SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 3, July 22, 2013

BANGLADESH

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Resisting Justice
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On July 17, 2013, the International Crimes Tribunal-2 (ICT-2) awarded the death sentence to Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) ‘secretary general’ Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed. The prosecution had stacked seven charges against him, including the killing of eminent journalist Serajuddin Hossain in Dhaka; mass killings at village Baidyadangi in Faridpur District; confinement of Ranjit Kumar Nath after taking him out of a Pakistan Army camp in Faridpur District; confining and causing torture to Abu Yusuf Pakhi; killing of Badi, Rumi, Jewel, Azad and Altaf Mahmud at Nakhalpara Army Camp in Dhaka; killing of intellectuals in Dhaka; and killing of Hindu civilians and persecution in Faridpur District. The Court found him guilty on five of these charges, but the prosecution failed to prove the charges of confining Ranjit Kumar Nath and confining and causing torture to Abu Yusuf Pakhi. Mojaheed was arrested on June 29, 2010, and was indicted on June 21, 2012.

Earlier, on July 15, 2013, former JeI ameer (chief) Ghulam Azam was sentenced to 90 years in prison after the ICT-1 found him guilty on all five charges brought against him by the prosecution. These included instigating his followers to commit crimes against humanity and genocide all over Bangladesh in 1971; complicity in commission of the crimes specified in section 3(2) of the Act, 1973; the murder of Siru Miah and three other civilians; holding of group meetings with the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan in support of the Pakistan Army’s genocidal campaign; and organizing press briefings on several occasions in connection with these activities. Azam had been arrested on January 11, 2012, and was indicted on May 13, 2012.

Meanwhile, prosecutors A.K.M. Saiful Islam and Nurjahan Begum Mukta, at a press briefing on July 18, 2013, disclosed that charges against JeI Assistant Secretary General A.T.M. Azharul Islam (arrested on Aug 22, 2012) had been submitted to the registrar of ICT-1. The prosecution team added that the charges included genocide of 1,225 people; the murder of four; abduction of 17; one rape; abduction and torture of 12; and setting on fire and looting hundreds of houses.

In addition, ICT-1, formed on March 25, 2010, and ICT-2, created on March 22, 2012, to speed up the War Crimes (WC) Trials, have delivered judgement in cases of four other JeI leaders. The ICT-1 awarded the death sentence to JeI nayeb-e-ameer ('deputy chief') Delwar Hossain Sayedee on February 28, 2013; ICT-2 sentenced JeI leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad alias Bachchu Razakar and JeI ‘assistant secretary general’ Muhammad Kamaruzzaman to death on January 21, 2013 and May 9, 2013, respectively, and awarded life imprisonment to JeI ‘assistant secretary general’ Abdul Quader Mollah on February 5, 2013.

The two tribunals have, thus far, indicted 11 high-profile political figures, including nine JeI leaders and two Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leaders. While nine persons had been indicted earlier, JeI leaders Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin and Ashrafuzzaman Khan were indicted in absentia by the ICT-2 on June 24, 2013, for their alleged involvement in killing a total of 18 intellectuals, including nine university teachers, six journalists and three physicians, between December 10 and 16, 1971.

Meanwhile, violent protests resumed across the country soon after the July 15 and July 17 verdicts, resulting in the death of at least nine persons and injuries to another 77. Indeed, according to partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since January 21, 2013, when the first verdict in the War Crime Trials (WCT) was delivered, the country has recorded 162 fatalities, including 68 JeI-Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) cadres, 85 other civilians, and nine SF personnel (all data till July 21, 2013) in street violence. As many as 4,316 persons, including JeI-ICS cadres and other civilians, and SF personnel have also been injured and 2,317 JeI-ICS cadres have been arrested for their involvement in 155 incidents of violence. The country has witnessed several hartals (general strikes).

