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Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 46, May 24, 2010

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
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CI Strategies: Garbage In, Garbage Out
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

For all its strutting about as an emerging Great Power India is increasingly perceived as a "flailing state" –floundering, uncoordinated, elephantine, inept. If any further evidence was needed, it has been amply provided in the past weeks since the Chintalnar massacre of April 6, 2010. The boastful incoherence of the Centre’s anti-Maoist ‘strategies’ has been entirely dispersed, subsiding, instead, into what one Opposition leader described as a posture of ‘injured martyrdom’.

Unsurprisingly, pure cacophony has followed once again after the most recent major Maoist outrage, the killing of 44 persons – 16 Security Forces (SF) personnel and 28 civilians – at Chingavaram in the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh, on May 17, 2010. Carrion feeders in the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) now circle around the increasingly hapless Union Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, even as the Opposition brings out its knives. That none of the nation’s luminaries has a single constructive idea to offer, beyond the vacuous slogans – ‘developmental solution’ and ‘political solution’, ‘two-pronged’ and ‘multi-pronged’ approaches – while others scream for the deployment of the Army and the Air Force, can only consolidate the reputation for articulate incompetence that the best and the brightest in India’s Parliament, Government and ‘civil society’ have rightly acquired.

While the media and the political establishment bring a hysterical focus on the Maoists and the state’s sorry ‘strategies’ only in the wake of the most dramatic incidents, the reality of Maoist violence has been altogether relentless. 468 persons have already been killed in Maoist violence this year (ICM data till May 23, 2010), including 167 SF personnel and 193 civilians. The year has already witnessed 22 major incidents (each accounting for three or more fatalities). Seven of these have recorded fatalities in the double digits:

May 17

The CPI-Maoist cadres killed 44 persons (16 SF personnel and 28 civilians) when they blew up a bus by triggering an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on a black-top road at Chingavaram near Sukma in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. Four civilians and two Special Police Officers (SPOs) were also injured. There were around 32 civilians and 18 SPOs in the bus.

May 8

The combined forces of Orissa Police’s Special Operations Group, Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhounds and the Border Security Force (BSF) killed at least 10 cadres of the CPI-Maoist in the Gumandi forest near Podapadar village under Narayanpatna Police Station area in Koraput District.

April 6

75 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and one State Policeman were killed in an attack by the CPI-Maoist in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. The incident took place near Chintalnad -Tarmetla village in the District when a CRPF patrol party was returning from a road opening duty in the Naxalite-infested Mukrana forest between 6 to 7 am. The team had been camping in interiors of Tarmetla forest for the last three days as part of a combing operation.

April 4

Eleven personnel of the anti-Maoist Special Operation Group (SOG) were killed and eight others were seriously injured when cadres of the CPI-Maoist triggered a landmine blast targeting a mini bus carrying the SOG personnel at Tanginiguda on the Govindpalli ghat road in Koraput District of Orissa. Sources said a brief exchange of fire took place between the SOG personnel and the Maoists near the blast site. Reports said there were 19 persons in the vehicle. The SOG personnel were on a mission to sanitise the Maoist-prone Govindpalli ghat road so that Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel camping at Govindpalli in Malkangiri District could move from there to Koraput.

February 17

At least 12 villagers, including three women and one child, were killed when nearly 150 heavily-armed cadres of the CPI-Maoist attacked Phulwariya village in Jamui District of Bihar. Four of a family was charred to death while others were shot dead. Those killed were Kora tribals and the attack was in retaliation of the alleged killing of eight Maoists by the Koras on January 31 at the instigation of one Lakhan Kora, suspected by the Maoists of being a Police informer. The Maoists triggered explosions and also set 30 houses ablaze. The whereabouts of Lakhan are not known. While the Police say he survived the attack, this could not be confirmed from local sources.

February 15

At least 24 SF personnel, mostly belonging to the Eastern Frontier Rifles were killed and several others injured when a large group of CPI-Maoist cadres attacked a SF camp at Silda in West Midnapore, West Bengal. The Maoists triggered several blasts before opening fire on the SF personnel. Before leaving, the Maoists looted firearms and set the camp ablaze. One civilian died of splinter injury the next day taking the death toll in the incident to 25.

