Skirting
Failure
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
...if
it weren't for nuclear weapons, Pakistan would
be the Congo...
US
State Department note published by Wikileaks
|
For far
too long, Western powers – vigorously led by the US
– have been party to a comprehensive cover-up, a pretence
that has sought to minimize Pakistan’s role in the active
sponsorship and export of terrorism, and an effort to
distract international attention from the country’s
failing institutions, to emphasise, instead, its acts
of purported ‘cooperation’ with global counter-terrorism
efforts.
This
farce, and elements of the international community’s
real appraisal of Pakistan and the many players in the
country, lay fully exposed with the Wikileaks
disclosure of US diplomatic correspondence and confidential
assessments in 2010. These have fully confirmed the
continuing complicity of the Pakistani establishment
in terrorism in the South Asian region and beyond; the
corruption and mendacity of its various institutions
of Government; the country’s hurtling trajectory towards
state failure; and the inescapable truth of the realities
SAIR has repeatedly emphasized in the past.
In sharp
contrast to frequent public declarations of faith in
Pakistan’s capacities to tide over its rising crises,
one leaked diplomatic post thus reads, "Although we
do not believe Pakistan is a failed state, we nonetheless
recognize that the challenges it confronts are dire...
The government is losing more and more territory every
day to foreign and domestic militant groups; deteriorating
law and order in turn is undermining economic recovery.
The bureaucracy is settling into third-world mediocrity,
as demonstrated by some corruption and a limited capacity
to implement or articulate policy." Worse, individual
leaders were deeply compromised. President Asif Ali
Zardari, Sir Jock Stirrup, the then British Chief of
Defence Staff told US diplomats, was a "numbskull",
even as other senior British officials described Pakistan’s
President as incompetent and "highly corrupt".
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani,
is revealed to have plotted an ‘informal coup’ to dismiss
the President. Hundreds of millions of dollars of US
aid, earmarked for fighting militants, were being diverted.
Crucially, then US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson,
warned that no amount of US aid would change the Pakistan
army's covert support for four major terrorist formations,
the Afghan Taliban,
the Haqqani group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s fighters, and
the Lashkar-e-Toiba: "...there is no chance that Pakistan
will view enhanced assistance... as sufficient compensation
for abandoning support to these groups". Moreover, extremism
was "no longer restricted to the border area",
and fighters were increasingly being recruited from
the Punjab province, even as "the phenomenon is
spreading into northern Sindh as well." Another
post notes, "The bad news is that the militants
increasingly are setting the agenda." Moreover,
"The government’s anti-terrorism strategy is based
on ‘dialogue, deterrence and development’; however,
it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and
the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP.
Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting
negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that
only has made the extremists stronger." The country
was facing "pending economic catastrophe."
Then Special Advisor on AfPak, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke,
in a May 29, 2009, note, observed that Pakistan was
a centre for terrorist financing through Islamic charities.
Despite a clear acceptance of these many aspects of
the chaos that is Pakistan, the US remained helpless
to counter these trends, since it saw itself as being
trapped in a "co-dependent relationship" with Pakistan.
The Wikileaks
revelations have now forced many of these issues out
into the open, and British Prime Minister David Cameron,
during a visit to India, stated unambiguously, on July
28, 2010, "We cannot tolerate in any sense the
idea that [Pakistan] is allowed to look both ways and
is able, in any way, to promote the export of terror,
whether to India or whether to Afghanistan or anywhere
else in the world." Despite vociferous Pakistani
protestations, he refused to withdraw or dilute his
observations.
The limited
decline in and shifting patterns of terrorism-related
fatalities and incidents over the past year offer poor
consolation against this backdrop. Total fatalities
have certainly dropped from the unnatural peak of 11,585
in 2009, to 7,435 in 2010, but are still higher than
any preceding year, including 2008, when the figure
stood at 6,715 [all data from the South Asia Terrorism
Portal database; the figures are likely to be gross
underestimates, since reportage from areas of conflict
is poor, as authorities deny access to reporters, international
observers and other independent institutions]. Civilian
fatalities registered a 22 per cent drop between 2009
and 2010, while militant and Security Force (SF) fatalities
declined by 54 and 37.5 per cent, respectively, essentially
indicating that some of indiscriminate slaughters that
were being engineered in the name of counter-terrorism,
what some of the US State Department correspondence
described as "ham handed military tactics, which
included indiscriminate artillery bombardment"
and "blind artillery and F-16 bombardments"
which had displaced millions of innocent civilians from
their target areas, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
had been selectively scaled back in 2010.
