SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 14, No. 3, July 20, 2015

INDIA

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Chhattisgarh: Uncertain Rumblings
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) abducted four auxiliary constables [former Salwa Judum cadres] of the Chhattisgarh Police near Sukanpali village under Kutru Police Station area in Bijapur District on July 13. Their dead bodies were found strewn on a road near Gudma village, close to the place of abduction, two days later. Maoists claimed responsibility for the killings, accusing them of participating in anti-Maoist operations. According to reports, Maoists stopped a passenger bus on the Kutru-Sukanpali road, in the evening of July 13 and abducted Mangal Sodi and Majji Rama who were travelling in it. A few minutes later, Raju Tela and Jayram Yadav, who were travelling on a motorcycle, were abducted from the same location. Three of them were posted in Kutru Police Station and one was posted in Bedre. They were returning to their base camps after collecting their salaries.

Some 18 to 20 other policemen were lucky to escape death as they were also travelling on the same road in another passenger bus, but stopped at a Police Post after receiving news of the abductions.

According to Bijapur Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP) Kalyaan Elesela, “Almost all the vehicles moving on that road were stopped by the Maoists and all the passengers were taken one kilometre inside the forest, after which the four policemen were identified and separated. The road where the incident took place, was under construction and secured for the last eight months. However, because of rain, the work had stopped and there was no movement of forces.” It has come to light that local Police knew about the Maoists conducting a similar search operation in the same area in the first week of July, but the incident was not reported to the Superintendent of Police (SP) of the District.

The incident speaks volumes about the hold of Maoists in the area and negligible presence of State authority even on the main roads. It is appalling, moreover, that local Police personnel deployed in anti-Maoist operations have to travel to nearby towns in public transport to receive their salaries, when there is a standing advisory against unprotected travel by security personnel in public transport. 

According to partial data collected by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) Chhattisgarh has recorded 66 fatalities in Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-related violence in the current year (all data till July 19) – including 16 civilians, 33 Security Force (SF) personnel and 18 Maoists. All these fatalities have occurred in Bastar Division. It has been noted earlier that Bastar Division has emerged as the nucleus of the Maoist Tactical Counter-offensive (TCO), and accounted for 55 out of 87 SF fatalities across all States in 2014; as against 45 out of 111 in 2013. The deteriorating trend seems to be continuing: the Bastar Division accounts for 33 of 40 SF fatalities across all States in 2015 (till July 19). Further, out of a total of eight major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) in all States in 2015, five occurred in the Bastar Division. The Maoists have abducted over 20 civilians and SF personnel in nine incidents, in which four civilians and five SF personnel have been killed.

While the Sukanpali incident does give the impression that the Maoists are getting stronger, all is not going well in the party. Earlier, four senior Maoists — Hemla Bhagat, Kosi, Badru and Hinge — were killed by their own comrades between June 22 and July 5, while another Maoist Hurra, [Malangir Local Operation Squad (LOS) member], who feared for his life, managed to escape and surrender before the Police on July 8. Badru was a Divisional Committee (DVC) member of the Darbha area and a section commander of Maoists’ “military platoon No. 24”. Hemla Bhagat was another Darbha DVC member and chief of the Maoists’ military intelligence wing in the area. Kosi Kursem, wife of Hemla Bhagat, was working with the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Majdoor Sangh (DAKMS), a Maoist front organisation. Nothing much has been reported about Hinge.

Hurra’s disclosures to the Police indicate that the surrender of the Maoists’ Malangir area committee member Sannu Potam alias Kiran to the Police, along with an SLR on May 24, 2015, triggered the spate of killings.

Meanwhile, Ayatu, ‘secretary’ of the Malangir area committee, is known to have been ‘detained’ by the Maoists in the Katekalyan Forest in Dantewada District on suspicion of being a Police informer and of helping Sannu Potam to surrender. Ayatu reportedly uttered some “unpleasant words” against the highhandedness of Darbha DVC member Nirmala.

Issuing a Press statement on July 12 regarding the killing of Badru and others, Darbha DVC secretary Surinder declared, “Our party held a people’s court which awarded death penalty to Badru and Hemla Bhagat. Both of them have been killed for indulging in anti-people, anti-party activities. They were in contact with the Police and were planning to kill some senior leaders of the party. They were also conspiring to surrender with weapons before the enemy [the Police].” The statement did not make any mention of the two other leaders — Hinge and Kosi — who were also killed by the Maoists in the last week of June.