January 19

13 CPI-Maoist cadres and one Salwa Judum (anti-Maoist vigilante group) activist were killed in a firing between Maoists and the Police in the dense Pareshgadh forest area, near Andhra Pradesh border, of Bijapur District in Chhattisgarh.

This follows on at least 998 fatalities in 2009 (392 civilians, 312 SF personnel and 294 Maoists), and including at least 88 major incidents.

It is evidently a complete waste of time to go over the contours of a strategic response to the Maoist challenge in India. This has been written about ad nauseam, in SAIR and a wide range of other publications. The counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (CI-CT) successes of Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh are all the models anyone could conceivably need – if the intellectual honesty, competence and due diligence to study these could, in fact, be tapped within the security policy establishment. It obviously cannot be. It is, consequently, far more productive to document elements of the utter imbecility of the discourse on the subject.

After the Chintalnar incident Home Minister Chidambaram had observed in Parliament, "If this tragedy is not a wake-up call, then nothing can wake-up this country and this Parliament." Just days later, he was challenged by his own senior party leadership, through Digvijay Singh, for his "intellectual arrogance", for treating the Naxalite problem as a "purely law and order issue" and for "failing to take into consideration the issues that affect the tribals". Reflecting a high measure of paternalistic contempt for a leadership that has remained committed to its cause, in some cases, for over half a century, Digvijay Singh went to describe the Maoists as "misguided ideologues". Having presided over one of India’s most backward and benighted States, Madhya Pradesh, as Chief Minister for two complete tenures, Digvijay Singh advocates ‘development’ as a panacea to neutralize the Maoists. His colleague, Mani Shankar Aiyar, declares him "one lakh per cent right" in his criticism of Chidambaram.

Among those brave souls who are setting out to ‘develop’ the dark recesses of Abujhmadh, or of the Bastar Division, the very heart of the Maoist insurgency, or those who have proclaimed their intention to ‘clear, hold and develop’ these areas, there is none who can explain why the six Districts of Chhattisgarh which are categorized "marginally affected" and the four, categorized "not affected" by Maoist activities remain backward and destitute. If the Chhattisgarh State Government, or the mighty Indian State, can, in fact, develop, or ‘seize, hold and develop’, the unconnected, uncharted jungles of the Bastar Division, what prevents them from bringing prosperity, justice and good governance to the territories well within their control?

It is significant, here, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first drew attention to the enormity of the threat of Left Wing Extremism as far back as in November 2004, and has since repeatedly warned that this is now the single greatest threat to the country’s security. Yet, nearly six years later, there is no coherence in national threat assessment and no consensus on response. Indeed, in all these years, the Prime Minister has not even been able to secure a consensus on this issue within his Cabinet – though, fortunately, the embarrassing public contradictions by his own Home Minister have become a thing of the past since Shivraj Patil’s departure.

India and her Parliament are not asleep. They are simply confused and deluded. The strategic and tactical discourse has been carried out, overwhelmingly, at a wishful plane, entirely divorced from the realities of the ground. The most powerful arguments advanced are not for consistent and effective response, but in favour of inaction, vacillation and perpetual deferral.

One leading intellectual, for instance, proposes the thesis of the ‘bell curve of insurgencies’, and insists that "There is no reason why the Maoist insurgency will not follow that same pattern." In other words, it is ‘natural’ that violence will escalate to a point, but then it will, equally naturally, and irrespective of state responses, wither away. The strategic lesson, apparently, is that, whatever we may choose – and the spectrum of choice includes doing nothing – the outcome will remain quite the same. Moreover, since it is not the children of the elites who are dying in the rising trajectory of the ‘bell curve’, one may assume that the mounting loss of life imposes no significant moral obligation on the state and its leadership. [Such sanguinity of perspective was notably absent in media commentary in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks (26/11), when the wealthy died at the Taj and Oberoi-Trident].

