South Asia Terrorism Portal

Balochistan: Ethnic Backlash
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Unidentified militants opened indiscriminate fire on labourers working in an agriculture field in the Manjho Shori area of Naseerabad District in Balochistan on May 15, 2019, killing three of them and injuring one. The deceased had come from Tando Adam area of the Nawab Shah District in Sindh, and were daily-wage labourers. The attackers managed to escape. Though no group has so far claimed responsibility for the killing, Baloch insurgent groups have a history of killing non-Baloch labourers.

In the intervening night of April 17 and 18, 2019, unidentified assailants shot dead at least 14 passengers after forcibly offloading them from a bus plying on the Makran Coastal Highway in the Ormara area of Gwadar District. Reports indicate that around 15 to 20 armed assailants wearing Security Forces’ (SF) uniforms stopped five or six buses travelling between Karachi (Sindh) and Gwadar (Balochistan), checked the identity cards of passengers, and offloaded 16 of the passengers from just one bus. Two of the offloaded passengers managed to escape despite sustaining injuries. Balochistan Inspector General of Police Mohsin Hassan Butt described the incident as a “targeted killing”. Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS, Baloch National Freedom Front) claimed responsibility for the killing.

On March 24, 2019, Police recovered three bullet-riddled bodies in the Zadin area under Rakhni tehsil (revenue unit) in Barkhan District. All the three deceased were residents of the Dera Ismail Khan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). No group claimed responsibility for the killings.

According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 229 ‘outsiders’ have been killed in Balochistan since the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe and President of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), on August 26, 2006, (data till May 19, 2019). Bugti was killed in a military operation in the Chalgri area of the Bhamboor Hills in Dera Bugti District.

Baloch insurgents have essentially targeted people from other provinces. However, out of the 229 ‘outsiders’ killed, at least 178 were Punjabis alone. Eight Punjabis were killed in 2018; 23 in 2017. There were no such fatalities among Punjabis in 2016. The number of Punjabi fatalities in the Province stood at 22 in 2015; 17 in 2014; 29 in 2013; 26 in 2012; 13 in 2011; 21 in 2010; 18 in 2009; and one in 2008. No such fatalities were recorded in 2007 and 2006. While Punjabis have been the main targets, other non-native persons also fell to the ethnic collateral damage. Out of 51 non-Punjabi ‘outsiders’, 33 were Sindhis, while the ethnic identity of the remaining 18 is unascertained.

A series of attacks on ‘outsiders’ in Balochistan, as well as the destruction of national infrastructure followed the killing of Akbar Bugti. These killings have been orchestrated by Baloch insurgent groups such as the BLA, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), among others, who began to voice anti-Punjabi sentiments in their campaigns in the wake of the military action against Bugti. A media report published on June 28, 2011, noted, “Almost all non-Baloch are on their hit-list.” Muhammad Khalid of Balochistan-Punjabi Ittehad stated, “The militants began to target the Punjabi settlers after Nawab Bugti was taken out by the military (in August, 2006). Before that there were occasional incidents in which Punjabis were targeted.”

Significantly, most of the Punjabi settler killings were recorded in South Balochistan, which accounts for 156 killings out of the total of 178, (principally in Bolan, Kech, Gwadar, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Sibi and Lasbela Districts); and 27 in North Balochistan (mostly in Nushki, Quetta and Mustang Districts). The overwhelming concentration of such killings in the South is because of the presence and dominance of Baloch insurgent groups in this region, while the North is dominated by Islamist extremist formations such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who engage principally in sectarian killings.

Forced disappearances engineered by Pakistani SFs are another reason behind the targeted killings of non-Baloch persons in the region. According to partial data compiled by the SATP, of the 4,317 civilian fatalities recorded in Balochistan since 2004 (data till May 19, 2019), at least 1,378 have been attributable to one or other terrorist/insurgent outfit. Of these, 435 civilian killings (263 in the South and 172 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations, while Islamist and sectarian extremist formations – primarily Islamic State, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), TTP and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of India) – claimed responsibility for another 943 civilian killings, 860 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta) and 83 in the South. The remaining 2,939 civilian fatalities – 1,708 in the South and 1,231 in the North – remain 'unattributed'. It is widely believed that Security Agencies are busy with “kill and dump” operations, particularly in the Southern region, against local Baloch dissidents, a reality that Pakistan’s Supreme Court has clearly recognized.

Irked, by such killings the Baloch insurgent groups target non-Baloch people or even some Baloch whom they suspect to be spying for the SFs. At least two labourers (ethnicity not known) were killed when unidentified militants opened fire on a coal mine in the Khosat area of Harnai District on May 9, 2019. After the incident, Frontier Corps (FC) personnel rushed to the spot and a vehicle carrying the FC personnel hit a landmine, resulting in three FC fatalities. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack in an emailed statement from Jeehand Baloch, a BLA spokesperson: "We want to make it clear to the local spies and death squad groups of Pakistan Army that they will not be forgiven for their crimes."

