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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 44, May 10, 2010

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT

 


NEPAL
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Rumblings of Anarchy
Guest Writer: Prashant Jha
Contributing Editor, Himal Southasian Magazine; Columnist, Nepal Times, Kathmandu

Nepal is limping back to normal after a six-day general strike (May 2 – 7) called by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (UCPN-M) that crippled the country.

Billed by the party as the ‘decisive’ and ‘final’ movement for ‘peace, constitution, national independence, civilian supremacy and a Maoist-led national unity Government’, the strike saw hundreds of thousands of Maoist cadres agitate in Kathmandu and other urban centres. While there was some hidden violence, in terms of extortion and pressuring urban dwellers to accommodate and feed party workers coming from outside, the movement itself was largely peaceful.

There was something of a carnival feel, with protestors congregating at every street corner early in the morning, singing and dancing to ‘revolutionary’ music, and listening to speeches directed against the present Madhav Kumar Nepal-led Government and ‘foreign powers’. The narrative was kept simple – we have brought the republic, federalism and secularism; we are the most powerful and popular party in the country; we won the elections; this Government is run by a set of unelected losers who do not want peace or constitution; it is there only because of India; so we need to have a movement against this Government and for national independence; people in security organs are also sons of Nepali farmers and workers and will not go against us.

But, almost a week into the movement, the Maoists unilaterally withdrew the strike on Friday, May 7. The next day, Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda gave a speech at a mass meeting, giving two reasons – to make life easier for the general public, and to foil the Government’s conspiracy of turning people against people, a reference to instances of backlash against Maoist protestors in parts of the Terai and Kathmandu. On Sunday, May 9, the Maoist Standing Committee decided that they would not engage in any talks with the Government till the PM resigned; that the party would focus on ‘internal training sessions’; and they would organize mass rallies across the country on May 25 – three days before the term of the Constituent Assembly (CA) is set to expire, even though a Constitution has not yet been finalised.

Ever since Prachanda’s resignation as PM after his failed attempt to sack the then Army Chief General Rukmangad Katawal in May 2009, the Maoists have been in agitation mode. They demanded that the President’s ‘unconstitutional move’ be corrected (the President had written to the Army Chief not to relinquish office); blocked parliament for six months; waged a movement for ‘national independence’ against India; toyed with the idea of tabling a no-confidence motion against the reigning coalition; and then decided to initiate its ‘final’ movement. Throughout the period, the party machinery has been active, organizing rallies and expanding membership.

But none of these attempts has succeeded in forcing the non-Maoist alliance to make way for the former rebels, or even cede them any space in the formal apparatus of power. The trust deficit between the Maoists and all the other parties remains deep. The latter suspect that the Maoists are not committed to multiparty democracy and, with an Army of their own in cantonments, they could attempt to ‘capture the state’. The Maoists, in turn, doubt the commitment of the older parties to any kind of progressive change, and suspect there is a deep conspiracy to dissolve the CA. The India-Maoist relationship has steadily deteriorated, with India suspicious of Maoist intentions and what they perceived to be insensitivity to its security concerns. Prachanda’s anti India rhetoric won him no friends down south, in the Madhesh region, either. The Maoists, for their part, blamed India for conspiring in the removal of their Government. Suggestions that India would find an alternative Maoist leader, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, more acceptable as PM made Prachanda both nervous and angry. And the Nepal Army and Maoists continued to view each other warily, despite repeated attempts by the Maoists to assure the Army that they were ‘natural allies’ for the cause of ‘nationalism’.

The cumulative constellation of forces that has emerged has, for the first time in four years, seen a strong anti Maoist alliance – of parties, President, Army, and India – in place.

