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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 34, March 2, 2010
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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The Trouble
with Talking
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
The
problem with talks – or even with talking about talks
– is not just that they have no possibility of success
within the circumstances that currently prevail in the
Maoist insurgency in India,
but that they create expectations that they do. Within
the existing situation, all talk about talks projects
an enveloping incoherence on the perspectives of the
state and its agencies, undermines the determination
and will to fight and, indeed, even to prepare for the
fight that is inevitable.
Politicians have little understanding of the fragility of
the fighting man’s psyche. In their distant imagining,
the jawan (trooper) is a trained and disciplined
machine, ‘designed’ simply to obey and execute. But
a man does not cease to be human just because you put
him into a uniform; the intangibles that contribute
to morale have to be understood by those who seek to
guide warfare from the safety of distant command centres
and State and national capitals.
Significantly, a flurry of statements about a ceasefire and
talks between the Centre and the Maoists came in the
wake of two major attacks executed by the Communist
Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist). On February 15,
2010, at least 24 Security Force (SF) personnel, principally
from the State’s paramilitary Eastern Frontier Rifiles,
were killed, along with one civilian, at a camp at Sildha
in the West Midnapore District of West Bengal. Just
two days later, at least 12 villagers, including three
women and a child, were killed when nearly 150 heavily
armed CPI-Maoist cadres attacked the Phulwariya village
in the Jamui District of Bihar, on February 17.
Published excerpts from the diary of one of the EFR jawans
killed in the Sildha raid are poignant testimony to
the abject collapse of morale in the State’s agencies
in Maoist afflicted areas in West Bengal. Suraj Bhan
Thapa’s diary recorded: "There is a threat to our lives
at all times here. Anything can happen at any time";
and further, "The party politics of a few people has
endangered the existence of the country. We are also
suffering..."
Just before the attack at Sildha, Solicitor General Gopal Subramanium
is reported to have told the Supreme Court, "Every officer
in the area is marked for death". The same news report
records the conditions of the Sildha camp: "No sentries,
no watchtowers, a fence with one entire side missing,
a crowded marketplace, a public toilet – personnel of
the EFR camp over-run by the Maoists were little more
than sitting ducks."
It
is within this context that the farce of mutually rejected
offers of ‘talks’ between Home Minister P. Chidambaram
and Maoist politburo member Koteshwar Rao aka
Kishan occurred. Initially, on February 19, 2010, Chidambaram
had declared that the Centre would ‘find ways to facilitate talks’ with the
Maoists if the latter halted violence for 72 hours. On February 22, Koteshwar Rao responded with a conditional
offer of a 72 day ceasefire commencing February 25,
if the Government suspended operations against the Maoists,
released all ‘political prisoners’ (read, Maoists in
custody) and "concentrate on development of tribal areas".
This was, in some measure, a dilution of Rao’s earlier
stance, where he had demanded the withdrawal of all
SF deployments in Maoist dominated areas before he would
engage in any negotiations with the State. The February
22 offer was made through the media, and triggered a
flurry of adolescent posturing on both sides. On February
23, Home Minister Chidambaram declared that he would
accept no "ifs and buts" for talks, and demanded that
the Maoists first "abjure violence". The puerile twist
came in the tail, when Chidambaram gave the media his
Fax number (011-23093155) with the instruction that the Maoists could Fax their truce
offer to him directly, if they were ready. Not to be
outdone, and again through the media, Rao gave his phone
number with the declaring, "If he (Chidambaram)
wants to talk on our ceasefire proposal, let him speak
to me on my phone number 09734695789. He is welcome
to call me on February 25 but after 5pm.''
Unsurprisingly, there was no direct communication from
either side.
The
absurdity of this exchange is underlined by the fact
that, less than a fortnight earlier, while addressing
the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security
at New Delhi, on February 7, Chidambaram had stated:
You
will recall that at the last Conference of Chief
Ministers, I had announced that we would encourage
State Governments to talk to the Naxalites if
they abjured violence. Our public offer was scoffed
at and spurned by the CPI-Maoist. Hence, in consultation
with the Chief Ministers of Naxal affected States,
we decided to boldly confront the challenge thrown
by the CPI-Maoist.
