SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 45, May 17, 2010

NEPAL

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Dissonant Integration
Anshuman Behera
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On May 10, 2010, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal's political advisor Raghuji Panta made it clear for the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) leadership and for all other who have been demanding for the resignation of the Prime Minister (PM), that no such outcome was possible until there was a clear agreement on the integration of Maoist combatants with the Nepalese Army (NA). Panta added, further, "There should be an agreement on the number of Maoist combatants before the Prime Minister could mull his resignation... The Prime Minister has no compulsion to resign just because the UCPN-M stopped its protests."

The statement came just as the Maoists called off their "indefinite" general strike which lasted six days (May 2-May 7). The end of the strike was followed by a statement by the Chairman, UCPN-M, Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda, in an interaction with intellectuals and civil society representatives on May 12, where he emphasised that the integration of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was possible within four months. He added, further, "We will dismantle the barracks of the Young Communist League (YCL, the militant youth wing of the (UCPN-M) within four-five days. We are ready to break the relation of the Party with the cantonments (where PLA cadres are located)". These commitments have evoked some hope and a great deal of scepticism at the political classes in Kathmandu.

The integration of the PLA with the Nepalese Army (NA) has evidently become the principal factor of contestation between UCPN-M and other political formations in Nepal, particularly the principal parties, the Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Nepali Congress (NC). After the fall of the Monarchy, the laying down of arms by the Maoists, and the agreement for the establishment of a democratic setup and a republic between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists, the PLA issue has remained the core of contention in evolving any national consensus.

The understanding between the SPA and the Maoists on the modalities and regulation of PLA combatants, and their verification, has passed through three different agreements: the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies of November 28, 2006; the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 21, 2006; and the SPA-Maoist Agreement of November 7, 2006. The role of the United Nations in regulating the Army and PLA combatants has been emphasised in these, and both the SPA and the Maoists have agreed on this through the joint letter to the United Nations (UN) of August 9, 2006. According to this last document, PLA combatants would remain in the designated camps and the UN would verify and monitor them. The temporary camps, as agreed to by both parties were established at Kailali, Surkhet, Rolpa, Nawalparasi, Chitwan, Sindhuli and Ilam.

Once the agreement on the PLA had been hammered out, the Maoist combatants were located in the cantonments, and the Government, along with the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) took charge of the camps. On February 25, 2007, the Government agreed to provide Nepali Rupees (NR) 50 million for the management of the Maoist cantonments, along with a daily allowance of NR 60 to each PLA combatant. Within the duration of a little over one year, on July 18, 2008, the ‘Division Commander’, Tej Bahadur Oli, of Dasharathpur in Surkhet cantonment, charged the Government with not releasing funds for the combatants for more than 11 months. "As the Government has not released funds," he declared, "we are managing our livelihood by taking loans." It is significant that, between August 18, 2008, and May 4, 2009, a Government headed by Prime Minister Dahal aka Prachanda, the Maoist supremo, was in power. Even over this period, there was insufficient release of funds, perhaps demonstrating the indifference of political elites across party lines towards the conditions of the rank and file fighters of the PLA. There are suspicions, moreover, that the Maoists may have sought to create a situation that forced the early integration of the PLA combatants into the NA.

Despite the apparent deadlock over the issue, there have been a number of initiatives to speed up the integration process, so that the peace process can be pushed to its logical end. On October 27, 2008, the Government formed a five-member special committee to oversee Army integration, under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Bamdev Gautam. The other members of the Committee included Defense Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa, Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) leader Mohammad Habibullah, and Minister for Peace Janardan Sharma. On October 28, 2008, Gautam stated that ‘homework’ for the integration of the Maoist combatants had already begun. He asserted that the Special Committee would complete Army integration "right on time". The Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants, on September 1, 2009, had decided to complete the process of integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants within six months. "We have decided to extend the tenure of the technical committee under the special committee for the next three months effective from today [September 1]," NC leader Ram Sharan Mahat told reporters in Singhadurbar after the meeting, adding, "Beginning Monday [September 7, 2009], the Committee will complete its work within six months." Subsequently, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on January 5, 2010, presented a 112-day Action Plan, proposing April 30, 2010, as the deadline for the completion of integration and rehabilitation of UCPN-M combatants. The Deputy Prime Minister expressed confidence that the Nepali Congress, which had refused to join the Special Committee, would rethink its decision.

On March 16, 2009, the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) decided to constitute a Technical Committee for the Integration and Rehabilitation of the PLA combatants with the Nepal Army. The AISC meeting held at the Prime Minister's Office at Singhadurbar (Parliament) decided to create the Technical Committee, since crucial tasks relating to the integration could not be carried because the AISC was a political, and not technical, committee.

Again, on January 6, 2010, the AISC started deliberations on proposals tabled by Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, with the objective of finishing all works related to the Maoist combatants, including their integration, by April 30, 2010.

The integration process has, however, failed to reach any logical conclusion, with every initiative stalled by the lack of consensus among the political parties and their growing mutual distrust.

Indeed, on July 18, 2008, Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra Poudel declared that the PLA could be integrated into any national security organs. Poudel insisted that integration of PLA combatants with security agencies would ‘complicate’ the overall security situation. Joining the chorus, on September 3, 2008, Nepali Congress leader, Ram Sharan Mahat, declared that the PLA should not be integrated into the national army ‘at any cost’. He threatened to take ‘strong action’ if PLA combatants were integrated into the national Army.

On September 25, 2008, Arjun Narsingh Khatri Chhetri, spokesperson of the NC, warned that the country would face a new round of conflict if the Government attempted to integrate the PLA with the NA in ‘violation’ of peace pacts and earlier agreements.