In another incident, not entirely unrelated, the Maoists killed one of their comrades after holding him guilty in a Jan Adalat [people’s court’ a Maoist Kangaroo court] of breaching party discipline. Another Maoist was demoted by the same Jan Adalat. According to a recent document published by the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) of the CPI-Maoist, “Rammurti [a commander of company-2 under DKZSC] had joined the Naxal movement as a member of company-1 in Bastar in 2002. He exhibited indiscipline and anarchist behaviour and hence was transferred to company-2. Despite repeated advice and attempts to reform him, he did not budge. When it was decided to send him home, he threatened to go to the police and divulge details about the movement to them. So after due inquiry and consent from senior leaders, it was decided to give him death penalty. Finally, a public hearing was also organised and the decision was reaffirmed.” In the other case, the in-charge secretary of south Gadchiroli committee of Aitu was demoted to the position of a committee member after a women cadre accused him of sexual misconduct.

Though the killings of Badru and three other senior comrades have been explained as a reaction to the surrender of Sannu Potam, it is not clear why the surrender of an area committee member should have rattled the Maoists so much. CPI-Maoist has witnessed the surrender of many and far more senior cadres in the past, without attracting such a pattern of reprisals against others. Lanka Papi Reddy, a Central Committee (CC) member surrendered in 2007; G.V.K. Prasad Rao aka Gudsa Usendi, 'spokesperson' and member of the DKSZC, surrendered on January 8, 2014; Chambala Ravinder aka Arjun 'commander' of the '2nd Battalion' of the PLGA, surrendered on August 1, 2014.

The most probable explanation is that, unlike others, Potam surrendered with an SLR. Given the extraordinary secrecy and control exercised over armed cadres and their weapons, it is unlikely that a cadre can escape with a weapon without the collusion of others. The party keeps a close watch, not only over each and every cadre to prevent surrenders and development of ‘anti-party activities’, but also on all villagers in their areas of operation. Even when a villager visits a nearby town or any other place and takes more time to return than is expected, the Maoists are informed and they (Maoists) follow up. The Maoists also maintain and periodically update their database of villages, listing each villager, and with details down to the quantity of foodgrain with each family, and the number of goats, hens, etc. Establishing contact with the Police and taking a weapon out of the jungles to surrender is, consequently, an extraordinarily difficult task without some collective involvement.

Media reports indicate that Hemla Bhagat, Kosi, Badru, Hurra and Hinge were suspected of facilitating Potam’s surrender. All five were ‘detained’ by the Maoists in the second week of June and were kept at different locations in the Gadiras area of Sukma and Aranpur area of Dantewada. Hemla Bhagat was the first to be killed on June 22, probably because he was very close to DKSZC member and South Regional Committee Secretary Ganesh Uike, had accompanied him on his trips to Kolkata, Delhi, and Hyderabad, and had knowledge of the Maoists’ secret urban network. Kosi and Hurra somehow managed to escape from Maoist custody on June 24. While Hurra managed to reach the Police, Kosi was intercepted by the Maoists’ Acheli range committee members and was beaten to death near Gotgul village. Hinge was also killed after Kosi, while Badru was killed on July 2, allegedly on the orders of Darbha DVC member Nirmala and Malangir area committee in-charge Deva, in the absence of Darbha DVC ‘secretary’ Surinder. There is some speculation that Badru’s killing at the hands of Nirmala and Deva, in the absence of area leader Surinder, suggests intense rivalry among the Maoist cadres.

Despite criticism, the large number of surrenders (385 in 2014 and 57, so far, in 2015) in Bastar division seems to have caught the Maoists on the back foot. Muppalla Lakshmana Rao aka Ganapathy, in a supplement to the Central Committee message issued on 10th anniversary of the CPI-Maoist observed:

Some people have lost preparedness to continue along the arduous path of PPW (protracted people’s war) and the will to sacrifice. They assess the might of the enemy as permanent and the people’s strength as always being weak. They are making bankrupt arguments joining hands with the enemy. We should strongly fight back against such betrayers.

