SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 35, March 4, 2013

BANGLADESH

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Backlash
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On February 28, 2013, at least 40 persons, including 17 cadres of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), 18 civilians and five Security Force (SF) personnel died, when JeI-ICS cadres clashed with law enforcers across the country. Of the 15 Districts in which incidents of killing were reported, Rangpur witnessed 7, followed by Gaibandha (6), Satkhira (5), Thakurgaon and Chittagong (4 each). More than 2,000 people were also injured in the clashes. 

Earlier in the day, the International Crimes Tribunal-1 (ICT-1), constituted on March 25, 2010, and conducting the War Crimes Trials, in its first verdict, awarded the death sentence to JeI nayeb-e-ameer (deputy chief)  Delwar Hossain Sayedee for War Crimes (WC) committed during the course of the 1971 Liberation Struggle.  Sayedee (indicted on October 3, 2011) was given the death sentence after eight out of 20 charges, brought against him were held proven. These included murder, abduction, confinement, torture, rape, persecution, abetment of torture, looting, forceful religious conversions and setting homes ablaze. For instance, details of charge number eight indicated that, on May 8, 1971, Sayedee and his accomplices accompanied by a Pakistan Army unit, raided the house of one Manik Posari at Chitholia under Pirojpur Sadar and caught his brother Mofizuddin and one Ibrahim. On the way to the Pakistani Army's camp, Sayedee instigated the members of the occupation force to kill Ibrahim and dump his body near a bridge. On the other hand, Mofiz was taken to the Army camp and tortured. According to charge number 10, on June 2, 1971, Sayedee's armed associates under his leadership and accompanied by a Pakistan Army unit, burnt 25 houses of a Hindu Para (neighbourhood) in Umedpur village under Indurkani Police Station. At one stage, a victim, Bisabali, was tied to a coconut tree and was shot dead by Sayedee's accomplice. In its judgment the Court noted:

Welcoming the verdict, pro-trial protesters termed it a “people’s victory” and marched out in a celebratory procession in Dhaka city. People from all walks of life, who had gathered at Shahbagh for 24 days in what was being described as “Bangladesh’s Tahrir Square”, shouted ‘Joy Bangla’, as soon as they heard that the tribunal had sentenced Sayedee to death. The Shahbag demonstration began on February 5, 2013, in Dhaka city, after JeI leader Abdul Quader Mollah had been awarded what was considered a ‘lenient’ sentence of life imprisonment. The Shahbag demonstrators demanded capital punishment for Mollah and all others charged for War Crimes before the ICT. Again, on February 21, 2013, the protestors issued an ultimatum to the Government to bring war crimes charges against the JeI as a formation, and to initiate legal processes by March 26, 2013, to ban the party.

Similarly, on February 26, 2013, the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA), the alliance of eight Left-leaning political parties, had taken out a procession in Dhaka city, demanding capital punishment for war criminals. DLA coordinator Zonayed Saki noted “JeI is a communal organization and not a political party. JeI and ICS cadres are creating anarchy across the country to foil the ongoing trials of war criminals. They cannot be forgiven for ransacking Shaheed Minar.” The Sylhet Central Shaheed Minar, a memorial to the martyrs of the Bengali Language Movement of 1952, killed by Pakistani Police Forces, had been vandalized on February 22, 2013. DLA leader Saiful Huq also declared that the people would not accept the anarchy of the Islamist parties in the name of religion.

Bangladesh has, in fact, been on the boil since January 21, 2013, when the ICT-2, constituted on March 22, 2012, delivered the first War Crimes verdict against JeI leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad alias Bachchu Razakar (indicted on November 4, 2012), awarding a sentence of death (in absentia) for genocide and crimes against humanity during the Liberation War of 1971. Again, on February 5, 2013, ICT-2, awarded life imprisonment to JeI leader Abdul Quader Mollah (indicted on May 28, 2012) on WC charges.

