SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 13, September 30 , 2013

INDIA

Print

J&K: Escalating Failures
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

At 6.40am on September 26, 2013, three terrorists of a fidayeen (suicide) squad, dressed in combat fatigues, commandeered an autorickshaw and drove up to the Hiranagar Police Station in Kathua District. They first shot two Policemen dead at the entrance, thereafter they killed a shopkeeper outside the Police Station, and injured the auto driver. Another two Policemen were killed inside the Police Station. The three terrorists then hijacked a truck, killing its helper, and reached an Army Camp at Mesar in the neighboring Samba District, after travelling some 20 kilometers on the Jammu-Pathankot Highway. Four Army personnel, including the Second-in-command of the 16^th Cavalry combat unit located there, Lieutenant Colonel Bikramjeet Singh, were killed. The commanding officer, Colonel Avin Uthaiya, was injured, along with another four Army men. The truck driver, Mohammad Ashraf Khan, is being questioned by the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the State Police. Sami-ul-Haq, ‘spokesperson’ of a little-known terrorist outfit, Shuhada (Martyrs) Brigade, has claimed responsibility for the attack. According to preliminary reports, the heavily armed suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists (operating under the identity of the Shuhada Brigade), had crossed the Chhappri rivulet and reached a graveyard in Jhandi village, close to the international border (IB), in the early hours of September 26. The same Shuhada Brigade has taken responsibility for the attack on an Army convoy in Srinagar on September 28, 2013, in which a civilian was injured in the crossfire between the Army and the militants.

The daring attack ended with all three militants killed by the Army after a 9-hour clash. Reports said that choppers were used to bring Army Commandos from nearby location, while tanks were used to provide safety cover to troops engaged in the operation. Indeed, the attack has necessitated a serious investigation into the failure of the Security Forces (SFs), who have been caught unaware and apparently unprepared on several occasions in the recent past. The terrorists have already killed a total of 53 SF personnel in 2013 (data till September 29, 2013), the highest in a year since 2010, when 69 SF personnel were killed, with three months still to go in the current year.

The last major attack (involving three or more killings) by terrorists in Samba District had taken place more than five years ago, on May 11, 2008. Two LeT terrorists, wearing Army uniforms, had intruded into the house of Hoshiar Singh, General Secretary of the Indian National Democratic Party, in Samba town at 5.58am, and killed Hoshiar Singh and his wife on the spot. The terrorists subsequently moved towards the Kaili Mandi area and took three women and two children hostage. At about 5pm, the SFs stormed the house where the terrorists were hiding and shot both of them dead. One of the hostage women and Ashok Sodhi, Chief Photographer of The Daily Excelsior, were also killed in the crossfire. 16 SF personnel and two women were injured in the day-long gun-battle.

There had been no such attack in Kathua District prior to the September 26 attack.

In fact, the last major attack by the militants in the entire Jammu Division had taken place on May 8, 2009, when the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) militants had shot dead three persons at Bandara village in the Gulabgarh area of Reasi District. In the last fidayeen (suicide squad) attack in the Jammu Division, 11 persons, including three Army soldiers, five civilians and three terrorists, were killed and another six, including three soldiers, two civilians and a woman, were injured in Jammu District on August 27, 2008. Three fidayeen terrorists, who had infiltrated in the early hours of August 27 from the Kanachak Sector, managed to hijack a truck at Gadla and travelled more than 15 kilometers before taking shelter in a house at Chinore on the old Jammu-Akhnoor Road, taking nine persons hostage. The operation which started at about 7am concluded after approximately 18 hours.

The Jammu Division had, however, witnessed a major violation of ceasefire on August 6, 2013, when personnel of Pakistan Army’s Border Action Team (BAT), along with a group of 20 heavily armed terrorists, entered 450-metres deep into Indian Territory along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Poonch Sector and killed five Indian soldiers.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the Jammu Division has witnessed a total of 30 killings, including five civilians, 13 SFs and 12 terrorists, in 2013 (all data till September 29, 2013) as compared to 14 killings, including one civilian, one SF trooper and 12 terrorists, in the corresponding period of 2012, indicating a visible spurt in violence. Overall fatalities across the State have also more than doubled during this period. As compared to 73 killings, including 11 civilians, 11 SF personnel and 51 terrorists in 2012 (till September 29), the current year has witnessed 156 fatalities, including 19 civilians, 53 SF personnel and 84 terrorists.

While the steep rise in overall fatalities is a matter of grave concern, what is more worrisome is the widening arc of terror in the State in recent past. Significantly, by end of 2011, the State Home Ministry had declared at least seven Districts in the J&K completely free of terrorism, including five of ten Districts in the Jammu Division – Jammu, Samba, Kathua, Reasi and Doda – apart from Leh and Kargil, which had never seen significant militancy. Further, of the 13 Districts that had reported terrorism related incidents ‘in single digits’ in 2011, six belonged to the Jammu Division – Ramban, Doda, Poonch, Rajouri, Udhampur, Kishtwar and Jammu (Jammu recorded just one incident in the year, though it had been declared ‘terrorism free’). The State of Jammu and Kashmir comprises three Divisions – Jammu Division, Kashmir Valley Division and Ladakh Division. The Jammu Division has 10 Districts; the Kashmir Valley has 10 Districts; and Ladakh has two Districts.

