SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 7, August 18, 2014

INDIA	PAKISTAN

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MJC: Perilous Outreach
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

In the most recent of its Jihadi proclamations, the Muttahida (United) Jehad Council (MJC) 'chairman' Mohammed Yusuf Shah alias Salahuddin Shah, also the 'supreme commander' of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), while attending a rally at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) declared, on July 14, 2014: "If al Qaeda, Taliban or any other organisation or country extends a helping hand to the oppressed Kashmiris, we will welcome it... We do not have any say at any international forum. In such a situation, we are left with no choice but to greet anyone and everyone that can help us overthrow our enemy.

Significantly, many of the constituents of the Council, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) have already established strong links with the al Qaeda and the Taliban. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy at Brookings Institution, notes that LeT, in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, matured “from a Punjabi-based Pakistani terror group targeting India exclusively, to a member of the global Islamic jihad targeting the enemies of al Qaeda: the Crusader West, Zionist Israel, and Hindu India”. Media reports, meanwhile, indicate that hundreds of Pakistani militants from groups like LeT and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) are fighting for the Islamic State (IS, formerly Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, ISIS). Pakistani security analyst Muhammad Amir Rana, talking about the strong linkages among all these groups notes, on July 13, 2014, "As Pakistani militants and religious organisations do not operate in isolation, it is natural for them to draw inspiration from ISIS.

Meanwhile, he asked India to grant Kashmiris ‘their birthright’ to freedom or else, he warned, it would disintegrate as a result of jihad. He also warned against any peace initiatives with regard to Kashmir declaring, "We will never accept any such decision." Significantly, referring to the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's suggestion that India-Pakistan supervise the autonomous or self-governed states of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Yusuf Shah on October 29, 2006, had stated, "Freedom is our goal and we will not accept anything under the Indian Constitution." He described Musharraf's proposals as "a document of slavery." He, however, had added that "options like joint control can only be acceptable if they are a stepping stone for the right to self-determination.”

Yusuf Shah's position has, however, varied widely over time. In 2011, strongly emphasizing MJC's pro-Pakistan outlook, Yusuf Shah stated, "The MJC is all for merger with Pakistan. I firmly believe that it is in the interest of the sub-continent that Kashmir goes to Pakistan. I feel that a majority of the people support this stand. However, if people are given the right to self-determination in which they opt for independence, India or Pakistan, we will back them. The MJC will endorse the people’s decision. But it is equally true that Kashmiris in all the agitations of the past four years have raised pro-Pakistan slogans".

MJC comprises of 16 terrorist groups, operating in India from bases in PoK. It was formed in November 1990 to bring all the outfits involved in terrorist violence in J&K onto a single platform, and is headquartered at Muzaffarabad in PoK. At the time of its inception, all the terrorist outfits operating in J&K were required to register with the MJC. The Council aims at joining forces and resources to augment operations in J&K, and acts as the primary public voice of the terrorist outfits currently active there. The present members of the Council are: HM, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Tehrik-e-Jehad, Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al Jehad, Al Umar Mujahideen, Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front, Muslim Janbaz Force, Hizbullah, Al Fatah, Hizb-ul-Momineen, LeT, JeM, and Al-Badr Mujahideen. However, many of the groups under the Council’s umbrella follow their own strategies and fight among and within themselves for resources and the patronage of the Pakistani Government, specifically, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

MJC shifted its base from Islamabad, the capital city of Pakistan to Muzzafarabad in PoK, in order to assert its pretence of its 'autonomy', and has been 'reorganized': component terrorist groups have been instructed by ISI to drop the expressions jehad, lashkar, jaish or mujahiddeen in their names in order to project a 'secular political' rather than Islamist image, though this directive has been uniformly ignored. The ISI has been funding the Council since 1994 and the various constituents of MJC have shared with the Pakistani Army, and especially with ISI, real decision-making authority and management of terrorism and subversion in J&K.

