| |
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 20, November 14, 2016
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
|
The
Shadow of Daesh
Tushar
Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
At least
52 persons were killed and more than hundred were injured
when a teenage suicide bomber detonated his explosive
vest in the midst of devotees at the shrine of Sufi saint
Shah Noorani in the Khuzdar District of Balochistan in
the evening of November 12, 2016. The explosion took place
at the spot where the dhamaal (Sufi ritual of devotional
dance) was being performed, within the premises of the
shrine. “The bomber appeared to be 14 to 16 years old,”
said Muhammad Hashim Ghalzai, the Commissioner of Kalat
Division, of which Khuzdar is a District. Nawaz Ali, the
shrine's custodian, added, "Every day, around sunset,
there is a dhamaal here, and there are large numbers
of people who come for this." According to Senior
Superintendent of Police (SSP) Jafar Khan, at the time
of the blast, around 1,000 devotees were present in the
shrine to view the performance. The Daesh (Islamic State,
IS, previously Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS)
claimed responsibility for the attack via Amaq, its affiliated
news agency.
Daesh,
along with Al Alami (international) faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ),
also claimed the October 24 attack on the Quetta Police
Training College (PTC) at New Sariab, in which 61 Security
Force (SF) personnel were killed, and another 164 were
injured. Three terrorists entered into the PTC and headed
straight for the hostel, where around 700 Police recruits
were sleeping. The attack began at around 11:10 pm, with
gunfire continuing to ring out at the site for several
hours. Major causalities were inflicted when two suicide
bombers blew themselves up. One of the terrorists, wearing
a suicide vest, was killed by SFs. Though the Pakistani
establishment claimed that the terrorists belonged to
the LeJ-Al Alami, Daesh claimed responsibility and released
photographs of the fighters involved, one of whom bore
a strong resemblance to an attacker who was killed by
SFs in the assault.
On the
same day, Daesh also allegedly orchestrated another killing,
when two motorcycle borne terrorists shot dead Intelligence
Sub-Inspector Akbar Ali at a bus stop near his home in
the Sardaryab area of Charsadda District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP), when he was on his way to work in Peshawar, the
provincial capital. In a short statement posted on Amaq,
its affiliated news agency, Daesh claimed that "Islamic
State fighters have killed a Pakistan intelligence agent
in the Sardaryab region... of Pakistan".
The most
significant claim from Daesh came on August 8, 2016, for
the suicide attacks on Quetta’s Civil Hospital in which
at least 74 persons, including 55 lawyers, were killed
and over 100 were wounded, when scores of people had gathered
to mourn the death of BBA President Bilal Anwar Kasi in
a gun attack earlier in the day. Law enforcement officials
stated that the two attacks were connected and the blast
was carried out by a suicide bomber. The 55 slain lawyers
include BBA’s former President Baz Muhammad Kakar; former
Supreme Court Bar Association Vice-President Syed Qahir
Shah; Advocate Sangat Jamaldani, son of Jahanzeb Jamaldani,
Secretary General, Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M);
and Advocate Dawood Kasi, son of Former Federal Minister
Dr. Abdul Malik Kasi. Reuters quoted Daesh’s Amaq news
agency as stating, “A martyr from the Islamic State detonated
his explosive belt at a gathering of justice ministry
employees and Pakistani policemen in...Quetta.” The Amaq
report was released from Cairo, Egypt.
A succession
of deadly attacks in Pakistan claimed by Daesh suggests
a rising partnership with local terrorist formations,
even though the Pakistan establishment continues to deny
Daesh presence in Balochistan. Thus, Baluchistan Home
Minister Sarfaraz Bugti stated, on November 13, 2016,
"There is no presence of (Islamic State) in Balochistan.
The claim IS made is false." Bugti claimed that the
recent attacks claimed by Daesh were carried out by LeJ-Al
Alami, but this group gave information to Daesh relating
to the attackers in order to harm Pakistan's reputation:
"Claims through IS are a conspiracy to isolate Pakistan
in the international community." Similarly, Pakistan’s
Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry, on November 15,
2015, had ruled out any Daesh ‘footprint’ in the country
and declared that no citizen would be allowed to have
links with the terrorist organisation, adding, “Pakistan
has the capability to thwart threats by any terrorist
organisation, including the Islamic State.” Similarly,
Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah on November 23, 2015,
claimed that the Islamic State did not exist in Pakistan
and that some proscribed organisations within the country
were using its name.
