arrested 721 militants and over 143 gangs related to the TTP in the city since 2008. They attacked my house in retaliation [September 19, 2012]. The officers working against the Taliban in Karachi are under constant threat. There was a suicide attack on one of our SSPs [Senior Superintendents of Police (SSP)] too.” The SSP Malir Rao Anwar’s convoy was targeted in the attack on April 5, 2012, and four persons were killed.

Karachi, with a population of 18 million, has only 31,861 Policemen, yielding just 177 Policemen per 100,000 people, an abysmal ratio for a major urban concentration, particularly the financial capital of the country, with overwhelming problems of security. Indeed, the overall Police population ratio for Sindh stands substantially higher, at 263 per 100,000. The Police population ratio for Lahore, to take an urban comparison, is 343/100,000. Urban concentrations, globally, tend to have significantly higher police-populations than rural areas.

Given the current security scenario in the Province at large, and Karachi in particular, and Islamabad’ reluctance to discontinue the patronage that it has extended to armed and extremist political, ethnic, sectarian and criminal formations, it is unlikely that Karachi well get any relief from the rising wave of violence in the foreseeable future.

INDIA

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Jharkhand: Little Respite
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Repeating familiar tactics, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) lured Security Force (SF) troops into a trap near Amawatikar village in Latehar District of Jharkhand on January 7, 2013. In the ensuing encounter, the SFs lost nine Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and one Jharkhand Jaguar (JJ) trooper, and at least another 15 SF personnel received injuries. At least two Maoists are believed to have been killed, though no bodies were recovered. The casualties in the incident increased next day as four civilians, who were helping the SFs recover the dead bodies of the troopers, lost their lives when the landmine placed beneath the body of one of the troopers exploded.   

More shocking was the fact that, during the autopsy on one of the troopers, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) weighing 2.75 kilograms was found inserted surgically in the abdomen of the body. Later, it was found that the Maoists had similarly placed another IED in the body of another trooper, but it had exploded earlier. The Maoists had also booby-trapped the body of another three troopers, but the devices failed to explode.

The SFs had been trying to trap Central Committee member Arvindji for almost a month prior to the January 7 encounter. Two encounters with his contingent of around 250 cadres had already occurred prior to this date, but he had managed to escape. Finally, his contingent managed to mislead the SFs and ambushed them.

This not the first time that Jharkhand Police was taken by surprise. Barely two months earlier, on November 9, 2012, three Policemen and a prisoner were killed when about 100 armed CPI-Maoist cadres, including women cadres, attacked a Police van carrying 32 prisoners from Giridih Court to the Divisional Jail, at Mahadev Chauk in Giridih District. The Maoists succeeded in freeing eight of their comrades from the prison van.

Indeed, while overall Maoist violence has declined dramatically across the country, the decline in Jharkhand has been relatively modest. According to Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data, total fatalities in Jharkhand declined by under 14 per cent, from 198 in 2011, to 169 in 2012, while all-India fatalities declined from 710 to 488, a drop of over 31 per cent.

MHA data indicates that Jharkhand has maintained its dubious distinction of recording the highest number of civilian fatalities among Maoist-affected States, with 133 civilians killed in 2012, though the number was down from 149 in 2011. Chhattisgarh, the State recording the second highest civilian fatalities, registered 63 killed, less than half the number for Jharkhand. SF and Maoist fatalities also declined marginally, from 33 and 16, respectively, in 2011, to 29 and seven in 2012. Partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) records a total of 20 Maoist related fatalities in Jharkhand in 2013 (till January 27), including six civilians, 10 SF personnel and 4 Maoists.

A range of other parameters also indicate a marginal slowdown in Maoist activity in Jharkhand.

While most parameters appeared to be comparable over the two years, there was a considerable decrease in arms training camps held by the Maoists, and the organization of ‘Jan Adalats’ ( ‘People’s Courts’, kangaroo courts organized by the Maoists), suggesting that the Maoist networks were under some pressure, resulting in a decline in political mobilization and recruitment.

According to partial data compiled by SATP, incidents of killing (civilian, SF and Naxal) were reported from 14 Districts in 2012 – Bokaro (1), Chatra (5), Dhanbad (1) Garhwa (13) Giridih (8) Gumla (18) Hazaribagh (3) Khunti (13) Latehar (12) Pakur (1) Palamu (7) Ranchi (6) Simdega (5) and West Singhbhum (5). In 2011 incidents of killing were recorded in 16 Districts.

Among the other patterns of violence recorded by SATP, the Maoists engaged in 18 incidents of arson in 11 Districts – Khunti (3), Giridih (2), Lohardaga (2), Ranchi (2), Latehar (2), West Singhbhum (2), Chatra (1), Gumla (1), Dumka (1), Bokaro (1) and Garwah (1). Emphasizing these incidents, Director General of Police (DGP) G.S. Rath, on December 20, 2012, stated that, barring incidents of setting ablaze of vehicles, Maoist activities have been ‘contained to a large extent’ in Jharkhand. LWE groups also abducted at least 26 Persons through 2012, and triggered at least 9 landmine blasts in the State. Jharkhand recorded at least six major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) against 14 such incidents in 2011.

An analysis of Maoist violence, as well as of overground and underground activities, through 2012, indicates that Bokaro, Chatra, Dhanbad, Garhwa, Giridih, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Khunti, Latehar, Pakur, Palamu, Ranchi, Simdega and West Singhbhum Districts remain highly affected; while Dhanbad, Lohardaga and Ramgarh are moderately affected.