‘Outsiders’ are also targeted as the Baloch groups believe that they are helping Islamabad push forward its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The Project according to Baloch nationalists, brings no benefit to the Baloch, but constitutes just another tool for their exploitation. Not surprisingly, since its inception in Pakistan on April 20, 2015, CPEC has been under attack from Baloch insurgents. According to official figures 44 people had died and over 100 wounded in “attacks targeting CPEC projects mainly road construction in Balochistan, which began in 2014” till September 8, 2016. Since September 9, 2016, according to partial data compiled by SATP, at least another 31 persons have been killed in attacks targeting CPEC-related projects across the Province (data till May 19, 2019), including the most recent attack on May 11, 2019, in which four terrorists stormed [https://satp.org/second-sight-volume-1-no-43] the luxury Zaver Pearl-Continental Hotel, in Gwadar in Balochistan. The Hotel had around 70 guests at the time, including 40 Chinese nationals. Nine persons, including four hotel employees, one Pakistan Navy soldier and all four attackers, were killed during the eight-hour long siege.

Amidst all this, overall fatalities in the province are on the rise. Between January 1 and May 19, 2019, a total of 127 fatalities (58 civilians, 39 SF personnel, and 30 terrorists) have been recorded. During the corresponding period of 2018, the number of fatalities stood at 108 (39 civilians, 39 SF personnel, and 30 terrorists). Through 2018, there were a total of 381 fatalities (239 civilians, 79 SF personnel, and 63 terrorists). There were 343 total fatalities in 2017. Fatalities had registered declining trends between 2014 and 2017. 

Baloch insurgents have been fighting continuously against Islamabad’s coercion for more than a decade – and, indeed, intermittently for over seven decades – demanding independence for the ethnic Baloch areas of the country. They argue that the Province has been neglected by the Pakistani state and exploited for its mineral resources, and that the ‘outsiders’ that are being targeted by the insurgents are agents of Islamabad. Islamabad has done little to alleviate conditions in Balochistan, or to address the grievances of its people.

Meghalaya: Warning Signs
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On May 12, 2019, a civilian, identified as Romeo Lyngdoh, was killed by Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) militants at Lapalang village in the East Khasi Hills District.

Later on May 14, HNLC ‘general secretary’ and ‘publicity secretary’ Sainkupar Nongtraw claimed responsibility for the killing and stated, “Our army cadres were responsible for the death of Romeo Lyngdoh due to his involvement in activities against the outfit and the ‘Jaidbynriew’ (indigenous Khasi-Pnar people)”. He also alleged that Lyngdoh was a ‘Police informer’, and warned that the group would eliminate all those people who were responsible for the death of HNLC cadres: “We will hit first and then make our claims.”

Ironically, the last reported incident of the killing of an HNLC cadre was recorded on March 27, 2008, when two HNLC militants were shot dead by the Meghalaya Police during an encounter at Umkiang in the Jaintia Hills District. It is not clear, consequently, why Nongtraw was referring to the killing of HNLC cadres.

Since March 1, 2000, when South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) commenced compiling data on insurgency in Meghalaya, a total of 30 HNLC cadres have been killed by the Security Forces (SFs) in Meghalaya, till May 19, 2019, with the last such fatality in March 2008.

Again, on May 17, warning the Police to stop harassing HNLC members, Nongtraw stated,

Again, there were no reports in the open media to support any of his allegations.

In this context it is important to recall here that, on January 2, 2019, HNLC had reconstituted its ‘Central Executive Council’ (CEC). The CEC is headed by ‘chairman’ and ‘commander-in-chief’ Bobby Reagan Marwein, ‘general secretary’ and ‘publicity secretary’ Sainkupar Nongtraw, ‘vice chairman’ Khrawbok Jyrwa, ‘foreign secretary’ Alex Diengdoh, ‘finance secretary’ Wanshan Marwein, ‘organising secretary’ Riewpyrkhat Sun and ‘socio cultural secretary’ M Rynjah.

The latest killing (on May 12) can therefore be linked with an attempt by the HNLC to regroup and secure some attention for this new leadership.

HNLC, initially known as Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC), was formed in 1987. In 1995, the trio of ‘chairman’ Julius Dorphang, ‘army chief’ John Kharkrang, ‘general secretary’ Cheritserfield Thangkhiew – founding members of HNLC – rechristened the group HNLC. HNLC operates from Khasi and Jaintia Hills Districts of the State.

The principle demands of HNLC were separate statehood for Hynniewtrep (Khasi-Pnar) tribes, implementation of the Inner Line Permit (ILP) system to check the entry of outsiders into the State, and expulsion of illegal Bangladeshi and Nepali nationals allegedly residing in Meghalaya.