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Again, on February 19, 2010, Chidambaram argued,
There
can be no half-way approach. Most people still
think there could be a compromise or some kind
of median approach. This is immature and foolish…
This is expected because as long as we did not
engage them, they were happy and expanding. They
will continue to expand unless we challenge them."
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Precisely month earlier on January 19, Chidambaram said,
"Left Wing Extremists have to be confronted squarely
and boldly. We have to deal with them firmly and decisively."
Within
such a perspective, abruptly engaging in a high profile
media debate on talks no more than served the Maoist
agenda of sowing confusion, particularly in the context
of the apparent unwillingness on the part of at least
two Chief Ministers among the worst affected States,
Shibu Soren of Jharkhand and Nitish Kumar of Bihar,
to tow the Centre’s line on anti-Naxalite operations.
Speaking in the immediate aftermath of the Sildha incident
in West Bengal, Nitish Kumar declared, on February 16,
2010, "Maoists cannot be countered by force. All round
development and launching of welfare measures can bring
the ultras back to the mainstream." Earlier, on January
18, Shibu Soren went a step further , denying the very
existence of the Maoists in his State: "The question
is whether they are Naxals or not? The media has created
a hype by claiming that Naxals are active in the State."
Soren added, further, "If there is a need, then force
can be used. But if the situation can be resolved without
confrontation, why not solve it?"
Worse,
it was abundantly clear that the Maoists had taken a
decision to escalate and widen their ‘people’s war’,
and this decision had influenced the Centre’s approach.
Chidambaram, at the February 7 Conference, noted,
In
consultation with the Chief Ministers of Naxal
affected States, we decided to boldly confront
the challenge thrown by the CPI-Maoist. Consequently,
there was a rise in the number of deaths in 2009.
As the SFs move forward to reclaim areas that
are now dominated by the Naxalites, it is possible
that this trend will continue in 2010 too.
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On
December 21, 2009, Koteswar Rao had, moreover, warned,
If
2009 was bad, 2010 would be 'bloodier' if the
Government goes ahead with its planned offensive
against the Maoist jungle. This so-called assault
against us will backfire.
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It
must be obvious that fishing for talks in these circumstances
could serve little purpose. Significantly, Chidambaram
had himself noted , on
February 19, that intellectual support to the Maoists
made the task of tackling them "very difficult", as
it confused people. Far from injecting some clarity
into the discourse, the futile talk about talks can
only have further confounded issues.
This
could not have happened at a worse time. The South
Asia Terrorism Portal database indicates that fatalities
in 2009 had seen a dramatic
spurt to a total of 998, just below the high intensity
conflict benchmark of 1,000 fatalities, as against 638
in 2008. In 2009, these included
392 civilians, 312 SF personnel and 292 Maoist cadres.
The situation, however, is much worse. According the
Ministry of Home Affairs data (Year-end Review, published
December 24, 2009) Maoist related fatalities in 2009,
up till November, included 514 civilians and 304 SF
personnel – numbers that will take the 2009 total well
above the high intensity mark. [Open source data frequently
underestimates fatalities]. The beginnings of 2010 are far from auspicious,
and by March 1, Maoist-related fatalities were already
totalling 160, including 65 civilians, 37 SF personnel
and 58 Naxalites.
Critically, Home Minister Chidambaram has already noted that
223 Districts across 20 States in the country are already
infected by Maoist activities, up from just 55 in 2003
– though areas that "consistently witnessed" violence
covered just 400 Police Stations in 90 Districts in
13 States (there are 14,000 Police Stations in the country).
The seven worst affected States in 2009, in terms of
fatalities, were Chhattisgarh (345 killed), Jharkhand
(217), West Bengal (159), Maharashtra (87), Orissa (81),
Bihar (78), and Andhra Pradesh (28) [SATP data].
