SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 6, August 8, 2016

INDIA

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Assam: Remaining Sparks
Nijeesh N.
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

In one of the worst terrorist attack on the civilians in the recent history of Assam, terrorists of the I.K. Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS) opened indiscriminate fire at a crowded weekly market, Balajan Tiniali Weekly (Friday) Market in Kokrajhar District on August 5, 2016, killing 14 persons, including two women, and injuring another 20. According to eyewitnesses, there were four to five terrorists in military fatigues, armed with sophisticated weapons, who fired at the crowd in the market at around 11.30 am. The terrorists also lobbed grenades at shops, destroying at least six. Personnel of the 3^rd Rajput Regiment based in Kokrajhar, who were passing through the market, started retaliatory firing, killing one terrorist, while the others managed to escape. One AK-57, 2 magazines, one grenade, 47 rounds of ammunition, 3 bags with clothes, one mobile and 2 SIM cards were recovered from the spot.

Confirming the attack as handiwork of NDFB-IKS, Inspector General of Police (IGP) of Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD), L.R. Bishnoi disclosed that the mobile SIMs recovered had earlier been used by NDFB-IKS leader Mada, a ‘self-styled commander’ of the outfit. The attack was carried out by the militant group with a view to create terror among people for extortion and also to divert the attention of the Security Forces (SFs) from on-going operations against the rebel group, he added. He confirmed that, those killed in the attack included six Bodos, four Muslims, and one each of the Nath (an Assamese caste), Adivasi (tribal) and Bengali communities. The identity of one civilian, who succumbed to his injuries on August 6, 2016, is yet to be confirmed.

Assam Director General of Police (DGP) Mukesh Sahay also confirmed the NDFB-IKS link, noting, “The style of operation also points to NDFB-Songbijit. We have launched counter-operations to nab the militant(s). Situation in the area is under control.”

However, NDFB-IKS denied its involvement in the incident. In a statement issued to some media houses in Kokrajhar, NDFB-IKS ‘general secretary’ B.R. Ferenga stated; "We condemn the allegation by the Assam police against the NDFB of being involved in the attack at Balajan Tiniali. Our organisation is not at all involved in this."

NDFB-IKS has, in fact, been facing serious setbacks over the past months, and has also targeted Bodos, their own core constituency, among others, in a desperate tactic to distract SFs and divert their attention towards jihadi outfits, which have also come to pose a significant security threat in the State.

The August 5, 2016, incident was the worst attack on civilians in the State after the December 23, 2014, massacrein which at least 69 Adivasis were killed by NDFB-IKS militants in Sonitpur, Kokrajhar and Chirang Districts under the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD). Only one major incident (involving three or more fatalities) has been reported with civilian fatalities between December 23, 2014, and August 5, 2016; on April 4, 2016, at least three persons were killed and over twenty were injured in a powerful grenade attack by the Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) at Dudhnoi in Goalpara District. Significantly, the number of civilians killed through 2015 (10) was the lowest since 1992.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), from December 24, 2014 to August 4, 2016, a total of 16 civilians were killed in Assam in connection with militancy, of which only two civilian fatalities in two incidents (in one of which SFs were targeted) had been attributed to the NDFB-IKS.

However, since its formation on November 20, 2012, NDFB-IKS had emerged as one of the most violent militant group in Assam. Out of 221 civilian fatalities in the State between November 20, 2012, and December 23, 2014, NDFB-IKS has been responsible for 140.

SFs launched ‘Operation All-Out’ to eliminate NDFB-IKS militants from the State after the December 23, 2014 massacre. The operation, in which the Army, Paramilitary Forces and State Police have worked together, with support from the Indian Air Force, is still on. According to a January 1, 2016, report during the period between 26.12.2014 and 31.12.2015, at least 31 militants have been killed and over 766 militants and linkmen have been arrested under the Operation. Although no further official data is available, according to the SATP database, another 12 NDFB-IKS militants have been killed and 110 militants have been arrested since January 1, 2016 (all data till August 5, 2016).

According to August 6, 2016, report, the estimated strength of NDFB-IKS currently stands at around 150 cadres, down from 300 to 400 a couple of years ago. The continuous crackdown by the SFs including the National Investigation Agency (NIA), State Police and Army, has hit the militant outfit hard over the past year-and-a-half.