According to partial data collected by theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal(SATP), the country has recorded 103 fatalities in street violence since January 21, 2013, including 46 JeI-ICS cadres, 50 civilians and seven SF personnel (all data till March 3). As many as 4,214 persons, including JeI-ICS cadres, SF personnel and civilians, have also been injured in at least 74 incidents; and 1,554 JeI-ICS cadres have been arrested for their involvement in 53 incidents of violence, while observing hartals (general shut down) across the country.

Some of the major acts of violence since January 21 include:

March 3: In Bogra District, at least 10 civilians, including three women, were killed in fierce fighting between law enforcers and villagers led by JeI-ICS cadres.

February 24: Four civilians were killed and at least 50 persons were injured in clashes between JeI-ICS cadres and the Police in Singair sub-District, Manikganj District, during a dawn-to-duskhartal.

February 15: Three JeI-ICS cadres were killed and another 50 were injured during a gun battle between JeI-ICS cadres and Police in Cox's Bazar town.

February 5: In Chittagong District, three persons, including two ICS cadres, were killed during a clash with Police. Police arrested 15 ICS cadres from the District.

January 31: In Bogra town of Bogra District, four JeI-ICS cadres were killed in a clash with the Police.

As SAIR noted earlier, the Tribunals have indicted 10 high-profile political figures, including eight JeI leaders and two Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) lawmakers.

The rising cycle of protests and counter-protests, compounded by escalating violence and threats of greater violence, have created apprehensions that the situation in Bangladesh, which had improved on a wide range of parameters over the past years, may once again hurtle towards instability. The business community – including the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI), Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA) – on February 23, 2013, expressed their deep concern over frequent hartal calls and requested the political parties concerned to call off countrywide daylong hartals for the greater interest of the national economy. The fear of JeI-ICS as well as other radical Islamist groupings provoking wider destabilization and armed violence, has already triggered a stream of refugees into India through the border District of Malda in West Bengal. Border Security Force (BSF) officials at the Mahadipur (Malda District) Check Post have stated that they had not seen such an exodus in years. Even Awami League (AL) members were among those seeking refuge in India.

Evidently, the Islamist extremist forces under the leadership of the JeI-ICS, have no intention to give up without a fight. With election due in December 2013, or at the latest, by mid-January 2014, it is inevitable that a last ditch confrontation will be sought. Another term for Sheikh Hasina Wajed would leave little possibility of the survival of the top Islamist extremist leadership in Bangladesh, most of whom were collaborators and perpetrators in the War Crimes of 1971, and at least ten among whom are currently arraigned before the ICT. It is significant that groups such as the Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) virtually collapsed after their top leaders were sent to the gallows. The JeI-ICS combine has flourished because of significant state protection under past regimes, and was, in fact, a coalition partner in the BNP-led Government that preceded the current AL led administration. The Islamist right in Bangladesh has flourished, essentially, under an umbrella of impunity, and it seeks to restore a regime that would, once again, provide such impunity, recognizing clearly that this is a race against time.

It is equally evident that the Sheikh Hasina regime has recognized the imperatives of swift and determined action. On February 17, 2013, Parliament amended the ICT Act of 1973, allowing the Government to prosecute organizations along with individuals for wartime atrocities, thus paving the way for prosecution of political parties such as JeI.  On February 19, 2013, Information Minister Hasanul Haq Inu reiterated, "JeI has no right to carry out their politics as they are opponents of democracy", and urged the Government to ban JeI-ICS politics and ensures the trial of war criminals.

The Government’s efforts to de-radicalize Bangladesh, and to consolidate its secular commitments have already won significant success, reining in Islamist extremist groups such as JeI, ICS, JMB, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), and Hizb-ut-Towhid (HT). The residual capacities of some of these groups – demonstrated in the street violence of the past weeks – are clearly significant. There is a danger, moreover, of armed escalation, potentially backed by foreign terrorist formations. On February 27, 2013, Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir, thus noted, “Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) is active in Bangladesh and law enforcement agencies tracked down their network and kept them under sharp security vigil. It is the moral and legal obligation of the Government to uproot them totally."