It
is now evident that the Maoist potential to penetrate
other States, which had hitherto remained outside their
grasp, has evolved enormously. On February 20, 2009,
for instance, Kerala State intelligence sources indicated,
against the backdrop of the launching of operations
to flush out Left Wing Extremists (LWEs) from Maharashtra,
Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, that the Maoists
had penetrated into rural areas of Kerala in the guise
of labourers. Similarly, after the arrest of five CPI-Maoist
cadres belonging to the Narayanpur District of Chhattisgarh
by a joint team of the Chhattisgarh Police and Gujarat
Police from the Hazira industrial area of Surat in Gujarat
on April 10, 2009, the Surat Deputy Commissioner of
Police, Subhash Trivedi disclosed that the group had
visited Chhattisgarh frequently. "They used to return
to Surat, either after carrying out attacks, or when
any member fell ill." On October 12, 2009, the Balaghat
Superintendent of Police, H. C. Mishra, noted that more
than 50 CPI-Maoist cadres had sneaked into Madhya Pradesh’s
insurgency-affected Balaghat District, from Chhattisgarh
and Maharashtra, after the SFs targeted them in the
two neighbouring States. It is evident that the Maoist
geographical extension is continuing and, as in the
past, may indeed be facilitated by the ‘squeeze’ that
operations are exerting on them in certain areas. Maoist
consolidation and mobilization has, indeed, continued
despite the arrest of several Maoist leaders, prominently
including Kobad Ghandy from an undisclosed place in
Delhi, Chhatradhar Mahato from West Bengal, and Ravi
Sarma and B. Anuradha, who were arrested in Jharkhand.
The Maoist organizational base clearly has the complexity
and dynamism not only to survive such losses, but to
continue to expand despite these.
Maoist
networks of extortion are further testimony to this
dynamism. Documents and hard disks seized from Misir
Besra alias Bhaskar alias Sunirmal, a
politburo and Central Military Commission member of
the CPI-Maoist, who was arrested in September 2007 from
Jharkhand's Khunti District, had revealed that the Maoists
collected over INR 1,000 crore in 2007 through their
State Committees, and had set a target of INR 1,125
crore for 2008. Vishwa Ranjan, Director General of Police,
Chhattisgarh, stated on November 29, 2009, that the
Maoists annually extorted up to INR 20 billion across
India, mostly targeting iron and coal mining companies,
infrastructure project contractors and tendu patta
(leaves of Diospyros melonoxylon
used for bidis, local cigarettes) businessmen.
These ‘levies’ are augmented through abductions, extortion
and looting, as well as coercive ‘tax collection’ in
rural areas. The Home Minister notes, moreover, "There
is no evidence of Naxalites getting money from abroad.
They are able to raise money inside the country. But
they also loot banks, kidnap and extort."
It
must be evident – and this is something that MHA rhetoric
has repeatedly confirmed – that an enemy as relentless
and well-organised as the Maoist can only be countered
through a coherent and well thought out strategy. If,
however, even a basic consensual assessment of the threat
is lacking – and is further undermined by the inconsistent
public postures of the top central and State leaderships
– it is not clear how such a strategy is to be framed.
Unsurprisingly, the operations that have been fitfully
launched over the past year have little potential to
secure any enduring gains. A ‘major’, concerted and
centrally coordinated offensive against Naxalites is
supposed to have started with Police in Maharashtra
and Chhattisgarh launching a joint operation on December
25, 2009, but with questionable gains, the Government
has been forced to backtrack. The reality is, in the
absence of a strategy that factors in available and
required Force capacities, any emphasis on operations
is destined to fail. Each such
failure will further undermine Force morale and create
rising and irrational pressure for ‘negotiated’, ‘developmental’
and ‘political’ solutions, even as Maoist consolidation
progresses.
