SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 8, August 22, 2016

INDIA

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J&K: Policy Paralysis
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

The street violence that engulfed a large part of Kashmir Valley in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has so far accounted for at least 68 deaths – 66 protestors and two Policemen (data till August 21, 2016). The violence was sparked subsequent to the killing of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) ‘commander’ Burhan Wani in an encounter on July 8, 2016. According to official figures, at least 4,515 Security Force (SF) personnel and 3,356 protestors were also injured during the protests till August 9. [No official figure about the number of inured has been released thereafter.] J& K consists of three divisions: Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh.

Significantly, at least 39 of the 68 reported deaths were recorded in the first week of street violence – 38 protestors and one Policeman. During the next seven days, another six persons – five protestors and one Policeman were killed. Thus over 66 per cent of such fatalities were reported during the first two weeks of violence. In subsequent weeks, though incidents of clashes between SFs and protesters were still being reported on an almost daily basis, the level of volatility has gone down considerably. Not surprisingly, curfew which was imposed in large parts of the Valley in the beginning has now been restricted to just a few areas. In a statement released on August 19, 2016, the J&K Police stated that curfew was imposed in Srinagar, Kaloosa in Bandipora area of Baramulla District, and in the towns of Anantnag, Shopian and Pampore. However, the statement, added, “The restrictions under Section 144/CrPC [Criminal Penal Code] remained in force in Kashmir valley today.” Section 144/CrPC basically restricts people from assembling in groups.

The ongoing protest is primarily the handiwork of Islamabad. In a video released by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on August 10, 2016, an arrested Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militant Bahadur Ali states,

…When I contacted them [Alpha-3] again they told me that one of our brothers, a mujahid, has been killed in Srinagar. His name is Burhan Wani and the situation in Kashmir has deteriorated because of his killing and that people are throwing stones at the Indian forces. I was told that two of my partners have fuelled the protests and that I have to do the same, participate in protests with grenades in hand... throw them at the Indian forces so that situation in Kashmir will deteriorate…

In its August 10, 2016, Press Release, NIA noted,

As per Bahadur Ali and other available evidence, control centre Alpha-3 is a fixed communication centre, established at a high altitude peak in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, which is operated with support from Pakistani forces. Once the terrorists are inside Indian territory, Alpha-3 guides, directs and controls their operations. Whenever required, Alpha-3 arranges tactical and material support through previously identified contacts.

Bahadur Ali aka Saifulla, son of Mohammed Haneef (Haneefi Deobandi), resident of Village Zia Bagha, near Haloka Bridge, Tehsil (revenue unit) Raiwind, District Lahore, Pakistan, was arrested on July 25, 2016, from the Yahama area of Kupwara District.

Revelations made by Bahadur Ali are corroborated by recent reports confirming that terrorists have openly joined protestors at several places. According to reports, LeT ‘commander’ Abu Dujana, who is presently heading the outfit in the Valley, attended a gathering in the Karimabad area of Pulwama District on July 31, 2016, wearing a mask.

Pakistan’s role in the recent troubles has also been highlighted by the Indian Government. Addressing the Indian Parliament on July 21, 2016, Union Home Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh reiterated that Pakistan played a “key role” in fomenting the recent protests in Kashmir.

Pakistan’s role was well established in the earlier orchestrated rage of 2008, 2010 and 2013. Those protests, aided and abetted by inimical agencies from across the border in connivance with their proxies on the Indian side, lost steam, with diminishing support, in due course. The current cycle of street violence is bound to come to a similar end.

However, things have been made difficult on the security front by the inept handling of the situation by Governments both at the Union and Sate level. First in a bizarre move, the incumbent State Government, soon after assuming office in April 2016, reportedly decided to disband the three-tier security grid. The grid comprised the Army and the Border Security Force (BSF) on the LoC; the Army and paramilitary troops in the Valley; and J&K Police as the final layer. The Army and BSF shared intelligence about infiltration with the Army and paramilitary forces in the Valley, who then synergised their movements with J&K Police to track down infiltrators. However, as the Army was completely withdrawn it led to a breakdown in intelligence sharing with the J&K Police. The effective interface between the Army and Police collapsed.

