SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 43, April 28, 2014

PAKISTAN

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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Insecure Police
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Five Policemen and a civilian were killed in an attack at the Zangli Checkpost on the Kohat-Peshawar road in the Badhaber area of Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), on April 21, 2014. KP Inspector General of Police (IGP) Nasir Khan Durrani asserted, on April 22, that the Badhaber attack was a repercussion of the Police’s search operation against terrorists on the outskirts of Peshawar. Police arrested several injured people from Peshawar hospitals in connection with the attack. Sources in the local Police claimed that all the suspects had bullets injuries and belonged to the Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Elsewhere in the province, on the same day, a Police mobile van was targeted by an improvised explosive device (IED) at Farooq Azam Chowk in the Tehsil Bazaar of Charsadda town. At least three persons, including two Policemen, were killed and another 30 were injured in the explosion. District Police Officer Charsadda, Shafiullah Khan, disclosed that the explosive material had been planted in a motorcycle and the Police mobile van was the primary target. The dead also included a shopkeeper.

Further, on April 27, a Police constable, Siraj Gul, was killed while another constable, Akhtar Ali, was injured, when unidentified militants attacked them near the Bakhshu Pul area under the jurisdiction of Khazana Police Station in Peshawar. Senior Superintendent of Police-Operations, Najibur Rehman, lamented that Police personnel were deployed at spots where they were targets for terrorists due to the lack of protective gear, including helmets and bullet-proof jackets.

Meanwhile, on April 21 itself, the Provincial Police Department sought authority from the Federal Government to carry out operations in the tribal areas outside the Province. IGP Durrani stated that the long boundary from Bajaur Agency up to the South Waziristan Agency posed a serious problem for the settled towns of KP. Anybody could enter the settled areas and launch a terrorist attack, but Police pursuing them had to stop when they reached the FATA tribal belt. 

The attack on the Police again demonstrated that, no matter how far the Government went with the peace-talk with the terrorists, the threat to the Police remained the same, even as gaping loopholes in the security arrangements persisted. Nevertheless, IGP Durrani asserted, on March 28, 2014, that the KP Police was ready to respond to any security threat in case peace negotiations with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) failed.

The Police, however, have been ineffectual in containing the terrorist campaign. On March 14, 2014, for instance, 11 persons were killed and another 45 were injured in a suicide attack targeting the Police in the Sarband area of Peshawar. Despite the ongoing Government-TTP peace-talks, a TTP splinter group, Ahrar-ul-Hind (AH) claimed responsibility for the attack. “We claim both Peshawar and Quetta attacks," AH 'chief' Umar Qasmi declared, “We don't abide by these talks and will continue to stage attacks."

The TTP’s ceasefire which started on March 1, ended on April 10, with the terror group's leaders alleging that there was "no positive response" from the Government. However, there was a series of attacks on the SFs during the ceasefire period as well. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 40 Policemen were killed and another 86 were injured in 23 incidents of terrorist attack on the Police in the first four months of 2014 in KP. Of these, three incidents occurred during the ceasefire period, including one suicide attack in which 14 Policemen were killed and 45 others were injured.

Overall terrorism-related fatalities in KP had been declining after 2010, but this trend was reversed in 2013. According to SATP’s partial data, KP saw at least 936 fatalities, including 603 civilians, 172 SF personnel and 161 terrorists, in 210 incidents of killing in 2013, as compared 656 fatalities, including 363 civilians, 195 militants and 98 SF personnel, in 170 such incidents, in 2012. The first four months of 2014 have already recorded 247 killings, including 151 civilians, 64 SF personnel and 32 terrorists, in 80 incidents of killing.

With total SF fatalities rising from 98 in 2012 to 172 in 2013, the number of KP Policemen killed also increased from 58 in 2012 to 91 in 2013. Out of 64 SF personnel killed in first four months of 2014, 40 are KP Policemen.