The
false confidence that was generated by the deployment
of ‘massive’ CPMF contingents into the Maoist afflicted
areas is a further case in point. In the wake of the
furious rhetoric about a ‘massive offensive’ against
the Maoists, CPMF deployments in Naxalite affected States
were raised from 37 battalions to 58 battalions. 21
additional battalions yield barely 8,400 personnel in
the field, taking total deployment up to a bare 23,200
CPMF personnel for the six worst-affected
States, with a total area of 1.86 million square kilometers
and a total population of over 446 million. As has been
repeatedly emphasized before, this is like trying to
irrigate the desert with dewdrops.
A
tremendous effort of capacity consolidation and building
will have to precede any effective operational strategy
to stall and then neutralize the Maoist rampage. The
most significant component of this process will have
to be distributed across the State’s Forces, and cannot
be engineered through CPMF augmentations alone. In the
absence of any consensus on the Maoist threat and counter-insurgent
strategy, however, there has been increasing reliance
on central Forces and agencies. Astonishingly, the
Government has reduced allocation for the CPMFs from
INR 30,900 crore in 2009-10 to INR 29,940 crore in the
next fiscal, introducing a new element of incoherence
in the state’s responses. Assistance to the States for
the modernization of their Forces, at INR 19.75 billion,
moreover, has seen no more than a modest increment of
INR 1.3 billion (6.6 per cent), making a mockery of
Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s commitments, in
his Budget Speech on February 26, to make "adequate
funds" available.
A
societal consensus clearly does not exist with regard
to the Maoist conundrum in India. A range of Maoist
front organizations, as well as sympathetic and often
simply confused ‘intellectuals’, systematically undermines
the possibility of the crystallization of such a consensus
[it is unsurprising that, while making his conditional
offer of a ceasefire, Koteshwar Rao appealed to ‘intellectuals
and human rights activists to mediate’ between the Maoists
and the Government]. This is to be expected, and can
be countered, if the state and its agencies are able
to project coherent assessments, policies, strategies
and perspectives. When the state itself sows confusion,
there can be no prizes for guessing who gains.
Note: The name and the
designation of Misir Besra were incorrectly mentioned
in the article. The mistake is rectified on May 4, 2010.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
February 22- March 1,
2010
|
Civilian
|
Security Force
Personnel
|
Terrorist/Insurgent
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu and Kashmir
|
1
|
5
|
6
|
12
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Maharashtra
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jharkhand
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Karnataka
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
West
Bengal
|
5
|
1
|
4
|
10
|
Total (INDIA)
|
11
|
6
|
14
|
31
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
FATA
|
4
|
1
|
28
|
33
|
NWFP
|
24
|
5
|
54
|
83
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
28
|
6
|
82
|
116
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Nine
Indians killed in Taliban
twin suicide attacks
on hotels in Kabul:
Taliban militants,
on February 26, carried
out coordinated suicide
attacks at two hotels
in Kabul, the capital
city of Afghanistan,
killing at least nine
Indians, including two
Major-rank Army officers.
At least 10 others,
including five Indian
Army officers, were
injured in the strike
that killed eight others,
including locals and
nationals from other
countries. The bombers,
believed to be three
in number, struck at
the guest houses, particularly
at Park Residence, rented
out by the Indian Embassy
for its staffers and
those linked to India’s
developmental work in Afghanistan.
External Affairs Minister
S.M. Krishna said that,
as per the preliminary
information provided
by Afghanistan Government
officials, "up to nine
Indians...have lost
their lives." The
Indian Ambassador in
Kabul, Jayant Prasad,
said that it looked
like a 26/11 (November
26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist
attacks) type attack,
specifically targeting
Indians, as the attackers
searched each and every
room and killed people.
Meanwhile,
the Taliban have already
claimed responsibility
for the attack. The
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
denied its involvement
in the attack following
a phone call by a man
who introduced himself
as spokesman for the
group to the BBC Urdu Service
in London to
claim responsibility
for the attack. The
Hindu;
IBN Live,
February 27, 2010.
Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram
rejects CPI-Maoist’s
conditional cease-fire:
A
day after Communist
Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) proposed
a conditional cease-fire,
Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram on February
23 rejected the offer,
saying the Government
would not accept any
"ifs and buts" for talks.
Instead, he asked the
CPI-Maoist to come out
with a statement pledging
to "abjure violence". He
said if the Maoists
were ready, they could
fax their truce offer
directly to him, on
011-23093155. Responding
to the invitation, Maoist
politburo member Koteswar
Rao alias Kishan
said, ''If he (Chidambaram)
wants to talk on our
ceasefire proposal,
let him speak to me
on my phone number 09734695789.
He is welcome to call
me on February 25 but
after 5pm.'' He
did not spell out if
he was ready to meet
Chidambaram's demand
to cease violence.
Earlier,
on February 22, the
Maoist leadership said
that it was ready for
dialogue only if the
Union Government halted
Security Force’s operations
targeting the outfit
for 72 days. Raju, an
aide of Maoist politburo
member Koteswar Rao alias Kishan,
said the Maoists were
ready to hold talks
with the Union Government
if the latter promised
to stop "violence" from
February 25 to May 7.
The condition comes
within a week of Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram
saying that the Centre
would find ways to facilitate
talks with the Maoists
if the latter halted
violence for 72 hours.
The
Hindu;
Times of India, February
23-24, 2010.
India
submit three dossiers
during foreign secretary
level talk with Pakistan:
India submitted three dossiers during foreign
secretary level talk
with Pakistan in New
Delhi on February
25, which Pakistan assured
it would seriously examine.
One dossier provides
information on some
individuals associated
with the November 26,
2008 (also known as
26/11) Mumbai attacks,
the second was a list
of Indian fugitives
sheltered in Pakistan
and the third on the
Jama'at-ud-Da'awa (JuD),
chief Hafiz Saeed’s
anti-India statements.
India asked for
33 terrorists -- Pakistani
nationals as well as
Indian fugitives, including
two serving Pakistan Army
officers, Major Iqbal
and Major Samir Ali
-- to be handed over.
In the meantime, Pakistan discussed India’s
involvement in supplying
weapons and money to
insurgents in Balochistan
which India said
was a "baseless allegation.
The
Hindu;
Times of India, February
26, 2010.
Infiltration
bid up at 485 in 2009,
says Chief Minister
Omar Abdullah: Admitting a surge in cross-border infiltration, the Jammu and
Kashmir Government on
March 1 said an estimated
485 attempts were made
by armed militants in
2009, up by 143 against
the previous year (2008).
"It is a fact that infiltration
bids have risen. During
2009, the gross infiltration
(attempts) was estimated
at 485 and net infiltration
(number of militants)
was 113," the Chief
Minister and Minister
in charge for Home Omar
Abdullah said in a written
reply to the Assembly.
During 2008, infiltration
bids were estimated
at 342, while 57 militants
intruded. There is an
increase of 143 bids
in 2009 and 56 militants
have been able to infiltrate.
"A number of steps have
been taken to check
infiltration. These
measures include border
fencing and its electrification,
installation of night
vision devices and heat
sensing gadgets," the
Minister added.
PTI News,
March 1, 2010.
Naxals
running arms manufacturing
units, says Union Minister
of State for Home Affairs
Ajay Maken: Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Ajay Maken
disclosed on February
24 that the Naxals (Left
wing Extremists) were
running arms manufacturing
units in the interior
areas of Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand and Bihar.
In a written reply in
the Rajya Sabha (Upper
House of Parliament)
Maken said the Maoists
arms factories manufacture
country-made weapons.
Maken added, "Most of
the foreign made arms
with Naxalites have
been looted from security
forces. There are no
inputs to indicate that
Maoists are procuring
arms from any foreign
country." The Security
Forces recovered 1,511
arms in 2008 and 572
in 2009, from the Naxalites.
