SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 10, September 8, 2014

INDIA	PAKISTAN

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Why are there storms in your teacups?
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM & SATP

"Why is there no storm in your ocean?" Maulana Aasim Umar, now designated as the leader of al Qaeda's jihad in the Indian sub-continent, had demanded of Indian Muslims in June 2013, "Today, when the call of Jihad is being raised all over the world and Muslims of every region have started Jihad in their lands to eradicate the system based on global disbelief, the leaders of the global Jihad have the right to ask... Why is it that the Muslims of India are totally absent from the fields of Jihad?"

A storm in the media teacup was, however, unleashed by al Qaeda (AQ) amir Ayman al Zawahiri's video declaring the creation of the Jamaat Qaiadat al Jihad fi Shibhi al Qarrat al Hindiya or Organisation of the Base of Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent for short, AQIS). Eminent Indian experts were particularly agitated by the fact that the Zawahiri's declaration specifically mentions three Indian States, Jammu & Kashmir, Gujarat and Assam, and that these would 'now become immediate targets' of recruitment to the organisation and of al Qaeda's brand of hyperterrorism. Media pundits were greatly disturbed by the 'new threat' of this 'India-centric' al Qaeda offshoot, and proclaimed that the global jihadi outfit had come out of the cold to 'focus' on India.

Electronic media hysteria appeared to have communicated itself to elements within Government, and the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, perhaps in an effort to demonstrate its unfailing grip on internal security, quickly announced a 'high alert'. Since no specific intelligence regarding an imminent terrorist threat was currently available, it is not clear what such a 'high alert' was intended to achieve, other than random harassment inflicted in Muslim neighbourhoods by the lower orders of the Police. Nevertheless, the general tenor of reportage suggests, the media was reassured by this measure.

No terrorist threat can ever be dismissed lightly, but assessments must be tempered by realism. A distinction between a declaration of intent and operational capacities is key. As a declaration of intent, Zawahiri's statement must be taken seriously. To the extent that a new organisation has been formed with a particular objective to advance the jihad in the Indian sub-continent, and that its leader, Maulana Aasim Umar, has been identified, such a declaration must be taken the more seriously. Nevertheless, it is necessary to moderate assessments with the recognition that South Asia has been unsuccessfully targeted by AQ at least since 1996, when Osama bin Laden referred to India in general, and Jammu & Kashmir and Assam in particular, among the regions across the world where the Muslims were living under 'oppression', and which were legitimate theatres of jihad. After 2002, the year of the communal riots in the State, Gujarat has been referred to, in addition to these two provinces, in several AQ statements on India. In 2006, moreover, bin Laden articulated the theory of the global 'Crusader-Zionist-Hindu' conspiracy against the Muslims and concluded, "It is the duty for the Umma with all its categories, men, women and youths, to give away themselves, their money, experiences and all types of material support, enough to establish jihad, particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kashmir and Chechnya."

Interestingly, Said al Masri, the number three in AQ at the time of his death in a US drone strike in Pakistan in May 2010, had made a garbled claim of an "India operation" targeting the German bakery. "Last February's India operation was against a Jewish locale in the west of the Indian capital", he declared, reflecting a somewhat uncertain grasp of detail and Indian geography, "in the area of the German bakeries - a fact that the enemy tried to hide - and close to 20 Jews were killed." [17 persons were, in fact, killed in the terrorist bombing of the German Bakery in Pune, more than 1,400 kilometres South West of India's capital, Delhi, on February 13, 2010. The victims included a Muslim from Iran, another three Muslims from Sudan, an Italian, and twelve Indians, all Hindu].

In 2012, Ustad Ahmad Farooq, then head of AQ's 'preaching and media department' for Pakistan, warned that the preceding killing of Muslims in Myanmar and Assam Assam "provide impetus for us to hasten our advance towards Delhi." And, as noted above, in June 2013 Maulana Asim Umar, now head of AQIS, released a video titled “Why is there no Storm in your Ocean?”, exhorting Indian Muslims to join the global jihad.