Various terrorist formations working under the Council fund themselves separately as well as collectively.  Interestingly, on March 11, 2014, India's Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered a money laundering case against 10 persons, including Yusuf Shah, for alleged cross-border funding of terror activities in the country. The ED was prompted to register the case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (Act) against these persons after the National Investigation Agency (NIA) filed a charge sheet in case number 'RC-11/2011/NIA/DLI’ on November 30, 2013.  The case was earlier registered by NIA on October 25, 2011, alleging regular and systematic funding of HM for carrying out terrorist activities. Investigations established that, under the cover of Jammu and Kashmir Affectees Relief Trust (JKART), HM operatives based in Pakistan used to provide funds through different channels for terrorist activities in India. Following the registration of the case, the NIA put Yusuf Shah on its wanted list.

The 2005 MJC ‘Code of Conduct’defines 14 points, including a strict prohibition against armed action in public places, including schools, religious places, hospitals, markets, civilian settlements, etc. This code has been systematically, routinely and intentionally violated by all the constituent groups of the MJC. According to some letters accessed by the media in November 2011, terrorists had been asked by MJC to specifically target places of worship and civilian VIPs. One of these letters cautions, further, that the terror group must not claim responsibility for such attacks.

Among the numerous operations of this nature was the November 10, 2006, attack in which six persons, including four girls, were killed, and over 50 were wounded, when HM terrorists hurled a grenade outside a mosque at Tahab village in the Pulwama District.

The most dramatic of the attacks India has ever faced, the November 26, 2008, Mumbai attacks (also known as 26/11) which killed a total of 195 people, including 166 civilians was carried out by the LeT, one of the major constituents of MJC,  with direct complicity of the ISI. 

HM was also found involved in the Delhi High Court blast of September 7, 2011, in which 15 persons were killed and another 87 were injured. NIA charge sheeted six HM cadre from J&K - Wasim Akram Malik, Amir Abbas Dev, Abid Hussain Bhawani, Amir Ali Kamal, Junaid Akram Malik and Shakir Hussain Sheikh in the case.

Earlier, on November 24, 2002, two terrorists of the LeT, carried out suicide attack on the Raghunath and Panjbakhtar temples in Jammu, killing 13 persons and injuring 45 others.

The ‘Code of Conduct’ and various other MJC directives principally emphasize the targeting of India’s defense and security establishments, as well as economic assets. Various terrorist formations have executed several such attacks. HM, for instance, claimed responsibility for the March 12, 2013, attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in Srinagar, which left five CRPF personnel dead and seven injured. Two terrorists, who were part of a fidayeen (suicide) squad that carried out the attack, were also killed in the gun battle. On January 29, 2012, HM claimed responsibility for the attack on then Lieutenant General Bikram Singh in 2001. Singh eventually became the Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army in 2012.

In pursuit of its agenda, MJC continues to infiltrate more and more militants from across the border into Indian territory, with the help of the Pakistani Army. According to seized MJC letters, about five entry points or “launching camps” are identified, from where terrorists are infiltrated into Indian territory – Forward Kahuta (Haveli District of PoK), Nakiyal (Kotli District of PoK), Khoi Ratta (Kotli District), and Samahni (Bhimber District, PoK). These routes are among many other prominent routes used. Another seized letter indicates that the Pakistani Army provides covering fire only if a terrorist unit is surrounded by the Indian Army and there is exchange of fire. Several incidents of cease-fire violations from across the border seem to bear this out. According to partial data collected by South Asia Terrorism Portal, there have been 411 Cease-Fire Agreement violations in J&K since 2009, 312 at the Line of Control (LoC) and 99 at International Border (IB).

MJC has survived for more than 20 years, under the aegis of ISI and the 'leadership in exile' of Yusuf Shah. Yusuf Shah has been facilitated in holding public rallies across PoK and Pakistan to incite anti-India sentiments among the people. On October 27, 2013, in a public rally at Muzaffarabad, Yusuf Shah declared, “Diplomacy, talks and negotiations spanned over several decades have not worked… The only way to liberate Kashmir is jihad and armed struggle because India does not understand the language of dialogue.”