‘Totally uprooting’ Islamist extremist and terrorist formations in Bangladesh cannot be an easy task. These groupings and the ideologies of violence and hatred that they propagate, have been entrenched over decades of implicit or explicit state complicity – or, minimally, in some phases, tolerance. As the AL led Government gears up for a final confrontation, it is natural to expect these formations to rally their fullest forces in a fight that may well be for their very survival. There are many uncertainties in the present confrontation, but the one certainty is that there will be a further escalation of violence in Bangladesh over the coming months, certainly till the next General Elections are accomplished.

INDIA

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Chhattisgarh: Biding Time
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 18, 2013, an Indian Air Force (IAF) helicopter on a rescue mission to evacuate two troopers who were injured in a gunfight near Puswada in the Sukma District of Chhattisgarh was hit twice by Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) small arms fire. A Chhattisgarh Police radio operator on board took a bullet hit. The chopper turned back without evacuating the injured troopers but crash landed a few kilometers after it reversed course, at a clearing between the Timal Wada and Chintagufa areas, when its hydraulic system and generator failed. The IAF crew abandoned the chopper and the injured radio operator at the crash site and walked back to a Central Reserve police Force (CRPF) camp in the Chintagufa area, roughly three kilometers away. The incident generated heated controversy over the decision of the IAF personnel to abandon the injured radio operator. The policeman was rescued four hours later, in critical condition, when reinforcements arrived.

Though it was reported to be ‘first incident of its kind’, Maoist firing on helicopters is not new. Some earlier incidents include:

• April 5, 2012: ABorder Security Force (BSF) Helicopter, which was flying from Latehar to Ranchi in Jharkhand with two injured personnel, was fired at by Maoists. It was subsequently grounded, on April 11 because of the damages it received in the firing.
• December 19, 2011: An IAF helicopter which had been sent to help the Police-CRPF operation in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh came under Maoist fire and was hit by nine rounds, including two shots in the rotor of the helicopter. However, the pilot managed to fly back safely with five troopers onboard.
• May 15, 2009: A Police constable, identified as Laxmi Narayan Dhurv, was killed and another injured when Maoists opened fire at a helicopter and at the Security Forces who were guarding the helipad at Kistaram village in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. However, the pilot managed to take off and evacuate the helicopter from the incident site.
• November 14, 2008: A non-commissioned officer of the IAF, identified as Sergeant Mustafa Ali, was killed and a Squadron Leader identified as, T.K. Chaudhury, was injured in a CPI-Maoist attack on their helicopter as soon as it took off from Bijapur in Chhattisgarh.
• August 30, 2007: Maoists opened fire at the helicopter carrying the Director-General of Police, Viswa Ranjan and Inspector General of Police (Bastar Range), R. K. Vij, in the Chintalnar village area of Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. But the helicopter was not hit.

Anticipating the deployment of ‘air power’ against them, the Maoists have, in fact, been preparing to counter this new dimension of war. Documents seized from Maoists demonstrate that the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, has been training cadres to counter aerial attacks. The Special Intelligence Branch of Andhra Pradesh Police recovered key documents and sketches with details of how Maoists intended to defend against air attacks and to capture airports. A revamped manual for military training of Maoist cadres, titled Guerrilla Air Defence and written by the ‘central military commissioner’ and senior Maoist, Tipparthi Tirupati alias ‘Devji’ of Andhra Pradesh, was, consequently, introduced into the Maoist syllabus.

The use of choppers for injury evacuation has been necessitated not only to cut down the time for medical aid, but also to avoid ambush and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, which are frequent.

Chhattisgarh Director General of Police (DGP) Ramniwas believes, “the Naxalite problem was very much under control” in the State. Maoist violence has certainly decreased in Chhattisgarh, in conformity with the all-India trend, but the degree of ‘control’ presently exercised by state agencies remains debatable.