Significantly, AQ efforts to establish linkages in India are far from recent in origin. Several prominent India-oriented terrorist organisations based in Pakistan, prominently including the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM), Indian Mujahiddeen (IM), as well as Harkat ul Jihad Islami Bangladesh [which was set up in 1992 with direct financial assistance from bin Laden's International Islamic Front], have established relations, ideological, financial and operational, with AQ for several years now. The IM 'operations commander' for India, Yasin Muhammad Ahmad Zarar Siddibapa aka Yasin Bhatkal, arrested in August 2013, disclosed that IM sought to collaborate with AQ for "joint operations" in India and had held talks with a senior leader of AQ. Further, IM cadres had joined AQ and were “fighting in Afghanistan-Pakistan border”. Abu Jundal, currently in Indian custody in connection with the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, also disclosed that the 26/11 attackers were trained by AQ terrorists at a LeT camp near the Pakistan-Iran border. A trickle of Indian volunteers are reported to have joined AQ over the past years in the AfPak region.

In sum, the present statement by Zawahiri only repeats what has been said in numerous earlier declarations of intent and attempts to provoke Indian Muslims to join the so-called ‘jihad’. Crucially, AQ has no operational capacities of its own in India, though several Pakistani groups as well as the Indian Mujahiddeen, which operate in India, have accepted its ideological leadership. This has been the case for several years now, and has had no significant impact on the trajectory of Islamist terrorism in India.

It is useful to understand that India has confronted and contained Islamist terrorism backed by the Pakistani state, its Army and Intelligence Agencies for more than 25 years. Any threat that the AQ may create cannot be greater than the threat of terrorism sustained by the collective resources of the Pakistani state.

Significantly, one of the elements that most commentators missed out was Zawahiri's inclusion of Islamabad in his promise to "our brothers in Burma, Kashmir, Islamabad, Bangladesh... we did not forget you in AQ and will liberate you from injustice and oppression". AQ has, at least since 2008, regarded the Pakistan Army and state as apostate entities, and legitimate targets of jihad. To the extent that the bulk of AQ's degraded capacities now survive in the AFPAK region, any consolidation of South Asian jihadi forces under the AQIS banner would constitute a grave and immediate threat to Pakistan, long before it radiated outwards to other theatres.

India’s vulnerabilities to terrorist attack remain great – perhaps no less than there were in 2008 at the time of the Mumbai attacks. Intelligence and security agencies have only seen uncoordinated and fitful improvements, and the cumulative impact on their capabilities to secure the nation would, at best, be marginal. Nevertheless, while the threat of terrorist attack on soft targets persists, terrorism constitutes no significant existential threat to India and its state structures.

PAKISTAN

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Under Siege
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

For over three weeks, beginning August 16, 2014, Constitution Avenue in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, have been the epicenter of violent demonstrations. Thousands of demonstrators, belonging to the Imran Khan led-Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri's Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), have thronged the venue. Constitution Avenue, also called Shahra-e-Dastoor, is the main road in Islamabad where prominent Government institutions, including Parliament House, Pakistan Secretariat, Supreme Court, Prime Minister’s House, President’s House, and Diplomatic Enclaves, are situated. The entire area has been designated the ‘Red Zone' of Islamabad.

At least three people have been killed and more than 550 have been injured in violent clashes between Security Forces (SFs) and the protesters. Crucially, Parliament has been attacked; the headquarters of the national television channel, PTV, were occupied by demonstrators; and attempts were made to barge into Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's house, as a result of which he was forced to move to Lahore.

The chaotic situation has led to the cancellation of Chinese President Xi Jinping's maiden visit to Pakistan. Several other world dignitaries, including Presidents of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, have canceled their visit to the country, as Islamabad remains virtually under siege.