In 2010 till February
16, Security Forces
recovered 78 arms from
the Naxalites. ANI News,
February 25, 2010.
NEPAL
Prachanda
threatens of "final
revolt" for poor people's
constitution: The Unified Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist
(Unified CPN-Maoist)
Chairman Pushpa Kamal
Dahal aka Prachanda
said on February 26
that the country needs
"the final revolt" to
write a new Constitution
in favour of poor people,
reports Kantipuronline.
Speaking at the inaugural
ceremony of a ‘martyr’s
memorial gate’ set up
by the Unified CPN-Maoist
District Committee in
Damauli District, Prachanda
remarked that, if anyone
dares to corner the
Maoists, the people
will wreak havoc against
the current Government.
Kantipur online,
February 27, 2010.
PAKISTAN
54
militants and 24 civilians
among 83 persons killed
during the week in NWFP:
Security
Forces (SFs) recovered
the dead bodies of a
senior Taliban ‘commander’
and five of his accomplices
from the Madyan area
of Swat in North West
Frontier Province (NWFP)
on March 1.
Seven
people were killed and
44 injured in sectarian
violence in the Dera
Ismail Khan area on
February 28. The violence
erupted in Paharpur
on February 27 as hundreds
rallied to celebrate
Eid Miladun Nabi, which
marks the Prophet Mohammad's
birthday. "… all the
dead are Sunnis, there
are some Shias among
the injured," District
Police Chief Gul Afzal
Afridi said.
SFs
killed 25 militants
in the frontier region
of Peshawar in NWFP
in the first four days
of Operation Spring
Cleaning. Officials
said the operation was
jointly launched on
February 24, 2010, and
would continue until
the elimination of militants
form the area. They
said one Frontier Crop
trooper had been killed
in fighting and five
others were injured.
Two
suicide bombers rammed
explosive-laden vehicles
into a Police Station
in Karak District, killing
three persons, including
two Policemen, and wounding
23 others on February
27. The District Police
Officer of Karak District
said there were two
suicide bombers. One
blew himself up at the
Police Station gate,
killing a Policeman
there. Then, another
suicide bomber brought
his vehicle with explosives
into the building and
blew himself up, killing
a child and a coach
driver.
At
least 17 Taliban militants
were killed in an operation
in the Pastawana area
of Kohat on February
26.
Four
militants were killed
during an encounter
between SFs and militants
in the Charsadda District
on February 25.
Three
passengers were killed
and three others sustained
injuries when unidentified
militants opened fired
at a railway coach in
the Tor Ghar area of
Thall tehsil
(revenue unit) in Hangu
District.
13
persons, including three
SF personnel and four
women, were killed,
and 41 were injured,
when a suicide bomber
hit a SF convoy at the
Nishat Chowk in Mingora
city on February 22.
A British woman, who
had converted to Islam
a month earlier, also
died in the attack,
while her husband was
injured. Dawn; Daily Times; The
News,
February 23–March 2,
2010.
28
militants and four civilians
among 33 persons killed
during the week in FATA:
A
Taliban ‘commander’,
Mohammed Qari Zafar,
wanted in connection
with the 2006 bombing
of the US consulate
in Karachi, was among
13 persons killed in
a suspected missile
strike in the Dargah
Mandi area of North
Waziristan in Federally
administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) near the
border with Afghanistan
on February 24. In addition,
nine Taliban militants
were killed when a US
drone fired missiles
into a Taliban compound
in the Dandey Darpa
Khel area of North Waziristan.
Further, the Taliban
militants beheaded three
men, including two Afghans,
in North Waziristan,
accusing them of spying
for the US.
Five
Taliban militants were
killed and four others
injured when the explosives
that they were planting
around their hideout
detonated accidentally
in Ali Sherzai Dar village
of Kurram Agency in
FATA on February 23.
Dawn; Daily Times; The
News,
February 23–March 2,
2010.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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