The JeI-ICS combine, backed by the BNP as well as other fundamentalist groups such as Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI, 'Protectorate of Islam'), are opposing the WC Trial, and have brought turmoil to Bangladesh through their violent and disruptive protests. JeI Member of Parliament (MP) A.N.M. Shamsul Islam, condemned the formation of the ICTs as ‘politically motivated’, and on June 16, 2013, told Parliament, “The Government in the name of so-called trial of crimes against humanity is plotting to kill the top leaders of JeI, including Delwar Hossain Saydee and Motiur Rahman Nizami, using the judiciary.” He also alleged that the Government has revived a 42-year-old settled issue like War Crimes to weaken the opposition alliance and divest the country of its Islamic leadership.

Unsurprisingly, it is this combine that has solely been responsible for the bloodshed over the past months, and these various political and extremist formations have worked in tandem. In the aftermath of violence that began on May 5, 2013, HeI enforced a 'Dhaka Siege' programme. On May 8, 2013, State Minister for Law, Advocate Quamrul Islam claimed, “The BNP-JeI men carried out vandalism, arson and looting during Sunday’s violence”. Information Minister Hasanul Haq Inu, had noted, on May 2, 2013, “The movement of HeI is not to protect the faith of Muslims. They are working as the shadow of JeI-ICS, to foil the trials of war criminals.” 

Indeed, ICT-1, while delivering the July 15, 2013, judgment against Ghulam Azam observed that the JeI, as a political party under the leadership of Ghulam Azam, had deliberately functioned as a ‘criminal organisation’, especially during the Liberation War in 1971. The ICT also noted:

In the interest of establishing a democratic as well as non-communal Bangladesh, no such anti-liberation people should be allowed to sit at the helm of Executives of the Government, social or political parties including Government and Non-Government Organisations. We are of the opinion that the Government may take necessary steps to that end for debarring those anti-liberation persons from holding the said superior posts in order to establish a democratic and non-communal country for which millions of people sacrificed their lives during the War of Liberation.

Significantly, the prosecution in ICT-2 disclosed on July 19, 2013, that it was preparing to file a case against JeI, for trial as an organisation engaged in War Crimes in 1971. Prosecutor Tureen Afroz stated, “We are working on the issue after the verdict in the Abdul Quader Mollah case. We all know about the role of this political party during the Liberation War. So they have no right to work as political party in Bangladesh.” Hannan Khan, Chief Coordinator of the Tribunal’s Investigation Agency also disclosed, “Our officers are working with the prosecution team. We have got many documents as proof of anti-liberation activities of Jamaat. They have no right to conduct political activity in an independent Bangladesh.”

Expectedly, the offices of JeI remain virtually closed across the country. Even the JeI central office at Maghbazar in Dhaka wears a deserted look as JeI men hardly visit it. JeI leader Barrister Abdur Razzak on July 18, 2013, said, "I look after mainly legal aspects of the party. Most of the front ranking as well as second tier leaders of JeI are in hiding."  At present, the party has been demonstrating its existence mainly through its website and through statements issued to the email addresses of various media houses. However, JeI-ICS cadres have remained quite active on the streets whenever a hartal or any agitation programme is announced by the party, employing new tactics to escalate violence. On July 17, 2013, for instance, posing as mourners at a funeral, some 30 JeI-ICS cadres vandalised two buses and torched another in Dhaka city’s Kalshi area, and then disappeared.

Strong resistance is, however, now building up against the consecutive hartals called by Islamist combine. On July 18, 2013, for instance, people defied the JeI-ICS-sponsored countrywide hartal and came out on streets to do their routine work. More significantly, the sustained ‘Shahbagh protests’, which begun on February 5, 2013, demanding capital punishment for all war criminals, have continued for well over five months now. Similarly, on July 16, 2013, Sammilita Sangskritik Jote, a cultural organisation, rejected the verdict against Ghulam Azam and sought capital punishment for him at a rally at the Teacher-Student Centre (TSC) on the Dhaka University campus. Another citizens’ platform against militancy and communalism, Samprodayikota-Jangibad Birodhi Mancha (SJBM), on July 17, 2013, urged all political, social and cultural organisations imbued with the spirit of the Liberation War to urgently demand an immediate ban on JeI and all its associate bodies.

As the radical combine comes under increasing pressure, now virtually fighting for survival, it is likely to unleash even more violence. With a General Election due in early 2014, and a slew of WCT judgments hitting powerful extremist political formations in the country, political turbulence in Bangladesh can only escalate over the coming months, creating a grave challenge for the regime at Dhaka.