Fatalities
in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: 2003- 2011
Year
|
Civilians
|
Security
Forces (SFs)
|
Terrorists
|
Total
|
2003
|
140
|
24
|
25
|
189
|
2004
|
435
|
184
|
244
|
863
|
2005
|
430
|
81
|
137
|
648
|
2006
|
608
|
325
|
538
|
1471
|
2007
|
1523
|
597
|
1479
|
3599
|
2008
|
2155
|
654
|
3906
|
6715
|
2009
|
2307
|
1011
|
8267
|
11585
|
2010
|
1796
|
469
|
5170
|
7435
|
2011*
|
226
|
98
|
384
|
708
|
Total
|
9620
|
3443
|
20150
|
33213
|
* Data
till February 20, 2011, Source: SATP
Significantly,
KP
accounts for the overwhelming proportion of the dramatic
drop in fatalities and violence, essentially indicating
active disengagement between the SFs and extremists
in this Province, as the total killed declined from
5,497 in 2009 to 1,202 in 2010. Terrorism related fatalities
also fell in the Punjab, from 441 to 316 over the same
period. However, FATA saw 5,408 killed in 2010, as against
5,304 in 2009; in Balochistan, fatalities rose from
277 to 347; while Sindh saw an increase from 66 to 162.
FATA
has acquired particular significance for Islamabad,
since the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which threatens
the country with massive internal destabilization, has
now substantially concentrated its forces in this Province.
Pakistan’s SFs have, consequently, focused overwhelming
attention against this principal sanctuary of the TTP,
even as they continue to studiously avoid any action
against elements of the Afghan Taliban, the al
Qaeda and the various India-directed
groups that continue to be seen as serving the countries
perceived ‘strategic interests’. The SFs launched major
operations in FATA through 2009-10, accounting for the
mounting casualties, though the gains of extended operations
in the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) and Orakzai Agency
have, at best, been cosmetic. Even the limited pressure
exerted on the terrorists will quickly dissipate unless
operations are taken forward into the North Waziristan
Agency (NWA), resulting in further escalation in the
hinterland, at a time when Islamabad is struggling to
contain terrorism in its core areas of Punjab and Sindh.
Balochistan
continued to witness overwhelming and relentless military
repression, human rights violations and excesses by
intelligence and security agencies, with fatalities
rising from 277 to 347. The increase was essentially
in the civilian category, and included an increasing
number of unexplained ‘disappearances’ engineered by
the Intelligence agencies and SFs operating in the Province.
SF and militant fatalities declined from 88 and 37 in
2009, to 59 and 14 in 2010.
|
2009
|
2010
|
Province
|
Civilians
|
SFs
|
Terrorists
|
Total
|
Civilians
|
SFs
|
Terrorists
|
Total
|
Balochistan
|
152
|
88
|
37
|
277
|
274
|
59
|
14
|
347
|
KP
|
1229
|
471
|
3797
|
5497
|
597
|
94
|
511
|
1202
|
FATA
|
636
|
350
|
4318
|
5304
|
542
|
262
|
4604
|
5408
|
Punjab
|
293
|
97
|
51
|
441
|
272
|
28
|
16
|
316
|
Sindh
|
49
|
3
|
14
|
66
|
111
|
26
|
25
|
162
|
Total
|
2359
|
1009
|
8217
|
11585
|
1796
|
469
|
5170
|
7435
|
Civilians
also bore the brunt of terrorist-related fatalities
in Punjab,
though fatalities even in this category fell from 293
in 2009 to 272 in 2010. Nevertheless, an index of the
inherent instability of the system was provided by the
assassination on January 4, 2011, of Salman Taseer,
the Governor of the Province, by his own bodyguard,
with the possible foreknowledge of his entire security
detail. Taseer had spoken repeatedly against Pakistan’s
oppressive and frequently abused blasphemy laws, and
specifically against the death penalty on blasphemy
charges awarded against a Christian woman, Asia Bibi.
The unrepentant killer was greeted with widespread public
applause and showered with rose petals on his first
court appearance on January 5, 2011. The Taseer killing
was also a worrying index of the growing religious extremism
within the security establishment. On January 12, the
Punjab Police recalled four Policemen from active duty
and asked them to report to their respective District
headquarters. Malik Mumtaz Qadri, Taseer’s assassin,
had revealed during interrogation that the four held
"extreme religious views" and could strike
at any time. Significantly, no religious leader or Imam
was willing to read a prayer at Taseer’s funeral, and
a significant faction within the Pakistani Senate walked
out during the Fateha (memorial prayer) for the slain
Governor.
The Taseer
assassination is only the latest and most dramatic manifestation
of the passions and abuse that have flowed from Pakistan’s
blasphemy laws. Nevertheless, in the wake of the killing,
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, under visible pressure
from Islamist extremist parties, made it abundantly
clear that the law would not be amended. Sherry Rehman,
a former Information Minister, was pressured to withdraw
a private member’s bill pending in Parliament, seeking
reforms in the blasphemy law. Rehman angrily declared,
"Appeasement of extremism is a policy that will
have its blowback", and is presently under death
threats from extremist groups.
The cumulative
‘blowback’ of pandering to extremism and, indeed, actively
supporting and encouraging it, has long been more than
visible across Pakistan. In 2010, suicide bombings acquired
an unprecedented lethality, with just 49 such attacks
inflicting 1,167 fatalities, as against 76 such attacks
in 2009, with a total of 949 fatalities. Figures compiled
by the Federal Ministry of Interior show that a total
of 3,433 Pakistanis had been killed in 215 incidents
of suicide attacks across Pakistan, between July 2007
and July 2010.
