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Jammu & Kashmir: Terror, Democracy and the International Pretence Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
It is truly amazing how terrorists and their sponsors set the agenda of international discourse – perhaps nowhere more so than is the case with the discourse on democracy. This is apparent on the current international positions on the forthcoming elections in Jammu & Kashmir, scheduled by India’s Election Commission (EC) for October 2002.
Even before the EC’s announcement of the poll dates, a constant refrain emanating from Pakistan has demanded ‘international observers’ to oversee this election, and Pakistan’s dictator, President Pervez Musharraf – who seized power through a coup d’etat against a democratically elected government, and who is also the architect of one of the greatest of electoral scams in the shape of a ‘referendum’ to legitimise is continuance in power – assures the world that ‘the United Nations would not recognise the outcome of the elections in Kashmir without international monitoring’. This is, of course, entirely within the established confines of the fractious Indo-Pak discourse, but when it is faithfully echoed by leaders of the ‘free world’ – including many in America – there is reason for both surprise and concern.
Another demand by the terrorist groupings operating in J&K, by their leaders headquartered in Pakistan, and by their state sponsors there is for the ‘release of political prisoners’ prior to the proposed elections, a demand, once again, conscientiously echoed by the leaders of the ‘free world’. This creates the image of hundreds of ‘political prisoners’ languishing in India’s prisons – which is arrant nonsense. Data available indicates that, with over 35,540 militants and suspects apprehended by security forces between 1990 and May 2001, on the latter date, a total of just 321 persons were still in judicial custody in J&K on various charges relating to terrorism (the rest had all been released, in due course, on bail or after preliminary investigations). There were, among these, none who could legitimately answer to the title of ‘political prisoner.’
The demand for the release of ‘political prisoners’ prominently refers to Yasin Malik and to Syed Ali Shah Geelani, members of the separatist Hurriyat Conference. As for Malik, it is a measure of the inefficiency and licentiousness of India’s justice and political systems that he could, till a few weeks ago, walk free. He is a prime accused in the murder of four Indian Air Force personnel in Srinagar in 1990; he was one of the architects of the Rubaiya Sayeed kidnapping that set the current wave of terrorism in motion in 1989; and as the head of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – the most prominent gang of terrorists in the State between 1989 and 1993 – he directly engineered hundreds of other murders before he chose to ‘come overground’ and ‘join the political process.’ And it is, to its abiding disgrace, perhaps only in India among democracies, that a former terrorist can so easily project himself and be accepted as a political leader. Geelani, in turn, was recently arrested (on June 9, 2002) on specific charges of illegal transfers of large sums of money from paymasters abroad to active terror groups in J&K. In the US, a man like Malik would long have been dispatched to the electric chair or gas chamber; and Geelani would have difficulty finding a lawyer to defend him in court. It is inconceivable how the release of individuals such as these can be of relevance to the legitimacy of a democratic electoral process.
There is a need, here, to begin to make clearer distinctions in the contemporary democratic discourse, and to suspend the artificial and absurd parity of status that is currently maintained between positions articulated by a democracy such as India, and an authoritarian state such as Pakistan. A separation of discourse among democracies, on the one hand, and that between democracies and various non-democratic, authoritarian and rogue states, on the other, is necessary if any rationality is to be imposed in the international discourse. While ‘constructive engagement’ with the latter category may be necessary or expedient in order to secure improvements in conditions within these states – states which deny and abuse the fundamental democratic rights of their people – such states must not be allowed to dictate the course and character of the discourse among democratic nations.
A closer look at the context of elections in J&K is useful. First, the terrorist conglomerate United Jehad Council (UJC), which operates openly from Pakistan, has issued direct threats of violence to disrupt the election process in J&K – and already several potential candidates, primarily from the ruling National Conference, have been assassinated. This, interestingly, has evoked little response from the very vocal defenders of freedom and democracy in the ‘international community.’
The separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) has long been claiming to represent the ‘will of the people of Kashmir’. For years they have been seeking negotiations to secure a privileged place on the democratic table as the ‘sole representatives’ of the Kashmiri people, but simply and obstinately refuse to enter the electoral process on equal terms. The reason is not far to find – go to Kashmir and talk to his worst critics, and they will tell you that Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah and his National Conference – for better or for worse – will win hands down. And they don’t need to rig the elections. The Hurriyat refuses to participate because it fears that its pretensions to popularity will be debunked
As for ‘monitoring’ the elections, if the objective is simply to ensure that these are free and fair, the conditions are more than easily met without the uncertain and politically questionable device of an official international monitor. The possibility of such an international monitor is specifically precluded by India’s Representation of the People Act, which bars both foreigners and private Indian citizens from appointment as observers.