Daesh appears
happy to let its local allies in Pakistan operate under
their own identities in exchange for allowing Daesh to
claim responsibility for high-profile attacks. Zahid Hussain,
a Pakistani security analyst, noted, on November 13, 2016,
"IS may not have a formal structure in Pakistan,
but certainly they have support among some of the banned
terrorist groups, particularly Sunni sectarian groups
like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami (LeJ-AA)… It's a kind
of nexus that we are seeing between global jihadi groups
and local sectarian groups."
US commander
General John W Nicholson, who commands the US and NATO
forces in Afghanistan, while briefing Washington-based
journalists at the Pentagon, on August 1, 2016, said that
almost 70 per cent of Daesh fighters in Afghanistan are
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
terrorists. Nicholson claimed, a "significant proportion,
a majority of fighters" with Daesh in Afghanistan
come from Pakistan's Orakzai Agency, over the border from
Nangarhar, and are former members of TTP. He further stated
that many of the fighters were Pakistani Pashtun from
Orakzai Agency and had been forced out of Pakistan by
the ongoing military offensive, Operation Zarb-e-Azb:
"In the case of the IS fighters in southern Nangarhar,
we see that many of them come from the Orakzai Agency,
which is south of Nangarhar – actually, south of the Khyber
Agency. And they were former members of the TTP, complete
with their leadership, who wholesale joined Islamic State,
pledged baya (allegiance) to Islamic State and
joined them earlier this year."
Seeing
Daesh as a major threat in the region, the US, on January
14, 2016, declared Daesh’s Afghanistan-Pakistan wing a
Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). A statement issued
in Washington declared, “The US Department of State has
announced the designation of ISIL-K (Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan) as a FTO under Section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” The Department
of State took this action in consultation with the Departments
of Justice and the Treasury, the statement added.
On July
26, 2016, the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan were able
to eliminate the then Daesh chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Hafiz Saeed, who was killed in a drone strike in the Kot
District of Nangarhar province. Saeed’s death represents
a major setback for Daesh-K (Daesh in the imagined ‘Khorasan’
wilayat), as it tries to establish itself as a
serious force in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Hafiz Saeed
Khan was a former commander of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA, Assembly
of Freedom), the break-away fraction of TTP, who pledged
allegiance to Daesh. After Hakimullah Mehsud, then head
of TTP, was killed in a US drone strike on November 1,
2013, the al Qaeda-linked group had been plagued by leadership
disputes, infighting, and defections. Mullah Fazlullah,
Mehsud’s successor, proved incapable of holding the coalition
of jihadists together. On August 26, 2014, a group of
TTP ‘commanders’, led by Maulana Qasim Omar Khorasani,
broke away from the parent organization and formed a new
outfit called Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA, Assembly of Freedom).
JuA included TTP factions from the tribal areas – Bajaur,
Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai Agencies in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); and Charsadda, Peshawar,
and Swat Districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). While announcing
the split, Khorasani claimed, "The leadership of
the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan [TTP] is a victim
of narrow, personal objectives. A separate group was announced
after the efforts to keep TTP united ended in failure.”
In June
2014, while announcing the formation of the Islamic State,
Daesh had released a map purportedly showing areas that
it planned to bring under its control within five years.
These areas included all of Pakistan within the projected
‘Islamic Caliphate’. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, who was
detained at Guantanamo for three years, had defected from
the Afghan Taliban on July 1, 2014, and joined Daesh and
was pronounced Amir of Islamic State Khorasan province
just two days after Abu Bakr al Baghdadi named himself
“Caliph Ibrahim I” and declared that his Islamic State
was now a “caliphate.” However, in April 2016, several
members of the ‘Islamic State Khorasan province’ “central
council” as well as other senior and mid-level leaders
based in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar broke
their oath to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and rejoined the Afghan
Taliban. Dost claim that the ‘Khorasan Province’ had become
a tool of “regional intelligence agencies and started
torturing innocent people.” He described Hafiz Saeed Khan,
the succeeding ‘emir’ of the ‘Khorasan province’, as “illiterate”
for approving attacks on civilians.
Purportedly
the first of its major attacks on Pakistan soil came on
May 14, 2015, when Daesh claimed responsibility for the
May 13, 2015, bus attack that killed 43 Ismaili Shias
in the Safoora Chowrangi area of Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town
in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. A blood-stained
Daesh pamphlet was recovered from the scene, according
to a Police official. A subsequent statement in Arabic
declared: "Thanks be to Allah, 43 apostates were
killed and around 30 were wounded in an attack carried
out by Islamic State soldiers on a bus transporting Shia
Ismaili infidels in the city of Karachi."