Since the start of Army operation in KP's Swat Valley in 2009, a sizable number of Army troops have also been operating in Swat, Malakand, Dir, Buner and Shangla (exact numbers are not available). On September 14, 2013, KP Chief Minister Pervez Khattak approved withdrawal of the Army from the Malakand Division, and the process of pulling out troops from Shangla and Buner Districts was scheduled to start from the following month. In a subsequent phase, troops were to be pulled out from Swat, Upper and Lower Dir Districts and other parts of the Malakand Division. On September 17, 2013, however, the Peshawar High Court stopped the KP Government from withdrawing the Army. Peshawar High Court's Chief Justice, Dost Muhammad Khan, observed that the Army had been deployed in these areas for many years to restore peace, and its withdrawal would create a vacuum there.  

Several senior Police officers also fell prey to the terrorists over this period. These prominently included:   

May 24, 2013: Six Policemen were killed and a District Police Officer (DPO) and his guard were injured when terrorists attacked their vehicles with rockets on the Indus Highway in the Mattani area of Darra Adamkhel District.

October 14, 2012: Five SF personnel, including the Superintendent of Police (SP) Rural, Khurshid Khan, were killed, while 10 Police and FC men were injured when TTP terrorists attacked two check posts of the Mattani Police Station on the outskirts of Peshawar.

March 15, 2012: SP Abdul Kalam Khan was killed and five others were injured in a suicide attack on his car at Pishtakhara Chowk in Peshawar.  

August 4, 2010: Additional Inspector General of Police Safwat Ghayur was killed in a suicide attack outside his office in Peshawar.

April 19, 2010: Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Gulfat Hussain was killed in a suicide attack in the Qissa Khawani area of Peshawar.

February 11, 2010: DPO Mohammad Iqbal Marwat was killed in twin bomb blasts outside a Police training centre in Bannu District.

June 5, 2009: Farid Hussain Bangash, DSP, Mardan (Rural), was killed in a gun-battle when terrorists attacked a Buner-bound joint Police and Frontier Constabulary (FC) convoy at Natian in Mardan District. 

April 27, 2009: DSP Asmatullah Khattak and five of his bodyguards were killed on their way to Lakki Marwat from Bannu, when his van struck a remote controlled bomb on the Lakki-Tajazai Road in Lakki Marwat.

February 28, 2008: DSP Lakki Marwat, Javed Iqbal, was killed in a bomb blast in southern Lakki Marwat. Later, Iqbal’s funeral procession was attacked by a suicide bomber, on March 1, 2008, in his native Swat, in Mingora, killing over 60 people, including his son and another Police officer.

January 27, 2007: Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Malik Mohammad Saad and DSP Khan Raziq were killed in a suicide attack on a Muharram procession in Peshawar.

December 18, 2006: DIG, Bannu, Abid Ali, was killed along with his driver, while coming from Bannu to Peshawar, near Matani town on Kohat Road.

The Police in KP have a sanctioned strength of 78,320 and a population of about 22 million, yielding a fairly healthy ratio of 356 Policemen per 100,000 population. With the formation of the Special Anti-Terrorism Force and Special Prisons Force in October 2013, another two Police Forces have been introduced in KP, where a number of uniformed forces, including the Army, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the Anti-Narcotics Force, and the Excise Police Force, already operate.

On November 28, 2013, the KP Government renamed the Directorate of Counter Terrorism (DCT) of the Police Department, the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), with an enlarged mandate, including intelligence collection, surveillance and monitoring, registration of terrorism cases, investigation of Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) cases, arrest and detention, and research and analysis. The strength of DCT has been merged into CTD, and the total sanctioned strength of CTD will be 2,350, including one DIG, 12 SPs, 43 DSPs, 153 Inspectors, 289 Sub-Inspectors (SI), 249 Assistant Sub-Inspectors (ASI), 314 Head constables (HC), 1,170 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel, and 119 Drivers. For operational purposes, seven CTD Police Stations (one at Capital City Police and one each at six Regional headquarters), will be established.  