According to MHA data, the state recorded fewer fatalities in Maoist-related violence, at 147 – including 63 civilians, 46 SFs and 38 Maoists – in 2012; as against a total of 238 fatalities – 124 civilians, 80 SFs and 34 Maoists in 2011. The marginal increase in Maoists fatalities, especially in the face of a significant decline in SF fatalities, may be deceptive, as many Maoist ‘kills’ are not matched by the recovery of bodies, and many so-called ‘Maoists’ are, in fact, mis-categorized civilians. In the June 28-29, 2012, Sarkeguda encounter, for instance, it was initially claimed that at least 19 Maoists had been killed; a judicial commission is now enquiring into the matter after widespread allegation that innocent civilians had been killed in the encounter.

Partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) indicates that the State recorded seven major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) in 2012, as against 13 in 2011.

In 2013, up to March, the Maoists had killed nine civilians and one SF trooper, while five Maoists had been killed in encounters with the SFs.

A range of other parameters also indicate a slowdown in Maoist activity in Chhattisgarh. Nevertheless, three significant indicators – number of attacks on Police, arms training camps held and Jan Adalats (‘People’s Courts’, kangaroo courts organized by the Maoists) organized – report no decline. In fact, the number of Jan Adalats held increased from 13 to 16 between 2011 and 2012, indicating greater control over areas in which such kangaroo courts were organized.  Moreover, while the number of attacks on the Police rose marginally, the number of encounters with the Police declined, even as did the total number of incidents, suggesting a decline in offensive operations by the SFs.

Indeed, the high profile abduction of Sukma District Collector Alex Paul Menon, exposed the security vulnerabilities of the State. The Government was forced to reach out to the Maoists through a mediator who eventually negotiated Menon’s release. Though the agreement signed did not concede much, it appears, there was an informal understanding not to oppose the bail applications of some Maoists under detention.

Pressure to perform has, of course, forced the SFs to engage in some offensive operations, and at least one of these went terribly wrong. In the intervening night of June 28 and 29, 2012, at least 19 ‘Maoists’ were declared to have been killed. During the operation, three encounters were reported – at Silger, Sarkeguda and Chimlipenta – in Sukma and Bijapur Districts. The overwhelming proportion of fatalities occurred in the Sakeguda encounter, where 17 ‘Maoists’ were killed. However, there were widespread allegations that most of those killed were innocent villagers. Even the CRPF eventually claimed that only seven of the dead were ‘known Maoists’. Following public outrage, Chhattisgarh, on July 5, 2012, ordered a judicial enquiry into the episode, by Justice (Retd.) V.K. Agarwal. The enquiry could start only in December, as the office for the enquiry commission was not made available till early November. The initial deadline for filing of complaints was January 14, 2013, but was extended to February 12, 2013 on the basis of applications and affidavits filed by the villagers under the Basaguda Police Station area. The inquiries of the commission are still ongoing.

Earlier, between March 5 and 20, 2012, an anti-Maoist operation, variously codenamed "Maad", "Kilam" and "Podku," was carried out in the Abujhmaad Forest, considered to be the CPI-Maoist ‘central guerilla zone’ and headquarters. IG (Operations), Chhattisgarh, Pankaj Singh, disclosed that 33 Maoist cadres were arrested during the operation.

Further, after the lid over the Maoists’ weapons manufacture programme was blown off with the arrest of Sadanala Ramakrishna alias RK in Kolkata, SFs raided the premises of two transporters in Raipur and seized a huge quantity of materials reportedly meant for manufacturing rocket launchers and grenades.

