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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 44, May 10, 2010
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Rumblings
of Anarchy
Guest Writer: Prashant Jha
Contributing Editor, Himal Southasian Magazine;
Columnist, Nepal Times, Kathmandu
Nepal
is limping back to normal after a six-day general strike
(May 2 – 7) called by the Unified Communist Party of
Nepal – Maoist (UCPN-M)
that crippled the country.
Billed
by the party as the ‘decisive’ and ‘final’ movement
for ‘peace, constitution, national independence, civilian
supremacy and a Maoist-led national unity Government’,
the strike saw hundreds of thousands of Maoist cadres
agitate in Kathmandu and other urban centres. While
there was some hidden violence, in terms of extortion
and pressuring urban dwellers to accommodate and feed
party workers coming from outside, the movement itself
was largely peaceful.
There
was something of a carnival feel, with protestors congregating
at every street corner early in the morning, singing
and dancing to ‘revolutionary’ music, and listening
to speeches directed against the present Madhav Kumar
Nepal-led Government and ‘foreign powers’. The narrative
was kept simple – we have brought the republic, federalism
and secularism; we are the most powerful and popular
party in the country; we won the elections; this Government
is run by a set of unelected losers who do not want
peace or constitution; it is there only because of India;
so we need to have a movement against this Government
and for national independence; people in security organs
are also sons of Nepali farmers and workers and will
not go against us.
But,
almost a week into the movement, the Maoists unilaterally
withdrew the strike on Friday, May 7. The next day,
Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda gave
a speech at a mass meeting, giving two reasons – to
make life easier for the general public, and to foil
the Government’s conspiracy of turning people against
people, a reference to instances of backlash against
Maoist protestors in parts of the Terai and Kathmandu.
On Sunday, May 9, the Maoist Standing Committee decided
that they would not engage in any talks with the Government
till the PM resigned; that the party would focus on
‘internal training sessions’; and they would organize
mass rallies across the country on May 25 – three days
before the term of the Constituent Assembly (CA) is
set to expire, even though a Constitution has not yet
been finalised.
Ever
since Prachanda’s resignation as PM after his failed
attempt to sack the then Army Chief General Rukmangad
Katawal in May 2009, the Maoists have been in agitation
mode. They demanded that the President’s ‘unconstitutional
move’ be corrected (the President had written to the
Army Chief not to relinquish office); blocked parliament
for six months; waged a movement for ‘national independence’
against India; toyed with the idea of tabling a no-confidence
motion against the reigning coalition; and then decided
to initiate its ‘final’ movement. Throughout the period,
the party machinery has been active, organizing rallies
and expanding membership.
But none
of these attempts has succeeded in forcing the non-Maoist
alliance to make way for the former rebels, or even
cede them any space in the formal apparatus of power.
The trust deficit between the Maoists and all the other
parties remains deep. The latter suspect that the Maoists
are not committed to multiparty democracy and, with
an Army of their own in cantonments, they could attempt
to ‘capture the state’. The Maoists, in turn, doubt
the commitment of the older parties to any kind of progressive
change, and suspect there is a deep conspiracy to dissolve
the CA. The India-Maoist relationship has steadily deteriorated,
with India suspicious of Maoist intentions and what
they perceived to be insensitivity to its security concerns.
Prachanda’s anti India rhetoric won him no friends down
south, in the Madhesh region, either. The Maoists, for
their part, blamed India for conspiring in the removal
of their Government. Suggestions that India would find
an alternative Maoist leader, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai,
more acceptable as PM made Prachanda both nervous and
angry. And the Nepal Army and Maoists continued to view
each other warily, despite repeated attempts by the
Maoists to assure the Army that they were ‘natural allies’
for the cause of ‘nationalism’.
The cumulative
constellation of forces that has emerged has, for the
first time in four years, seen a strong anti Maoist
alliance – of parties, President, Army, and India –
in place.