Prachanda thought this could be broken with an indefinite national strike and a show of strength. His calculations were four-fold. One, getting hundreds of thousands on the streets would generate enough moral pressure on the Government to resign. Two, the disenchantment of the Kathmandu populace with the Government would translate into support for the Maoists, and the increasing frustration due to the bandh (shut down) would be directed against Prime Minister Madhav Nepal. Three, a prolonged deadlock would force the international community, particularly the Indians, to step in and stitch a deal ceding space to the Maoists. And four, the ‘military-bourgeoisie’ alliance, manifested in the consolidation of all non-Maoist political forces, President and Army, would fracture; there would be fissures within both the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) eroding the Government’s strength.

This was a miscalculation on all fronts. The Government sat tight, and did not blink. The support of locals in Kathmandu was limited; they did not particularly like the Government, but neither did they understand the need for such a massive and disruptive movement at the present juncture. The middle class was further alienated due to the strong-arm tactics adopted by the Maoists in the run-up to the movement, and showed up in large numbers at a ‘peace rally’ on Friday morning, calling for an end to the strike and a resolution of the political deadlock. The Maoists also under-estimated the Indian resolve as well as the determination of domestic political forces not to allow the Maoists back in ‘till they change’. The more the Maoists adopted the route of militant mass politics, the tougher the non-Maoist camp was getting. And the pressure from non-regional international actors, including the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, was on the Maoists, urging them not to cripple the country.

Faced with such an adverse reaction, the Maoists made a tactical retreat. Realizing that they could not achieve what they sought through the strike, they came to project the withdrawal as the moral high ground, making a show of magnanimity; putting the onus on the Government; reaching out to the internationals; and hoping to win public sympathy for being a ‘sensitive and responsible party’. The top Maoist leaders feel the present battle could go on till May 28 (the deadline for the Constitution drafting process) and beyond. Sustaining a strike till then would be difficult. The current withdrawal creates a breather to regroup and re-strategize.

The non-Maoist camp has been smug, viewing the collapse of the strike as a victory. The PM has refused to resign, and many in the Indian establishment and in the NC-UML combine feel this is the moment to pressurize the Maoists even more. These, however, are short-sighted and potentially counter-productive perspectives that would push the Maoists to unleashing their substantial destructive prowess (which was held in check last week). The Maoist organisational ability to mobilize masses, as demonstrated through the strike, should give ample warning about the risks of brinkmanship in the current situation.

If the objective remains completing the peace process, writing a constitution, and achieving a degree of political stability, a fresh political settlement will be necessary.

For now, the Maoists have to be honest on integration and put the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under the all party Special Committee in practice. Numbers and process (of who would be incorporated in the Nepal Army, in other security organs, and who would be rehabilitated) have to be agreed upon. There have to be serious negotiations on how to transform the paramilitary structure of the Young Communist League (YCL). The culture of militant youth wings in other parties, especially the UML’s Youth Force, has to be simultaneously tackled. All parties would also have to accept the need for an extension of the CA through a constitutional amendment. And a new national unity Government, led by an acceptable figure, would have to be constituted to reflect the actual power realities of the country and to bridge the current trust deficit.

If such a deal is not arrived at in the next fortnight, a political and constitutional crisis is inevitable. The CA would cease to exist on May 28. Ultra-left sections of the Maoists would seek to capitalize on the vacuum by declaring a constitution from the streets, even as the ultra-right would try to use President Ram Baran Yadav to take over state power. The risk of a militarized confrontation on the streets, the consequences of which would be totally unpredictable, would rise unacceptably.

It is crucial that the process that was initiated with the 12-point agreement in New Delhi in November 2005 is not aborted mid-way. The Maoists must implement their commitments; Prachanda would have to accept that the balance of power is not conducive for him to become Prime Minister immediately; the older parties have to remain wedded to the agenda of a new constitution; the Prime Minister has to resign and make way for a Government with Maoist participation; and India has to use its leverage with all sides to revive the process instead of remaining totally partisan.

The alternative is greater anarchy and violence.