It is not mere coincidence that this escalation of terror overlaps with the ‘messenger of peace’ Nawaz Sharif assuming power in Pakistan in June this year. Despite ever-mounting evidence of intentional Pakistani malfeasance since Sharif assumed power, the Indian Government, in its incessant attempts to ‘buy peace’, has constantly changed its terms of engagement with Pakistan. Indeed, India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, on August 6, 2013 (soon after the killing of five Indian soldiers in a ceasefire violation), had stressed that “there was no point in even discussing holding talks with Pakistan till the situation at the border becomes totally normal”, adding that “any dialogue would be possible only after normalisation of circumstances.” There is no visible improvement in the situation on the ground. In fact, a total another 34 ceasefire violations have occurred since then, with the total number of such violations in 2013 standing at 100 [tillSeptember 29], as compared to 93 through 2012. Despite this, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on a trip to the US to participate in the UN General Assembly, soon after the September 26 attack, while conceding that "this is one more in a series of provocations and barbaric actions by the enemies of peace," without referring to Pakistan, in an incomprehensible inversion of logic, stressed, "such attacks will not deter us and will not succeed in derailing our efforts to find a resolution to all problems through a process of dialogue." In his subsequent meeting with US President Barak Obama on September 27, he once again argued, "I look forward to meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even though the expectations have to be toned down given the terror arm which is still active in our subcontinent."

New Delhi’s incoherent approach to Pakistani state backed terrorism has had an adverse impact on the security scenario in J&K, which had witnessed a deepening peace not long ago. With the deadline for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan now rapidly approaching, it is inevitable that Pakistan will gamble even more recklessly in its terrorist ventures across the region. The complete absence of any costs – diplomatic, political, economic or military – for its continuing misadventures in India, and, indeed, the diplomatic validation that a dialogue process with this rogue state provides, ensure that Pakistan will continue with its ongoing gambit. Each terrorist ‘success’ will only add to the incentives and determination to continue with this covert war. It is unlikely that the present regime at New Delhi will suddenly acquire a working spine. It is, once again, India’s SFs who will have to carry the tragic burdens inflicted by political cowardice, vacillation and failure.

INDIA

Print

Odisha: "Fight, fail, fight again, fail again. . ."
Mrinal Kanta Das
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Mao Tse Tung’s iterative exhortation to fight and fail and fight again… till there is victory, has been inspiring cycles of Left Wing Extremist (LWE) violence in India for decades. In Odisha, the current phase appears to be a rising cycle of failure for the rebels. 

On September 14, 2013, the Odisha Police managed to inflict a severe jolt on the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) when at least 13 of its cadres, including a woman, were killed in an encounter with the State Police Special Operations Group (SOG) and the District Volunteer Force (DVF, comprising mostly of ex-service men) near Silakota village under Podia Block of the Malkangiri District. All the 13 bodies were recovered from the site of the encounter. A cache of arms and ammunition including two claymore mines, several Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), AK 47s, country-made pistols and magazines, were recovered, and one person was arrested on suspicion of being a Maoist. The operation was led by Malkangiri Superintendent of Police (SP) Akhileswar Singh.

The encounter assumes greater significance as the Maoists have lost their vice-like grip over Malkangiri District, and the incident accounted for the heaviest casualty suffered by Maoists in a single incident in Odisha. The lone dampener was the fact that none of the Maoists killed was a senior leader in the Maoist hierarchy. A CPI-Maoist ‘divisional committee’ member, identified as Rakesh, who was present at the encounter site, managed to escape. His presence was confirmed after the seizure of his diary from the spot. Nevertheless, the sheer number of casualties inflicted is bound to impact adversely on the Maoists morale.

The encounter was a precise, intelligence-based operation, and the Police suffered no casualties. Based on specific information that a group of 30 to 40 Maoists would be crossing over from the Chhattisgarh side [the Darbha Ghati area is close to the encounter site], the Security Forces (SFs) trekked about 10 kilometers from the last motorable road in the night, even as it was raining heavily, and engaged the Maoists early in the morning. However, while one group remained engaged, other Maoists managed to escape. The SFs took huge risks, going into the operation with a lean force of 40, barely matching the expected number of Maoists.

Such incidents of SF success have been few and far between in Odisha. Nevertheless, some significant successes of the past include:  

January 9, 2011: Nine CPI-Maoist cadres, including four women, were killed in an encounter with DVF and a special team of the Rayagada Police in Rayagada District.

January 1, 2011: Five CPI-Maoist cadres, including three women, were killed in an encounter with Police personnel in Jajpur District.

November 4, 2010: Four CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in a gun battle with Police in a forested area near Karlakuta village of Malkangiri District.

March 4, 2006: Six CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with Police near Kanaguda village in Malkangiri District.