It is unlikely
that Daesh can extend its direct operational outreach
into the AfPak region at a time when it is under increasing
pressure in its Syrian and Iraqi heartlands, but the audacity
of the attacks executed by its regional affiliates suggests
a rising danger and an infusion of a greater lethality
into the enduring trends in terrorism and sectarian strife
afflicting both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Crucially, fragments
of groups that have long flourished under state protection
or neglect in Pakistan, are now coalescing into the Daesh
identity and finding a unity of purpose with an increasingly
globalized movement of jihad, outside the control
of the Pakistani state. This can only reinforce the instability
of the AfPak region, and project increasing risks beyond.
|
Foreign
Targets
Ajit
Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
Just after
5:30 am AST [Afghanistan Standard Time] on November 12,
2016, terrorists carried out an explosion at Bagram Airfield
in the Bagram District of Parwan Province, the largest
United Stated (US) military base in Afghanistan. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is heading
the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, issued
a statement that "An explosive device was detonated
on Bagram Airfield resulting in multiple casualties. Four
people have died in the attack and approximately 14 have
been wounded." No one has claimed responsibility
for the attack so far.
At around
11 pm on November 10, 2016, a vehicle laden with heavy
explosives detonated in the vicinity of the German Consulate
in Mazar-i-Sharif, the capital of Balkh Province, in Northern
Afghanistan. The explosion followed an exchange of fire
between the Security Forces (SFs) and the terrorists which
lasted till the early hours of November 11. Though all
German employees of the Consulate General remained safe,
at least four Afghan civilians were killed and another
128 Afghans, including 19 women and 38 children, sustained
injuries in the attack. The explosion also damaged more
than 100 homes and shops. Claiming responsibility for
the attack, Afghan Taliban ‘spokesman’ Zabihullah Mujahid
stated that heavily armed fighters, including suicide
bombers, had been sent “with a mission to destroy the
German consulate general and kill whoever they found there”.
Germany heads the NATO-led RSM in Northern Afghanistan.
In another
major attack, at least 13 persons – seven students, one
professor, two security guards of the University, and
three SF personnel – were killed and another 45 persons,
including 36 students and staff members and nine SF personnel,
were injured, when terrorists carried out an attack targeting
the well guarded American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)
in capital Kabul on August 24, 2016. The attack, which
commenced at 18:30 AST after the attackers exploded a
car bomb at a University entry gate, stormed into the
University complex and opened gunfire, lasted for almost
10 hours. SFs eliminated two terrorists, bringing an end
to the attack. There were about 750 students on Campus
at the time of the attack. According to reports, the attackers
had made their way past the University’s armed guards
and watchtowers, lobbing grenades and checking out their
maps.
Over a
fortnight earlier, on August 7, 2016, two professors of
the same University – an American and an Australian –
were abducted at a gun point from near the University
campus. Their whereabouts are still unknown. Significantly,
the AUAF was founded with US help in 2004.
On August
4, 2016, Afghan Taliban terrorists attacked a group of
12 foreign tourists – eight from the United Kingdom, three
from US and one from Germany – escorted by an Afghan Army
convoy in the Chesht-e-Sharif District of Herat Province.
At least seven people were wounded in the attack.
These incidents
are not in isolation. Terrorists inside Afghanistan are
continuing with their long avowed policy of targeting
foreign interests, including that of US, United Kingdom
(UK), India
and others. Unsurprisingly, the US Department of State
in a release on November 10, 2016, disclosed, "The
US Embassy in Kabul has received reports regarding a possible
pending attack targeting foreigners at the Serena Hotel
and a guest house located in PD-10 Kabul City. The attack
may be carried out by multiple suicide bombers at each
location."
Though
there is a lack of data on total fatalities among foreign
civilians in Afghanistan, according to The Aid Worker
Security Database, at least 147 foreign nationals
working as aid workers have been either killed (40) injured
(29) or abducted (38) in Afghanistan between November
24, 2002, and July 9, 2016. Moreover, according to icasualties.org,
at least 3,525 foreign troopers, including 2,389 personnel
from the US, have been killed in Afghanistan since 2001,
when the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) launched its operation in Afghanistan. 40 of these
fatalities have been recorded since December 28, 2014,
when ISAF ended its combat operations in Afghanistan.
Following the ‘completion of ISAF’s mission’ at the end
on December 28, 2014, the new, follow-on NATO-led mission,
RSM, was launched on January 1, 2015, to provide training,
advice and assistance to the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) and institutions. According to official
figures, RSM consists of 13,453 US and Coalition personnel
as of September 17, 2016. Of that number, 6,939 are US
forces, 4,934 are from the 26 NATO allied partners, and
1,580 are from 12 non-NATO partner nations. The number
of US forces conducting or supporting counterterrorism
operations is not known.
