J&K:
Politics in the Labyrinth
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
A ‘political
solution’, every political actor in Srinagar and Delhi
faithfully parrots, is required to resolve the unending
crisis of violence and terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K). The evidence, however, suggests that the
very people who are loudest in their proclamations of
the ‘political solution’ are often the fountainhead
of problems in the State, at a time when extraordinary
gains have, in fact been registered on a wide range
of security parameters.
Thus,
a major breakthrough was secured – entirely without
the mediation of the State’s principal political formations,
or the Centre and its ‘interlocutors’ – when moderates
within the separatist constituency broke rank to speak
out for the first time, with exceptional courage and
candour, against the terrorists who had hijacked the
movement in Kashmir, and who had murdered some of the
State’s most notable leaders. Most conventional political
players, however, continue to pander to the extremist
political formations and constituency, while others
remain simply disruptive.
On January
2, 2011, the chief spokesman of the separatist Hurriyat
Conference, Abdul Ghani Bhat, broke through the conspiracy
of silence and terror that had enveloped J&K for
over two decades, to declare:
Lone
Sahib, Mirwaiz Farooq and Professor Wani were
not killed by the Army or the police. They were
targeted by our own people... The story is a long
one, but we have to tell the truth. If you want
to free the people of Kashmir from sentimentalism
bordering on insanity, you have to speak the truth....
Here I am letting it out. The present movement
against India was started by us killing our intellectuals...
wherever we found an intellectual, we ended up
killing him...
|
Mirwaiz
Mohammad Farooq, father of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the
current chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference-Mirwaiz
(APHC-M), was killed on May 21, 1990; Abdul Gani Lone
was killed on the same date in 2002, while participating
in a programme commemorating the late Mirwaiz’s death
anniversary; Professor Abdul Ahad Wani was killed on
December 31, 1993; each of them by "unidentified
gunmen".
Other
voices quickly echoed Ghani Bhat’s sentiment, albeit
more guardedly, including Gani Lone’s sons, Sajjad and
Bilal Lone, who regretted their own past failure to
expose their father’s assassins, because of "an
element of fear".
Ghani
Bhat’s offensive went further, to directly attack the
campaign of stone pelting and disruption that had enveloped
the Valley through the summer
of 2010 under the principal leadership
and direction of the rival Tehrik-e-Hurriyat chairman,
Syed Ali Shah Gilani. "There was a hartal
(shut down) for five months and 112 people died,"
Ghani Bhat argued, "And at the end of it there
is nothing by way of achievement. This is what happens
when there is no thinking, no strategy."
In this
declaration, Ghani Bhat was articulating a widespread
sentiment that had been actively, and often violently
suppressed through the stone pelting campaign. Any failure
to follow Gilani’s ‘calendar’ of disruption ordinarily
met with swift reprisals; shop keepers who failed to
down shutters were thrashed, their shops vandalized;
special buses transporting children to school were stopped
and burned; trucks and cars moving along highways were
forced to stop on the roadside for hours on end, and
those who argued or protested would have their screens,
and sometimes more, smashed.
Despite
the intimidation, resistance to the unending strikes
and stone-pelting was not unknown. There were numberless
cases of non-cooperation, particularly of what became
known as the ‘half-shutter phenomenon’, where shops
and businesses operated with their shutters only half
open, to quickly evade reprisal in case a wandering
gang of separatist ‘enforcers’ came by. Indeed, on September
1, 2010, at the height of the campaign, activist Farooq
Ganderbal had organized a small protest demonstration
at Residency Road. Again, on November 7, 2010, activists
of the Jammu & Kashmir Non-governmental Organisations
(NGO) Forum managed to stage a small ‘peace rally’ in
Srinagar, against the shut-downs.
It is
crucial to note, in this context, that the entire protracted
stone-pelting campaign was directly backed by Pakistan
and by Pakistan-based terrorist formations, in a strategy
to offset declining capacities for terrorist action.
Masarat
Alam, chief of the Muslim League,
a constituent of Geelani’s Tehrik-e-Hurriyat, who had
engineered and enforced the ‘calendars’ of shut-downs
and stone pelting from the underground, was arrested
in Srinagar in the night of October 18, 2010. In his
disclosures to the Police, he admitted that he had received
INR 4 million from Geelani through different channels
to fuel the protests and incite the stone-pelters. Disclosing
details of Alam’s confession, J&K Director General
of Police (DGP) Kuldip Khoda stated that Pakistan had
been using different channels to fund the separatists,
including Geelani, to sustain the stone-pelting campaign,
as part of its ‘new strategy’. He added, further, "It
was not that everybody engaged in protests was paid.