Further, in spite of visible evidences and admissions by the Government that the current cycle of street violence, as on previous occasions, were an act of aggression from across the border, Governments have been found short of ideas. Instead of allowing the SFs to assess the ground situation and act accordingly, both the Central and State Governments publicly asked them to "exercise maximum restraint," escalating violence by protestors and implicitly suggesting that SF actions were not justified by the situation. An unnamed security officer was thus quoted as stating, “Even on August 9, we spotted three armed militants in a protest demonstration at Lalpora in Lolab area of Kupwara District. We did not strike them as there was every apprehension of civilian casualties." Indeed, the mindless and ill-informed public discourse on operational procedures is enormously hampering security operations.

Meanwhile, reports indicate that not a single raid or counterinsurgency operation was conducted in the plains till August 15, 2016, since the beginning of the street protests on July 9, 2016. On August 15, 2016, an encounter took place between SFs and militants in Srinagar, in which a commandant of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Pramod Kumar was martyred and two militants were killed. "No reason has been specified, though it is clear enough that operations have been suspended for fear of mob attacks and civilian casualties," according to security sources. This has emboldened the sagging spirit of the separatists and terrorists.  

Not surprisingly, terrorists have carried out 17 attacks between July 9, 2016 and August 19, 2016 (excluding the August 15 attack), resulting in one fatality among the SFs. Three civilians have also been killed by terrorists during this period. During the whole of 2016, the total number of civilians killed in terrorism-related incidents stands at eight.   

The SFs have, however, continued with operation in areas along the Line of Control (LoC) and have killed 21 terrorists. SFs have also lost 10 of their personnel in these operations.  According to official figures, released on July 19, 2016, the number of infiltration attempts in the current year was 51 (up to May 2016).  

The current crisis is nothing more than an attempt by Islamabad to reverse the process of deepening peace in J&K. Fighting all odds, SFs have managed to restore a semblance of peace through sheer resolve and efficiency. The effective leadership required to secure a more enduring resolution of the crisis has, however, been conspicuous in its absence.

Indeed, in a rather bizarre move, addressing Parliament on August 10, 2016, UHM Rajnath Singh stated that Union Government is ready to talk to "mainstream political parties, moderates and other organisations." This statement clearly tells the sorry state of affairs in New Delhi, suggesting that UHM Singh is not aware that none of these three – mainstream political parties, moderates and other organisations – are party to the current cycle of violence. Talking about talks with these people, at this juncture, make little sense. But what more only can be expected from a Government which lapses into a deep slumber during periods when there was a genuine and conducive environment for talks among most of the democratic stakeholders.

NEPAL

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Promises and Dilemmas
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 3, 2016, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-Maoist Center) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal was elected as the new Prime Minister of Nepal after garnering 63.35 per cent of votes in Parliament. Out of 595 lawmakers, 573 cast their votes in the poll, of which 363 were in Dahal’s favour. Dahal was backed by the largest party in the House, Nepali Congress (NC), constituents of the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), the Federal Alliance, and some fringe parties. 210 lawmakers, including those of the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal (RPP-N) voted against the Maoist leader. This is Dahal’s second stint as Prime Minister; he led the Government after the first Constituent Assembly (CA) elections from August 18, 2008, to May 25, 2009.

On July 12, 2016, CPN-Maoist Center, a major coalition partner with 82 seats in the CPN-UML-led coalition Government, had withdrawn its support from the incumbent Government, on the grounds that CPN-UML was reluctant to implement the “gentlemen’s agreement” and the nine-point agreement made with it on May 5, 2016. According to the “gentleman’s agreement”, former Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli was to let Dahal take over the reins of Government after the tabling of the Fiscal Budget, and the nine-point agreement provided blanket amnesty for human rights abusers over the decade-long Maoist insurgency, in order to save Maoist leaders from being implicated in war crimes. However, when Oli refused to step down even after the passage of the Appropriation Bill on July 9, 2016, the Maoists decided to withdraw support.

Significantly, on August 4, 2016, as promised in the seven-point agreement signed with NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba on July 13, 2016, to build a new coalition Government, in his first speech as Prime Minister, Dahal declared that addressing the demands raised by the agitating Madhesis, Tharus and Janajatis to strengthen internal unity and increasing the acceptance of the Constitution, would be his top priority. The first point of the seven-point agreement is to amend the Constitution, if the need arises, to address the demands of these indigenous groups.