On June 27, 2014, Imran Khan had called for a protest march, the 'Tsunami March', from Lahore to Islamabad, to commence on August 14, 2014, Pakistan’s Independence Day. Later the March was renamed the Azadi (Freedom) March. Meanwhile, soon after Khan's announcement, Qadri called for a similar protest, the ‘Inqilab (Revolution) March’. The two parties subsequently agreed to combine their protest, and the march began from Khan's residence at Zaman Park in Lahore at about 12:30pm on August 14, and arrived at the ‘Red Zone’ in Islamabad on August 16. The protests intensified on August 30, when hundreds of protesters broke the fence around Parliament and entered the building. Many protesters also marched towards PM Sharif's residence, resulting in clashes between the Government Forces and the protesters, with three protestors consequently killed.

Addressing the participants of the Freedom March in the night of August 20, 2014, Imran Khan announced six demands, the foremost being the resignation of the Prime Minister. Earlier, on August 16, 2014, Qadri had put forward a 36-point charter of demands, again emphasising Sharif's resignation.

It is widely believed that the crisis is the creation of the all powerful Army. Indeed, Javed Hashmi, claiming that he is still the President of PTI (he was dismissed by Imran Khan on August 31, 2014) revealed on September 1, 2014, that Imran Khan had stated, 'we can’t move forward without the Army': “Imran Khan also said that all the matters had been decided and there will be elections in September.” Hashmi added, further, that it appeared as if everything had been planned in advance. Later, in an interview with Hamid Mir on September 3, 2014, Hashmi claimed Imran Khan had travelled to London and held a meeting with Qadri, and that there were discussions within PTI that former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Lt. General Shuja Pasha was ‘active’ in Lahore.

Confirming the Army’s role, an unnamed senior leader of Sharif’s party stated, “The Prime Minister is paying a price for demanding General Musharraf’s prosecution.” Significantly, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif had said on April 7, 2014, that the Army respects all the institutions of the country, but will preserve its own dignity and institutional pride at all costs. The Army Chief was addressing officers at the Special Services Group (SSG) headquarters in Tarbela when he made these remarks in response to soldiers’ concerns over “undue criticism of the [Army] in recent days.” The ‘criticism’ is most likely related to the treason trial of former Army Chief and President General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf. It was earlier reported that General Raheel had advised the Government to let Musharraf go abroad for his medical treatment and to look after his ailing mother.

On the other hand, the Sharif Government has been vigorously pushing its efforts to prosecute Musharraf for 'high treason', among other charges. The Federal Government had leveled five charges against Musharraf, praying to the Special Court to award the former military ruler the death penalty or life imprisonment, setting the stage for a major potential confrontation between the civilian Government and the Army. In the month of March, a special court indicted Musharraf on five counts of treason over his suspension of the Constitution and imposition of emergency rule in 2007, when the General was trying to extend his rule. Musharraf’s indictment has broken an unwritten rule that the top ranks of the military are untouchable. He has pleaded not guilty and faces the death penalty if convicted.

The Army and the civilian Government were at odds also on the issue of continuation of peace talks with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Nawaz Sharif, who had won the May 2013 General Elections on a promise to hold talks with TTP terrorists as part of a broader settlement, and had initiated a dialogue with TTP through a panel of representatives in January 29, 2014, had asserted, during a meeting with General Raheel Sharif on January 28, 2014, that no decision on launching an offensive in the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) could be taken without consensus among ‘all stakeholders’, and that any such decision must be in the best ‘national interest’. On the other hand, the Army, always reluctant to initiate any operations against the many cross-border terrorist groups in NWA because of their long association with the ISI and their potential as “strategic assets”, both in the country's expansionist campaigns in Afghanistan, and in Indian Jammu & Kashmir, was eater to carry out targeted operations against the TTP, which was attacking military establishments and killing its personnel, despite engaging in talks with the Government. Unsurprisingly, the Prime Minister was forced to authorize the military to launch an operations in the region barely a month after his meeting with General Sharif. Significantly, the military strikes were in retaliation against the February 16, 2014, announcement by the Mohmand chapter of the TTP, that it had executed 23 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel, allegedly as revenge for the killing of its fighters in custody in several parts of the country. The FC personnel had been abducted in June 14, 2010, from the Shoonkri Post of Mohmand Agency. The talks finally collapsed. Meanwhile, the targeted operation also ended very soon, only to re-start on June 15 in the name of Operation Zarb-e-Azb [Sword of the Prophet].