The organizers had been paid and they incited the people
to hold protests and subject security forces and Police
to stone pelting. The militants of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
had also been working behind the scenes to fuel the
protests.’’
Given
the atmosphere of enveloping terror and intimidation
the open voicing of dissent against the dominant, terrorist-backed,
separatist position in J&K was unprecedented, and
was quickly seized upon – but just as quickly relinquished
– by the media. Despite the sea change in the ground
situation that these tentative developments indicate
(and they can easily be reversed at the cost of a few
bullets), no constitutional political formation, and
neither the State Government nor the Centre, appear
to have significantly accommodated these changes within
their current policy framework. Indeed, the unsettling
nonsense that has been the essence of the political
discourse, and of various ‘peace-making initiatives’
in J&K, and the relentless appeasement of the most
extreme voices, remains the hallmark of all policy and
pronouncements.
Ignoring
the turmoil of the preceding year, and the abject failure
of state agencies to bring the orchestrated disorders
under control till the Valley’s unforgiving winter froze
them out, Union Home Secretary thus announced, on January
14, 2011, "As a CBM (confidence building measure) in
J&K, the strength of the Security Forces [SFs] would
come down by 25 per cent." Troop reduction has
been the most strident of separatist demands, even through
periods of extreme disorder and significant terrorism.
The fact that this is part of the strategy of appeasement
of extremist elements, and not an initiative based on
a considered security assessment, is borne out by the
immediate response from both the Army command and the
Ministry of Defence. Even as speculation on troop reduction
mounted in Delhi, Army Chief General V.K. Singh had
cautioned, on January 13, 2011, that care had to be
taken to ensure that "extra pressure" was
not put on the "already stretched" troops
in J&K, and that only the Forces which were ‘dispensable’
were removed. On January 15, 2011, General Officer Commanding
(GOC) in Chief, Northern Command, Lt. Gen. K.T. Parnaik
cautioned, "I don't think it is the right time to go
for troops reduction in J&K. It may be somebody's
opinion or perception but we think there is no scope
for reduction of troops at this moment." Defence Minister
A.K. Antony added that the Army had already reduced
nearly 30,000 Army troops in the State and that there
was no proposal to reduce the number further.
The lack
of a tangible Kashmir Policy in Delhi is further manifested
in the activities of the weak group of interlocutors
who have been appointed by the Centre to find a "political
solution" in J&K. On October 13, 2010, the
Union Government appointed journalist Dileep Padgaonkar,
academician Radha Kumar and former Central Information
Commissioner M. M. Ansari, as its interlocutors for
the State. On December 9, 2010, Home Minister P. Chidambaram,
with Panglossian optimism, assured the nation that the
"contours of a political solution to the Kashmir problem
are likely to emerge in the next few months." His interlocutors,
however, have failed to speak to a single prominent
separatist leader till date, including ‘moderate’ factions
of the Hurriyat, and their most significant achievement
is that they have prevailed upon Chief Minister Omar
Abdullah and some leaders of the opposition People’s
Democratic Party (PDP), to speak to one another. Beyond
this, they have regurgitated tired proposals for administrative
relief and CBMs, including ‘demilitarization’ proposals
that have led to the Home Ministry’s hasty announcement
of troop withdrawal. They have also intervened to secure
the release of 66 youth and the withdrawal of 22 cases
under the Public Safety Act.
The situation
has been muddied further by conflicting and ambivalent
political postures. Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram,
on June 30, 2010, had claimed that the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT) was fuelling the unrest of the stone pelting campaign
in J&K. On December 9, 2010, he shifted positions
to distinguish between ‘two types of violence’ in the
State, arguing, "The violence perpetrated by militants
and infiltrators must be dealt with in a strong and
resolute manner. On the other hand, the violence witnessed
during protests by residents of the State requires deft
and sensitive handling."
Chief
Minister Abdullah added to the muddle, insisting that
the stone-pelting campaign had no correlation with militancy
and, at one stage, raised a question mark on Kashmir’s
accession to India. He has also chosen to add his voice
to the separatist clamour for the removal of the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), ignoring the vehement
opposition of the Security Forces to any such move and,
more significantly, the fundamental conundrum that the
Army cannot perform internal security duties without
the legal mandate that this Act provides.
It is
useful, in passing, to record here the mischief a Bharatiya
Janata Party initiative to engage in a highly publicised
flag-hoisting campaign at the Lal Chowk in Srinagar
on Republic Day, January 26, 2011, not in any meaningful
assertion of a long-standing and substantive engagement
with the State, but rather as a red rag to the separatists
and ambivalent elements within the larger population.