What is missed in all this passionate promotion of paralysis is that, from the localized insurgencies of the past, India has now come to a stage where nearly half the country is afflicted, in different measure, by chronic conflict variables. 223 Districts, according to the Home Minister’s 2009 estimate, are affected, in various degrees, by Maoist activities; another 20 Districts by the Pakistan-backed proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir; and some 67 Districts by the multiple insurgencies that trouble India’s Northeast. That adds up to 310 Districts out of a total of 636. In addition, terrorist attacks have targeted urban centres across the length and breadth of the country. Though individual movements may rise and fall, evidently, there is no ‘bell curve’ here – rather, a steadily rising trajectory of disorders.

Another widely articulated sentiment is the contention that rising Maoist violence and mass killings are ‘acts of desperation’. Attempts have been made to reinforce this position by a number of media plants suggesting that the Maoists are on the verge of a split because of ‘ideological differences’ and wrangles over jurisdiction and the sharing of booty. The unsettling reality is, the dramatic Maoist attacks witnessed over the past months are far from the ‘acts of desperation’ the more vacuous among our political leaders would have us believe. These are manifestations of the strategic confidence and tactical capability of the rebels, on the one hand, and of strategic and operational infirmity of the state’s Forces, on the other. As the Maoists expand and consolidate areas of activity and influence, these attacks will become more frequent and lethal, pushing the already over-extended capacities of the security establishment towards a breaking point.

In the wake of the Chintalnar incident, the Home Minister informed India’s Parliament – and through it, the nation – that he was "not afraid of the Maoists". [For different reasons, neither, frankly, am I; Chidambaram is extraordinarily well protected; I doubt if the Maoists will waste a bullet on me.] But ask the CPMF companies flung about randomly into the dense jungles of the Maoist heartlands; ask the ill-equipped, ill-trained Policemen, huddled in unprotected Police Stations and Posts, wondering, each moment of each day, whether it is their turn to be overrun; ask the tiny contingents that are sent out for ‘area domination’ into territories they know little or nothing of, and whose ends they cannot imagine, leave alone dominate; and the answer you will uniformly get is, yes, we are afraid; very afraid.

And that is what matters. The Policeman, today, is marked out by his uniform, not as a symbol of the state’s authority, or as an agent of its power, but a hapless and preferred target of Maoist violence. When he is killed, this is not because a necessary ‘cost of war’ is to be rendered; it is, more often than not, a life simply thrown away to strategic and tactical stupidity. There is, as has repeatedly been noted, no calculus of victory here; only empty posturing and irresponsible individual ambition.

Who are these people who call themselves the state’s strategists? Who holds them to account? How are the same cycles of operational failure repeated again and again without correctives? How can the same vacuous, failed, rhetoric exhaust the policy discourse for endless years and decades?

The core of India’s problems is simple dishonesty, falsification, dereliction. How can there be a consensus on assessments and strategies when the first response to stress is a fudging of facts? Take, for example, data on Maoist-related fatalities. According to Institute for Conflict Management data, based on open source monitoring, there had been at least 998 Maoist-related fatalities in 2009. Past records have shown that ICM figures on fatalities are consistently lower than eventually disclosed official data – and this is to be expected; open source coverage is not as comprehensive, and most frequently misses out a number of secondary fatalities (the injured who die, often days after recorded incidents, in hospital). The MHA’s January 2010 ‘monthly report card’ noted 1,125 Maoist related fatalities in 2009; and this would be consistent with expectations. Surprisingly, however, MHA’s Annual Report 2009-10 inexplicably brings this figure down to 908!