But the creation of the new Forces is yet to have a measurable impact on terrorism in the Province. According to statistics compiled by the Central Police Office in Peshawar, 1,002 Policemen had been killed in suicide attacks, bombings, ambushes, rocket attacks and other incidents, while fighting terrorists, since January 2006, according to a KP Police statement on April 2, 2014. More than 2,072 others were injured. Peshawar had the highest death toll among the 25 KP Districts, at 265. Kohistan remained the only District in the Province where no Police officer has been killed or wounded over this period. The worst year was 2009, when 201 Policemen were killed fighting terrorists. 31 policemen had already been killed in 2014 on the date of these disclosures.

Despite the apparently healthy sanctioned strength, KP Police is riddled with deficits, particularly at the leadership level. About 60 per cent of posts for Grade 21 Additional Inspectors General (IGs), 56 per cent of grade 20 Deputy Inspectors General (DIGs) and 42 per cent of Grade 19 and 18 Assistant Inspectors General, Senior Superintendents of Police (SSPs) and SPs are vacant, or are being filled by junior officers, according to official statistics. IG Durrani disclosed, "We have asked the Federal and Provincial Governments on a number of occasions to post senior Police officers because a large number of positions are vacant in KP." There are more than 73,000 Police officials in all the Districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Further, sub-standard weapons at the disposal of KP Police have also raised a question mark on its fighting capacity. Very recently on April 22, 2014, the KP Police Department blacklisted four firms in connection with the supply of substandard weapons, ammunition and other equipment for the Police force. The KP Police had carried out the procurement of weapons, ammunition and other equipment for operational policing in 2008 and 2009 through competitive tenders. In addition to Majeed and Sons, which is already blacklisted, the name of its sister firms have also surfaced. These include Shayan-e-Sarhad Enterprises, Peshawar; Al Moiz Trading Cooperation Peshawar; Shahid Traders Peshawar; and Shaheer Trading Company Peshawar, according to an official communiqué.

The KP Government has announced several measures to revamp its Police Force to improve provincial security. KP Police implemented several changes at two Police Stations in the Province and declared them as models. All of the Province's 210 Police Stations are to be converted into model stations within three years, commencing October 2013, Ehsan Ghani, former KP IGP disclosed. The model stations are well armed and staffed with enough properly trained officers. More sniffer dogs and bomb detectors will be added, allowing Police to stage random sweeps for explosives. In August, the Provincial Force recruited 1,300 Policemen in Peshawar, according to Ghani, who noted, further, "We need at least 8,000 more Policemen in the Province to meet the present challenges."

In January 2014, the KP Government requested the Federal Government to categorize the Province as a "hard area", so that KP could better cope with the law-and-order situation. Classifying KP as a “hard area” would make postings to KP more attractive for senior officers, since such postings are mandatory for promotions. The provincial IG of Police Nasir Khan Durrani lamented, "We have asked the Federal and Provincial Governments on a number of occasions to post senior police officers because a large number of positions are vacant in KP." However, the requests have met with little result. 

On March 17, 2014, KP Chief Minister (CM) Pervez Khattak announced a raise in the salaries of the provincial Police. Emphasizing that hundreds of Policemen had sacrificed their lives for the security of the people, he announced incentives and measures for improvement in the KP Police.

The steady stream of Police fatalities in KP indicate that the various measures implemented are yet to have a decisive impact on the ground, and that the Government continues to dither over other crucial pending measures.

INDIA

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Jharkhand: Maoists: Never say Die
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Turning adversity into advantage is easier said than done, but when the adversary lets his guard down, difficulties diminish. After the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) managed to engineer a succession of attacks during the earlier phases of the General Elections in different States, especially Chhattisgarh and Bihar, Security Forces (SFs) and poll officials were expected to be more cautious. Jharkhand had a surprisingly peaceful poll during the first two phases on April 10 and April 17, in areas where the Maoist threat was much higher, and this appears to have seduced a section of election officials and SFs to relative complacence during the third phase, for which a tragic price has been paid.