While the constitutional legitimacy of such a move is
beyond doubt, its political sagacity and strategic utility
is far from evident, outside a framework of competitive
political communalisation and electoral brinkmanship.
All these
positions have been held and articulated with little
or no reference to the situation on the ground. Crucially,
a trend of dramatically declining terrorist activities
in J&K, commencing 2002, appears to have stalled
in 2010. Total fatalities in 2010 stood at 375 – the
same number as the previous year (all data from the
South Asia Terrorism Portal database). 2008 had
witnessed 541 terrorism-related fatalities, 2007, 777,
and, at peak, 2001, at 4,507. There was, however, a
significant increase in terrorist fatalities, at 270
in 2010, as against 242 in 2009, while fatalities in
both the civilian and SF category fell, from 55 and
78 in 2009, to 36 and 69 in 2010, respectively.
Jammu
and Kashmir Fatalities: 2001-2010
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists
|
Total
|
2001
|
1067
|
590
|
2850
|
4507
|
2002
|
839
|
469
|
1714
|
3022
|
2003
|
658
|
338
|
1546
|
2542
|
2004
|
534
|
325
|
951
|
1810
|
2005
|
521
|
218
|
1000
|
1739
|
2006
|
349
|
168
|
599
|
1116
|
2007
|
164
|
121
|
492
|
777
|
2008
|
69
|
90
|
382
|
541
|
2009
|
55
|
78
|
242
|
375
|
2010
|
36
|
69
|
270
|
375
|
Source:
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)
The number
of militancy-related incidents have also remained nearly
constant, at 488 in 2010, as against 499 in 2009. 2008
had seen 708 such incidents, and 2007, 1,092. Disturbingly,
the number of major incidents (three or more killings)
increased significantly in 2010. While 2009 saw 29 major
incidents, there were 36 such incidents in 2010. Prominent
among these were:
October
21: The SFs shot dead three militants of the Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
who were on a mission to target the 15 Corps’ Army Headquarters
at Badamibagh Cantonment and another camp at Haft Chinar
in Srinagar.
August
10: Militants attacked a Police post guarding Mohammad
Abdullah, a leader of the Democratic Party – Nationalist,
in the Sopore town of Baramulla District, killing all
three Policemen on duty.
March
16: Three civilians and three SF personnel were killed
and eight others, including three SF personnel, injured
by militants in the Srinagar and Baramulla Districts.
Moreover,
on January 6, militants carried out an abortive fidayeen
(suicide squad) attack on a Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) camp at Lal Chowk in Srinagar, killing a Policeman
and injuring nine persons, including a CRPF trooper.
The last such attack in Srinagar had occurred on October
11-12, 2007, when two suicide bombers were killed and
three paramilitary personnel were wounded in a suicide
attack on a CRPF camp near the Dal Lake.
The terrorism-related
fatality figures for 2010, moreover, do not include
the 112 killed – principally in SF firing – in the summer
unrest through June-October 2010.
Nearly 4,000 Police and CRPF personnel and 504 civilians
were also injured in the violent clashes, as bewildered
State and Central Government responses, compounded by
a severely inadequate deployment of ill-equipped and
unsuitably trained SFs, gave a virtually free run to
the troublemakers in the streets.
Despite
continuous undermining of morale and operational effectiveness
as a result of contradictory political postures, the
SFs continued to inflict severe damage on terrorist
capabilities in the State. Among the 270 terrorists
killed in 2010 at least 31 were self-styled ‘commanders’.
In 2009, the 242 terrorists killed included 53 ‘commanders’.
172 terrorists from different outfits were also arrested
through 2010. The pressure created by the State SF’s,
moreover, forced the terrorists to seek shelter elsewhere
in the country. With the active support of Police Forces
of other States, the J&K Police managed to arrest
and bring back several top militant leaders, prominently
including HM ‘divisional commander’ Mohammed Abdullah
alias Abdullah Inquilabi from New Delhi on November
14; ‘divisional commander’ Ghulam Nabi Sheikh alias
Javaid Qureshi and his associate Tanveer Ahmed from
Dehradun (Uttarakhand) on December 11; and ‘divisional
commander’ Jameel Ahmed alias Nissar Qureshi
from Kangra (Himachal Pradesh) on December 15. SFs also
claimed to have rid the Districts of Jammu, Kathua,
Samba, Reasi and Udhampur, Doda, Kistwar and Srinagar,
of a significant militant presence.