INDIA
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The Rise of Hindutva Terrorism
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Associate Editor, The Hindu, New Delhi

Eight hundred years ago, the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti described what he called the highest form of worship: "to redress the misery of those in distress, to fulfil the needs of the helpless and to feed the hungry."

Back in October, 2007, bombs ripped through the courtyard of what is without dispute South Asia’s most popular Muslim religious centre — the shrine that commemorates Chishti’s life at Ajmer Sharif, in Rajasthan. For months, Police believed the attacks had been carried out by Islamist groups, who oppose the shrine’s syncretic message. On April 30, 2010, however, Rajasthan Police investigators arrested the man they say purchased the mobile phone subscriber-identification modules (SIM) used to trigger the attack. Devendra Gupta, a long standing worker of the Hindu-nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), was held along with his political associates Vishnu Prasad and Chandrashekhar Patidar. All three men are now also thought to have participated in the bombing of the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. Rajasthan Home Minister Shanti Kumar Dhariwal said the men were backed by an "organisation which tries to incite violence between Hindus and Muslims", adding that authorities were "investigating the links of the organisation with the RSS."

The arrests in Rajasthan mark progress in resolving some of the most opaque and contentious terrorist attacks India has seen in recent years — but have also focussed attention on the little-understood threat of Hindu-nationalist or Hindutva terrorism.

Evidence that Hindutva groups were seeking to acquire terrorist capabilities began to emerge late in 2002. In December that year, an improvised explosive device was found at Bhopal’s railway station, evidently intended to target Muslims arriving in the city to attend a Tablighi Jamaat gathering. Exactly a year later, a second bomb was found in the Lamba Khera area, on the outskirts of Bhopal, on the last day of a Talblighi Jamaat meeting. Both devices were made with commercial nitroglycerine-based explosive, packed inside a four-inch long section of grooved pipe — the kind used, for example, in tube-wells. The explosive was linked to a detonator controlled by both a quartz alarm clock and a mobile phone. Investigators would, in coming years, become familiar with the device: it would be used, with only minor modifications, at Mecca Masjid and at the Ajmer Sharif Shrine. Police in Madhya Pradesh soon developed information linking the attempted Bhopal bombings to local Hindutva activists Ramnarayan Kalsangram and Sunil Joshi. Both suspects were, Police sources said, questioned. No hard evidence linking them to the attempted bombings, however, emerged. Nevertheless, former Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Digvijay Singh announced that he had evidence of the involvement of members of the Bajrang Dal, an affiliate of the RSS, in acts of terrorism. For reasons that are unclear, though, this evidence was not used to prosecute members of the organisation or any other suspects. Nor were Kalsangram and Joshi placed under sustained surveillance, a failure — regrettably common in Indian policing — that was to cost many lives in coming years.

From 2006, more evidence began to become available that Hindutva terrorist groups were seeking to enhance their lethality. That summer, Bajrang Dal activists Naresh Kondwar and Himanshu Panse were killed in a bomb-making accident in Nanded, Maharashtra. Police later discovered that the two men had been responsible for bombing a mosque in the Parbhani District in April 2006. Bajrang Dal activists linked to the Nanded cell, the Police also found, had bombed mosques at Purna and Jalna in April, 2003, injuring 18 people.

Few in India’s intelligence services saw these activities as a serious threat. In New Delhi, where two low-grade bombs went off at the historic Jama Masjid at the same time, Police made almost no serious effort to investigate the case. However, the Maharashtra Police — who had better reason than most to rue the fact, after all, that the Indian jihadist movement flowered because inadequate attention had been paid to a handful of obscure Islamists staging parades in a Mumbai slum — made clear its disquiet. In a 2006 interview to the Mumbai-based magazine Communalism Combat, former Maharashtra anti-terrorism Police chief K.P. Raghuvanshi noted that the Nanded cell’s operations could have "frightening repercussions", adding further that "bombs were not being manufactured for a puja [prayer ceremony]".