A peculiar feature of LWE violence in Jharkhand is that, along with the CPI-Maoist, other splinter groups (which have broken away from the CPI-Maoist) continue to operate. These groups include the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI), Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC), Jharkhand Prastuti Committee (JPC), Jharkhand Janmukti Parishad (JJP), Swatantra Jan Sangharsh India Morcha (SJSIM), Sangharsh Janmukti Morcha (SJMM), and Jharkhand Sangharsh Janmukti Morcha (JSJM). These splinter groups are strongly antagonist to CPI-Maoist though they also fight among themselves. On June 24, 2012, in a change of strategy, the CPI-Maoist decided to call off violence against other armed outfits, including their splinter groups, for three months, to facilitate unity of action against the unified command of the Centre and the State Governments. The attempt, however, appears to have failed.

Significantly, S.N. Pradhan, the Jharkhand Police spokesperson, disclosed to the media that none of the 23 troopers who died in encounters in 2012 (till October), had been killed by non-Maoist groups. On the other hand, of the 33 extremists killed during this period in Jharkhand, 22 were reportedly eliminated in fratricidal operations by rival groups. Six died in encounters with Government Forces, while five were lynched by the “public”. In 2011, fratricidal violence reportedly killed 40 Maoists. CPI-Maoist involvement in violent incidents came down from 65-70 per cent in 2008-09 to 44 per cent in 2012, Pradhan added. In contrast, the PLFI’s ‘share’ rose to 30 per cent, from 14 per cent. Pradhan observed, further, “Where the (CPI) Maoists are retreating, their rival groups are moving in to occupy the space. All of them are purely criminal groups fighting over extortion and killing people if their demands are not met.”

The SFs made some ‘commander’ level arrests in the year. Maoist ‘zonal commander' Naveen Majhi, wanted in 110 criminal cases in four States, was arrested in Hazaribagh District on May 31, 2012. He is also a member of the Bihar-Jharkhand-North Chhattisgarh Special Area Committee of the CPI-Maoist. Among others arrested were two ‘zonal commanders’, nine ‘sub-zonal commanders’, four ‘area commanders’, five hardcore Maoists and 12 ‘top’ Maoists from CPI-Maoist; two ‘zonal commanders’, three ‘sub-zonal commanders’ and four ‘area commanders’ from PLFI; one TPC ‘zonal commander’ and one ‘zonal commander’ and one ‘area commander’ from JPC. Significantly police arrested three CPI-Maoist cadres and seized a US-made M-16 rifle and 14 cartridges of 5.56 mm, one 9-mm pistol of Italian make, and one light weight bullet-proof jacket worth INR 400,000, manufactured in the United Kingdom, prompting the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to launch a probe into the influx of arms and equipment from Western sources.

Among those killed in encounters with the Police, Ajay Ganjhu alias Parasji (45), who had been heading the Bihar-Jharkhand regional committee of the CPI-Maoist, was the most notorious. Ganjhu, who carried a reward of INR 1.7 million on his head, was killed in a joint operation by the Jharkhand Police and the CRPF in Kunda forest in Chatra District on July 19, 2012.

Meanwhile, the Saranda Forest of West Singhbhum District, which was reclaimed from Maoist dominance last year and where development work is being carried under the Saranda Action Plan (SAP), again witnessed Maoist violence. On November 17, 2012, just a month after work started on road construction under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) as part of the SAP, Maoists set ablaze four dumpers and two earth movers (Josephy Cyril Bamford Ltd) in Ushariya village of Digha Panchayat in West Singhbhum District.  SFs then started ‘Operation Anaconda II’ (from December 10, 2012) to flush the Maoists out from Saranda. It may be noted here that Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh is personally monitoring implementation of SAP, and has already made at least four visits to Saranda to monitor the implementation of the development plan. Despite this, on September 12, 2012, at Digha, Ramesh apologized to the people for the tardy pace of development work due to the “Naxal activities”.

Before ‘Operation Anaconda II’, SFs had conducted some large cordon and search operations in the State. 'Operation Octopus', launched in April in Latehar District; ‘Operation Thunder’ in Jhumra hills in Bokaro District in May;  Operation 'Rain Storm' in Garhwa District in July-end; and 'Operation Marangdeo' on the Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh borders in August. However, the operational efficiency of such large scale campaigns is open to debate.

Jharkhand’s Police Population ratio (Policemen per 100,000 population) was 167 as on December 31, 2011, well above the national average of 137, but substantially below the level needed to deal with the State’s complex problems of law and order administration and security. 18 battalions of CRPF have also been deployed in the State, and another five battalions are likely to be added shortly, in view of the latest encounter at Latehar.  

Compounding Jharkhand’s fraught security situation is political instability that has, again, necessitated the implementation of President’s rule in this poorly governed, backward and impoverished State. President’s rule does, of course, create a small window of opportunity for a better alignment of the Centre’s and State’s anti-Maoist orientation. However, given the results of large-scale area domination exercises, dramatic improvements are unlikely, unless there is a dramatic improvement in intelligence capabilities, and the escalation of targeted, intelligence led special operations.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Left-Wing Extremism

INDIA

Assam

Meghalaya

Manipur

Left-wing Extremism

Jharkhand

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Punjab

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)