The September 14, 2013, incident has taken place at a time when the Maoists were trying to recover from the ‘strategic retreat’ they had been forced into, to preserve their strength and regroup, after mounting SF pressure since 2011, and an internal evaluation that underlined the need to reenergize the organisation. On August 27, 2013, the Maoists had trigged a landmine blast on the busy National Highway 26, at a culvert between Sakirai and Kauguntha villages near Ralegada in the Sunki Ghat area, under the Pottangi Police Station in Koraput District, killing four Border Security Force (BSF) personnel and injuring another three. The BSF personnel were moving to Visakhapatnam in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, in a convoy of three vehicles. What had surprised everybody was the timing and the ability to single out the BSF vehicles on a busy national highway.

Earlier, motor boat services to the 150-odd villages of Kudumulu Gumma Block – separated from the rest of the Block by the Balimela Reservoir – remained suspended for 10 days from August 21 to 31, due to a Maoist threat, creating a crisis situation in the area, as other routes of transport are too circuitous and difficult to be undertaken by villagers.

These ‘morale building operations', notwithstanding, things have not gone the way the Maoists may have wished. In addition to the the September 14 incident, the Secretary of Malkangiri Divisional Committee of the CPI-Maoist, Madhav alias Golla Ramullu, was killed in an encounter with SFs in Malkangiri District on August 23, 2013. He was allegedly involved in over 50 murder cases and carried a cash reward of INR 300,000 on his head in Andhra Pradesh. Again, on September 11, 2013, a woman CPI-Maoist cadre was killed in an exchange of fire with SFs in the jungle near Kandrakabandali village under the Kalyansinghpur Police Station limits of Rayagada District.

Further, at least 25 Maoist cadres and sympathizers have surrendered in Malkangiri alone, over just past two months. More worrisome for the Maoists was the en masse surrender of supporters of the Narayanpatna-based Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha (CMAS), numbering almost 2,400 according to Odisha Police sources. CMAS is a Maoist front organization.

These reverses were preceded by the greater debacle of the defection of Sabyasachi Panda, the Maoists’ Odisha State Committee Secretary, with a small group of his followers, resulting in an almost comprehensive loss of influence in the ‘heartland’ areas of the Gajapati, Ganjam, Rayagada and Kandhamal Districts. After an increasingly tempestuous relationship with the party over the past several years, Panda was finally declared a renegade by the CPI-Maoist when he abducted two Italian citizens without consulting the ‘central leadership’, in March 2012. The tipping point came when Panda wrote a 60 page letter to the Party’s Central Committee (CC), raising several questions about recent strategic failures, and purported ‘deviations’ – ideological, tactical and cultural – including allegations of an increasing proclivity to autocratic command, regional partisanship (in favour of Telugu cadres and leaders), the absence of grievance redressal, ‘cultural hegemony’, intolerance of dissent, “financial anarchy” and sexual improprieties. Panda formed the Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP) in March 2012, but has consistently lost ground and men since then. The split in the Odisha CPI-Maoist resulted in further polarization between locals and the Telugu leadership from Andhra Pradesh, and has triggered a continuous succession of surrenders by Odiya cadres.  Since the split, at least 96 Maoists have surrendered in Odisha [till September 29, 2013]. In the latest such incident, six Maoists surrendered before the Odisha Police in Malkangiri District on September 23, 2013.

According to SATP data, levels of Maoist-related violence in Odisha have been dropping steadily since 2010.

With just about three months remaining in the current year, moreover, the Maoists have already suffered far greater fatalities (23) as compared to the previous year (14). Civilian fatalities, on the other hand, have more than halved, while SF fatalities have dropped to almost a fourth of the previous year’s figure. Other patterns of violence, including attacks, intimidation, abduction and disruptive activities, have also remained muted.  

Encouraged by the decline in Maoist violence, the Odisha Government has asked for the deployment of two additional battalions of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in the State, to consolidate the gains of the recent past. At present there are 17 CAPF battalions – eight BSF, eight CRPF and one of the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) – deployed in Odisha. Additionally, the State Police has 57 SOG teams. However, the Police-population ratio in the State, at 110 to 100,000 which is far below the low national average of 138, as on December 31, 2012, according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data, and capacities and quality of general policing are poor.

Maoist violence dropped sharply in Odisha in 2012, and is now concentrated mostly in two clusters of Districts: Koraput-Malkangiri-Nabarangpur and Nuapada-Balangir-Bargarh. While the Nuapada-Balangir-Bargarh cluster is emerging as a new Maoist haven, their presence in the Koraput-Malkangiri-Nabarangpur cluster has been long established. The setbacks the Maoists have suffered in Koraput and Malkangiri are, consequently, of great significance, and create expanding opportunities for surgical intelligence-based operations, particularly targeting the Maoist leadership, which have already undermined Maoist capabilities in the State. With the Maoists unambiguously on the defensive in Odisha at this stage, effective policies and operations can go a long way to consolidate recent counter-insurgency successes.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)