Raghuvanshi’s concern was likely driven by information that Hindutva groups could gain access to more lethal explosives. In September 2006, the Police seized a 195-kilogram cocktail of military grade explosives from an Ahmednagar scrap dealer, Shankar Shelke. Shelke, investigators found, retrieved the material — more than enough to execute all terror strikes across India since 1993 — from a decommissioned Indian Army ordinance store which had sold it as scrap. From Shelke’s telephone records, the investigators established the existence of a huge underground market for high-grade explosives — in the main industrial users who found legally available ammonium nitrate-based slurry explosives a nuisance to store and use.

In May, 2007, a high-intensity bomb went off under a granite slab in an open-air area of the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad, killing nine people and injuring at least 50; another five people were shot dead when Police fired on violent mobs who protested against the attack. Police then said the attack was likely carried out by the Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI); State Home Minister K. Jana Reddy attributed it to "foreign elements". Police in Hyderabad have, rightly, been criticised for jumping to conclusions. It is worth noting, though, that — some media accounts notwithstanding — no arrests were made in the case, which was handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigations. More than a dozen Hyderabad Muslims were, indeed, held after the 2008 bombings at Gokul Chaat and Lumbini Park, now believed to have been carried out by a jihadist group, the Indian Mujahideen (IM). None of the men, however, were charged with involvement in either the 2007 or 2008 attacks; they were, instead, accused, and eventually acquitted, on unrelated charges of conspiring to execute acts of terror, based on their alleged possession of fake identification and pseudonymously-acquired mobile phones. Police in Hyderabad have, in the course of the Hindutva terrorism allegation, frequently been accused of communal bias. While the force no doubt suffers from prejudices endemic to Indian society as a whole, there is no empirical basis to suggest communalism coloured its investigation of the Mecca Masjid bombing.

Police in Rajasthan proved just as clueless when bombs went off just outside the famous shrine at Ajmer, killing two people. However, some critical pieces of evidence did emerge. The SIM cards for mobile phones used to activate the bombs at both Mecca Masjid and Ajmer, it turned out were among a set of seven purchased by the perpetrators from West Bengal and Jharkhand in April 2007. The bomb maker had linked the phone’s speaker to a detonator, and packed explosives inside grooved metal pipe — just as they had in the earlier attempts in Bhopal.

In September, 2008, when bombs went off at Malegaon in Maharashtra and Modasa in Gujarat, killing eight and injuring over eighty, Police in Maharashtra were well-poised to develop the leads they had been gathering since 2006. Within weeks, investigators had arrested several key figures in a Pune-based Hindutva cell they believed had carried out the Malegaon attacks — among them, Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, a Madhya Pradesh-based Hindu nun with deep links to the Hindutva movement, Jammu-based cleric Sudhakar Dwivedi, and a serving Indian Army Lieutenant Colonel, Shrikant Prasad Purohit, linked under the umbrella of Abhinav Bharat.

Founded in the summer of 2006 (on June 12), Abhinav Bharat had been set up as an educational trust with Himani Savarkar — daughter of Gopal Godse, brother of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin — as its President. But, documents filed by Maharashtra prosecutors in the Pune court where Malegaon suspects are being tried, showed that members of the group were soon discussing terrorist activity. In June 2007, Purohit allegedly suggested that the time had come to target Muslims through terrorist attacks — a plea others in Abhinav Bharat rejected. But, evidence gathered by the Police suggests, many within the group were determined to press ahead. At a meeting in April 2008, key suspects including Thakur Dwivedi, also known as Amritananda Dev Tirtha, met Purohit to hammer out the Malegaon plot. Explosives were later procured by Purohit, and handed over to Ram Narayan Kalsangram, in early August 2008.