Prachanda
thought this could be broken with an indefinite national
strike and a show of strength. His calculations were
four-fold. One, getting hundreds of thousands on the
streets would generate enough moral pressure on the
Government to resign. Two, the disenchantment of the
Kathmandu populace with the Government would translate
into support for the Maoists, and the increasing frustration
due to the bandh (shut down) would be directed
against Prime Minister Madhav Nepal. Three, a prolonged
deadlock would force the international community, particularly
the Indians, to step in and stitch a deal ceding space
to the Maoists. And four, the ‘military-bourgeoisie’
alliance, manifested in the consolidation of all non-Maoist
political forces, President and Army, would fracture;
there would be fissures within both the Nepali Congress
(NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist
Leninist (CPN-UML) eroding the Government’s strength.
This
was a miscalculation on all fronts. The Government sat
tight, and did not blink. The support of locals in Kathmandu
was limited; they did not particularly like the Government,
but neither did they understand the need for such a
massive and disruptive movement at the present juncture.
The middle class was further alienated due to the strong-arm
tactics adopted by the Maoists in the run-up to the
movement, and showed up in large numbers at a ‘peace
rally’ on Friday morning, calling for an end to the
strike and a resolution of the political deadlock. The
Maoists also under-estimated the Indian resolve as well
as the determination of domestic political forces not
to allow the Maoists back in ‘till they change’. The
more the Maoists adopted the route of militant mass
politics, the tougher the non-Maoist camp was getting.
And the pressure from non-regional international actors,
including the United States, the European Union and
the United Nations, was on the Maoists, urging them
not to cripple the country.
Faced
with such an adverse reaction, the Maoists made a tactical
retreat. Realizing that they could not achieve what
they sought through the strike, they came to project
the withdrawal as the moral high ground, making a show
of magnanimity; putting the onus on the Government;
reaching out to the internationals; and hoping to win
public sympathy for being a ‘sensitive and responsible
party’. The top Maoist leaders feel the present battle
could go on till May 28 (the deadline for the Constitution
drafting process) and beyond. Sustaining a strike till
then would be difficult. The current withdrawal creates
a breather to regroup and re-strategize.
The non-Maoist
camp has been smug, viewing the collapse of the strike
as a victory. The PM has refused to resign, and many
in the Indian establishment and in the NC-UML combine
feel this is the moment to pressurize the Maoists even
more. These, however, are short-sighted and potentially
counter-productive perspectives that would push the
Maoists to unleashing their substantial destructive
prowess (which was held in check last week). The Maoist
organisational ability to mobilize masses, as demonstrated
through the strike, should give ample warning about
the risks of brinkmanship in the current situation.
If the
objective remains completing the peace process, writing
a constitution, and achieving a degree of political
stability, a fresh political settlement will be necessary.
For now,
the Maoists have to be honest on integration and put
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under the all party
Special Committee in practice. Numbers and process (of
who would be incorporated in the Nepal Army, in other
security organs, and who would be rehabilitated) have
to be agreed upon. There have to be serious negotiations
on how to transform the paramilitary structure of the
Young Communist League (YCL).
The culture of militant youth wings in other parties,
especially the UML’s Youth Force, has to be simultaneously
tackled. All parties would also have to accept the need
for an extension of the CA through a constitutional
amendment. And a new national unity Government, led
by an acceptable figure, would have to be constituted
to reflect the actual power realities of the country
and to bridge the current trust deficit.
If such
a deal is not arrived at in the next fortnight, a political
and constitutional crisis is inevitable. The CA would
cease to exist on May 28. Ultra-left sections of the
Maoists would seek to capitalize on the vacuum by declaring
a constitution from the streets, even as the ultra-right
would try to use President Ram Baran Yadav to take over
state power. The risk of a militarized confrontation
on the streets, the consequences of which would be totally
unpredictable, would rise unacceptably.
It is
crucial that the process that was initiated with the
12-point agreement in New Delhi in November 2005 is
not aborted mid-way. The Maoists must implement their
commitments; Prachanda would have to accept that the
balance of power is not conducive for him to become
Prime Minister immediately; the older parties have to
remain wedded to the agenda of a new constitution; the
Prime Minister has to resign and make way for a Government
with Maoist participation; and India has to use its
leverage with all sides to revive the process instead
of remaining totally partisan.
The alternative
is greater anarchy and violence.