INDIA

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J&K: Dangerous Disruption
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

At least four persons were killed when Security Forces (SFs) opened fire on a violent group of protesters who attacked the Border Security Force (BSF) Dharam Camp in the Gool area of Ramban District on July 18, 2013. The deceased included a teacher at the Government Higher Secondary School, Manzoor Ahmed Shan, who was also the brother of a local National Conference leader, Dr. Shamshad Shan. The others killed were Javed Iqbal Manhas, Abdul Lateef and Farooq Ahmad Baig. The firing by the SFs and stone pelting by the ‘protesters’ during the clashes resulted in injuries to at least another 43 persons, including a BSF trooper and 14 Police constables. An unnamed senior BSF official said the protesters pelted at least 15,000 stones on their post.

Narrating the chain of events at Ramban, a BSF press release stated,

Tensions started some time after 9 pm on July 17 after a patrol party at the Dharam check post asked one Mohammad Lateef, who is the imam of the local mosque, for a proof of identity. Lateef allegedly reacted aggressively and 15-20 people assembled. The troopers, sensing trouble, then returned to their post. However, it is learnt that Lateef made a baseless and false allegation that the patrol party had desecrated the Quran and announced same thing (sic) on the loudspeaker from the mosque. Following this, around 400-500 persons gathered outside the BSF camp and started pelting stones. But the BSF restrained itself, and the Police succeeded in dispersing the mob around 3am... Around 6.45am, mob started to build up again in big numbers and tried forcefully to enter the Dharam campus... Due to deteriorating law and order situation, the Police tried to disperse the mob and fired three-four rounds. Constable Ramhari of the BSF got bullet injury in his stomach. It was learnt that two civilians also got bullet injuries. However again at 9.30 am, around 700-800 men started stone-pelting vigorously on the BSF Post. Police and BSF men had to fire in self-defence which resulted into death of four civilians…

BSF Inspector General, Jammu Frontier, Rajiv Krishna added, “They (mob) tried to break open the gates of the camp. The mob tried to storm their storehouse where a large cache of explosives and automatic weapons was stored.”

There are some suggestions that the incident may, in fact, have been mishandled to a certain extent. While the overwhelming numbers of protesters, relative to the small BSF unit, may have made use of lethal force necessary, Superintendent of Police (SP), Ramban, Bashaarat Masood, claimed on July 19, “Police were standing between the BSF camp and the protesters. We had been controlling the mob for an hour. There was no need to open fire. The BSF men opened fire suddenly. I myself had a miraculous escape. I too would have been killed had my colleague not dragged me away."

The Union Government, the State Government as well as the BSF have already announced a probe into the case. The BSF team of 30 personnel, which was deployed at Dharam to look after the security of the newly opened Qazigund-Banhihal rail link vacated the camp in the night of July 18 itself, and the State Police has taken over the premises.

Earlier, on June 30, 2013, a civilian identified as Irfan Ahmad Ganaie was killed in Army firing in the Sumbal area of Bandipora District when the Army launched an operation in the region after being tipped off about the presence of militants there. On the same day, another youth, Irshad Ahmad Dar, was killed in the same area, after soldiers allegedly opened fire at protesters demonstrating against Ganaie's killing. On July 3, 2013, Police arrested an Army ‘informer’, Manzoor Ahmad Sheikh, who had misinformed Army about the presence of militants to take revenge against Irfan, with whom he had had a fight.

These were not isolated incidents. According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, the SFs have opened fire on violent protesters on at least nine occasions since 2011, resulting in six fatalities. Another two protesters drowned after being allegedly chased by the SFs. It is pertinent to recall here that at least 112 protesters were killed in SF action against violent demonstrators during the turmoil in 2010. Kashmir has sporadically witnessed such incidents, though at varying scales, since 2006. According to a July 2013 Police report, there have been 2,317 incidents of stone pelting in the State, resulting in injuries to 5,643 State Police personnel and 1,356 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, since 2008.