Again, speaking at the All India Conference of Directors and Inspectors General of Police at Delhi on September 16, 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh indicated that the Police-population ratio for the country was 145 per 100,000. This is a figure that has been rattling around since a report of the Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D: Data on Police Organisations in India) was published in June 2006, and is selectively projected whenever the Government wants to demonstrate its ‘achievements’. The far more reliable annual compendium, Crime in India, published by the National Crime Records Bureau is given the go-by. NCRB’s latest report, Crime in India – 2008, however, records that the Police-population ratio for the whole country stands at just 128 per 100,000, marginally up from 125 per 100,000 in 2007. The MHA may, of course, have even more recent data, but it is improbable, given the numbers of recruitments known, that a single year could have pushed the ratio up from 128 to 145. Significantly, BPR&D data for 2007 claims a Police-population ratio of 153 per 100,000.

How can two departments of the same MHA fail to reconcile their data on so fundamental an index? Who is feeding falsehoods and fabricated figures to the highest offices of the land? How can a country not even get its basic statistics right?

Another aspect of the current crisis is the Centre’s own postures. In this, Chidambaram has, for the past year, simply been setting himself up for a fall, projecting the MHA as the core respondent to the challenge of Naxalism, and providing an alibi to the State’s to abdicate responsibility. Inevitably, as disaster strikes – again and again – the MHA now finds itself isolated and blamed for every failure, and sets about complaining about an ‘incomplete mandate’. The reality is, it is the States that will have to take up their constitutional responsibility for law and order management, and not the MHA that is to be conferred a ‘wider mandate’. It was State Governments, within the existing constitutional, administrative and policing provisions, in Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh, who defeated raging insurgencies. There is no reason, other than the failure of will and intellect, why this cannot be done in current theatres of Maoist depredation. The Centre’s role is to support the efforts of the States, and must so remain.

Then again, the MHA has apparently gone cross-eyed with frustration. Confronted with the shambles of their ‘clear, hold and develop’ and ‘area domination’ strategies, and their ‘massive coordinated operations’ across the worst Maoist afflicted States, the mandarins at North Block appear to be "looking left, shooting right". As ‘civil rights activists’ invent the oxymoron "Gandhians with guns" to describe the Maoists, and with Maoist depredations escalating, the Home Minister declared that civil rights groups were "getting in the way of the state’s efforts to contain the rebels." His Ministry, noting that "Some Maoist leaders have been directly contacting certain NGOs/intellectuals to propagate their ideology," warned that supporters of the ‘Maoist ideology’ could face up to 10 years in prison.

There is, of course, a very real problem here. The Maoists set up front organizations deliberately intended to exploit the interstices of democratic freedoms and rights to undermine the State, and also exploit a range of ‘useful idiots’ – and there are many eager innocents available – to propagate their cause. Where there is clear evidence of criminal collusion or of incitement to offence, the state must, of course, launch strong, evidence-based prosecutions – not the embarrassing legal travesties that have marked some actions against ‘sympathisers’ in the past. If, however, mere advocacy is now to be punished, consistent application of this policy may well require the Home Minister to send at least some of his own Cabinet and Party colleagues to jail. There is, moreover, something farcical here, as if the state, unable to beat the opposing team in the field, decides to vent its ire against their cheerleaders – hardly the most sagacious course of action in any contest.

The Prime Minister, on May 24, 2010, once again reiterated his Government’s determination "to squarely tackle the threat of terrorism and ideological extremism", and claimed that he had "on earlier occasions outlined our approach to tackling Naxalism." There is, however, simply too much garbage in the policy discourse today for any coherent CI policy or strategy to be shaped or implemented. In such an environment, escalating operations and thoughtless deployments will only result in augmenting fatalities, particularly among the SFs. The mere claim to an "approach to tackling Naxalism" can no longer pass muster. If effective CI policies and strategies are to be designed within the currently degraded system of institutions and capacities at the Centre and in the States, India’s leaders will have to discover a far greater clarity of assessment, purpose and intent than is currently evident.


Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
May 17-23, 2010



Security Force Personnel





Left-wing Extremism






Jammu and Kashmir




Left-wing Extremism








West Bengal


Total (INDIA)










Khyber Pakhtunkhwa





Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


44 persons including 16 SPOs killed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh: The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres killed 44 persons, including 28 civilians and 16 Special Police Officers (SPOs), when they blew up a bus by triggering an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on a black-top road at Chingavaram near Sukma in the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh on May 17. Four civilians and two SPOs were also injured. There were around 32 civilians and 18 SPOs in the bus. Times of India, May 18, 2010.