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The Rise
of Hindutva Terrorism
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Associate Editor, The Hindu, New Delhi
Eight hundred
years ago, the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti described
what he called the highest form of worship: "to redress
the misery of those in distress, to fulfil the needs of
the helpless and to feed the hungry."
Back in
October, 2007, bombs ripped through the courtyard of what
is without dispute South Asia’s most popular Muslim religious
centre — the shrine that commemorates Chishti’s life at
Ajmer Sharif, in Rajasthan. For months, Police believed
the attacks had been carried out by Islamist groups, who
oppose the shrine’s syncretic message. On April 30, 2010,
however, Rajasthan Police investigators arrested the man
they say purchased the mobile phone subscriber-identification
modules (SIM) used to trigger the attack. Devendra Gupta,
a long standing worker of the Hindu-nationalist Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), was held along with his political
associates Vishnu Prasad and Chandrashekhar Patidar. All
three men are now also thought to have participated in
the bombing of the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.
Rajasthan Home Minister Shanti Kumar Dhariwal said the
men were backed by an "organisation which tries to
incite violence between Hindus and Muslims", adding
that authorities were "investigating the links of
the organisation with the RSS."
The arrests
in Rajasthan mark progress in resolving some of the most
opaque and contentious terrorist attacks India has seen
in recent years — but have also focussed attention on
the little-understood threat of Hindu-nationalist or Hindutva
terrorism.
Evidence
that Hindutva groups were seeking to acquire terrorist
capabilities began to emerge late in 2002. In December
that year, an improvised explosive device was found at
Bhopal’s railway station, evidently intended to target
Muslims arriving in the city to attend a Tablighi Jamaat
gathering. Exactly a year later, a second bomb was found
in the Lamba Khera area, on the outskirts of Bhopal, on
the last day of a Talblighi Jamaat meeting. Both devices
were made with commercial nitroglycerine-based explosive,
packed inside a four-inch long section of grooved pipe
— the kind used, for example, in tube-wells. The explosive
was linked to a detonator controlled by both a quartz
alarm clock and a mobile phone. Investigators would, in
coming years, become familiar with the device: it would
be used, with only minor modifications, at Mecca Masjid
and at the Ajmer Sharif Shrine. Police in Madhya Pradesh
soon developed information linking the attempted Bhopal
bombings to local Hindutva activists Ramnarayan Kalsangram
and Sunil Joshi. Both suspects were, Police sources said,
questioned. No hard evidence linking them to the attempted
bombings, however, emerged. Nevertheless, former Madhya
Pradesh Chief Minister Digvijay Singh announced that he
had evidence of the involvement of members of the Bajrang
Dal, an affiliate of the RSS, in acts of terrorism. For
reasons that are unclear, though, this evidence was not
used to prosecute members of the organisation or any other
suspects. Nor were Kalsangram and Joshi placed under sustained
surveillance, a failure — regrettably common in Indian
policing — that was to cost many lives in coming years.
From 2006,
more evidence began to become available that Hindutva
terrorist groups were seeking to enhance their lethality.
That summer, Bajrang Dal activists Naresh Kondwar and
Himanshu Panse were killed in a bomb-making accident in
Nanded, Maharashtra. Police later discovered that the
two men had been responsible for bombing a mosque in the
Parbhani District in April 2006. Bajrang Dal activists
linked to the Nanded cell, the Police also found, had
bombed mosques at Purna and Jalna in April, 2003, injuring
18 people.
Few in
India’s intelligence services saw these activities as
a serious threat. In New Delhi, where two low-grade bombs
went off at the historic Jama Masjid at the same time,
Police made almost no serious effort to investigate the
case. However, the Maharashtra Police — who had better
reason than most to rue the fact, after all, that the
Indian jihadist movement flowered because inadequate
attention had been paid to a handful of obscure Islamists
staging parades in a Mumbai slum — made clear its disquiet.
In a 2006 interview to the Mumbai-based magazine Communalism
Combat, former Maharashtra anti-terrorism Police chief
K.P. Raghuvanshi noted that the Nanded cell’s operations
could have "frightening repercussions", adding
further that "bombs were not being manufactured for
a puja [prayer ceremony]".