More recently, on January 19, 2010, Defense Minister Bidhya Devi Bhandari stated that all the decisions the Prime Minister had made could not be implemented, and that her Ministry was not obliged to integrate Maoist combatants with the NA. Expressing her dissatisfaction over the failure to include the Defense Ministry and NA representatives in the AISC, Bhandari argued that, since it was not mentioned in the Comprehensive Peace Accord, the integration of former Maoist fighters into the national Army was ‘not compulsory’, even if the AISC decided on the modalities of such integration.

The unwillingness of all political formations, except UCPN-M, to implement the proposals for PLA integration is rooted in the apprehensions that, if a substantial number of Maoist combatants were inducted into the NA, there was significant risk of political subversion of the Force in its entirety.

The Maoists, nevertheless, are no less responsible for the delay, and have created a great deal of ambiguity around their plans for integration, even as their political postures and statements have fanned fears. On their own statements, it is clear that, once the PLA has been inducted into the national Army, their plans for the seizure of power would be easier than they ever have been. On May 3, 2009, Prachanda, addressing PLA combatants in a meeting at Shaktikhor Cantonment in Chitwan, declared that the Party had deceived all into believing that the number of PLA was 35,000, when it was never actually more than 8,000. Thus, the PLA had grown as a result of the peace process, rather than been reduced as had been widely assumed. He added, further, that apart from the the PLA, which had already become a "regular army", the Party had also formed the YCL, comprising thousands of youth, "who now add to our strength". The Maoist Chairman also revealed that a significant share of the money intended for "our martyrs" in villages throughout the country and for the PLA in cantonments, would be used by the Party to prepare for a final revolt to "capture the state": "You all know that if we have enough money in our hands we can prepare a good battle plan. So, the Party needs a good amount of money for the revolt." He stated, further, that though the Party may appear to have again reached a compromise (with the state and other political parties), "if you look deeply then you will know how seriously the Party is preparing for the ultimate revolt". Claiming that PLA combatants were "politically aware", he said, even the entry of a small number into the Nepalese Army was enough to establish a complete Maoist control over the Army.

Such declarations can only have hardened the resistance to integration among other political formation. There were, moreover, numerous instances of the involvement of PLA cadres in breaches of the various agreements intended to govern their conduct. Some of these included:

December 20, 2006: Over two dozen people – including Policemen and civilians – sustained injuries after some 300 PLA combatants from a satellite camp attacked an all-party meeting at Katari Bazar in Udaypur District.

September 14, 2007: PLA cadres came out of their cantonments in Arunkhola of Nawalparasi and demonstrated for an hour, demanding the implementation of the 22-points raised by the Maoists.

October 3, 2007: PLA cadres from the ‘Third Division’ at Shaktikhor in Chitwan District staged a blockade of the East-West Mahendra Highway when the Police prevented them from carting timber into their camp at Shaktikhor.

March 13, 2009: PLA cadres from Jit Smriti Brigade indiscriminately attacked a rally organised by locals of the Kalyan VDC-3 in the Surkhet District protesting the ongoing PLA raids in the village. Following an attack on a Maoist combatant by some locals over a dispute during Holi (the festival of colours) on March 11, PLA cadres from Jit Smriti Brigade repeatedly raided houses under the Kalyan Village Development Committee (VDC), assaulting villagers in acts of reprisal.

August 4, 2009: Organising a Press conference at Damak, the Kochila State Committee of the Matrika Yadav-led CPN-Maoist said that PLA fighters of the First Division Cantonment had abducted two of its District leaders, Santa Rai and Sharan Rai, from Damak in Jhapa District on August 3. Santa was the Chairman of the Jhapa Committee whereas Sharan was the assistant coordinator of the Party's ‘security branch’. Both were former PLA combatants who defected to the Yadav-led CPN-Maoist.

August 14, 2009: Some 200 PLA combatants came out of their cantonment and assaulted locals in the Kailali District. The assailants, belonging to the Bahubiryodha Brigade in Sahajpur, attacked 36 locals at Shantipur in the Nigali Village Development Committee-1 area. The victims alleged that they could not complain immediately after the incident since the PLA personnel had threatened them with ‘dire consequences’ if they informed the Police and media. Trouble reportedly broke out when locals questioned four PLA combatants who were consuming alcohol at a shop in Shantipur.

November 23, 2009: Police arrested Narendra Tamrakar, PLA ‘commander’ of Masuriya-based cantonment, on the charge of abducting a girl, Kalawati Tamrakar (18), in Dadeldhura District. Narendra was caught from Ajayameru VDC-7 on the same day. According to eyewitness accounts, seven men, including Narendra, had grabbed Kalawati and took her away in broad daylight. Deputy Superintendent of Police Chakra Bahadur Singh said that the other six men involved in the abduction were on the run and a Police team has been mobilized to search and arrest them. Kalawati was handed over to her family.

PLA cadres are also reported to routinely leave their respective cantonments, carrying arms and destructive weapons.

The activities of the YCL have given grounds for more urgent fears, since widespread intimidation and extortion across the country – and including capital, Kathmandu – has been reported.

Given the fractious relations between political formations in Nepal, the tardy process of Constitution drafting, and widespread brinkmanship, expectations of any early integration of the PLA with the NA may well be belied, even as any permanent resolution to the crisis in Nepal remains elusive. While the other political formations remain largely obstructive and directionless, the Maoists continue to push the envelope through tactics such as the disruptive strikes of May 2010, expanding and consolidating their cadres, and positioning themselves for an eventual takeover.

The only tentative prospect that this outcome may be averted arises from the possibility that this process will take a great deal of time, and that, in the intervening years the Maoist leadership will be ‘co-opted’ by the corruption of Nepal’s parliamentary democracy, even as the rank and file of the Party lose their taste for combat.

There is no cost to wishful thinking, but the price eventually to be paid is often prohibitive.