On April 24, the third and last phase of General Elections in Jharkhand, the Maoists triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast in the Shikaripada Police Station area in Dumka District, killing eight persons — five Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP) personnel, two poll officials and a cleaner of the minibus in which they were travelling – and injuring at least another nine. The poll party was returning with Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), after completion of the polling process, towards the helipad through an alternative kutcha [mud track] road, when Maoists triggered the land mine under a culvert near Palsa village and fired indiscriminately. The Maoists also attacked the first rescue party, but later withdrew after looting five INSAS rifles, 25 magazines and about 550 bullets.

Though the poll party took an alternative route on its return, important standard operating procedures (SOPs) were flouted, with the group travelling in a minibus instead of walking back with the EVMs. Reports suggest that Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel deployed at booth no 101, from where the poll party started its ill-fated journey, advised the JAP personnel not to travel in the minibus. However, they chose to do so, and were ambushed within fifteen minutes. The CRPF team suffered no casualty.

Despite the peaceful completion of the first two phases in the State, there were some apprehensions of trouble during the third phase. Documents recovered by SFs in the Jamui area of Bihar on February 2, 2014, indicated that Maoist cadres had been instructed to arrange for explosives to carry out strikes, including the targeting of vehicles used in election campaigns, abduction or elimination of political leaders, and ambushing security personnel, across operational areas in the Red Corridor, through the election process. Accordingly, elaborate security arrangement had been made for the third phase. IAF helicopters had been pressed into service for dropping poll personnel in sensitive areas in the Dumka District. Polling personnel of 19 booths in Kathikund, Shikaripara and Gopikandar blocks in the District were ferried to respective helipads, which had been specially constructed earlier amid fears of a possible attack. The District administration had identified six booths in Shikaripara, seven in Kathikund and six in Gopikandar Blocks in the District as 'most vulnerable'. Chopper services were made available to ferry poll workers in these blocks. A total of 76 polling personnel were lifted by IAF helicopters which ferried them from Dumka Airport in separate trips, and were deployed until April 24 for any emergencies, particularly injuries to SF or polling personnel in all the three Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) constituencies in Santhal Pargana. 132 companies of the CRPF already deployed in the State and another 80 CRPF companies from other States, were deputed for elections in Jharkhand scheduled on April 10, 17 and 24. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, Maoists had ambushed a polling party in Dumka killing one and injuring three.

The incident is the second major Maoist attack in Dumka after Maoists killed Pakur District Superintendent of Police (SP) Amarjit Balihar and another five Policemen in an ambush on July 2, 2013, in the Kathikund Forest area of Dumka District, bordering Pakur. The SP was returning from a meeting with Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Priya Dubey in Dumka District when his vehicle was attacked. The Maoists first triggered a landmine blast and then started firing indiscriminately on the convoy from higher ground. Another three Policemen suffered serious injuries. The Maoists escaped with two AK-47s, four INSAS rifles, two pistols and more than 600 rounds of ammunition.

The incident was then considered an opportunist strike, since the Maoist were not believed to have any significant influence over the area. The Jharkhand Police website maintains, “Dumka is a tribal-dominated District as a result of which tribal culture and system is predominant in the way of living of other communities living in the District. Naxalism has not taken its root [emphasis added] because of Santhal culture and their system and their own village administrative set up.” However, the website concedes that two armed Naxalite gangs of a strength of 15 to 18 were active in the Dumka District, one of them in the Northern part of the Rampurhat pakki road, under the ledership of Pravil Da aka Hirendra Murmu; and the other in Southern Dumka, led by Ramlal Rai.