Raghuvanshi’s
concern was likely driven by information that Hindutva
groups could gain access to more lethal explosives. In
September 2006, the Police seized a 195-kilogram cocktail
of military grade explosives from an Ahmednagar scrap
dealer, Shankar Shelke. Shelke, investigators found, retrieved
the material — more than enough to execute all terror
strikes across India since 1993 — from a decommissioned
Indian Army ordinance store which had sold it as scrap.
From Shelke’s telephone records, the investigators established
the existence of a huge underground market for high-grade
explosives — in the main industrial users who found legally
available ammonium nitrate-based slurry explosives a nuisance
to store and use.
In May,
2007, a high-intensity bomb went off under a granite slab
in an open-air area of the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad,
killing nine people and injuring at least 50; another
five people were shot dead when Police fired on violent
mobs who protested against the attack. Police then said
the attack was likely carried out by the Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami
(HuJI);
State Home Minister K. Jana Reddy attributed it to "foreign
elements". Police in Hyderabad have, rightly, been
criticised for jumping to conclusions. It is worth noting,
though, that — some media accounts notwithstanding — no
arrests were made in the case, which was handed over to
the Central Bureau of Investigations. More than a dozen
Hyderabad Muslims were, indeed, held after the 2008 bombings
at Gokul Chaat and Lumbini Park, now believed to have
been carried out by a jihadist group, the Indian
Mujahideen (IM). None of the men, however, were charged
with involvement in either the 2007 or 2008 attacks; they
were, instead, accused, and eventually acquitted, on unrelated
charges of conspiring to execute acts of terror, based
on their alleged possession of fake identification and
pseudonymously-acquired mobile phones. Police in Hyderabad
have, in the course of the Hindutva terrorism allegation,
frequently been accused of communal bias. While the force
no doubt suffers from prejudices endemic to Indian society
as a whole, there is no empirical basis to suggest communalism
coloured its investigation of the Mecca Masjid bombing.
Police
in Rajasthan proved just as clueless when bombs went off
just outside the famous shrine at Ajmer, killing two people.
However, some critical pieces of evidence did emerge.
The SIM cards for mobile phones used to activate the bombs
at both Mecca Masjid and Ajmer, it turned out were among
a set of seven purchased by the perpetrators from West
Bengal and Jharkhand in April 2007. The bomb maker had
linked the phone’s speaker to a detonator, and packed
explosives inside grooved metal pipe — just as they had
in the earlier attempts in Bhopal.
In September,
2008, when bombs went off at Malegaon in Maharashtra and
Modasa in Gujarat, killing eight and injuring over eighty,
Police in Maharashtra were well-poised to develop the
leads they had been gathering since 2006. Within weeks,
investigators had arrested several key figures in a Pune-based
Hindutva cell they believed had carried out the Malegaon
attacks — among them, Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, a Madhya
Pradesh-based Hindu nun with deep links to the Hindutva
movement, Jammu-based cleric Sudhakar Dwivedi, and a serving
Indian Army Lieutenant Colonel, Shrikant Prasad Purohit,
linked under the umbrella of Abhinav Bharat.
Founded
in the summer of 2006 (on June 12), Abhinav Bharat had
been set up as an educational trust with Himani Savarkar
— daughter of Gopal Godse, brother of Mahatma Gandhi’s
assassin — as its President. But, documents filed by Maharashtra
prosecutors in the Pune court where Malegaon suspects
are being tried, showed that members of the group were
soon discussing terrorist activity. In June 2007, Purohit
allegedly suggested that the time had come to target Muslims
through terrorist attacks — a plea others in Abhinav Bharat
rejected. But, evidence gathered by the Police suggests,
many within the group were determined to press ahead.
At a meeting in April 2008, key suspects including Thakur
Dwivedi, also known as Amritananda Dev Tirtha, met Purohit
to hammer out the Malegaon plot. Explosives were later
procured by Purohit, and handed over to Ram Narayan Kalsangram,
in early August 2008.
Abhinav
Bharat’s long-term aims, though, went far beyond targeting
Muslims: its members wanted to overthrow the Indian state
and replace it with a totalitarian, theocratic order.
A ‘draft constitution’ spoke of a single-party system,
presided over by a leader who "shall be followed
at all levels without questioning the authority."