These protests have largely been orchestrated by various fronts linked to Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and have capitalized on every opportunity that presents itself by accident or design. The objective of such a mobilization has invariably been to provoke SF responses that will result in fatalities, and to use such fatalities to feed an unending cycle of street violence – a process that met with its greatest and most protracted success in the stone pelting campaigns of 2008.

Unfortunately, it appears that the State’s administration and political leadership is yet to learn the lessons of the past and have inclined, quickly, to add fuel to the fire. Instead of waiting for the reports of enquiries into the Ramban incidents, extraordinarily imprudent statements have been made by people in various positions of power. State Minister for Home, Sajjad Ahmad Kitchloo, claimed the ‘riots’ began after BSF personnel walked into a mosque with their shoes on. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, despite, admitting that the tension escalated as a result of exaggerated rumours and reports about the incident in a section of the media, nevertheless added his own inflammatory remarks to the already heated debate, declaring, “some amongst us are determined to repeat past mistakes and use force against unarmed protesters. Such incidents risk throwing the entire peaceful atmosphere in jeopardy.” It may be recalled that Abdullah had also added to tensions in the aftermath of the Afzal Guru’s hanging (February 9, 2013), with the observation, on February 11, 2013, that “Afzal Guru's execution may fuel a feeling of alienation among the Kashmiri youth… The onus rests on the judiciary and the political leadership to show that this wasn't a selective execution." Similarly, on July 7, 2013, cautioning authorities in New Delhi against purportedly taking Kashmiris "for granted" he had said, "Although the people, particularly those living in the Valley, have always chosen peace against disturbance, one can't take them for granted forever. Permanent peace and tranquillity in the State is predicated upon the resolution of basic political issues bedeviling it.” Abdullah has, indeed, often adopted the language of the ‘soft separatist’ constituency in J&K, despite visible and overwhelming evidence of declining public alienation in the State.

With people in authority making reckless remarks, it was expected that the separatist constituency, including the All Party Hurriyat Conference-Geelani (APHC-G) Chairman Syed Ali Shah Geelani, APHC-Mirwaiz (APHC-M) Chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Chairman Mohammad Yasin Malik, Democratic Party Chairman Shabir Ahmad Shah, and others, looking for an opportunity to reclaim their shrinking space, would jump onto the bandwagon. They did issue calls for protest marches and bandhs (general shut down), but, with the exception of a few incidents of violent protest in some parts of the State, peace has largely been restored.

SFs in Kashmir have learned much from the experience of 2010, and violent protests have been handled with much greater success through the use of minimal force. Despite tremendous challenges and intentional and extreme provocation, the SFs have avoided opening fire on crowds. This principal has been violated after a significant interregnum in the Ramban incident, and it remains to be seen whether the various inquiries determine whether the threat of the violent mobs was sufficient to justify firing by the relatively small BSF unit located there.

Whatever the particulars of this case, the challenge of managing violent mass protests will continue to return to haunt SFs operating Kashmir, and it is unlikely that the State’s political classes will respond with any measure of maturity to the inevitable crises that will periodically result. The onus, consequently, will necessarily fall on the Police and Paramilitary Forces’ leadership to ensure that their personnel are deployed in formations that are trained, oriented, equipped and able to respond to street violence with minimal recourse to lethal measures.

INDIA

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Assam: Bodoland Discord
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

In a dramatic escalation of their rhetorical posture, the Pro-Talks faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-PTF) declared, on July 14, 2013, that they would prefer existence as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rather than accept the Centre’s move to provide more powers to Autonomous Councils. A press statement issued by the NDFB-PTF’s ‘publicity secretary’, S. Sanjarang, said it would be better for Bodos and other tribal communities to be a part of a SAR in PRC, if the Government of India has only decided to provide more powers to the existing autonomous councils of the region (North-east).SARs include the former colonies of Hong Kong and Macao. Sanjarang issued this statement in response to news about Union Minister of Home Affairs, Sushilkumar Shinde telling a delegation about the Centre’s plan to give more power to autonomous councils to uplift the socio-economic status of Scheduled Tribes of the North-east.