In 2000, Dumka was ascribed the status of the sub-capital of Jharkhand, and is considered to be the political 'backyard' of former Chief Minister Shibu Soren and his son and present Chief Minister Hemant Soren, both of whom are known to be soft towards the Maoists.

The recent attack in Dumka can also be read as an index of the Maoists' attempt to implement elements of their revival plan formulated by the Central Committee (CC), after acknowledging the reversals the movement had suffered, and the weaknesses that had crept into it.

A parallel development in Jharkhand is also significant in this context.  The 4^th CC Resolution observes:

Thousands of party leaders of various levels, cadres, activists of mass organizations and RPCs and sympathizers are incarcerated in jails all over the country. They form a considerable part of our party at present. The leadership inside the prisons and outside should put efforts so that all of them get rallied through jail communes and build movements with coordination and get educated ideologically and politically. We should put efforts so that they can play appropriate roles directly in the revolutionary movement after their release from the prisons.

A February 14, 2014, media report indicates that, after simultaneous hunger strikes by 1,100 to 1,500 prisoners, led by imprisoned Maoists across Central and District Jails in Palamu, Hazaribagh and Garhwa Districts, the Jharkhand Sentence Review Board recommended the release of 53 lifers who had completed 14 years. The prisoners were demanding that the board, which had not met in a year, convene a meeting to consider remitting sentences of those serving life terms. 

In the Palamu Jail, where eight had applied for release, 410 prisoners went on fast. A senior official in the Palamu Central Jail stated, on condition of anonymity, “On January 31, eight prisoners called a fast. The next day 20 more joined them… By February 6, 410 of 817 prisoners were on strike led by Naveenji, a Maoist prisoner, and Satish.” Jail Superintendent Uday Khushwaha declared, “In my 28 years here, I had not seen prisoners going on a mass fast before.”  

While it was mostly in Central Jails, where those serving life terms are kept, that prisoners went on fast, in some instances prisoners in District Jails also joined the protest in large numbers. Bandi Sangharsh Samitis — prison committees — led by Maoist prisoners have been active in the Garhwa District Jail for several years. Jail Superintendent K. Paswan noted, “The sangathan members [Maoists] imprisoned here have led a fast several times. But this time, 515 of the total 640 prisoners — the largest number — went on a fast for four days." None of the prisoners in the Garhwa Jail had applied for remission. 

Officials at Hazaribagh Jail put the number of prisoners who went on strike there at over 250. The CPI-Maoist called a bandh (general shutdown strike) on February 7 in support of the striking prisoners. Inspector-General (Prisons) Shailendra Bhushan disclosed, “Of 106, we approved the release of 53 prisoners. These will now be considered by Chief Minister Hemant Soren. He has approved these already in his capacity as Home Minister.” 

The activation of Maoist leaders and cadres in jail, and the ideological mobilisation of other prisoners is an openly declared objective of the CPI-Maoist's two-year plan for revival, and the incidents in jails across Jharkhand cannot be viewed in isolation from this general intent. Given the wide participation of prisoners in these jails in the hunger strike, it is clear that the incarcerated Maoists' efforts to indoctrinate fellow inmates have met with substantial success. The incident in Dumka, moreover, indicates that efforts to widen operational areas and to hit SF and Government targets are ongoing. Jharkhand has now the dubious distinction of the highest Maoist-related fatalities among States in 2012 and 2013 (Union Ministry of Home Affairs data), and the 4th CC Resolution has singled out cadres and activists in this State for high praise. Jharkhand has, moreover, a record of sustained political ambivalence in the state response to the Maoist challenge. The Maoists have, moreover, formulated a complex and detailed strategy of revival across their traditional areas of dominance and beyond, and unless the state devises a systemic counter to target and neutralize the Maoist leadership, the limited gains of the past years may quickly dissipate.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Terrorism

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Left-wing Extremism

Andhra Pradesh

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Maharashtra

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)