Again, when top Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir (47) was attacked on April 19, 2014, and his brother and head of Geo TV channel, Amir Mir accused the ISI of engineering the assassination attempt, Nawaz Sharif visited Hamid Mir in hospital, in an initial show of solidarity, and promised that a judicial commission, comprising three Supreme Court judges, would investigate the attack and announce its findings within three weeks. However, the Army’s pressure tactics soon came to the fore, and the Prime Minister, was forced to praise the ISI for "ensuring protection and defence of the country". The judicial commission was subsequently appointed on April 21, but is yet to complete its inquiries.

The orchestrated crisis has provided the Army an opportunity to settle scores with the Sharif Government. Indeed, the PM was forced to seek the Army’s help in sorting out the crisis.  On August 29, 2014, Major General Asim Bajwa tweeted, "COAS (Chief of Army Staff) was asked by the Government to play facilitative role for resolution of current impasse, in August 28's meeting, at PM house." Earlier on the same day, responding to the allegations leveled by PTI and PAT that the Government has asked for Army’s intervention in the crisis, Sharif had told the National Assembly, "Neither had I asked Army nor the armed forces sought a role in the present political crisis," and alleged it was Khan and Qadri who approached Army Chief Raheel Sharif to mediate. The Army’s quick refutation was to prevent Sharif from positioning himself as a champion of democracy, as well as to reiterate its position as the supreme power in Islamabad.

In the night of August 28, 2014, Army Chief Raheel Sharif took up the role of mediator between the Government and the PTI and PAT, following his meeting with the Nawaz Sharif at the PM’s residence. He held two separate meetings with Imran Khan and Qadri. Worryingly, however, the protests intensified thereafter. What really transpired between the protesting leaders and the COAS can, consequently, be surmised. 

Not surprisingly, the beleaguered Nawaz Sharif, seeking support of all political parties in Parliament, on September 5, 2014, pleaded,

I hope the Opposition will continue on its path of supporting the Government. I assure you that if it was the PPP [Pakistan People’s Party] Government instead of PML-N's [Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz] and we were in the Opposition, we would have stuck by the PPP. There should be no compromise over that unity... over the supremacy of Constitution, democracy and rule of law... all parties should set that example.

He went on to add,

It was the opposition which urged me not to resign... I do not care for power... being the Prime Minister of Pakistan, governing Pakistan is not easy. And even though we are talking to the Opposition, if you look at the issues of those parties (PTI, PAT), you will wonder if these are the issues of Pakistan.

The PM was addressing the emergency joint session of the Parliament convened to support the Premier and discuss the over three week-long crisis.

While the Army has forced PM Sharif to realize his fragility in the corridors of power, the terrorists have also challenged his authority. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief, Maulana Fazlullah, on August 31, 2014, warned, “About 30,000 people have besieged the capital of Pakistan for the last two weeks and the Government is unable to deal with them. Taliban fighters could easily seize the Parliament House as our numbers are far bigger than these people and we are well-equipped with sophisticated arms.” Worryingly, Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan on September 2, 2014, told Parliament that nearly 1,500 trained militants, belonging to terrorist outfits, were among the participants of the sit-ins organized by the PTI and PAT. Though he did not name the terrorist group, he pointed out, “They are armed with axes, wooden batons, nails, hammers, cutters and slingshots. This is not protest but rebellion against the State of Pakistan.”

This orchestrated political drama also appears to be the Army's attempt to shift attention from the much publicized operation Zarb-e-Azb that was launched on June 15, 2014, to eliminate terrorists from the NWA of FATA. During more than two and half months of the operation, no significant gain has been made in the region. Though a press release by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) on September 3, 2014, asserted that 910 ‘militants’ had been killed in the operation, and that that the SFs had cleared five towns, including Miranshah, Mir Ali, Dattakhel, Boya and Degan, this has limited credibility, given past records of superficial and exaggerated claims of the Pakistani Forces. Significantly, the Jamaat al-Ahrar, a new faction of the TTP, has claimed that only 30 fighters had thus far been killed in operation Zarb-e-Azb, and that the SFs’ claim of killing 910 militants was baseless and unfounded. He alleged the Pakistan media had been presenting one-sided reports to the people without confirming these from independent sources. The allegation is implausible, since the media in Pakistan operates under the shadow of death.