The NDFB-PTF ‘publicity secretary’ was principally referring to the Bodoland Territorial Administered Districts (BTAD), which are governed by the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) accord, created under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution in February 2003. The BTAD area comprises of four Districts – Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri – in Assam, and is presently the only autonomous territorial council experiment to be completed in India’s strife-torn Northeast. Violence, however, continues in the Bodo areas inspite of the 2003 Accord. The ongoing peace talks with NDFB-PTF have failed to achieve any major breakthrough, apart from the periodic extension of the ceasefire. The Suspension of Operations (SoO) Agreement has currently been extended till September 30, 2013.

Meanwhile, another NDFB faction led by the group’s founding ‘chairman’, Ranjan Daimary, the NDFB-RD, and Central Government Interlocutor, P.C. Halder, held a first round of formal talks on July 18, 2013.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, a total of four incidents resulting in seven killings have taken place in the BTAD area in 2013.  While six persons including two civilians and four militants were killed in Kokrajhar District, Baksa has recorded one militant killing. The remaining Districts-Udalguri and Chirang-in BTAD have not recorded any fatalities in 2013, thus far.

In 2012, nine persons, including seven civilians and two militants; 2011 had recorded 27 killings, including five civilians, 11 Security Force (SF) personnel and an equal number of militants in 2011. The fall in fatalities can be ascribed to the NDFB-RD’s announcement of an indefinite ceasefire on August 2011.

SATP has recorded 318 fatalities, including 117 civilians, 16 SF personnel and 185 militants, in the BTAD area since the formation of BTC in February 2003.

As the data indicates, despite the accord, intermittent violence continues to threaten peace in the region. This is, in part, a consequence of the nature of the Accord itself, and the circumstances under which it was reached. At the time of the signing of the Accord, the most active militant formation, the NDFB, was kept out of the deal, while the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) was given prominence. Indeed, NDFB had killed 68 non-locals in Bodo areas between 2001 and 2003. Even the first Bodo Accord of 1993, which led to the formation of first autonomous arrangement in the area – the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) – excluded NDFB from its signatories. The 1993 Accord was reached between the Central Government, State Government and the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and its political wing, the Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC). The first Bodo Accord collapsed due to its failure to clearly demarcate BAC territories.

Not surprisingly, with the passage of time, NDFB continued its violence, resulting in the the killing of 32 persons in BTAD between February 2003 and May 25, 2005, the day the SoO was signed with NDFB. The group had declared a ceasefire on October 8, 2004, following the State Government’s offer of negotiation, which was followed by the signing of the tripartite SoO. 

In another distortion, the Government continued the SoO with NDFB-PTF led by B. Sungthagra alias Dhiren Boro, after the split in the NDFB in 2009, and started peace talks after the faction dropped the issue of ‘sovereignty’. However, NDFB-PTF has been found to be involved in cases of abduction and extortion during the period of the SoO. According to a February 11, 2012, report, SFs arrested 46 NDFB-PTF cadres on charges of abduction and extortion and recovered 37 weapons from them, between 2005 and 2011. More worryingly, a February 8, 2012, report stated that a total of 108 NDFB-PTF militants fled their designated camps between 2010 and 2012.

Meanwhile, NDFB-RD continued violence in the BTAD region and beyond. However, following, the ‘handing over’ of Ranjan Daimary by Bangladesh to India in May 2010, followed by the similar transfer of ‘vice-chairman’ NDFB-RD, Rajen Goyari alias G. Rifikhang and “finance secretary”, Dorsang Narzary in April 2011, the outfit declared a unilateral ceasefire. Moreover, NDFB-RD witnessed a further split, announced on November 20, 2012, by the NDFB-RD’s Myanmar based, ‘army chief’ I.K. Songbijit, who, vowed to “work and fight together with vigour and determination to liberate Boroland” and “Western South East Asia (North-East India)”. The split was announced following a November 13-14, 2012, meeting, leading to the formation of the I.K Songbijit faction [NDFB-IKS].