Some recent incidents involving NDFB-IKS include:

July 17, 2016: Two NDFB-IKS militants, identified as Ritu Basumatary aka B. Rugungsha and Rahul Basumatary aka B. Rakhao were killed in an encounter at Khalasi and Saralpara in Ultapani, near the Indo-Bhutan border in Kokrajhar District. Two 7.65 mm pistols, five 7.65 mm live rounds, two hand grenades, one AK-47 magazine, dry rations, cash, medicines, two letter pads of NDFB-IKS, toiletries and other materials were recovered from the area.

July 16, 2016: An NDFB-IKS militant, identified as Sudem Borgoyary aka Gorom was killed in SF operations while other cadres managed to escape. Two pistols, two grenades, ammunitions, cash, an extortion note, a mobile phone, one solar panel, rice, pulses and medicines were recovered from the spot.

June 24, 2016: Two NDFB-IKS cadres, identified as Jwngsar Basumatary aka Laudum and Phungkha Narzary, were killed in an encounter with SFs in the Jharbari area under the Serfanguri Police Station in Kokrajhar District. The cadres opened fire on the operational party first and the party retaliated, killing two. Two 7.65mm pistols, five rounds of ammunition and four fired cases of 7.65mm pistols, seven AK-47 fired cases, two Chinese grenades and a backpack were recovered from the slain militants.

According to a July 22, 2016, report fighting with their backs to the wall with depleting cadre strength due to relentless SF action, Bodo militants threatened to target NIA’s officers and their families. In a direction issued to its cadres, NDFB-IKS leaders have cadres to track NIA officers even in the national capital (New Delhi) and strike at the right opportunity. Officials disclosed that the NDFB-IKS threat is the result of its frustration after 86 of its cadres were arrested in the last two to three years from Assam, out of which 63 have been charge-sheeted. A senior commander of the militant outfit, Pradip Brahma aka Pwler, was recently sentenced to life imprisonment by a Guwahati court.

Though, NDFB-IKS’ operational capacity has been sharply diminished as a result of the elimination of a large number of its low- and mid-level cadres, the top leadership is relatively safe in Myanmar and in jungles along the Indo-Bhutan border. Intelligence inputs also indicates that there are growing rumblings of discontent within the group, as its ‘chief’ and founder, Ingi Kathar Songbijit is under pressure to make way for ‘general secretary’ B. Saoraigwra. Songbijit’s current status is unclear. According to information available with security agencies, Saoraigwra is believed to be hiding in the Manas National Park, a 950 square kilometer wildlife sanctuary bordering Bhutan; while Songbijit is reportedly in Myanmar. Other important leaders of the outfit, including B. Bidai, are believed to be camping along the India-Bhutan border.

While, most militant outfits in India’s Northeast are now in negotiations or under ceasefire agreements with the Government, NDFB-IKS and ULFA-I are not part of any peace process. Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju stated in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) on July 27, 2016, “there is no question of talks with National Democratic Front of Bodoland (S) as it was involved in an incident in December 2014 in which innocent people were killed.” However the Minister emphasised that the Government is open to talks with all insurgent groups which are “sincere” in their intention to give up arms and join the mainstream. Further, he disclosed, the Centre and the Assam Governments had entered into Suspension of Operations (SoP) agreements with certain insurgent groups, including the Progressive faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-P) and the Ranjan Daimary faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-RD) among others.

The SFs have been successful in beating back NDFB-IKS militancy, but the group’s residual capacities to execute indiscriminate attacks against soft targets across the sprawling Assam State, particularly the over 27,000 square kilometers that lie within the BTAD areas, can sow terror in the civilian population, feeding the group’s extortion networks. The recent attack and these surviving insurgent capacities are a major challenge before the Sarbananda Sonowal led Assam Government, which took charge on May 24, 2016.

INDIA

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Maoists: Fighting amidst Losses
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

At least three cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), including a woman, were killed in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) in the forests of Kacheghat under Faraspal Police Station limits, Dantewada District, Chhattisgarh, on August 5, 2016. The slain Maoists were identified as Faggoo aka Nishant, Soma aka Ajeet and Manki aka Geeta. Two .315-bore country-made revolvers, eight live rounds, one muzzle loading gun, two grenades, one Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) magazine with two live rounds, three detonators, four bundles of wire, 35 gelatine sticks, one kilogram of explosive, Naxal [Left Wing Extremism (LWE)] literature and magazines, and other materials were recovered from the encounter site.