Abhinav Bharat’s long-term aims, though, went far beyond targeting Muslims: its members wanted to overthrow the Indian state and replace it with a totalitarian, theocratic order. A ‘draft constitution’ spoke of a single-party system, presided over by a leader who "shall be followed at all levels without questioning the authority." It called for the creation of an "academy of indoctrinization [sic]." The concluding comment was stark: "People whose ideas are detrimental to Hindu Rashtra should be killed." Purohit’s plans to bring about a Hindutva state were often fantastical — bordering, even, on the pathological. He claimed, prosecutors say, to have secured an appointment with Nepal’s former monarch, Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev in 2006 and 2007, to press for his support for the planned Hindutva revolution. Nepal, he went on, was willing to train Abhinav Bharat’s cadre, and supply it with assault rifles. Israel’s Government, he said, had agreed to grant members of the group military support and, if needed, political asylum. No evidence has ever emerged that Purohit had, in fact, succeeded in developing transnational patronage or linkages.

The son of a bank officer with no particular political leanings, Purohit seems to have first encountered Hindutva politics in his late teens when he attended a special coaching class for Short Service Commission officer-aspirants at the Bhonsala Military School in Nashik. Founded in 1937 by B.S. Moonje, the controversial school drew on fascist pedagogical practices the Hindutva ideologue encountered on a visit to Europe. Moonje, who had earlier served with the British Indian Army as a doctor during the visit, had met with Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and studied fascist institutions.

Purohit’s military career itself was undistinguished. In 2002, he participated in 15 Maratha Light Infantry’s counter-terrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir, but won no special honours. Later, he was given an administrative job linked to the raising of 41 Rashtriya Rifles, a dedicated counter-terrorism formation that operates out of Kupwara, in northern Kashmir. His tenure in Jammu and Kashmir ended in January, 2005, while serving in the Awantipora-based 31-Counter Intelligence Unit of the Military Intelligence Directorate, an assignment not considered among the most prestigious.

Investigators suspect Purohit’s decision to set up Abhinav Bharat germinated soon after he moved to Maharashtra in 2005. Purohit was assigned charge of an Army Liaison Unit, a Military Intelligence cell responsible for developing and maintaining links between the Army and local communities. The job provided a perfect cover for developing contacts with his old school, and the circle of Pune-region Hindutva activists who were connected to it. School commandant Colonel S.S. Raikar, investigators say, played a key role in putting Purohit in touch with the activists who went on to form Abhinav Bharat. Raikar, who retired from the Indian Army as head of a Military Intelligence detachment in Manipur, is not charged with criminal wrong-doing. In the summer of 2006, though, Abhinav Bharat held the first of what was to be a series of meetings in rooms provided by the Bhonsala Military School. From the outset, it made no secret of its objectives. Abhinav Bharat drew its name from a terrorist group set up by Hindutva activists in 1904 to fight colonial Britain. Himani Savarkar, grandniece of the Hindutva movement’s founding patriarch Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and niece of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin Nathuram Godse, was appointed the organisation’s President.

Purohit is alleged to have told Abhinav Bharat supporters that his military background had equipped him, unlike the political leadership of existing Hindutva organisations, to prepare for what he saw as an inevitable Hindu-Muslim civilisational war. He would often invent stories of heroic covert exploits against jihadi terrorists to impress his recruits. Full-time cadres of the organisation were known by the honorific Chanakya, a reference to the scholar-advisor who is reputed to have helped build the foundations for the rule of the emperor Chandragupta Maurya.

Despite the formidable mass of evidence it gathered, the Maharashtra investigation ran into a wall — a wall from which the recent arrests in Rajasthan may have removed a few bricks. Thakur’s long-standing associate, Dewas-based RSS organiser and Hindutva activist Sunil Joshi, was murdered on December 31, 2008. His political associates claimed he was killed by Islamists; Police, however, believe that his murder was driven both by disputes over funds within the Abhinav Bharat network, and a romantic issue. Police have also been unable to locate Gujarat-based Jatin Chatterjee, an influential Hindu cleric who uses the clerical alias Swami Asimananad. Chatterjee is a key figure in the controversial Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, which operates a Hindu-proselytisation programme targeting adivasis (tribals) in southern Gujarat. Police sources say he is likely hiding out in Gujarat’s Dangs area, but claim the State Government has failed to cooperate with efforts to locate the suspect. Ram Narayan Kalsangram, the third key fugitive, is also thought to be hiding out in Gujarat. Lawyers for Thakur say she had sold a motorcycle used in the Malegaon bombings to Joshi who, without her knowledge, passed it on to Kalsangram.