According to SATP, incidents of killings were reported from at least 11 Districts (out of a total of 27 in the State) – Bijapur, Kanker, Sukma, Rajnandgaon, Dantewada, Kondagaon, Gariabandh, Raipur, Narayanpur, Raigarh and Dhamtari. Most of the incidents of arson, abduction and blasts triggered by Maoists were reported from these Districts. In 2011, 14 out of a total of 19 Districts were Maoist-affected (existing Districts were subdivided to add eight new Districts in 2012).

Worryingly, after a gap of three years, there was a visible rise in Maoist attacks on persons associated with Salwa Judum (a state-backed anti-Maoist vigilante group) in 2012. At least seven civilians associated with Salwa Judum were killed in 2012, as against one in 2011. Among those killed were Lachhuram Kashyap, a prominent Salwa Judum leader of Mirtur; Chika Mazi, who actively participated in Salwa Judum in Bastar; and Chhinnaram Gota of Bijapur District. Further, Mahendra Karma, who led the Salwa Judum in the State, had a miraculous escape when his convoy hit a landmine on November 8, 2012. The renewed targeting of Salwa Judum leaders suggests that the Maoists are ‘comfortable’ with the present level of engagement with the SFs, as they would be unlikely to renew old enmities if they were under extraordinary pressure from the SFs.

Further, on February 11, 2012, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) recovered two IEDs (one weighing 40 kilograms and the other 20 kilograms) hidden three feet below the surface on the busy Kohka-Manpur Road (a black-top road) in Rajnandgaon District. The Maoists also blew up a Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV) killing a CRPF trooper and injuring five in Dantewada District on August 6, 2012.

State authorities may assert that ‘Naxal situation is very much under control’, but Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh warned, on July 1, 2012, "Abujhmaad is a liberated zone where Governments have not been able to reach. It is not possible for our Ministry to carry out any development programme there." While the Minister’s definition of ‘liberated zones’ may not coincide with the classical Maoist notion – even the Maoists do not consider Abujhmaad a liberated area – the difficulties of carrying out developmental activities in Abujhmaad are manifest. [For the Maoists, the concept of a liberated area is much broader than mere disruptive dominance in an area].

It is, of course, the case that Maoist disruptive dominance remains widespread across Chhattishgar. According to the July 2012 report of the Chhattisgarh Public Works Department (PWD), in the preceding three years, only two of 30 roads sanctioned, have been completed under the MHA’s development programme. While 15 of the 30 projects approved in 2010 or earlier are stuck at various stages of bidding or awarding of tenders, in the remaining 13 projects contractors have stopped execution of works, allegedly due to Maoist threat. According to an unnamed senior Union Home Ministry official cited by The Hindu, however, “The contractors themselves burn their machineries in some cases or fund renegade Maoist groups to do that, after taking an advance. If an interest free work advance of 20 crore is returned after three years, without even a scratch on the road, imagine how much [money] the contractor is making by investing it in the market in the name of Maoists.”

Meanwhile, the Centre was worried that the Bhilai Steel Plant in Chhattisgarh would have to be closed down over the next three years, as it runs out of iron ore supplies. Such a situation has arisen due to bitter Maoist opposition to mining in a new area called Rowghat, as well as to the construction of a railway line to transport the iron ore from Rowghat to the plant. The new mining project involves deforestation in an area of over 2,030 hectares in Kanker and Narayanpur Districts. Further, the proposed 235-km railway line would have to run through the Abujhmaad area. All of these areas are Maoist strong-holds.

The decline in violence notwithstanding, the Maoist threat in Chhattisgarh remains vibrant, and the State’s capacities to counter it, limited. The dangers of escalation, by either side, are ever-present, and state adventurism, without adequate preparation and capacity-building, may well lead to disasters comparable to the many debacles of the past. The essentials of a coherent strategy – a reality based assessment of threat, of capacities and resources for condign response, and a deployment of these within a calculated framework of response – remain conspicuous in their absence.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Extremism

Left Wing Extremism

Total (BANGLADESH)

INDIA

Arunachal Pradesh

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Nagaland

Left-wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Maharashtra

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)