SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 51, June 23, 2014

PAKISTAN

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NWA: Pointless Symbolism
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

At 01:30am [PST] on June 15, 2014, Pakistani Air Force jets launched aerial attacks on purported terrorist hideouts in the Degan and Datta Khel areas of North Waziristan Agency (NWA) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) killing at least 140 alleged terrorists and destroying eight hideouts, according to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) [no independent confirmation of these claims is available]. Later in the day, ISPR declared, “On the directions of the Government, Armed forces of Pakistan have launched a comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). The operation has been named Zarb-e-Azb [Sword of the Prophet].”

Since the commencement of the operation, several alleged terrorist hideouts in areas like Shawal, Degan-Boya, Hasokhel, Zartatangi and Qutab Khel have been neutralised. A total of 257 terrorists and eight soldiers have been killed during the operation so far.

Some experts have started describing the current operation as an earnest effort on the part of authorities in Pakistan to finally taken on terrorists, since the recent strikes have targeted their safest sanctuaries in NWA, which had, hitherto, remained untouched. Significantly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had declared, in National Assembly on June 16, 2014, “Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been launched against terrorism and it will continue till the obtainment (sic) of the final objective of restoration of peace and tranquillity in Pakistan. I am confident the operation will be the harbinger of peace and security for Pakistan.”

Such vaunting declarations are not a novelty in Pakistan, but are difficult to reconcile with the country's broader strategic design and continuing exploitation of terrorism as an instrument, both of domestic political management and external strategic projection.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in the aftermath of the attack on Karachi Airport on June 8-9, 2014, in which at least 33 persons, including all ten attackers, were killed. Significantly, claiming responsibility for the attack, the NWA-based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) posted a statement that read, “...This is revenge for the killing of civilians, migrant women and their children. This is revenge for the violence of the corrupt Pakistani Government.” The statement signed by Usman Gazij, IMU emir, concludes, “The jihad already in place in Afghanistan should be extended to Pakistan’s territory as well. Jihad in Pakistan should be fought by the entire Muslim Ummah and not just a few people or groups.” Pakistani Major General Rizvan Akhtar, speaking on the day of the attack, had claimed that there were Uzbeks among the suicide fighters in Karachi, and some reports claimed that most of the slain terrorists were Uzbeks. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had also claimed responsibility for the attack.

The air raids have mostly damaged the hideouts used by the terrorists of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction of the TTP, which has just come out of the truce pact with the Government signed way back in 2006-2007, and groups sheltered by it. On May 30, 2013, a pamphlet issued in the name of Bahadur on behalf of the Shura Mujahideen, North Waziristan, accused the Government of reneging on the peace agreement, arguing, “It is now abundantly clear that the Government had quietly reneged on the peace agreement long ago – but we have been showing restraint against our will for the sake of people of Waziristan... Those who want to fight for the honour of Waziristan should cooperate with us.” Significantly, the Pakistani Air Force jets had pounded terrorist outfits in NWA on at least 11 occasions (prior to June 15) since the beginning of the New Year, claiming to have eliminated at least 287 terrorists, mostly foreign terrorists sheltered by the Gul Bahadur faction. It is believed that, as the Nawaz Sharif Government began peace talks with the Baitullah Mehsud faction of the TTP, now led by Fazlullah [also known as Mullah Radio, the leader of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) or Swat Taliban], it started targeting the Gul Bahadur faction to appease the Fazlullah faction. However, Islamabad appears to have lost the plot again, as the talks with the Fazlullah faction have also ended.

The launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb may also help Pakistan appease the US, as Washington has repeatedly conveyed to Islamabad that Bahadur and his group have been helping al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. As the drawdown in Afghanistan inches closer, US pressure has mounted manifold.

Meanwhile, the ‘spokesman’ of TTP's Gul Bahadur faction, Ahmadullah Ahmadi, on June 19, threatened, “From today [June 19] we are launching a war against security forces with the name Zarb-e-Momin. We are an independent group and have no affiliation with the TTP.”