With the Pentagon reasserting the fact that Pakistan “continues to be a safe haven for terrorists”, the further strengthening of the destabilizing military-mullah combine can only compound the vulnerabilities of the Sharif Government. It remains to be seen how long Sharif is able to endure the pressure and defy the inevitable.

INDIA

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J&K: Volatile Border
Anurag Tripathi
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 24, 2014, the Border Security Force (BSF) killed two terrorists along the International Border (IB) in Jammu District. The terrorists, while attempting to intrude into Indian territory, were receiving covering fire from Pakistani Rangers across the border.

A day earlier, two civilians had been killed and another seven injured in heavy firing by Pakistani Rangers targeting BSF posts near the IB in RS Pura Sector of Jammu District.

According to partial data compile by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 18 terrorists have been killed at the Line of Control (LoC) / IB since the beginning of the current year. The total number of terrorists killed in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), during this period, stands at 67. In the corresponding period of 2013, these numbers stood at 33 and 63 respectively. At least 28 attempts at infiltration were made from across the border in 2014 till September 4, in addition to 34 such attempts in the corresponding period of 2013.

Meanwhile, an unnamed official at the Department of Internal Security and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Affairs at the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), disclosed, on August 31, 2014, that about 60 terrorists had succeeded in entering into J&K in 2014: “The first successful infiltration bid has taken place in May this year in Keran Sector of Kupwara District in which 14 terrorists entered the Valley. There have been eight more successful infiltration bids so far in 2014... Of 60 infiltrated terrorists, the forces have killed 14 in different encounters so far.”

Clearly, serious attempts are being made by Islamabad to infiltrate terrorists to reverse the trend of relative peace in the State. Indeed, the number of annual terrorism-related fatalities in the State have witnessed continuous decline since the peak of 4,507 in 2001 (barring a marginal spike 2013). A total of 108 persons, including 13 civilians, 28 SFs and 67 terrorists have been killed in 2014, thus far, as compared to 121 fatalities, including 14 civilians, 44 SFs and 63 terrorists in the corresponding period of 2013. Other parameters of violence, including suicide attacks and explosions have also registered sharp decline. Moreover, only a few incidents of street violence, orchestrated by separatist proxies of the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI), have been reported in Kashmir over thepast few years. Orchestrated street violence had become a regular feature in Kashmir after the 2008 Amaranth land controversy, and peaked in 2010.

Pakistan's ISI appears to be worried about the dwindling strength of terrorists operating inside Kashmir. Significantly, Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju informed the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) on August 12, 2014, that approximately 6,800 terrorists of different tanzeems (outfit) were active during 1996 in the J&K, and that this number had reduced to just 240 and 199 in 2013 and 2014 (January) respectively.

Unsurprisingly, the Pakistan Army has escalated its campaign of violating the November 2003 ceasefire agreement (CFA). Indeed, a total of 22 CFA violations were recorded in just 45 days between July 12, 2014, and August 25, 2014. Two civilians and one trooper were killed inside Indian territory in these violations. On August 26, 2014, Director General of Border Security Force (BSF), D K Pathak, noted,

This is for the first time since 1971 war between the two neighbours that hostilities have prolonged to more than 45 days since first sniper shot was fired by Pakistan on the BSF post on July 12. The incidents of border firing, shelling, ceasefire violations, infiltration, etc., have taken place earlier also but this is for the first time when situation had deteriorated and prolonged to more than 45 days. We are giving them a befitting reply as we ensure that no civilian areas on their side are affected by our response. There were 25-30 launching pads where heavily armed terrorists were waiting on the Pakistan side to infiltrate into Jammu & Kashmir. These launching pads are located in schools, community halls and forest areas on the other side.