It called for the creation of an "academy of indoctrinization
[sic]." The concluding comment was stark:
"People whose ideas are detrimental to Hindu Rashtra
should be killed." Purohit’s plans to bring about
a Hindutva state were often fantastical — bordering, even,
on the pathological. He claimed, prosecutors say, to have
secured an appointment with Nepal’s former monarch, Gyanendra
Bir Bikram Shah Dev in 2006 and 2007, to press for his
support for the planned Hindutva revolution. Nepal, he
went on, was willing to train Abhinav Bharat’s cadre,
and supply it with assault rifles. Israel’s Government,
he said, had agreed to grant members of the group military
support and, if needed, political asylum. No evidence
has ever emerged that Purohit had, in fact, succeeded
in developing transnational patronage or linkages.
The son
of a bank officer with no particular political leanings,
Purohit seems to have first encountered Hindutva politics
in his late teens when he attended a special coaching
class for Short Service Commission officer-aspirants at
the Bhonsala Military School in Nashik. Founded in 1937
by B.S. Moonje, the controversial school drew on fascist
pedagogical practices the Hindutva ideologue encountered
on a visit to Europe. Moonje, who had earlier served with
the British Indian Army as a doctor during the visit,
had met with Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and studied
fascist institutions.
Purohit’s
military career itself was undistinguished. In 2002, he
participated in 15 Maratha Light Infantry’s counter-terrorism
operations in Jammu and Kashmir, but won no special honours.
Later, he was given an administrative job linked to the
raising of 41 Rashtriya Rifles, a dedicated counter-terrorism
formation that operates out of Kupwara, in northern Kashmir.
His tenure in Jammu and Kashmir ended in January, 2005,
while serving in the Awantipora-based 31-Counter Intelligence
Unit of the Military Intelligence Directorate, an assignment
not considered among the most prestigious.
Investigators
suspect Purohit’s decision to set up Abhinav Bharat germinated
soon after he moved to Maharashtra in 2005. Purohit was
assigned charge of an Army Liaison Unit, a Military Intelligence
cell responsible for developing and maintaining links
between the Army and local communities. The job provided
a perfect cover for developing contacts with his old school,
and the circle of Pune-region Hindutva activists who were
connected to it. School commandant Colonel S.S. Raikar,
investigators say, played a key role in putting Purohit
in touch with the activists who went on to form Abhinav
Bharat. Raikar, who retired from the Indian Army as head
of a Military Intelligence detachment in Manipur, is not
charged with criminal wrong-doing. In the summer of 2006,
though, Abhinav Bharat held the first of what was to be
a series of meetings in rooms provided by the Bhonsala
Military School. From the outset, it made no secret of
its objectives. Abhinav Bharat drew its name from a terrorist
group set up by Hindutva activists in 1904 to fight colonial
Britain. Himani Savarkar, grandniece of the Hindutva movement’s
founding patriarch Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and niece
of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin Nathuram Godse, was appointed
the organisation’s President.
Purohit
is alleged to have told Abhinav Bharat supporters that
his military background had equipped him, unlike the political
leadership of existing Hindutva organisations, to prepare
for what he saw as an inevitable Hindu-Muslim civilisational
war. He would often invent stories of heroic covert exploits
against jihadi terrorists to impress his recruits.
Full-time cadres of the organisation were known by the
honorific Chanakya, a reference to the scholar-advisor
who is reputed to have helped build the foundations for
the rule of the emperor Chandragupta Maurya.
Despite
the formidable mass of evidence it gathered, the Maharashtra
investigation ran into a wall — a wall from which the
recent arrests in Rajasthan may have removed a few bricks.
Thakur’s long-standing associate, Dewas-based RSS organiser
and Hindutva activist Sunil Joshi, was murdered on December
31, 2008. His political associates claimed he was killed
by Islamists; Police, however, believe that his murder
was driven both by disputes over funds within the Abhinav
Bharat network, and a romantic issue. Police have also
been unable to locate Gujarat-based Jatin Chatterjee,
an influential Hindu cleric who uses the clerical alias
Swami Asimananad. Chatterjee is a key figure in the controversial
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, which operates a Hindu-proselytisation
programme targeting adivasis (tribals) in southern
Gujarat. Police sources say he is likely hiding out in
Gujarat’s Dangs area, but claim the State Government has
failed to cooperate with efforts to locate the suspect.