This does not, however, preclude, or even dilute, the possibility of transparency. If there is, indeed, a real and unbiased desire to see free and fair elections in J&K – and not just to play the ‘Great Game’ in this region – let the nations of the world saturate J&K with their diplomats and their media. The latter will, in any event, be there in overwhelming numbers with or without such ‘concerned’ intervention. Let the smallest infraction, the least incident of abuse, be magnified a million-fold through the media across the world as a measure of India’s failure. India has made it abundantly clear that it would have no objection to – and would, indeed, facilitate – such a presence, without any limit to numbers. But if any Western country, or coalition of states, presumes that it can interfere in processes of constitutional governance in India, a lesson in rudimentary geography is, perhaps, in order: India is not Pakistan.
The breakdown of negotiations between the Andhra Pradesh (AP) State government and the left-wing extremist — popularly termed ‘Naxalite’ — group, the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (People’s War) CPI-ML (PW), also known as the People’s War Group (PWG), has, once again, exposed the weaknesses of a peace process based on ill-conceived premises, demonstrating that an unrealistic assessment of the motivation and capabilities of insurgent organisations can result in greater escalation of violence. Such misconceived processes also constitute significant security risks: they provide insurgent groups an opportunity to regroup; and they contain in-built structures of incentives and concessions for continuing violence.
Among the approximately 40 Left Wing extremist groups active in India, the PWG is the most powerful. The Naxalite movement originated in Naxalbari (hence the term Naxal) in the State of West Bengal in the late 1960s, but lost its momentum and faced a series of splits after the death of its leader Charu Mazumdar in 1972. The Naxalites trace their ideology to the Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung’s theory of organised peasant insurrection, reject parliamentary democracy and believe in capturing political power through ‘protracted armed struggle’ based on guerrilla warfare. This strategy entails building up of bases in rural and remote areas and transforming them into ‘liberated zones’, which would ultimately be extended to surround and encircle urban centres of power. The eventual objective is to install a ‘people’s government’ through ‘people’s war’.
Andhra Pradesh has been affected by Naxal violence for over three decades. A total of 5,149 persons have been killed in the State between 1968 (when the Naxalite movement began) and July 2002 [Statistical Review], including 2,292 Naxalites, 2,369 civilians and 488 security force (SF) personnel.
The current peace process began on May 10, 2002, when the PWG declared a unilateral month long cease-fire. The groundwork for negotiations was done by a non-governmental organisation, the Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) over a period of three years. After three rounds of preliminary discussions between PWG emissaries and the State government, the talks broke down because the latter refused to accede to PWG demands for an official cease-fire, and termination of ‘fake encounters’ and arrests of Naxal cadres. The continuing hostilities between the State government and PWG reached a flashpoint when the latter called for a two-day Statewide bandh (general strike) on July 11-12, 2002, in protest against these encounters. The possibilities of the first ever direct talks between the government and the PWG leadership ended when the PWG withdrew from the process on July 19.
A closer examination of the peace initiative would reveal that political compulsions rather than rational strategic imperatives, were the defining factor. The government had failed to make a comprehensive assessment of the PWG’s intent and capabilities, its activities in the year 2001, and its ideological openness, or otherwise, to a negotiated settlement. The logic of negotiations in a particular State with a group that continued with its activities in several other States was also unclear.
The fact is, the PWG in Andhra Pradesh opted for a cease-fire because it was under intense pressure from the security forces (SFs) in this State. The carrot and stick policy adopted by the government in mounting a counter-insurgency offensive and, at the same time, vigorously encouraging surrenders through incentives, had substantially eroded the Naxal base in the North Telangana districts, the Naxalite heartland. With increasing casualties and recruitment to party cadres registering a downward trend, cases of forced recruitment were on the rise, and the Naxalites were rapidly losing popular support.
The Naxalites justify their violence in terms of the ‘people’s cause’ and the suffering of the ‘oppressed classes’. The fact, however, is that more than 75 per cent of those killed by them over the last decades were drawn precisely from these classes, primarily dalits (the poorest and most oppressed in the Hindu caste system) and tribals, or from the other backward classes. Of the 1,669 civilians killed by Naxalites between 1991 and 2001, 107 were drawn from the Scheduled Castes (dalits), 194 from the Scheduled Tribes, and 983 from the Other Backward castes. Just 385 were from the upper castes.