Significantly, the Gul Bahadur faction had distanced itself from the umbrella TTP organization due to rivalries with former chief Baitullah Mehsud and disagreements over targeting the Pakistani state. Often cited as an example of the “good Taliban”, loyal to the Pakistani state, the faction has now turned renegade; hence the retaliation by the SFs. It is likely, however, that the main leaders of the Gul Bahadur faction have fled as information regarding the operation was leaked in advance. In Its May 30 pamphlet, the group had disclosed, “We’ve received credible information that the Government has decided to launch a military offensive [in the region].” This has been an established pattern in Pakistan, with state agencies launching operations well after information has been passed on to the target terrorist formations, and has facilitated the state to channels of communication with the outfit open for the future. Fazlullah had, similarly, escaped when massive operations were launched in Swat in 2009, and survived to eventually head the ‘united’ TTP.

The geographical mapping of the aerial operation clearly demonstrates that its targets are the anti-state groups in Pakistan, clearly distinguished from 'loyal' groupings that continue to do Islamabad's bidding in Afghanistan. The worst attack took place in Datta Khel, the stronghold of the Gul Bahdur faction. There was, however, no attack in Miranshah and Mir Ali, strongholds of the Fazllulah faction and the Haqqani Network.

A US Congressional report notes that the large number of terrorist outfits within Pakistan can be broadly divided into five groups: globally oriented terrorists, Afghanistan-oriented, India- and Kashmir-oriented, sectarian, and domestically oriented. Islamabad’s policy has been to cultivate the first four categories of 'loyal' terrorist formations, and to targeting only those that have turned renegade and redirected their ire against domestic targets. This policy remains in clear evidence in the latest operations in NWA.

Indeed, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif, on June 16, emphasized, “All terrorists along with their sanctuaries must be eliminated without any discrimination. The operation is not targeted against our valiant tribes of North Waziristan but against those terrorists who are holed up in the Agency and have picked up arms against the state of Pakistan.”

The hype generated around Operation Zarb-e-Azb is, consequently, misplaced. This is just another campaign in a long series that has been launched after the Lal Masjid debacle of 2007, targeting renegade terrorist formations. Other prominent operations of this nature in the past have included: Operation Rah-e-Haq-I (Swat Valley and Shangla District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP); October 25, 2007-December 8, 2007); Operation Rah-e-Haq- II (Shangla District in KP, July 2008); Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (Khyber Agency in FATA; June 28, 2008-July 9, 2008); Operation Sherdil (Bajaur Agency in FATA; August 7, 2008– February 28, 2009); Operation Rah-e-Haq-III (Swat District in KP, January 2009); Operation Black Thunderstorm (Buner, Lower Dir, Swat and Shangla Districts in KP; April 26, 2009–June 14, 2009); Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat Valley and Shangla District in KP; May 16, 2009–July 15, 2009);  Operation Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan Agency in FATA; June 19, 2009-December 12, 2009); Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (Orakzai and Kurram Agencies in FATA; March 23, 2010-June 1, 2010); Operation Brekhna (Mohmand Agency in FATA; November 3, 2009); and Operation Koh-i-Sufaid (Kurram Agency in FATA; July 2, 2011 - August 18, 2011).

The precarious security environment in Pakistan, with the maximum number of civilian fatalities since 2003, recorded in 2012 and 2013 (3007 and 3001 respectively), underline the comprehensive failure of this long succession of past operations, and their inability to stall Pakistan’s accelerating hurtle into chaos.

With the start of this latest operation, an estimated over 200,000 persons have already been evacuated from the area. The localized operation in targeted areas in NWA also increase the probabilities of a terrorist retaliation in other areas of Pakistan providing, a pattern that has resulted in the suspension of operations in the past. On June 19, 2014, Federal Minister for Defence Khawaja Asif had already stated, “We will try to end the operation in North Waziristan as soon as possible.”