The SFs
also made huge recoveries of arms and ammunition through
the year. In one such incident on May 17, 2010, the
Army neutralised a militant hideout in the Kupwara District
recovering 22 AK rifles and thousands of live rounds,
a Rocket Propelled Grenade, one 60 mm Mortar, over 100
grenades, other weapons, Radio Sets, Night Vision Goggles
and other ‘war like stores’. Sources indicate that the
quantity of arms and ammunition seized from militants
and their hideouts in the State since the eruption of
militancy in 1990 was more than sufficient to raise
42 new SF battalions: "The Security Forces including
Army, Police, CRPF and BSF [Border Security Force] have
seized more than 30,000 AK rifles from the militants
and militant hideouts in the State over the past 20
years since militancy began here." Ashok Gupta, Inspector
General of Police (IGP, Jammu Zone), now claims that
as many as 20 per cent of the small contingent of militants
now present in the State "are without guns".
It was
this depletion in men and striking capacities that had
provoked the shift in strategy towards street mobilisation
and low grade violence, backed by selective terrorist
strikes. Significantly, terrorist tactics have also
been changed as a consequence, with greater emphasis
on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and grenade attacks,
in order to avoid direct contact with the SFs and consequent
loss of cadres. SATP recorded 36 explosions in 2010,
as against just 13 in 2009.
There
are clear signs of worry in Pakistan, over these developments.
As a result, Pakistan violated the ceasefire along the
Line of Control and International Border in J&K
on 43 occasions in 2010, as against 28 incidents in
2009, principally to facilitate infiltration. However,
just 92 successful infiltration bids were recorded in
2010, as compared to 110 in 2009. An estimated 100 terrorists
are believed to have entered the State in these bids
through 2010. The total strength of terrorists in J&K
is currently believed to be no more than 500 to 700.
Worryingly, however, an estimated 2,500 terrorists are
believed to be waiting to enter Indian territory from
Pakistan, in some 42 terrorist training camps, including
34 that are designated ‘active’. Reports also indicate
that the infiltrating militants of different outfits
are entering J&K in mixed batches – including HM,
LeT and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen [HuM]
cadres. An estimated 200 youth have also ex-filtrated
into Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) through 2010, for
training in handling of arms and ammunition. A new phenomenon,
termed 'legal infiltration' is also causing concern
among Indian security agencies, as reports emerge that
youth are visiting Pakistan on regular visas, which
are extended to facilitate their basic training in handling
weapons and explosives.
Authorities
in Pakistan are also believed to have hiked the ‘pay’
of Kashmiri terrorists and refugees from J&K in
PoK. According to the latest inputs from various agencies,
Pakistani authorities now offer terrorists coming to
fight in J&K a monthly salary in the range of INR
8,000 to INR 10,000 per month, up from an earlier average
of INR 5,000. Financial support to those staying back
in refugee camps in PoK has been raised from INR 1,800
per month to INR 2,400, since early 2010. There are
no clear numbers, but some estimates suggest that as
many as 30,000 refugees are being supported in PoK.
Funding, moreover, seems to be no problem for terrorists
in J&K, and alternative sources are also available.
US cable dated May 24, 2006, leaked by WikiLeaks,
for instance, quotes al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden
as promising that jihadis fighting in Kashmir
would not "run short of funds", and committing USD 20
million to support Kashmiri militancy.
In an
effort to undercut terrorist recruitment and strength,
the J&K State Cabinet cleared its rehabilitation
policy on November 22, 2010, for youth who had ex-filtrated
from the State for arms training in PoK and Pakistan,
but who had given up insurgent activities and were willing
to return to the State to join mainstream. The Cabinet
also gave its nod to an amnesty plan for those who had
gone to PoK or Pakistan between January 1, 1989, and
December 31, 2009.
There
have been tremendous gains in J&K over the past
years, particularly since 2002, and these have been
consolidated through relentless sacrifices on the part
of the SFs. Little, if any, credit is due to the political
leadership, either at the Centre or in the State, while
significant reversals can certainly be directly attributed
to botched political initiatives and destructive political
postures and decisions. It is these gains and these
sacrifices that have opened up tiny and tentative spaces
for political dissent and democratic discourse in J&K,
long dominated by a politics, exclusively, of separatism
– both hard and soft. Any dilution of the slowly deepening
security cover in J&K will quickly squeeze these
emerging spaces – and the occasional and hesitant political
voices that are finding expression within them – out
of existence. If Kashmir is to be recovered from the
politics of hate and terrorism that has consumed it
for over two decades, these incipient voices will have
to be nurtured and, more importantly, protected. This
is the touchstone against which all present and future
policy must be judged.