What lessons ought India to be learning from the story of the Hindutva terror network? Key among them is the urgent need to address the country’s dysfunctional communal politics. Thakur and her Hindutva terror cell have deep — and, for some, discomfiting — roots in history. Influenced by the dramatic impact of terrorism in imperial Russia, the Hindu nationalist leader, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, became increasingly drawn to violence as a tool to achieve Indian independence. A year after the searing 1905 revolution, which compelled Czar Alexander II to grant basic civil rights, Tilak exhorted his followers: "The days of prayer have gone… Look to the examples of Ireland, Japan and Russia and follow their methods." Tilak’s message proved attractive to many young, upper caste Hindu neoconservatives — often the products of western-style education who had found in their re-imagining of Indian tradition a language with which to oppose British imperialism.

Figures like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who went on to lead the Hindu Mahasabha, cast the struggle against Britain as a fight to defend the Hindu faith. In one manifesto, the original Abhinav Bharat’s followers promised to "shed upon the earth the life-blood of the enemies who destroy religion." Later, the radical right journal Yugantar argued that the murder of foreigners in India was "not a sin but a yagna [ritual sacrifice]"—sentiments that would be entirely familiar to Osama bin-Laden’s jihadi armies today.

Despite the arrests in Rajasthan, investigators probing Hindutva terror groups still have much work to do. First, a number of mysteries remain to be resolved—ranging from the New Delhi bombings, to the unresolved firebombing of the New Delhi-Lahore Samjhauta Express. Maharashtra prosecutors say a witness heard Purohit linking Joshi to the train’s firebombing. Purohit, the witness claimed, made the claim after a December 29, 2007, phone call, when he was informed of Joshi’s death. "After the phone call," a senior Maharashtra Police officer disclosed, "our witness says Lieutenant-Colonel Purohit credited Joshi with having executed the Samjhauta Express attack, and hailed him as a martyr." In 2009, however, the United States Treasury Department attributed the attack to top Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative Arif Kasmani who, it said, was funded by Karachi-based ganglord Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar.

The arrests over the past weeks notwithstanding, the threat remains real — and must be snuffed out. Last year, in June, Hindu Janajagruti Samiti operatives were held for the bombing of the Gadkari Rangayatan theatre in Thane (Maharashtra), to protest the staging of a satire on the Mahabharata, Amhi Pachpute. One of those arrested by the Police, Mangesh Nikam, was facing trial on charges of bombing the home of a Ratnagiri family that had converted to Christianity, and was out on bail. Members of the Goa-based Sanatan Sanstha, affiliated to Hindu Janajagruti, were held for staging a bombing in Panani. Earlier, Bajrang Dal-linked Rajiv Mishra and Bhupinder Singh were killed in a bomb-making accident in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh (UP). UP Police sources said there was little to show that the group had links with the terror cells in Maharashtra, but experience shows that even small cells, left untouched, will acquire ever-greater levels of lethality.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
May 3-9, 2010

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

Bangladesh

 

Left-wing Extremism

0
0
2
2

INDIA

 

Assam

0
0
4
4

Jammu and Kashmir

1
4
11
16

Manipur

0
0
1
1

Left-wing Extremism

 

Andhra Pradesh

1
0
0
1

Bihar

0
4
0
4

Chhattisgarh

1
8
3
12

Orissa

0
0
10
10

West Bengal

5
0
0
5

Total (INDIA)

8
16
29
53

NEPAL

1
0
0
1

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

1
2
0
3

FATA

0
2
119
121

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*

0
4
8
12

Sindh

1
0
0
1

Total (PAKISTAN)

2
8
127
137
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.
* On April 15, 2010, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed the Bill changing the name of the North West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.