With the latest call for support from international terrorist groupings, the MJC under Yusuf Shah may seek to escalate terrorism and harden its ideology further under the influence of increasingly radicalized formations such as al Qaeda, the Taliban and, potentially, the Islamic State. It is significant that anti-Israel demonstrations in Kashmir on July 29, 2014, saw a peppering of IS and al Qaeda flags among the protestors. ISI has long tightly controlled and strategically calibrated terrorism in J&K, even as it had used 'loyal' terrorist assets to extend influence into Afghanistan and for domestic political management. The trajectory of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) over the past years, and the endemic terrorist violence across Pakistan since 2007 [after the disastrous Lal Masjid Operation by the Pakistan Army underline the dangers of a loss of control, and the emergence of a terrorist agenda beyond and independent of the state institutions that currently exercise diminishing sway. The ISI continues to instrumentalize terrorism, purportedly to further Pakistan's strategic objectives; but as international jihadi groups acquire independent goals and agendas, the threat to the region, including, at once, both J&K and Pakistan itself, is steadily augmenting.

INDIA

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Maoists: Attacking Lifelines
Mrinal Kanta Das
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

In yet another attack on the Indian Railways, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres blasted a portion of a railway track at Lahat village, between the Ismailpur and Rafiganj section, under Rafiganj Police Station in Aurangabad District of Bihar, on July 22, leading to the derailment of a pilot engine running ahead of the Bhubaneswar-New Delhi Rajdhani Express. No casualty was reported in the incident. The Indian Railways and the Bihar State Government confirmed that the incident was the handiwork of the Maoists. It is believed that the attack was carried out targetting the Bhubaneswar-New Delhi Rajdhani Express during a one-day bandh (shut down strike) called by the Maoists against Police firing in Rohtas District on July 8 and in Aurangabad District on July 19, in each of which two persons were killed.

Meanwhile, an alleged Maoist, identified as Siddharth Yadav alias Vikas, was arrested from the Goh area of Gaya District on July 29 in connection with the derailment of the pilot engine. Vikas had been heading Maoist activities in Goh and other areas of Aurangabad District after the arrest of another Maoist, Kariman Yadav.

On June 24, 2014, 18 wagons of a goods train were derailed in an explosion allegedly triggered by the Maoists between Mehasi and Harpurnag stations near the Manigachhi unmanned railway crossing in the East Champaran District of Bihar. An eyewitness in the village claimed that he had seen around 30 persons, including seven women, sitting near the rail line, talking among themselves in the morning. The train services on the Muzaffarpur-Narkatiyaganj section of East Central Railway (ECR) were restored after 38 hours of disruption.

On April 13, 2014, the Maoists blew off a part of the railway track minutes before New Delhi-bound Garib Rath was to arrive on the Howrah-Patna main rail route in Lakhisarai District of Bihar. An engine of a goods train that was parked on the track was damaged in the explosion.

On March 27, 2014, train services between Muzaffarpur and Sitamarhi Districts in Bihar were disrupted following a bomb explosion triggered by the Maoists on the railway track. Villagers claimed that over 50 Maoist cadres had gone to that site to trigger the explosion, many of them in Police uniform.

Despite this continuous stream of incidents, however, data provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) indicates an overall decline in Maoist attacks on the Railways since a peak in 2010.  This decline, however, is not the result of any extraordinary preparedness or measures to prevent such attacks but is, rather, a consequence of an absolute decline in the number of attempts by the Maoists, and follows the trend of other indices of Maoist violence over the years. Significantly, overall fatalities in Maoist violence have also varied dramatically, indicating the fluctuating strength of the Maoists in India.

Maoist attacks on the Railways have been concentrated principally in Jharkhand (51), Chhattisgarh (47) and Bihar (45), followed by Odisha (24) and West Bengal (14). Maharashtra has had no attacks over the period for which data is available, while Andhra Pradesh Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have had no attacks on the Railways since 2011. Odisha has been free of such attacks since 2012.

According to partial data collected by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since 2009, 157 persons have been killed and 239 injured in 85 incidents of Maoist-led attacks on the Indian Railways. 148 people were killed in just one incident, the Gyaneshwari Express derailment of May 28, 2010 in West Bengal.