In all probability, Operation Zarb-e-Azb will also come to an end sooner rather than later, without any decisive gains. The military may bring away the illusion that the terrorist assault at Karachi has been 'avenged', but the capacities and intentions of the terrorists are unlikely to be impacted in any significant measure.

INDIA

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Jharkhand: Khunti: Solution by Redefinition
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On June 4, 2014, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres gunned down three villagers, accusing them of being involved in 'anti-Maoist activities', at Jojo in the Khunti District of Jharkhand. Some reports, however, claimed that the trio - Dubraj Munda (25), who held a ‘sub-zonal commander’ rank in the CPI-Maoist, his wife Nagi Munda (24) and close associate Surya Munda (21) - were suspected to have been killed by fellow Maoists because of an internal dispute within the outfit.

On May 24, suspected cadres of the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI), a breakaway faction of the CPI-Maoist, killed a Policeman at Dadigutu village in Khunti District.

Earlier, on March 25, a Police officer and three troopers were injured when suspected PLFI cadres triggered a landmine blast and opened fire at a 15-member Police squad, which was heading towards Kotna village in the same District, to conduct a meeting with the villagers on the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) elections. Three PLFI cadres were arrested on the same day for their alleged involvement in the blast.

Khunti is one of the 16 Districts highly affected by Naxal [Left Wing Extremist (LWE)] activities in Jharkhand. Jharkhand has a total of 24 Districts, of which 21 are LWE-affected in varying measure.

Khunti has an area of 2,535 square kilometers, and was carved out of the Ranchi District on September 12, 2007. The District has six Police Stations and one Police Outpost. Khunti shares its borders with other highly affected Districts: Ranchi in the north and east; Saraikela-Kharsawan in the south-east, West Singhbhum in the south, and Simdega and Gumla in the West. According to the 2011 Census, the District has the highest percentage of scheduled tribes in Jharkhand, at 73 per cent, followed by Simdega (71 per cent) and Gumla (69 per cent).

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, LWE-related fatalities have been continuous, though uneven, with a peak of 21 fatalities recorded in 2011, when the District witnessed 13 civilian fatalities in seven incidents linked to the LWEs. Most of the civilian fatalities, 18 of the total of 47 since the creation of the District, have been inflicted after the extremists branded some villagers as ‘Police informers’.

Apart from the CPI-Maoist, PLFI has a strong presence in Khunti. According to partial data compiled by SATP, of the 47 civilians killed since 2007, Maoists were responsible for 23 fatalities, while PLFI killed 24. However, an overwhelming proportion of Security Force (SF) personnel have been killed by the CPI-Maoist. Of 18 SF fatalities, 15 were inflicted by the Maoists, while just three are attributed to PLFI cadres, confirming the impression that PLFI avoids engagement with the SFs. Significantly, of 33 LWE extremists killed, 15 were killed by SF personnel and another 15 in internecine clashes between the CPI-Maoist and PLFI. The remaining three were lynched by villagers. There is a very strong turf war between the Maoists, led by ‘zonal commander’ Kundan Pahan, and PLFI led by its chief Dinesh Gope, in Khunti District. The turf war has been confirmed by two PLFI cadres, who survived the June 23, 2013, Maoist attack on a PLFI group near Namsilli village of Khunti District, where six PLFI cadres were killed. The survivors later admitted to the Police that they were in the village to lay the ground work for PLFI to wrest control of the village from the Maoists.  

Some of the major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) in Khunti District include:

June 3, 2014: Three villagers were shot dead, allegedly by CPI-Maoist cadres who suspected the trio of working against them, at Jojo.

July 23, 2013: Six cadres of PLFI were killed in a factional clash when around 30 to 40 CPI-Maoist cadres surrounded the PLFI cadres and opened fired indiscriminately near Namsilli village.

June 2, 2011: Three CPI-Maoist cadres were killed and as many Policemen were injured in a gunfight at Murhu.

April 11, 2009: Five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed and three others injured when CPI-Maoist cadres opened fire on them in the Jalko Forest under the Arki Police Station.