INDIA

Lashkar-e-Toiba militant Kasab sentenced to death in Mumbai multiple terrorist attacks case: The Special Sessions Court in Mumbai (Maharashtra) on May 6 sentenced the lone surviving Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militant, Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab, to death for his involvement in the November 26, 2008 (also known as 26/11) Mumbai terrorist attacks. Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab "shall be hanged by neck till he is dead", the court pronounced. Kasab was given the death penalty on five counts: murder, abetment to murder, waging war, criminal conspiracy and committing terrorist acts. Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam told reporters that a confirmation of the death penalty from the Bombay High Court was awaited.

Earlier, on May 3, the Court pronounced Kasab guilty on the above five counts, after a 271-day trial. The 1,522-page judgment convicted Kasab of conspiring to wage war, along with nine other terrorists and 20 co-conspirators in Pakistan, and of murder and abetment to murder, among other offences. Among the 20 wanted accused indicted by the Court are LeT Chief Muhammad Hafiz Saeed and operatives Zaki-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Zarar Shah and Abu Hamza. The Court acquitted the other two accused, Indians, Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed, of "all the charges framed against them." The two had been accused of making and conveying maps of target locations in Mumbai.

Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on May 3 said that Kasab’s conviction "is a message to Pakistan that they should not export terror to India. If they do and if the terrorists are apprehended, we will be able to bring them to justice and give them exemplary punishment."

Meanwhile, the Maharashtra Government would challenge the acquittal of Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed in the 26/11 case. The Hindu, May 4-7, 2010.

ISI trying to disturb peace in Punjab, says DGP Paramjit Singh Gill: Punjab Director General of Police (DGP) Paramjit Singh Gill on May 5 said that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) keeps backing anti-national elements to disturb peace in Punjab. He said that there were reports that ISI keeps instigating Khalistani as well as Kashmiri terrorists to jointly strike at sensitive places. Gill said the way the ISI operates is clear indication that Pakistan’s agencies tries to ensure their (Khalistani and Kashmiri miliatants) closer coordination. The DGP said he did not foresee revival of terrorism in Punjab. On presence of Naxals (Left Wing Extremists) he said there are some "sleeping Naxal elements" in Punjab but these are harmless. Outlook India ; Indian Express, May 6, 2010.

Ajmer, Mecca Masjid and Malegaon bomb blasts are linked, says CBI: The bomb blasts carried out at the Ajmer (Rajasthan) Dargah (Sufi Shrine), the Mecca Masjid (Mosque, Andhra Pradesh) and Malegaon (Maharashtra) are linked, with the self-styled right-wing group, Abhinav Bharat, believed to be behind them, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) said on May 3. The Hindu, May 4, 2010.

Union Government extends cease-fire agreement with NSCN-K in Nagaland: The Union Government on May 3 extended the cease-fire agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (NSCN-K) for another year till April 28, 2011. Nagaland Post, May 4, 2010.

Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram makes offer for talks to Maoists: Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on May 5 made a fresh offer for talks to the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) provided they abjure violence. "No killings, no demolition of buildings and give me seventy-two hours. Let me get the chief ministers together and tell you time and place. I know you will not give up arms as armed struggle is your ideology, but abjure violence and then we can discuss everything under the sun," Chidambaram said. PTI News, May 6, 2010.

Support to Maoists will attract jail term, warns MHA: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in a statement on May 6 warned civil society groups, non-governmental organisations, intellectuals and the general public to refrain from supporting the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) ideology as it will attract action under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Hindu, May 7, 2010.