Pressure on the Maoists in the Bastar Division is clearly mounting, and harsh action against defecting cadres, or those under suspicion of defecting, is clearly necessary for the Maoist leadership to maintain a modicum of discipline. These moves are likely, however, to prove counterproductive over time, creating mistrust among cadres. Worse, since the four cadres executed by the Maoists in the present instance were all Bastar tribals, this action is likely to increase the already high levels of resentment against the ‘outsider’ leadership from the Telangana and Andhra regions. Disturbing as the continuing spate of killings by the Maoists is, it is an index of their difficulties, rather than of any rising strength.

INDIA

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Meghalaya: Prospective Gains
M.A. Athul
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On July 9, 2015, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team of Meghalaya Police killed a Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) ‘commander’, identified as Savio Marak, at Rengregre village in East Garo Hills District. Inspector General of Police (Operations) G.H.P Raju disclosed that Savio, a former Meghalaya Police constable was wanted in several cases of murder, abduction, bombings and extortion in the Garo Hills region. Savio had deserted the Police Force in February 2011, while on duty at a relief camp for victims of the Garo-Rabha ethnic clashes during the month of January 2011.

On June 28, 2015, two unidentified Achik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF) militants were killed during a joint operation by the Army and State Police at Resubelpara in North Garo Hills District. One 9mm pistol and two live rounds and a 7.65mm pistol with three live rounds were recovered from the possession of the slain militants.

These encounters are part of Operation Hill Storm 2, launched by Security Forces (SFs) on April 2, 2015. According to the State Police, between April 2 and June 6, 2015, at least 17 militants have been killed during the anti-insurgency operation. These included seven cadres of GNLA, four cadres of AMEF, two cadres of A’chik Songna An'pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK), and one cadre each of Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) and Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF). Group affiliation of the remaining two was not known. According to partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), SFs involved in the operation have killed another three militants since June 7, 2015, (data till July 19, 2015). Though Police data did not reveal the number of SF personnel killed during Operation Hill Storm 2, SATP data records four SF fatalities and another seven injured between April 2, 2015 and July 19, 2015.

State Police data further indicates that, between April 2 and June 6, 2015, 25 militants surrendered to SFs. These included 10 GNLA cadres, four ASAK cadres, and three cadres each of United Achik Liberation Army (UALA), Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA), and AMEF. Group affiliation of the remaining two surrendered militants was not known. Since June 7, according to SATP, at least another nine militants have surrendered. These include six GNLA cadres and one cadre each of Liberation A'chik Matgrik Army (LAMA), Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and United Achik Matgrik Army (UAMA). In a significant incident of surrender, on July 12, 2015, GNLA ‘joint political secretary’, Benjamin M. Marak and another militant identified as Kenny Roger Sangma, surrendered before Tura Police in West Garo Hills District.

Earlier, SFs had conducted Operation Hill Storm 1 between July 7, 2014, and December 31, 2014. During that phase of the operation, SFs had killed 16 militants [seven GNLA, five ASAK, two UALA, and one each of ULFA-I and LAEF]. Another 24 militants were injured during the operation. The official statement had also disclosed that six Policemen were killed and another 10 police personnel were injured during this period. 973 arms with ammunition, mostly belonging to GNLA, ULFA and ASAK, were recovered by Police during Operation Hill Storm 1. 174 militants of different militant groups active in the Garo Hills region were arrested during the operation, including 55 GNLA cadres, followed by 24 of ANVC-B, 22 ULFA, 19 ASAK, 13 LAEF, 11 UALA, 11 AMEF, eight Achik National Cooperative Army (ANCA), and one each of ANLA and the A'chik National Liberation Co-operative Army (ANLCA). Affiliations of the remaining arrested militants were not known.

These operational successes have indeed helped in providing a relatively secure environment for the civilian population of the State. According to the SATP database, during a period of 12 months and 12 days, since the launch of the operation’s first phase on July 7, 2014, the State recorded a total of 19 civilian fatalities. In the corresponding period prior to the launch of the operation, fatalities among civilians totalled 31.