Ram Narayan Kalsangram, the third key fugitive, is also
thought to be hiding out in Gujarat. Lawyers for Thakur
say she had sold a motorcycle used in the Malegaon bombings
to Joshi who, without her knowledge, passed it on to Kalsangram.
What lessons
ought India to be learning from the story of the Hindutva
terror network? Key among them is the urgent need to address
the country’s dysfunctional communal politics. Thakur
and her Hindutva terror cell have deep — and, for some,
discomfiting — roots in history. Influenced by the dramatic
impact of terrorism in imperial Russia, the Hindu nationalist
leader, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, became increasingly drawn
to violence as a tool to achieve Indian independence.
A year after the searing 1905 revolution, which compelled
Czar Alexander II to grant basic civil rights, Tilak exhorted
his followers: "The days of prayer have gone… Look
to the examples of Ireland, Japan and Russia and follow
their methods." Tilak’s message proved attractive
to many young, upper caste Hindu neoconservatives — often
the products of western-style education who had found
in their re-imagining of Indian tradition a language with
which to oppose British imperialism.
Figures
like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who went on to lead the
Hindu Mahasabha, cast the struggle against Britain as
a fight to defend the Hindu faith. In one manifesto, the
original Abhinav Bharat’s followers promised to "shed
upon the earth the life-blood of the enemies who destroy
religion." Later, the radical right journal Yugantar
argued that the murder of foreigners in India was "not
a sin but a yagna [ritual sacrifice]"—sentiments
that would be entirely familiar to Osama bin-Laden’s jihadi
armies today.
Despite
the arrests in Rajasthan, investigators probing Hindutva
terror groups still have much work to do. First, a number
of mysteries remain to be resolved—ranging from the New
Delhi bombings, to the unresolved firebombing of the New
Delhi-Lahore Samjhauta Express. Maharashtra prosecutors
say a witness heard Purohit linking Joshi to the train’s
firebombing. Purohit, the witness claimed, made the claim
after a December 29, 2007, phone call, when he was informed
of Joshi’s death. "After the phone call," a
senior Maharashtra Police officer disclosed, "our
witness says Lieutenant-Colonel Purohit credited Joshi
with having executed the Samjhauta Express attack, and
hailed him as a martyr." In 2009, however, the United
States Treasury Department attributed the attack to top
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
operative Arif Kasmani who, it said, was funded by Karachi-based
ganglord Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar.
The arrests
over the past weeks notwithstanding, the threat remains
real — and must be snuffed out. Last year, in June, Hindu
Janajagruti Samiti operatives were held for the bombing
of the Gadkari Rangayatan theatre in Thane (Maharashtra),
to protest the staging of a satire on the Mahabharata,
Amhi Pachpute. One of those arrested by the Police,
Mangesh Nikam, was facing trial on charges of bombing
the home of a Ratnagiri family that had converted to Christianity,
and was out on bail. Members of the Goa-based Sanatan
Sanstha, affiliated to Hindu Janajagruti, were held for
staging a bombing in Panani. Earlier, Bajrang Dal-linked
Rajiv Mishra and Bhupinder Singh were killed in a bomb-making
accident in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh (UP). UP Police sources
said there was little to show that the group had links
with the terror cells in Maharashtra, but experience shows
that even small cells, left untouched, will acquire ever-greater
levels of lethality.
|
Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
May 3-9,
2010
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
Bangladesh
|
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
1
|
4
|
11
|
16
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Andhra Pradesh
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Bihar
|
0
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
Chhattisgarh
|
1
|
8
|
3
|
12
|
Orissa
|
0
|
0
|
10
|
10
|
West Bengal
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
Total
(INDIA)
|
8
|
16
|
29
|
53
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
1
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
FATA
|
0
|
2
|
119
|
121
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*
|
0
|
4
|
8
|
12
|
Sindh
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total
(PAKISTAN)
|
2
|
8
|
127
|
137
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
* On April 15, 2010, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed
the Bill changing the name of the North West Frontier Province
to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
|
INDIA
Lashkar-e-Toiba
militant Kasab sentenced to death in Mumbai
multiple terrorist attacks case:
The
Special Sessions Court in Mumbai (Maharashtra)
on May 6 sentenced the lone surviving
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militant, Mohammad
Ajmal Amir Kasab, to death for his involvement
in the November 26, 2008 (also known as
26/11) Mumbai terrorist attacks. Mohammad
Ajmal Amir Kasab "shall be hanged by neck
till he is dead", the court pronounced.