Notably, on August 9, 2016, Prime Minister Dahal presented a proposal to the Madhes-based parties for forming a Joint Task Force to prepare a Constitution amendment proposal. In a major development, during a Cabinet meeting on August 18, 2016, the Government decided to declare 52 persons, including 41 Madhes protestors and 11 Security Force (SF) personnel killed during protests in 2015, as martyrs. Earlier, on August 6, 2016, the Government had decided to provide NR 1 million each to family members of individuals killed during the Madhes movement. Declaration of those killed in the Madhes protests as martyrs was one of the major demands of the agitating Madhes-based parties.

On August 6, 2016, Sarvendranath Shukla, Spokesperson of the Tarai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP), a constituent of UDMF, declared that UDMF could discuss its participation in the Cabinet if a Bill to amend the Constitution was tabled in Parliament in the next two months. However, a delay would dampen the front’s chance of joining the Government. Likewise, on August 17, 2016, Rajendra Mahato, Chairman of Sadbhawana Party (SP), another UDMF constituent, ruled out the possibility of joining the Cabinet, declaring, “We want the Government to address our concerns; we are in no hurry to join it.” UDMF has long been demanding Constitutional amendments to meet its 11-point demands.

Assuring the Madhesi parties regarding Constitutional amendments, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Bimalendra Nidhi stated, on August 11, 2016, “Now, the Constitution will be amended in accordance with the agreement signed with the Madhesi Front. The ruling parties have already begun preparations for it. We are ready to amend the Constitution to address demands of Madhesis, Janajatis, indigenous communities and Tharus among others.” Separately, on the same day, Speaker Onsari Gharti Magar observed, “We do not have option (but) to amend the Constitution. Along with the amendment, we must implement the basics of the Constitution now. Except for the clauses which cannot be amended, Constitution is something that is always open for amendment. In fact, such amendment is a progress that goes on (sic).”

Another dilemma for the Government is the issue of transitional justice in the country. Two transitional justice bodies, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), were formed in February 2015 in the spirit of the Interim Constitution of 2007 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2006, to probe instances of the serious violation of human rights and to discover the status of those who ‘disappeared’ in the course of the armed conflict between the State and the then CPN-Maoist. These bodies closed registration of complaints on August 10, 2016, with around 60,000 cases registered. However, TRC and CIEDP, now have only six months to establish the truth, investigate violations of human rights and make recommendations for action, as terms of the transitional mechanisms expire on February 10, 2017.

Sensing a Herculean task lying ahead, Surya Kiran Gurung, Chairman, TRC, which received over 55,000 complaints on human rights violations, noted, on August 11, 2016, that TRC had finalized a procedure to select war-era cases that could be put on hold on several grounds, including lack of evidence and inadequate details. Urging the Prime Minister to resolve war-era cases swiftly, a TRC delegation led by Gurung on August 15, 2016, requested Dahal to allocate an adequate budget for the transitional justice bodies. Similarly, Bishnu Pathak, a member of CIEDP, which got 2,846 complaints, stated, on August 19, 2016, “The Government seems reluctant to give us the needed resources so that it can later blame us for not doing our job. CIEDP’s work was much more challenging, as 25 per cent of cases out of 2,846 complaints could require excavation at suspected sites. Digging out one site could take at least one month and DNA test of degenerated bones could take 6 to 9 months. CIEDP would need at least 10 years to complete its assigned task.”

Meanwhile, reiterating the Government's commitment to providing necessary resources as well as the legal setup for the transitional justice mechanism, Prime Minister Dahal, during a meeting with the Chairman and Commissioners of TRC on August 15, 2016, gave an assurance that the Government and his party were not seeking blanket amnesty in conflict-era cases of human rights violation. Earlier, on July 31, 2016, Attorney General Hari Phuyal asserted that Dahal was appreciative of the work carried out by the Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, and the CPN-Maoist-Center was ready to face conflict-era cases.

In Nepal, the game of toppling and forming Governments dominates the national political arena and has badly hampered the country’s development and economic growth. Now, again, the CPN-Maoist Center and NC, which joined forces against the CPN-UML-led Government, have agreed to hold the leadership of Government on a rotation basis. There is deep conflict of interest on investigating cases relating to war era excesses, and it remains to be seen whether Nepal is able to reconcile the demands of political stability and continuity, on the one hand, and deliver justice for war era crimes, on the other.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Terrorism

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Left-Wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Total (PAKISTAN)