No CFA violation was reported on August 26 following a Directors General of Military Operations (DGMO) level meet on the same day. However, the Pakistani Rangers violated the CFA twice on August 28, 2014. No CFA violation has been reported thereafter.

Interestingly, on September 2, 2014, Indian Army authorities disclosed that a 150 meters long tunnel, which was discovered on August 22, 2014, near a forward post along the LoC in Pallanwalla Sector of Akhnoor tehsil (revenue unit) of Jammu District, was apparently aimed at infiltrating terrorists. A similar tunnel had been found in 2008 in the same area. Earlier, on July 27, 2012, a 540-meters long cross-border tunnel was detected after an area caved-in at three spots due to rains, near the BSF’s Chillayari Border Outpost (BOP) in the Samba District of J&K. The tunnel had been dug from the Pakistani side into Indian Territory. A farmer had detected the tunnel on July 27, 2012, when the land caved in at three straight points in his fields.

Amidst these developments India has called off Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan, following the Pakistani High Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit’s meeting with Kashmiri separatist leaders in New Delhi, despite India’s request of not to hold any such meeting. Regarding the development Prime Minister Narendra Modi observed, on August 29, 2014,

India has no hesitation to discuss any outstanding issue with Pakistan within the bilateral framework that has been established under the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. We, therefore, were disappointed that Pakistan sought to make a spectacle of these efforts and went ahead with talks with secessionist elements from Jammu & Kashmir in New Delhi just prior to the meeting of the foreign secretaries….

On the other hand, State Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has demanded that talks between India and Pakistan be resumed, to ease the tension at the border. On August 31, 2014, Abdullah stated,

It basically just demoralizes the people because at the end of the day we only see a solution emerging out of dialogue. We had 25 years of violence, we had wars, we had skirmishes but we haven't seen a solution. The closest we have come to the solution is through dialogue, first with the then Prime Minister (Atal Behari) Vajpayee and (former Pakistan President Gen. Pervez) Musharraf, and then with former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Musharraf and with Nawaz Sharif and Singh. We were hoping that process will actually carry on.

Abdullah's worries can only intensify, as the Assembly Elections in the State are due by the end of the year.

In fact, the Indian 'policy pendulum' has swung constantly between talks and no talks with Pakistan, with little enduring impact on the trajectory of terrorism. If anything, it is a range of extraneous factors, including Pakistan's domestic difficulties, growing international focus and pressure on ISI backed terrorism, a shift in Islamabad's priorities towards it terrorist campaigns in Afghanistan, among others, that have resulted in dramatic relief in J&K over the past years. Indian SFs have effectively exploited this hiatus to consolidate operational gains and, if anything, here is need to further strengthen the safety and security of the borders, rather than falling back into the trap of the 'talks or no talks' debate.

Significantly, on July 21, 2014, nearly 2,000 additional BSF personnel and special surveillance equipment were deployed along the IB in the Jammu region to check infiltration bids, and for effective domination of the areas. Infiltration attempts and ceasefire violations along the 190-kilometer long IB had witnessed a preceding surge.

Prime Minister Modi had, during his election campaign, repeatedly emphasised that talks and terrorism could not go on side by side. Unfortunately, this policy declaration has not been acted upon, as the Indian diplomatic establishment lapsed into its default mode, importunately approaching Islamabad to resume the 'peace process' despite repeated and brutal ceasefire violations and terrorist atrocities. It remains to be seen whether the Modi Government is able to communicate an uncompromising message needs to be sent to Pakistan to wind down the infrastructure of support to terrorism from its soil and to end the abetment of cross border terrorism. Policy incoherence and weakness have only encouraged Pakistan in its continuing mischief in the past, creating increasing volatility along the border. A continuance of past policies by New Delhi will only result in continuing disruption and bloodshed by Pakistan backed terrorists.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Arunachal Pradesh

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Left-wing Extremism

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)