Pro-Maoist groups under close watch of MHA: There are at least 57 front organisations of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and they are under constant vigil of intelligence agencies. A circular by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) alerts heads of para-military forces and Police in Maoist-affected States that the CPI-Maoist has 57 "front bodies" of peasants, labourers, women, students, tribals and trade unions who have helped the them raise the level of their tactical warfare, including winning court battles and getting their arrested leaders released. Indo-Asian News Service, May 18, 2010.

Need to revisit anti-Naxal strategy, says Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on May 17 said that there was a need to revisit the anti-Naxal (Left wing Extremism) strategy in the light of the fact that four States want use of air power against the LWE. PTI News, May 18, 2010.

Maoists reject fresh offer for talks by Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: South Bastar regional committee secretary of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) Ravula Srinivas alias Ramanna on May 18 rejected the fresh offer for talks by Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram. Earlier in the day, the Home Minister said that India is willing to begin peace talks with Maoists, but only if the insurgents halt all attacks for 72 hours. The Government would then convene talks with the insurgents, he added. The Hindu, May 19, 2010.

Militants slip into Jammu and Kashmir through LoC, say intelligence sources: Intelligence inputs suggest that some top Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants, including top militant Furqan, have sneaked into Kashmir Valley infiltrating the Line of Control (LoC). Sources in the State Home Department have said the inputs of wireless intercepts suggested that Furqan, whose actual name was not known, had infiltrated into the Valley to muster support among the local population and to streamline the operations of the terror outfit. Besides Furqan, five other top LeT militants were also among them, the sources said. PTI News, May 20, 2010.

Mining industry funding Naxal movement, says Maharashtra Home Minister R. R. Patil: Maharashtra State Home Minister R. R. Patil on May 20 claimed that the Naxal (Left Wing Extremist) movement is being funded by a section of the cash-rich mining industry. Talking to the media in Mumbai the Minister suggested that the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) should find out details like the source of funding of these companies doing work in Naxal-hit areas. Times of India, May 21, 2010.

Maoists threaten to blow Rail Bhawan in Delhi: The Railway Headquarter in New Delhi has received a letter on May 19 purportedly written by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) threatening to blow up Rail Bhawan along with some other vital railway establishments in Delhi like Baroda House.. PTI News, May 21, 2010.

10,000 new towers to strengthen communication in militancy and Naxalism-affected States: The Union Ministry for Information Technology (IT) and Communications has decided to install 10,000 new mobile phone towers to strengthen the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited’s (BSNL) communication system in the country, including Jammu and Kashmir, mainly in the areas affected by militancy and Naxalism (Left Wing Extremism). The new towers would strengthen Security Forces network and will prepare them better to take on the threat of militants and Naxalites. Daily Excelsior, May 22, 2010.


229 militants and five SFs among 238 persons killed during the week in FATA: At least 71 Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) militants, including four ‘commanders’, were killed when Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jet fighters bombed targets in upper parts of Orakzai Agency in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) during Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (I will see you) on May 23.

The Security Forces (SFs) backed by fighter jets killed at least 34 Taliban (TTP) militants in the on going Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham in various parts of Orakzai Agency on May 21. In addition, a US drone attack on a militant compound killed six Taliban (TTP) militants in Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan Agency.

At least 24 Taliban (TTP) militants were killed and 29 others injured when PAF fighter jets bombed different parts of Orakzai Agency on May 20 in the on going Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham.

At least 60 Taliban (TTP) militants and four soldiers were killed in a clash between the Taliban (TTP) and SFs during Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham in Dabori area of Orakzai Agency on May 19. Also, the jet fighters bombed Taliban (TTP) militant hideouts in Dabori area, killing five Taliban (TTP) militants and injuring several others.

Six Taliban (TTP) militants were killed and 10 others injured in a clash with SFs during Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham in Kol area of Dabori tehsil (revenue unit) in Orakzai Agency on May 18.