On July 24, 2016, CPI-Maoist cadres killed three civilians in the Barkol Forest range of Latehar District in Jharkhand. A pamphlet recovered from the spot alleged that the victims were 'Police informers'. According to reports, after the surrender of one Maoist cadre Rampreet Yadav (date not specified), the Maoists had been suspecting his two sons Shravan Yadav (32) and Hiralal Yadav (20), along with Shivlal Yadav (22), to be working as 'Police informers'. On July 24, the Maoists learned about Shravan and Hiralal's presence in the Barkol area. A team of Maoists went to their homes and took them into the Barkol Forest and gunned them down. The Maoists also went to Shivlal Yadav's house on the same day, and strangulated him with a rope.

On July 18, 2016, 10 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel belonging to the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) were killed and five were injured in a CPI-Maoist orchestrated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast and encounter in the Chakarbanda-Dumarinala Forests of Aurangabad District in Bihar. Three Maoists were also killed in the encounter. It was the worst attack targeting the SFs reported since March 11, 2014, when 15 SF personnel were killed in a CPI-Maoist ambush in Sukma District of south Chhattisgarh; one civilian, Vikram Nishad, had also died in the crossfire, while three others were injured.

According to data released by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) at least 259 persons, including 123 civilians, 38 SF personnel and 98 Naxalites-[Left-Wing Extremists (LWEs)], were killed in LWE-linked violence across India in 2016 (data till June 30, 2016). Since July 1, 2016, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), another 50 persons, including 15 civilians, 13 SF personnel and 22 Naxalites have been killed, taking the total death toll in such violence during the current year  to 309 – 138 civilians, 51 SF personnel and 120 LWEs.

During the corresponding period of 2015, according to the combined figure of UMHA and SATP, at least 200 persons, including 90 civilians, 53 SF personnel and 57 Naxalites were killed. [At least 160 persons, including 80 civilians, 40 SF personnel and 40 LWEs, were killed upto June 30, 2015. Between July 1, 2015, and August 5, 2015, another 40 persons, including 10 civilians, 13 SF personnel and 17 Naxalites were killed].

According to the SATP database, killings were reported from 35 Districts in seven States in 2016, as against 30 Districts in seven States in 2015.

UMHA data indicates that there has been marginal increase in number of Maoist-related incidents. As against 591 such incidents recorded in 2015 (till June 30), there were 605 incidents in 2016 (till June 30).

The significant increase in number of civilians killed – 53.33 percent – is worrisome. The primary reason for this steep rise is the growing belief among the Maoists that more and more civilians are acting as ‘police informers’, and that the SFs are mostly dependent on local information in their anti-Maoist operations. The continuous losses the rebels have suffered at the hand of SFs underline and reinforce their belief. Significantly, SFs have always denied that targeted civilians were ‘police informers’ and have argued that Maoists are killing civilians to infuse fear among them and, in turn, secure their support at a time when they are facing more setbacks.

Significantly, the kill ratio in 2016 has significantly improved at 1:2.35 in favour of SF, far better than the already healthy ratio in the corresponding period of 2015, at 1:1.07. At its worst, the ratio had dropped to 1:0.59 in 2007. The number of encounters with Police has also increased from 101 in 2015 to 187 in 2016 (till June 30 in both years). On the other hand, during the same period, the number of attacks on SFs carried out by the Maoists has come down from 80 in 2015 to 69 in 2016. Similarly, incidents of snatching of arms came down from 14 in 2015 to just three in 2016. SFs have recovered 436 arms in 2016 as against 330 in 2015. SFs have also arrested 1,006 Maoists till June 30, 2016, in addition to 717 arrests during the corresponding period of 2015. Through 2015, the SFs had arrested 1,668 Maoists. Mounting SF pressure has also resulted in the surrender of 804 Maoists in 2016 (till June 30). During the corresponding period of 2015, at least 220 Maoists had surrendered. At least 570 Maoist cadres had surrendered through 2015.

In another indication of the Maoists losing influence, the rebels were able to hold only nine Jan Adalats (people’s courts) during the first six months of 2016, as against 22 such incidents during the corresponding period of 2015. The number of Jan Adalats held by Maoists stood at 40 through 2015. The Maoists held 97 such ‘courts’ in year 2011, the highest number of such incidents since 2008.