Kasab was given the death penalty on five
counts: murder, abetment to murder, waging
war, criminal conspiracy and committing
terrorist acts. Special Public Prosecutor
Ujjwal Nikam told reporters that a confirmation
of the death penalty from the Bombay High
Court was awaited.
Earlier,
on May
3, the Court pronounced Kasab guilty on
the above five counts, after a 271-day
trial. The 1,522-page judgment convicted
Kasab of conspiring to wage war, along
with nine other terrorists and 20 co-conspirators
in Pakistan, and of murder and abetment
to murder, among other offences. Among
the 20 wanted accused indicted by the
Court are LeT Chief Muhammad Hafiz Saeed
and operatives Zaki-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi,
Zarar Shah and Abu Hamza. The Court acquitted
the other two accused, Indians, Fahim
Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed, of "all
the charges framed against them."
The two had been accused of making and
conveying maps of target locations in
Mumbai.
Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram on May 3
said that Kasab’s conviction "is
a message to Pakistan that they should
not export terror to India. If they do
and if the terrorists are apprehended,
we will be able to bring them to justice
and give them exemplary punishment."
Meanwhile,
the Maharashtra Government would challenge
the acquittal of Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin
Ahmed in the 26/11 case. The
Hindu,
May 4-7, 2010.
ISI
trying to disturb peace in Punjab, says
DGP Paramjit Singh Gill: Punjab
Director General of Police (DGP) Paramjit
Singh Gill on May 5 said that Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) keeps
backing anti-national elements to disturb
peace in Punjab. He said that there were
reports that ISI keeps instigating Khalistani
as well as Kashmiri terrorists to jointly
strike at sensitive places. Gill said
the way the ISI operates is clear indication
that Pakistan’s agencies tries to ensure
their (Khalistani and Kashmiri miliatants)
closer coordination. The DGP said he did
not foresee revival of terrorism in Punjab.
On presence of Naxals (Left Wing Extremists)
he said there are some "sleeping Naxal
elements" in Punjab but these are harmless.
Outlook
India ; Indian
Express, May 6,
2010.
Ajmer,
Mecca Masjid and Malegaon bomb blasts
are linked, says CBI:
The bomb blasts carried out
at the Ajmer (Rajasthan) Dargah
(Sufi Shrine), the Mecca Masjid
(Mosque, Andhra Pradesh) and Malegaon
(Maharashtra) are linked, with the self-styled
right-wing group, Abhinav Bharat, believed
to be behind them, the Central Bureau
of Investigation (CBI) said on May 3.
The
Hindu,
May 4, 2010.
Union
Government extends cease-fire agreement
with NSCN-K in Nagaland:
The
Union Government on May 3 extended the
cease-fire agreement with the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang
(NSCN-K) for another year till April 28,
2011.
Nagaland
Post,
May 4, 2010.
Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram makes offer
for talks to Maoists: Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram on May 5 made a fresh offer
for talks to the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) provided they abjure violence.
"No killings, no demolition of buildings
and give me seventy-two hours. Let me
get the chief ministers together and tell
you time and place. I know you will not
give up arms as armed struggle is your
ideology, but abjure violence and then
we can discuss everything under the sun,"
Chidambaram said. PTI
News, May 6, 2010.
Support
to Maoists will attract jail term, warns
MHA: The
Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in
a statement on May 6 warned civil society
groups, non-governmental organisations,
intellectuals and the general public to
refrain from supporting the Communist
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) ideology
as it will attract action under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
The
Hindu, May 7,
2010.