Other attacks that resulted in killing include:  

June 13, 2013: A group of around 200 CPI-Maoist cadres attacked the Dhanbad-Patna Intercity Express at the Bhalui halt near Jamui District in Bihar, killing three persons and injuring six passengers.  

November 30, 2013: Three Policemen were killed and another two were injured as 20-odd CPI-Maoist cadres attacked a Police team escorting the Patna-bound Sahebganj-Danapur Intercity Express near Jamalpur city in Munger District of Bihar.

Maoist attacks have forced the Railways to take precautionary steps that have caused enormous inconvenience to the passengers. According to an advisory issued after the derailment of the Gyaneshwari Express on May 28, 2010, Rajdhani trains were to move at 75 kilometres per hour instead of their normal speed of 110 to 130 kilometres per hour. Moreover, trains were not allowed to run between 10 pm and 5 am on these stretches. The ban was clamped on the Kharagpur-Tatanagar, Kharagpur-Adra and Chakradharpur-Rourkela sections of South Eastern Railway (SER). On December 23, 2011, the night ban was lifted on the Chakradharpur-Rourkela section. Subsequently, on January 14, 2012, the Kharagpur-Tatanagar ban was lifted. From January 27, 2013, trains resumed normal speed. The night ban had affected as many as 18 trains and 40,000 passengers daily. These restriction, however, have now all been lifted.

Significantly, after the derailment of the New Delhi-Dibrugarh Rajdhani Express on the outskirts of Chhapra in the Saran District of Bihar on June 25, 2014, in which four passengers were killed, an ECR official admitted that the Maoists had been giving a tough time to the Railways, targeting Railway property for the past 15 years, particularly under three divisions of the zone - Danapur, Dhanbad and Mughalsarai. Railways had suffered a loss of about INR 700 to 800 million during these years, due to extremists' attacks under the three divisions. However, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) subsequently found no Maoist involvement in the New Delhi-Dibrugarh Rajdhani Express derailment.

Inspector General of Police of Railway Protection Force (RPF), ECR, Atul Pathak said the East-Central Zone had suffered a loss of over INR 95.8 million due to damage to ECR properties caused by Maoist groups between 2011 - June 2013.

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in its report on Security Management in Indian Railways (2011-2012) observed, “Even though threat perception has increased from every angle - terrorist or Naxalite attack - the Railways and the State Governments appear to be very slow in filling up the existing vacancies or redeploying man power for meeting the challenge of increased threat.” The situation has hardly changed as, according to the Indian Railways Safety Performance Report published in March 2013, at least 17,000 positions of loco pilots and one lakh positions of safety employees are lying vacant. Further, out of the sanctioned strength of 5,400 officers in RPF, about 1,700 (31.48 per cent) were vacant.

The CAG audit did note that in SER, patrolling by gang men had been intensified, but no surprise patrolling was being carried out by security personnel. Since sabotage in Naxal infested areas was normally not in the form of thefts/tampering of railway track fittings/signal gears, etc, routine patrolling by gang men offered no protection. Track sabotage normally occurred during pre-announced bandh-calls and protests, but Railway authorities had taken no specific measure to prevent such action. Given the enormous size of the Indian rail network, physical patrolling in motorised trolleys and on foot can be possible only in selective sensitive stretches. As protection of rail tracks [and bridges] against tampering or obstructions is the primary responsibility of the State Governments [while guarding of other vulnerable installations is undertaken by RPF], protecting the Railways from Maoist attack without a general improvement in the prevailing security situation in the affected States will remain difficult.

The Railways remains one of the favourite Maoist targets during bandh-calls and protests, as the tracks and isolated platforms remain vulnerable. Such attacks are deeply disruptive and provide the Maoists much needed publicity with little effort and risk to, or loss of, cadres. The current decline in Maoist activities provides an opportunity to address the many deficiencies in security that afflict the vast Rail networks across the affected areas, as well as the broader deficits of the system. Regrettably, broad indicators suggest that this may be just another opportunity that will be missed.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Left-wing Extremism

Jharkhand

Maharashtra

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)