The decline registered in LWE violence is due to several factors, the primary among which has been successful intelligence-based operations launched by SFs over the past years, which have helped neutralize top cadres among the rebels. According to the SATP database, between 2010 and 2016 (till August 5), at least 724 Maoist leadership elements have been neutralized (92 killed, 409 arrested, 220 surrendered). According to UMHA data, the total number of LWE cadres arrested between 2010 and 2015 stood at 11,608. During the same period at least 633 LWE cadres surrendered.

The area of LWE influence also continued to shrink. The number of LWE-affected Districts in 2015 stood at 106 in 10 States, down from 161 Districts in 16 States in 2014. A maximum 232 Districts were declared Maoist-affected in 2007. There has been a continuous decline in the number since, with an exception in 2011, when the number increased to 203 Districts in 20 States, from 196 in 20 States recorded in 2010.

Significantly, while giving an interview in the interiors of the Andhra Odisha Border (AOB) region on the eve of their “Martyr’s Week”, Maoist ‘Central Committee’ member Ramachandra Reddy aka Pratap Reddy aka Chalpath admitted that the Naxal movement had received serious setbacks in recent times in the form of encounter deaths and surrenders of leaders. However, he expressed confidence that the ‘people’s movement’ has not been suppressed and it would bounce back. The “Martyr’s Week” is a week-long commemoration observed by the Maoists between July 28 and August 3 every year in the memory of their founder leader Charu Majumdar, who died in Police custody on July 28, 1972.

According to UMHA’s Annual Report for 2015-16, submitted to the Parliament in March 2016, "Left Wing Extremism (LWE) remains an area of concern for internal security of the country. CPI (Maoist) continues to be the most potent among the various LWE outfits in the country and accounts for more than 80 per cent of total LWE violence incidents and resultant deaths."

The Maoists though have lost much of their prowess. However, they still have the wherewithal to inflict major losses upon SFs and to carry out random attacks against civilians. On July 30, 2014, the Government had informed Parliament “As per available reports, the estimated armed cadre strength of the Left Wing Extremist groups is around 8,500. However, their support base is in larger number.” No subsequent official estimate of strength is available, though the numbers are likely to have diminished significantly, although their residual capacities remain sufficient to inflict substantial, albeit episodic, damage.

Indeed, K. Vijay Kumar, former CRPF chief and current Advisor on Internal Security to UMHA observed, in the aftermath of the Bihar (July 18) attack, “The remaining 10 per cent [of Maoists] are capable of launching an attack. The loss will not impede security operations against them. There is an urgent need to improve governance and policing at the local level.”

In terms of SF operations, it must be underlined that, though the Maoists’ presence remains in 106 Districts in 10 States, violence is primarily concentrated in just two States: Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. According to SATP data, out of a total of 264 Maoist-related fatalities recorded in the first seven months of 2016, at least 176, i.e. 66.66 per cent, have been reported from these two States alone [Chhattisgarh, 122; Jharkhand, 54]. In fact this has been the story since 2005. Overall Maoist related fatalities across India since 2005 stands 7,148; of these, 3,876, i.e. 54.22 per cent, were reported from Chhattisgarh (2,444) and Jharkhand (1,432).

The primary focus of security operations will remain focused on Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, but the attack in Bihar underlines the need for continuing vigilance in all other States, where the Maoists do retain residual capabilities. Moreover, it is premature to celebrate an imminent victory over the Maoists and lapse into complacence. Regrettably, for reasons displaying a tremendous lack of comprehension, both of the challenge and of the nature of administration in the States, the Centre has been cutting back on expenditure for critical programmes that it had underwritten in the past, on the argument that the States’ share in central revenues has increased significantly (10 per cent). Thus, the Centre has either scrapped, or has not allocated funds in the current year, for the Security Related Expenditure Scheme (SRE), the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), Construction/Strengthening of fortified Police Stations, the Skill Development Scheme in 34 LWE affected Districts, and the Additional Central Assistance (ACA) to LWE affected Districts, crippling crucial projects for which State funding has often been lacking.

The Maoists have demonstrated tremendous staying power in the past, and any pattern of political neglect will restore spaces for their revival once again. The SFs have repeatedly done their job, and continue to secure successes despite deficits and deficiencies. It is in the broader context of administrative lacunae, political outreach and public welfare that the greatest obstacles to an enduring solution persist. Many of the Maoist afflicted States remain poorly governed, with large populations in poverty and distress – an environment that provides ample opportunities for at least marginal Maoist recruitment, even in the face of continuing SF pressure.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Terrorism

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Left-Wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)