Counter-insurgency
force in West Bengal by August 2010, says
Police Chief:
West
Bengal Director General of Police (DGP)
Bhupinder Singh said the State will have
a 1,000-strong counter- insurgency force
on the pattern of the Grey Hound forces
of Andhra Pradesh and also a training
school for tackling terrorism within the
next two to three months. The project
is expected to cost around INR 270 million.
The Hindu,
May 7, 2010.
PAKISTAN
119
militants and two SFs among 121 persons
killed during the week in FATA: The
Security Forces (SFs) and drone strikes
killed around 43 Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, TTP) militants in various areas
of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA) on May 9.
At
least nine Taliban (TTP) militants were
killed and several others sustained injuries
during clashes with SFs in Orakzai Agency
on May 8.
Five
Taliban (TTP) militants were killed as
choppers pounded militant hideouts during
operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (I will see
you) in various areas of Orakzai Agency
on May 7.
27
Taliban (TTP) militants and a trooper
were killed during operation Khwakh
Ba De Sham in various areas of Orakzai
Agency on May 6.
At
least 13 Taliban (TTP) militants and two
troopers were killed during clashes in
Orakzai Agency, while helicopter gunships
fired heavy artillery at militant hideouts
in Bajaur Agency, killing another 18 Taliban
(TTP) militants on May 3. Officials said
that the Taliban (TTP) attacked a check-post
in Qamber Khawas village in the Lower
Orakzai Agency. The SFs retaliated and
killed 13 militants. Two SF personnel
were also killed.
US
missiles fired from a drone killed four
suspected Taliban (TTP) militants in North
Waziristan. The three missiles were fired
minutes apart at a moving vehicle in the
Marsi Khel area. The attack came just
hours after TTP ‘chief’ Hakeemullah Mehsud
vowed to attack US cities in two purported
new videos released on May 3. Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, May 4-10,
2010.
500
militants and about 30 civilians killed
in two years of drone strikes, says US
report: A
United States estimates show Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) drone strikes in Pakistan’s
tribal areas over the last two years have
killed more than 500 militants — a fraction
of whom are considered top-tier leaders
— and fewer than 30 civilians, US officials
said on May 3.
Daily
Times, May 4,
2010.
'40
terror camps near Af-Pak border’, says
Russian ambassador to India Alexander
M. Kadakin: The
Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander
M. Kadakin, has said that around 40 terror
camps are still active in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border areas, adding, this information
was based on Russian satellite imagery
and intelligence. "From the information
we have, there are about 38 to 40 such
terror camps. Earlier they would have
these bright green boards declaring the
name of the organization like Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT), they have now removed them. However,
the camps still remain,’’ Kadakin said,
adding that Pakistan had not done enough
to get rid of these camps.
Times
of India, May
10, 2010.
Tehreek-e-Taliban
expanding alliances, says New York Times
report: A
New York Times report on May 7 claimed
that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
which American investigators suspect was
behind the attempt to bomb Times Square,
has in recent years combined forces with
al Qaeda and other groups, threatening
to extend their reach and ambitions.
New
York Times, May
7, 2010.
Severe
consequences in case of proven bomb attack,
says US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:
The
United States (US) has warned of "severe
consequences" if a successful extremist
attack in America were traced back to
Pakistan, US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton said in an interview on May 7.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had
earlier been linked to a failed bid to
bomb New York's Times Square on May 2.
The
News, May 7, 2010.
Pakistan
economic woes linked to war against terror,
says Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani:
Pakistan’s
economic challenges are directly linked
to the war on terror, Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gilani said on May 3, and called
on the US Congress to facilitate his country
in addressing the root cause of terror.
Daily
Times, May 4,
2010.
SRI LANKA
LTTE
threat shifted from field of battle to
field of diplomacy, says External Affairs
Minister G.L. Peiris:
The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
threat against Sri Lanka has only shifted
from the field of battle to the field
of diplomacy, with attempts to establish
a Transnational Government in exile continuing,
said External Affairs Minister Professor
G. L. Peiris on May 6. Stating that the
Government has instructed the Sri Lankan
ambassadors in relevant countries to take
suitable action to handle the situation,
the Minister said Sri Lanka was now facing
a different type of threat inimical to
the interests of the country. "Although
the LTTE is militarily defeated the risk
is not over," Minister Peiris added further.
Daily
News,
May 7, 2010.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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