According to partial data compiled by the SATP, there have been a total of 44 HNLC-linked fatalities (eight civilians, six SF personnel and 30 militants) from March 1, 2000 (data till May 19, 2019).

The last incident involving HNLC was reported on February 13, 2018, when HNLC militants lobbed a hand grenade inside the residence of an individual named Than Khonglah. Nongtraw later claimed that it was a warning to all those ‘conspirators’ who aided in the operation to nab militants. The last civilian killing incident linked to HNLC was reported on December 23, 2009. A coal trader, Raja Khongsit (45), was shot dead by four suspected HNLC militants at Pomshutia village in East Khasi Hills District. His wife was injured in the attack. The last SF killing linked to HNLC was reported on November 7, 2007. On that day, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Raymond P. Diengdoh was killed when a team of Police personal attacked a HNLC hideout at Paham Umdoh Forest near Byrnihat area in the Ri-Bhoi District.

Unsurprisingly, over the past decade and a half, HNLC was almost written off. The outfit lost a significant number of cadres, either to surrenders or arrests.  According to SATP, since March 1, 2000, SFs have arrested 209 militants (all data till May 17, 2019). Another 175 HNLC militants surrendered during this period, due to sustained SF pressure. In the latest incident of surrender, on May 20, 2018, two HNLC militants, Aiborlang Thongni aka Bahbah Mawpud and his wife Rishalin Syiemlieh, surrendered before the Police at Shillong, the State capital, in the East Khasi Hills District.

Further, the India-friendly regime of Sheikh Hasina Wajed in Bangladesh since 2009 led to the closing down of several HNLC camps in that country. According to media reports, there are now no camps of Indian militant groups in Bangladesh. Earlier, in February 2017, the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) had reported that HNLC had three camps in Bangladesh. There were seven HNLC camps in Bangladesh in 2015.

The outfit, which has been lying low for many years, suffered another blow on October 18, 2018, when HNLC ‘general secretary’ Cherishstarfield Thangkhiew surrendered before Deputy Chief Minister Prestone Tynsong and Director General of Police (DGP) R.P. Agarwal at Shillong.

There have also been intervening efforts by both the Government and HNLC to initiate peace talks. On August 21, 2014, HNLC declared that it was “ready for peace talks” and asked the Meghalaya Government to appoint an “interlocutor” if it was committed to peace. Sainkupar Nongtraw then stated, “The HNLC is ready for peace talks within the ambit of the Constitution of India or outside the Constitution as per requirements.” The move, among others, failed to fructify.

Most recently, on February 2019, the HNLC leadership and State Chief Minister Conrad Sangam both called for peace talks. However, the middle ground seems to be missing. Chief Minister Sangma had stated that the Government was open for unconditional talks with the militant groups for achieving long-term peace in the State. In response, Nongtraw asserted, “We are ready for talks, but peace talks should not compel us to take to the streets, stage blackflag protests or hunger strike in front of the Secretariat, which will eventually send us back to militancy”. No further reports on the status of the proposed peace talks are available.

However, the controversial and hurried proposed enactment of the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill (CAB), 2016, (subsequently introduced in Parliament as the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019), did provide some ammunition to HNLC, to once again raise the issue of illegal immigrants and the costs they imposed on locals. After the Bill was passed in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) on January 8, 2019, Nongtraw argued,

Nongtraw further asserted that the Government of India should grant freedom to the States, if it could not ensure equality to every citizen.

CAB was allowed to lapse subsequently, when it was not introduced in the Rajya Sabha (upper House of the Parliament), and General Elections were announced, heralding the dissolution of the Lok Sabha. However, BJP, the leading party of the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government at the Centre, has promised to bring the Bill back again if voted back to power. The results of the on-going General seven-phase elections are scheduled to be declared on May 23, 2019.

Moreover, the 2014 ban on ‘rat hole mining’ in the State by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) is also opposed by the HNLC. A December 2018 report quoted HNLC ‘general secretary’ Nongtraw calling for alternatives for the poor, who lost their source of livelihood due to the ban. Rat hole mining is a primitive unscientific and hazardous method of mining for coal; many a times resulting in river pollution and death of miners extracting the coal. The tragedy of December 13, 2018, when 15 miners were trapped in one such mine at Ksan in the East Jaintia Hills District in Meghalaya. Elaborate search operations were eventually abandoned on March 2, 2019. Only two decomposed bodies were recovered. The remaining miners were presumed dead at this stage.

HNLC is trying to regain lost space in Meghalaya, taking up positions on a range of sensitive issues, in an effort to make up for its depleted strength. CAB has given the entire Northeast region, including Meghalaya, some cause once again to rally around identity-based movements. These and other fault lines have been exploited by militant formations in the past. Despite the sustained decline in violence across the Northeast and in Meghalaya, there is no space for complacency, and no reason to believe that this long-troubled region cannot, once again, descend into crisis.