At least 26 Taliban (TTP) and a soldier were killed in a clash between SFs and the Taliban (TTP) militants during Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham in Orakzai Agency on May 17.

Six Taliban (TTP) militants were killed and seven others injured in a clash with SFs in Shoti area of Upper Orakzai. Dawn; Daily Times; The News, May 17-23, 2010.

13 civilians and 10 militants among 26 persons killed during the week in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: At least three Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) militants were killed and others injured during a clash with Security Forces (SFs) in Gangro and Gambat areas of Maidan tehsil (revenue unit) of the Lower Dir District on May 23.

Three Taliban (TTP) militants, identified as Alam Sher, Khan Wali and Muhammad Ameen, were killed during a clash with the SFs in the Matta tehsil of Swat District on May 21.

Four suspected TTP militants were killed and seven houses destroyed during an encounter with the SFs in Amakhel village of Tank District on May 19.

A remote-controlled bomb targeting a Police patrol killed 13 persons, including Kullachi Deputy Superintendent of Police Muhammad Iqbal, his gunman and driver, in Kachi Paind Khel area of Dera Ismail Khan on May 18. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack. Dawn; Daily Times; The News, May 17-23, 2010.

Pakistani Army Major arrested for links to New York bomb plot, indicates report: A Pakistani Army Major has been arrested in connection with the May 1 failed bomb plot in New York’s Times Square. Daily Times, May 19, 2010.

Agencies warn of TTP plans to attack Parliament House: Intelligence agencies, on May 18, warned that the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) militants have recruited a suicide bomber to attack the Parliament House or any other important building. According to the report, the TTP has prepared a 24 or 25-year-old bomber named Amer Aaqa Hadifa, belonging to Jhang in Punjab for the purpose. Meanwhile, militant outfits have formed two separate groups to target senior law enforcement officials and Shia leaders in Punjab. Daily Times, May 19, 2010.

Taliban trying to overthrow Government in Islamabad, says US Defence Secretary Robert Gates: The Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) is not only trying to overthrow the Government in Islamabad, but is also launching attack against other countries, including the United States, said the Defence Secretary Robert Gates. Times of India, May 21, 2010.

LeT trained Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad in PoK, indicate reports: The Canada’s weekly current affairs magazine, Maclean, quoting an unnamed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) ‘commander’ on May 19 claimed that Faisal Shahzad, the confessed bomb plotter of Pakistani origin, had received terror training in one of the ‘jihad’ (Holy War) camps of the LeT in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The LeT commander, however, denied any direct involvement of his outfit with New York bombing plot. Macleans, May 19, 2010.

Taliban and Afghanistan Government hold talks in Maldives: The representatives of the Taliban and the Afghanistan Government held talks in the Maldives, officials said on May 20. Maldives Government spokesman Mohamed Zuhair said 15 representatives of the Afghan Government and seven Taliban militants met and would meet again over the weekend. However, a spokesman for Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai, Waheed Omar said the Government did not send any official representatives. "We do not have any representation and we do not think it will be very helpful for the peace process in Afghanistan," Waheed Omar said.. Daily Times, May 21, 2010.


LTTE holds Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam sessions in US: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran on May 17 disclosed in a press statement that the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) is holding its inaugural sessions in the city of Philadelphia in the United States for three days. Rudrakumaran reportedly announced the meeting in an e-mail statement that had been circulated to e-mail addresses of several Sri Lankan newspapers.. Colombo Page, May 18, 2010.

LTTE sympathisers trying to revive Tamil separatist movement, says Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse on May 20 said that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sympathisers outside the country were trying to revive the Tamil separatist movement. Gotabhaya also said that although the LTTE had not carried out any attacks since the outfit's leadership was wiped out in May 2009, the pro-LTTE lobby abroad was still active. "The motive of these international groups remains the same as that of the LTTE," he said in a statement marking the first anniversary of LTTE’s defeat. Special Broadcasting Service, May 21, 2010.

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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