Despite setbacks in Andhra Pradesh, however, the PWG and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) have increased their activities in certain parts of the States of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. Their main area of operation has been the Dandkaranya region, a wide swathe of forests spread across the Gadchiroli, Chandrapur and Bhandara districts of Maharashtra; Rajnandgaon, Bastar and Kanker in Chhattisgarh; Balaghat in Madhya Pradesh, Koraput in (Orissa), and East Godavari and Vishakhapatnam in AP. Between January and July 2002, a total of 157 persons have been killed in Naxalite related violence in affected areas in these States. This included 72 Naxalites, 46 SF personnel and 39 civilians. In the year 2001, a total of 412 persons had been killed including 156 Naxalites, 109 SF personnel and 144 civilians.
The PWG’s activities in these States demonstrated that the organisation had little intention to de-escalate. Indeed, on May 7, 2001, the day on which the PWG declared its ‘unilateral cease-fire’ in Andhra Pradesh, 15 police personnel were killed in Jharkhand. The PWG has also used the breather provided by the cease-fire to strengthen its ideological and military base, as confirmed in documents recovered from a Naxalite killed during an encounter in the Karimnagar district of AP on June 24, 2002, which indicated that the PWG initiated the peace process only to regroup, recruit and augment its fire power.
The PWG has also initiated a number of strategic changes over the past year to consolidate its base. These include the formation of a new Andhra – Orissa Border Special Zone Committee and bases in Dandkaranya and contiguous forest areas, tactical withdrawal of underground cadres, creation of a special action team to attack single targets, and the establishment of a ‘Central Military Commission’. The PWG has also been making concerted moves in the States adjoining Andhra Pradesh in order to expand its area of influence. In Orissa, the group has already set up bases in the five districts of Malkangiri, Nabarangapur, Koraput, Gajapati and Rayagada, and has declared the forest areas of southern and western Orissa as ‘liberated zones’. In Chhattisgarh, there are reports of forcible recruitment, including that of young girls, into the People’s Guerrilla Army (PGA). Reports indicate that all families in and around the Tanda and Bagh rivers bordering Gondhia and Balaghat are sending their young girls away from the villages because the Naxalites are forcing them to join the Jang Chhapamar Sena, as the PGA is called.
The PWG is also deepening its transnational connections. Available evidence suggests that the PWG and the MCC, in collaboration with Maoist insurgents in Nepal, are attempting to create a ‘compact revolutionary zone’ running from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh. On July 1, 2001, left-wing extremist organisations from four South Asian countries – India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – had formed an umbrella organisation called the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) to unify and co-ordinate their activities across the region. Maoist insurgents in Nepal are also attempting to establish a network in the border districts of eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Uttaranchal, North Bengal and Sikkim. In May 2001, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) had forwarded a Nepalese request to the Bihar government to flush out Nepalese Maoists from the Kaimur and Aurangabad districts in the State. Nepalese Maoists have reportedly been infiltrating into India in increasing numbers, building on their relations with the PWG and MCC, following the military crackdown in their country.
Farooq Sobhan Former Foreign Secretary, Bangladesh
President Musharraf’s two-day visit to Bangladesh from 29th to 31st July,2002 will be considered by many Bangladeshis as a landmark visit on two counts. For the very first time, a Pakistani Head of State expressed regret for the army action in 1971 and apologized for what transpired at that time in Bangladesh. Such an apology was well beyond expectations for most people. However, the Acting President of the Awami League (AL), Abdus Samad Azad referred to the apology as ‘non-serious’ and wanted an ‘unqualified apology’. Some observers have pointed out that while the Pakistani President expressed both regret and an apology, this was done in a qualified manner. In the visitor’s book at the National Monument at Savar, he wrote "your brothers and sisters in Pakistan share the pain of the events of 1971." The following day, at a banquet hosted in his honour by Begum Khaleda Zia, he said, "We feel sorry for the tragedy which left deep scars on both our nations. But wounds do heal with time." In her reply, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh thanked Musharraf for his "candid expression on the events of 1971," adding, "this will, no doubt, help to mitigate the old wounds."