Nor was
there any respite from sectarian
strife. Though the number of incidents
fell from 106 in 2009 to 57 in 2010, total fatalities
rose from 190 to 509. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
remained the principal organisations responsible for
the rise of sectarian violence, but it was their association
with terrorist groups such as the TTP which has conferred
increasing lethality on their operations..
Amidst
growing radicalisation and rising terror, US pressure
has increased along the borders with Afghanistan. US
drone attacks have more than tripled since January 20,
2009, when Barack Obama took over the Presidency. A
BBC report of July 24, 2010, indicated that there
were 25 drone strikes between January 2008 and January
2009, in which slightly fewer than 200 people were killed.
In the year 2010, SATP data recorded at least 90 attacks
by US drones, killing more than 831 persons, as against
46 such attacks killing 536 in 2009. The annual report
of the Conflict Monitoring Centre released on January
1, 2011 revealed that, while a total of 2,043 people,
mostly civilians, were killed in US drone attacks during
the preceding five years, 929 of those causalities were
reported in FATA alone in 2010.
In reaction
to the drone attacks as well as US backed military operations
of Pakistan Army in tribal regions, the attacks on the
NATO supply vehicles has increased from just eight in
2008 and 25 in 2009, to at least 99 in 2010. The most
brazen among these was witnessed near the national capital,
Islamabad, on June 8, 2010, when unidentified militants
attacked and set ablaze a convoy of about 50 tankers
and containers heading towards Peshawar, the provincial
capital of KP, on the Motorway in the Sangjani area
of Ternol. Four people were killed in the attack and
another three were injured.
With
cumulative evidence of Pakistani reluctance to act against
major terrorist formations operating in Afghanistan,
it is unsurprising that relations between Islamabad
and Washington have come under increasing strain. On
December 16, 2010, the Central Investigation Agency
(CIA) station chief in Islamabad, Jonathan Banks, was
forced to leave the country after his name was disclosed
in a class-action lawsuit brought by Kareem Khan, a
tribesman from the NWA, who sued the CIA over the deaths
of his son and brother in a 2009 US missile strike.
The diplomatic relation between the two countries fell
to an all-time-low as it was suspected that the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)
leaked the CIA station chief’s name. It was no coincidence
that the lawsuit against the CIA station chief occurred
shortly after the head of Pakistan’s directorate, Lieutenant
General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, was accused in a civil lawsuit
for alleged involvement in the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.
The suit was brought in US District Court in Brooklyn
by family members of the American rabbi killed alongside
his wife in the 26/11 attacks.
The Raymond
Davis episode has further strained US-Pakistan diplomatic
relations. Davis, suspected to be an undercover spy,
shot dead two persons on January 27, 2011, in Islamabad.
Reports suggest that the two may have been ISI agents,
though Davis claims he fired during an apparent robbery
attempt. Pakistani officials have corroborated Davis’
version of events and, according to their preliminary
report, Davis appears to have acted in self-defense.
But the matter has become mired in politics and Pakistani
public sentiment, and Pakistan is refusing to accept
the US plea of diplomatic immunity for Davis. At the
time of writing, there is rising pressure from Washington
for Davis’ release, and indications that the US will
use its massive financial aid to Pakistan as an irresistible
lever in this case.
The Barack
Obama’s administration has proposed to Congress a total
of USD 3.1 billion in its budget for economic and security
assistance and diplomatic operations in Pakistan, for
the fiscal year 2012, beginning October 1, 2011. Earlier,
on January 27, 2011, President Barack Obama discussed
ways of achieving US goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan
with his top security and foreign policy advisors. There
seems to be growing uneasiness in the US over the status
of its AfPak
policy, which many believe has failed
to generate any positive impact.
Indeed,
the continuing farce of the US AfPak policy, and the
war of imminent flight the ISAF is seen to be fighting
in Afghanistan, can only destabilize the region – and
Pakistan in particular – even further. Islamabad remains
unwilling to act consistently against a wide spectrum
of Islamist terrorists and extremists – with the exception
of the TTP and factions that operate within the country,
even as stranglehold of radicalism strengthens over
the country’s institutions and chokes of the most incipient
signs of reform. A significant proportion of foreign
aid continues to be diverted to the extremist constituency
in the country, even as this constituency continues
to enjoy unfettered access to a wide range of independent
financial sources. In December 2009, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton wrote, somewhat coyly, that "some
ISI officials... continue to maintain ties with a wide
array of extremist organisations, in particular the
Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations." The
persistent ambivalence about the role of state institutions
in promoting terrorism sourced from Pakistan is now
no longer sustainable. Regrettably, the world, and the
US in particular, is yet to respond unambiguously to
the continuing adventurism of a nation that should have
been declared rogue more than two decades ago.