January 31, 2009: Four villagers were shot dead by suspected cadres of the PLFI in Chalgi village of Khunti District. "The killing seems to be the outcome of an internal rivalry," Khunti SP Prabhat Kumar stated.

April 1, 2008: CPI-Maoist cadres killed four civilians at Poradih-Chenpur village in the Khunti District. Dead bodies of the victims, whose throats were slit, were recovered on April 2. A hand-written note left behind by the Maoists claimed that the four persons were being ‘punished’ for engaging in robbery.

According to partial data compiled by SATP, there have been at least 23 encounters between the SFs and LWEs in Khunti, since the formation of the District in September 2007.

The Maoists have long exploited the lack of development of basic infrastructure, administrative apathy and limited reach of civil governance in the region. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Arcelor-Mittal in 2005 to set up a Steel plant at Torpa in the District, has exacerbated existing faultlines. Protesting against the Arcelor-Mittal land acquisition for the steel plant in 2009, villagers in their 'memorandum of demands', vowed to fight “till the end” to safeguard their basic rights over water, forest and land resources. Local opposition has been sustained since, with the company going ahead with its decision to set up its 12 million tonne steel plant as proposed in its MoU with the Jharkhand Government. Faced with opposition from villagers from the Khunti and Gumla areas, the company is now making efforts to acquire land at Petarwar in the Bokaro District of the State.

Jharkhand Director General of Police (DGP) Rajeev Kumar claimed on June 1, 2014, that measures taken in 2014 by the Jharkhand Police had reduced the Maoist threat by 35 per cent in Jharkhand. "Except Dumka where the District administration ignored the instructions given by the State Government, resulting in a landmine explosion on April 24, no other violence was reported from any part of the state," the DG claimed. The facts, however, appear contrary to his claim “no other violence was reported from any part of the State”, since partial data compiled by ICM records at least 35 LWE related fatalities in Jharkhand in 2014 (till June 22).

Meanwhile, the State's Chief Secretary Sajal Chakraborty, on May 19, termed Jharkhand’s LWE problem as a “threat blown out of proportion”, because criminal acts committed by splinter groups without ideological moorings simply inflated the number of violent incidents and fatalities. Justifying his claims he said, “For example, in 2011, CPI (Maoist) presence and activities was 59 per cent [of total LWE activities] that reduced to 35 per cent last year [2013]. In contrast, PLFI grew from 15 per cent in 2011 to 37 per cent in 2013.” He added that seven splinter groups - Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC), PLFI, Jharkhand Prastuti Committee (JPC), Sangharsh Janmukti Morcha (SJMM), Shastra People's Morcha (SPM - Armed People's Front), Revolutionary Communist Centre (RCC) and Jharkhand Jan Mukti Parishad (JJMP) – may be denotifed from the LWE list while keeping only the CPI-Maoist on the LWE list. “These are criminal activities without ideology. Thug groups need to be treated as criminals. Giving them the LWE tag makes them stronger and inflates our rebel-violence figures,” he said. Taking his cue from this announcement, Khunti Superintendent of Police (SP) Anis Gupta, on May 28, observed, “Presently we have the names and identities of about 35-40 PLFI cadres in the Police records. These cadres, also having criminal records in the past, have now totally involved themselves in extortion business in the name of Maoists.” Purely criminal activities are regarded as a less intractable problem than ideologically motivated violence. If the Chief Secretary’s formulae is accepted, this simple act of redefinition will abruptly result in a dramatic drop in violence attributed to LWE groups in the State, including Khunti District, where the problem of the splinter groups, especially PLFI, is prominent. But this 'solution by redefinition' is unlikely to impact on the scale and character of the problem, and will leave the civilian population just as vulnerable. Khunti, a District just 40 kilometers away from the State capital at Ranchi, deserves better governance, rather than an administration that tries to bury its head in the sand.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Left-wing Extremism

Andhra Pradesh

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)