The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Morshed Khan, was quick to remind the Awami League that in 1974 it was none other than Bangubandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who, in a spirit of magnanimity, had opted to forgive and forget the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army in 1971, and had agreed to the repatriation of the 195 war criminals who were in Indian custody; and that the demand for an apology was raised by neither Sheikh Hasina nor her father when they were at the helm of affairs. On the issue of the last minute refusal of the Awami League leadership to meet with Pervez Musharraf because he was a military dictator, Morshed Khan referred to Hasina’s 75-minute meeting with Musharraf during the D-8 summit in Cairo in year 2001, when she was Prime Minister. He also mentioned the fact that the then-Foreign Secretary, Shafi Sami, had traveled to Pakistan at Sheikh Hasina’s behest to deliver an invitation to the Pakistani President to visit Bangladesh. Diplomatic observers feel that the Awami League’s attempts to embarrass the government on account of the Musharraf visit back-fired miserably, and that the last minute decision of the Awami League not to meet Musharraf was, in the words of the former State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abul Hassan Chowdhury, who had been instructed by Sheikh Hasina to set up the meeting, an act of ‘great immaturity’ on the part of the Awami League leadership. Why did the Awami League do this?
The government had its back to the wall because of the recent traumatic events in Dhaka University. There has been country-wide criticism of the police action against women students, and the Awami League felt it could exploit this situation to its advantage by linking the strike called by the students on July 30 calling to serve simultaneously as a protest against the Musharraf visit. There were, however, few takers for this posture.
It has also been suggested that a possible reason for the cancellation was because India had asked for it. This seems far fetched. In reality, both the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the AL have woken up to the fact that, in this day and age, no government in Bangladesh can sustain unfriendly relations with India or ignore its other neighbours in the region.
Pervez Musharraf had evidently done some homework before coming to Bangladesh. He knew exactly which buttons to press in order to win over the otherwise suspicious, some might even say hostile, public. Having expressed his apologies for 1971, he announced that Pakistan would allow duty free access to 10,000 tons of tea from Bangladesh and waive all tariffs on raw jute, and also agreed to examine the request to extend duty free access for some other items. The possibility of a free trade agreement was also discussed. The business community has made it a point to contrast this gesture with the prevarication and foot-dragging by four successive governments in India on the issue of duty free access for 25 product lines from Bangladesh, which has been promised to Bangladesh.
Pervez Musharraf also earned kudos for his comments on ‘reinventing SAARC’, including his suggestion that it was high time that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was asked to play a role in the settlement of disputes between member states. Implicit in what Musharraf said was a criticism of India’s preference to deal with its neighbours bilaterally, and this was underlined by the statement that SAARC was held hostage by Indo-Pak relations.
Commenting on the Kashmir issue, Musharraf reiterated the position that Pakistan would "accept whatever the Kashmiris want. But elections under coercion cannot be a substitute for plebiscite." He was of the view that the Kashmir problem had been internationalized and that the United Nations would not recognize the outcome of the elections in Kashmir without international monitoring. Bangladesh, however, was careful to avoid taking sides on the issue.
The Musharraf visit was very much the General’s initiative, and was possibly an attempt to make the point that Pakistan was far from being isolated in the region, and that it was, on the contrary, sensitive to the concerns of its neighbours. His ‘two gestures’ combined with his comments on SAARC and the fact that he refrained from making any statement that would in any way embarrass his hosts, have encouraged the Bangladesh government to view the visit as a very successful one. An added bonus has been the very successful initiative taken by the Awami League to shoot itself in the foot by fixing an appointment with Musharraf and canceling it at the last minute.
In fact, the visit on the whole, rather like Musharraf’s apology, was only a qualified success. No headway was made in respect of the two long standing issues: the division of assets and liabilities, and the repatriation of the ‘stranded Pakistanis’ or Biharis who opted to go to Pakistan in 1972. Musharraf’s position that the repatriation of these persons must await the return of three million Afghan refugees, was certainly not well received in any quarter. It also remains to be seen whether the efforts to strengthen economic and commercial relations will actually produce anything concrete.
Can the Musharraf visit change the political or economic dynamics in the region? The answer must be an emphatic no. For Bangladesh today, perhaps more so than ever before, there is a compelling need to put its relations with India on a solid and stable footing. Both countries need to reach out to each other in a pragmatic way in order to strengthen trade and economic relations and move forward on a whole range of issues. The building of bridges between the States of India’s Northeast and Bangladesh, breathing life into sub-regional cooperation, development of roads, railways and ports on a sub-regional basis, the harnessing of water resources, energy cooperation and a host of other subjects, need to be addressed when India’s Minister for External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha, visits Dhaka later this month. Notwithstanding all the hoopla surrounding Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Bangladesh, there can be little doubt that the Indian Minister’s visit is of much greater significance to Bangladesh.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
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