Numerous challenges, nevertheless, persist. The most lethal group, GNLA, which was the primary target of the Operation, still retains the capacity to unleash periodic violence. Significantly, out of 19 civilians killed since the launch of the Operation on July 7, 2014, GNLA was responsible for five in five separate incidents; AMEF was responsible for five in four incidents; while nine civilian killings remained unattributed. GNLA was also responsible for seven of 12 explosions recorded during this period, and for the lone incident targeting Policemen during this period.  On March 10, 2015, four Policemen were killed and another two were injured when GNLA militants ambushed a Police team at Panda Reserve Forest in the South Garo Hills District. That the outfit continues to operate is also evident from the incident of May 27, 2015, where nine civilians, including three women, sustained injuries when GNLA militants triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast outside a hardware store in Tura town in West Garo Hills District. According to reports, GNLA ‘area commander’ of West Garo Hills District, Karak Momin alias Hedeo, had earlier served an extortion notice on the shop for INR 2 million. Later, a GNLA militant identified as Junepaul Sangma, arrested on July 7, 2015, confessed that he had planted the IED outside the hardware store.

Apart from GNLA, other militant outfits such as ASAK and AMEF continue to operate, though they are mainly involved in acts of abduction-for ransom, especially in the Garo Hills Region. According to SATP data, in the current year, until July 19, 20 incidents of abduction, in which 30 people were abducted, were reported, as compared to 23 such incidents resulting in 33 abductions during the corresponding period of 2014, clearly not much of a respite. Summing up the situation, Union Home Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh thus conceded, on July 12, 2015,

In Garo Hills, some new splinter groups were kidnapping and looting businessmen at gunpoint. Such criminal activities must be dealt with firmly. There has been a marked increase in low-visibility yet high-impact violent crimes like kidnapping for ransom and extortions in Meghalaya.

Evidently, insurgency in Meghalaya is at critical juncture. Nevertheless, Meghalaya Director General of Police (DGP) Rajiv Mehta stated on February 26, 2015, "there cannot be any deadline to end insurgency in Meghalaya". He also noted, further, that "there is no new strategy to deal with militancy", adding that the biggest stumbling block to tackle militancy in the Garo Hills was the terrain. The DGP also observed, on April 10, 2015, that the objective of the ongoing operation was the same as that of Operation Hill Storm 1, that is, to flush out militants from the interior areas of the Garo Hills region.

The ongoing Operation Hill Storm 2, jointly conducted by State Police Forces and the Central Forces, has resulted in limited operational successes, and constitutes a further move towards restoring peace in the State, which has been marred by insurgency for a long period. Nevertheless, if a consolidation of the state’s control over remote regions and difficult terrain is to be secured, the capacities and capabilities of the State Police will have to undergo dramatic review and augmentation. UHM Rajnath Singh, stated, on July 12, 2015,

In view of the improved security scenario, there is a need to review deployment of (Central) Forces in the region. Without compromising the security, we must plan to reduce deployment so as to encourage positive thinking among the outsiders about the region... I would urge all the Honourable Chief Ministers to conduct a realistic audit of deployment of Central Armed Police Forces in their States. However, I assure you of our endeavour to help you in the deployment of Central Forces when actually needed.

Meghalaya already boasts of a Police-population ratio of 416 policemen per hundred thousand [according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) 2013 data], well above the national average of 141. The State Police has set up special multi task force, SF-10, to deal with the insurgency, as well as for riot control and initiatives to ensure communal harmony, especially in border areas. 485 candidates have been selected to form this Force, which is to grow in strength to 1,400. The first batch is expected to be raised by February 2016. Over time, greater responsibility for counter-insurgency will be handled by the State Police itself, rather than the present and excessive dependence on Central Forces.

It is not, however, in the use of force that the principal challenge lies. Insurgency thrives in regions of poor governance, in areas where the state has failed to establish a minimal structure of administration and the delivery of public goods. SFs have repeatedly succeeded in beating back the insurgents, in defeating numerous movements of disorder; such successes have, unfortunately, seldom been followed up with concerted action to secure and promote public welfare, and movements of violence eventually recover spaces within areas of neglect and administrative failure. This fruitless cycle will continue, with its enormous cost in human suffering, as long as these deficits endure.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Nagaland

Left-Wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

PAKISTAN (Total)