Meanwhile,
the Taliban continues to hold ground in areas of its consolidation.
According to the 33rd Quarterly report of the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR), released on October 30, 2016, approximately 63.4
per cent of the country’s districts are under Afghan Government
control or influence as of August 28, 2016, a decrease
from the 65.6 per cent reported as of May 28, 2016. Giving
further detail, the report says that out of 407 districts
within the 34 provinces, 258 districts were under government
control (88 districts) or influence (170), 33 districts
(in 16 provinces) were under insurgent control (8) or
influence (25), and 116 districts were “contested”. Referring
to the Islamic State (IS), the report said that it was
operating primarily in three to four districts including
Nangarhar and Kunar — a decrease from the nine to 10 districts
the group populated in 2015.
Nevertheless,
the country continues to record a further surge
in violence. The midyear report on
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan
published on July 25, 2016, prepared by the Human Rights
Unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA), which covers the period from January 1 to June
30, 2016, indicates that at least 5,166 civilians suffered
casualties – 1,601 deaths and 3,565 injuries – during
this period. This is the highest number of such casualties
recorded during the first six months of a year
since 2009, when UNAMA began systematically documenting
civilian casualties. During the corresponding period of
2015, at least 4,982 persons had suffered casualties –
1615 deaths and 3,367 injured. There is no further authentic/systematic
data available on civilian fatalities in Afghanistan.
Partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict
Management (ICM) has recorded 418 such fatalities
since July 1, 2016 (data till November 11, 2016). Meanwhile,
fatalities among ANSF personnel remain alarmingly high.
According to the SIGAR report, between January 1, 2016,
and August 19, 2016, at least 5,523 ANSF personnel were
killed and an additional 9,665 personnel were wounded.
The number of ANSF personnel killed through 2015 stood
at 6,637 and another 12,471 injured. Though there are
no systematic estimates of the number of insurgents killed,
partial data compiled by the ICM indicates that the insurgents
have also been suffering significantly increased fatalities.
The number of terrorist fatalities, which stood at 2,702
in 2013, increased to 6,030 in 2014, and further to 10,628
in 2015. So far, in 2016, 10,931 terrorists have been
killed (data till November 11, 2016).
Despite
mounting losses, the Taliban remains unrelenting. Following
Donald Trump’s victory in the US Presidential Elections,
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, stated, on November
9, 2016, "Most importantly, he (Trump) should withdraw
all U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and unlike other former
US rulers, he should neither seek any more titles of ignominy
for his self and American generals, nor worsen the American
prestige, economy and military by engaging in this futile
war…” Trump will assume office on January 20, 2017.
There are
indications that the war in Afghanistan will intensify
further, with increasing and more incidents of the Taliban
targeting foreign establishments/individuals in an environment
of overall insecurity within the country. A US revaluation
of its Af-Pak policy appears likely under Trump. During
the course of a debate while he was on the campaign trail,
on being asked, “do you pull out of Afghanistan and let
the Taliban take over”, Trump responded, “I don't know
that Afghanistan is much -- as much of a problem as Pakistan,
because everyone is telling me they're all in Pakistan;
they're not in Afghanistan.” However, on further and insistent
questioning, he acknowledged that he would withdraw US
troops out of Afghanistan. In the same breath, however,
he asserted, “I don't believe too much in the soldier
concept, other than I believe in air power. You're sort
of seeing that over in Libya. You can knock the hell out
of them without losing soldiers and losing lives and arms
and legs.” Qualifying his statement further, when asked
“You kill (sic) a lot of civilians though”, he
added, “Well, not necessarily if you have good intelligence.
You know, intelligence is the thing that this country
is lacking, especially from its leadership.”
On an American
radio show on September 21, 2015, Trump had called Pakistan
“probably the most dangerous country in the world today”,
adding, “You have to get India involved… They have their
own nukes and have a very powerful army. They seem to
be the real check…. I think we have to deal very closely
with India to deal with it (Pakistan).”
Much of
this is incoherent, and Trump’s projections about an Indian
role are probably unrealistic. It is, however, unlikely
that US AfPak policy under Trump will be ‘more of the
same’. Crucially, Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism
in Afghanistan will come under close examination, though
the outcome of such scrutiny remains currently uncertain.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
November
7-13, 2016
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
|
Left-Wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
INDIA
|
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
Left-Wing
Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
4
|
Madhya Pradesh
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
1
|
2
|
8
|
11
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
52
|
2
|
2
|
56
|
FATA
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Sindh
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
|
|
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
| |