Since its formation, NDFB-IKS has been found involved in at least two killings. On February 2, 2013, NDFB-IKS militants abducted a businessman, Raju Saha, from Dotma in Kokrajhar District. Saha’s body was subsequently recovered on February 12 from an area near Serfanguri in the same District. Earlier, NDFB-IKS militants had killed Mahalaxmi Tea Estate owner Adilur Rehman, and injured his body guard, on November 13, 2012, in Sonitpur District, for failure to meet extortion demands.

Like its predecessors, NDFB-IKS has been found involved in several cases of extortion, and has recently issued a spate of extortion notices in the BTAD area. Pramila Rani Brahma, Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from the Kokrajhar East constituency, on May 28, 2013, observed that NDFB-IKS extortionists had been serving notice for huge amount of money, ranging from INR 1 million to INR 2 million, in Ultapani and Saralpara areas of the Kokrajhar District, and had created a reign of terror in the region. She urged the Government to take necessary action to immediately end the NDFB-IKS’ ongoing extortion drive.

Besides these Bodo outfits, Adivasi and Kamtapur militant formations are also involved in extortion in BTAD areas.

The violent environment in BTAD areas is compounded by tense ethnic relations between different groups, variously due to overlapping demands, land alienation and the problem of illegal immigration. In 2012, during the months of July, August and November, a total of 109 persons died in ethnic violence in the BTAD, and an estimated 450,000 were displaced. This was not the first instance of clashes between Bodos and non-Bodos. According to the figures provided by the Government in 2012, 558 persons had been killed in ethnic and communal violence in BTAD areas from 1993 to 2003, and another 173 persons were killed in such clashes thereafter, till December 5, 2012. No such incident has been recorded in BTAD in 2013.

The roots of conflict, consequently, persist, despite the Bodo Accord. The main demand of NDFB-PTF for a separate Bodo State is opposed by the State Government. Although, the united NDFB was originally fighting for a ‘sovereign’ Bodoland comprising the present BTAD areas as well as other plain tribal inhabiting areas of North Bank of Brahmaputra River, two out of the present three NDFB factions, NDFB-PTF and NDFB-RD, are now asking for a State within the Country. Talks are also being held with the Adivasi militant groups – the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), Adivasi Cobra Militants of Assam (ACMA), Adivasi People’s Army (APA), Birsa Commando Force (BCF) and Santhal Tiger Force (STF). Another Adivasi outfit, the National Santhal Liberation Army (NSLA), a breakaway faction of APA, is also active in BTAD.

There have been growing demands for re-look at the 2003 Bodo Accord, from both Bodos and non-Bodos, particularly after the ethnic conflagration of 2012. Commenting on the failures of the BTC experiment on June 23, 2013, NDFB-RD ‘chairman’ Ranjan Daimary observed, “It [BTC] has not helped; it has failed to fulfil the aspirations of the Bodo people. That’s why even the Bodoland Peoples Front (BPF) leaders (former Bodoland Liberation Tigers), who had signed the memorandum of settlement on February 10, 2003, for creation of the autonomous council as well as other organisations such as the All Bodo Students Union, have revived the demand for statehood so that the Bodos can live with dignity.’’

The Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) Birodhi Gana Aikya Moncha (BTCBGAM), a non-Bodo body, on July 8, 2013 submitted a Memorandum to State Governor, J.B. Patnaik, to press for the exclusion of non–Bodo villages from the BTC area so that there would be no conflict between Bodos and non-Bodos. The memorandum requested the Governor to review the 2003 BTC Accord and to call a round-table conference of all the ethnic representatives “to find out the problems of ethnic autonomy”. The memorandum has also asked for a white paper on the Bodo movement for autonomy and the Government’s policy in handling the Bodo problems since 1990.

Earlier, on December 14, 2012 another non-Bodo organization, the Sanmilita Janagosthiya Sangram Samiti (SJSS), raised the demand for a review of the BTC Accord and claimed that unless the terms of the Accord were amended, conflict in BTAD would persist and the security of non-Bodos living in the area would always be at stake.

The latest split in NDFB-RD and the escalating demands for a review of the Bodo Accord, as well as growing tensions between Bodos and non-Bodos, threaten to keep this long-troubled region volatile in the foreseeable future.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Extremism

Left-wing Extremism

Total (BANGLADESH)

INDIA

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Manipur

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)