Counter-insurgency force in West Bengal by August 2010, says Police Chief: West Bengal Director General of Police (DGP) Bhupinder Singh said the State will have a 1,000-strong counter- insurgency force on the pattern of the Grey Hound forces of Andhra Pradesh and also a training school for tackling terrorism within the next two to three months. The project is expected to cost around INR 270 million. The Hindu, May 7, 2010.


PAKISTAN

119 militants and two SFs among 121 persons killed during the week in FATA: The Security Forces (SFs) and drone strikes killed around 43 Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) militants in various areas of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) on May 9.

At least nine Taliban (TTP) militants were killed and several others sustained injuries during clashes with SFs in Orakzai Agency on May 8.

Five Taliban (TTP) militants were killed as choppers pounded militant hideouts during operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (I will see you) in various areas of Orakzai Agency on May 7.

27 Taliban (TTP) militants and a trooper were killed during operation Khwakh Ba De Sham in various areas of Orakzai Agency on May 6.

At least 13 Taliban (TTP) militants and two troopers were killed during clashes in Orakzai Agency, while helicopter gunships fired heavy artillery at militant hideouts in Bajaur Agency, killing another 18 Taliban (TTP) militants on May 3. Officials said that the Taliban (TTP) attacked a check-post in Qamber Khawas village in the Lower Orakzai Agency. The SFs retaliated and killed 13 militants. Two SF personnel were also killed.

US missiles fired from a drone killed four suspected Taliban (TTP) militants in North Waziristan. The three missiles were fired minutes apart at a moving vehicle in the Marsi Khel area. The attack came just hours after TTP ‘chief’ Hakeemullah Mehsud vowed to attack US cities in two purported new videos released on May 3. Dawn; Daily Times; The News, May 4-10, 2010.

500 militants and about 30 civilians killed in two years of drone strikes, says US report: A United States estimates show Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas over the last two years have killed more than 500 militants — a fraction of whom are considered top-tier leaders — and fewer than 30 civilians, US officials said on May 3. Daily Times, May 4, 2010.

'40 terror camps near Af-Pak border’, says Russian ambassador to India Alexander M. Kadakin: The Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander M. Kadakin, has said that around 40 terror camps are still active in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, adding, this information was based on Russian satellite imagery and intelligence. "From the information we have, there are about 38 to 40 such terror camps. Earlier they would have these bright green boards declaring the name of the organization like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), they have now removed them. However, the camps still remain,’’ Kadakin said, adding that Pakistan had not done enough to get rid of these camps. Times of India, May 10, 2010.

Tehreek-e-Taliban expanding alliances, says New York Times report: A New York Times report on May 7 claimed that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which American investigators suspect was behind the attempt to bomb Times Square, has in recent years combined forces with al Qaeda and other groups, threatening to extend their reach and ambitions. New York Times, May 7, 2010.

Severe consequences in case of proven bomb attack, says US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: The United States (US) has warned of "severe consequences" if a successful extremist attack in America were traced back to Pakistan, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview on May 7. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had earlier been linked to a failed bid to bomb New York's Times Square on May 2. The News, May 7, 2010.

Pakistan economic woes linked to war against terror, says Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani: Pakistan’s economic challenges are directly linked to the war on terror, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said on May 3, and called on the US Congress to facilitate his country in addressing the root cause of terror. Daily Times, May 4, 2010.


SRI LANKA

LTTE threat shifted from field of battle to field of diplomacy, says External Affairs Minister G.L. Peiris: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) threat against Sri Lanka has only shifted from the field of battle to the field of diplomacy, with attempts to establish a Transnational Government in exile continuing, said External Affairs Minister Professor G. L. Peiris on May 6. Stating that the Government has instructed the Sri Lankan ambassadors in relevant countries to take suitable action to handle the situation, the Minister said Sri Lanka was now facing a different type of threat inimical to the interests of the country. "Although the LTTE is militarily defeated the risk is not over," Minister Peiris added further. Daily News, May 7, 2010.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


A Project of the
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