South Asia Terrorism Portal

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
[SAIR]

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

AFGHANISTAN

 

   

IS-KP: Another Weapon in the ISI Armory
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
 

On June 12, 2020, at least four civilians, were killed in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack that occurred at Sher Shah Suri Mosque in the Kart-e-Char area of Kabul city in Kabul Province. The blast took place when people were offering Friday prayers, killing four worshippers, including the prayer leader Imam Maulavi Azizullah Mufleh.

Though no group has claimed responsibility for the attack so far, the Taliban has, in fact, condemned the attack. It is widely believed that the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) was behind the attack. Significantly, a similar attack on the Wazir Akber Khan Mosque in Kabul took place on June 2, 2020. Two persons, including prayer leader, Mullah Mohammad Ayaz Niazi, were killed and two others were injured in the blast, which took place when worshippers had gathered for evening prayers. Claiming responsibility for the attack, IS-KP described the targeted prayer leader as “an apostate and evil, propagating loyalty to the apostate Afghan government.”

On May 30, 2020, two employees of Khurshid TV, a private TV channel, were killed in an explosion in Kabul City. Those killed included a reporter and a technical worker of the television channel. Six others, including one of the employees of the TV channel, were injured. IS-KP claimed responsibility for the attack.

Meanwhile, two of the worst attacks in the recent past were attributed to/ claimed by IS-KP:

May 12, 2020: Unidentified terrorists attacked a maternity ward run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors Without Borders) killing 16 civilians, including two new-born infants, in Dasht-e Barchi area, a Hazara Shia dominated neighbourhood of Kabul city. Security Forces killed four terrorists at the site. The civilian death toll later increased to 24.

May 12, 2020: A suicide attack targeting the funeral ceremony of Shaikh Akram, a former ‘commander’ of the Public Uprising Forces, killed at least 24 civilians in Shewa District of Nangarhar Province. Abdullah Malikzai, a member of the Nangarhar Provincial Council, also lost his life in the attack. Later, the civilian death toll increased to 32.

The Taliban issued a statement asserting that the group was not behind either of these attacks. IS-KP claimed the funeral attack. Though it did not make any statement on the hospital attack, the United States (US) Special Envoy for Afghan Peace, Zalmay Khalilzad, on May 14, 2020, asserted,

The USG [United States Government] has assessed IS-K [IS-KP] conducted the horrific attacks on a maternity ward and a funeral earlier this week in Afghanistan. IS-K [IS-KP] has demonstrated a pattern for favouring these types of heinous attacks against civilians and is a threat to the Afghan people and to the world.

According to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report released on April 27, 2020, a total of 1,293 civilian casualties (533 killed and 760 injured) took place in Afghanistan during the first three months of 2020. UNAMA attributed 55 per cent of the total casualties to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs): 39 per cent to the Taliban, 13.38 per cent to IS-KP, i.e. 173 civilian casualties (63 killed and 110 injured)], and the remainder to unspecified AGEs. According to the report,

Two of the most egregious incidents were mass shootings claimed by ISIL-KP [IS-KP] in March: an attack on 6 March at a commemoration for a Hazara leader in Kabul, which killed 34 civilians and injured 78 more, and an attack on 25 March on worshippers at a Sikh-Hindu temple in Kabul, which killed 26 civilians and injured 11 more.

IS-KP continues to wreak havoc, despite suffering severe losses over a long period. According to a Combating Terrorism Centre Report released in March 2020, between 2015 and 2018,

In Afghanistan, ISK's [IS-KP's] losses amounted to a total of 11,668 deaths, 696 individuals captured, and 375 individuals surrendered, which were primarily concentrated in Nangarhar.

Further, a United Nations report on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security released  on February 4, 2020, noted,

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan [IS-KP] came under severe military pressure from the security forces of Afghanistan and Taliban fighters towards the end of 2019, leading to its virtual expulsion from what had been its Afghan headquarters in Nangarhar Province. The authorities of Afghanistan took custody of more than 1,400 people, including fighters of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan [IS-KP] and their dependents. The impact on the number and geographic distribution of the group's fighters is assessed as significant.

Not surprisingly, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani on November 19, 2019, buoyantly declared, "No one believed one year ago that we would stand up and remain in Nangarhar, and thank God that today we have obliterated Daesh [IS-KP]." Adding to the optimism, Nangarhar Governor Shah Mahmoud Miakhel asserted, "It's not possible that they once again equip themselves in other areas of Afghanistan and threaten other parts of the country."

However, the recent attacks demonstrate that the jubilation was premature.

Indeed, the US was more cautious in its assessment. An unnamed US official stated on November 21, 2019, that, according to the US assessment “IS-KP still maintains a presence [in Kunar], as well as the northern provinces of Afghanistan”. The US at that time estimated that the IS-KP had between 4,000 and 5,000 fighters across Afghanistan, and the outfit was far from finished.

The United Nations report on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) released on February 4, 2020, noted,

The presence of ISIL in Afghanistan is still of great concern to Member States… Nevertheless, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan [IS-KP] remains active, ambitious and threatening… Some 2,100 fighters are now in Kunar Province, which has effectively become the group's new Afghan core area, whereas the number of fighters elsewhere in Afghanistan may now be as low as 400, giving a total estimate of 2,500 for the whole country.

Formed in January 2015, IS-KP had a large number of cadres of Pakistani origin from the beginning. However, it has gradually found increasing support from Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and much of the replenishment of losses comes from Pakistan. Antonio Giustozzi, in his 2018 book “The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad” that chronicles the formation of the group and related activities states,

The patient work of the ISI towards gaining influence within IS-K [IS-KP] seemed to be paying off in May 2017, when a former commander of LeT [Lashkar-e-Toiba] associated with the agency was (controversially) chosen as the new governor of Wilayat Khorasan..

The book further notes that spate of eliminations of IS-KP leaders by US and Afghan forces had forced the group to seek Pakistani help.

An IS-K [IS-KP] source indicated that the choice was the result of contacts with the Pakistani ISI, which hinted to IS-K [IS-KP] the possibility of a trade-off: the appointment of a leader linked to the ISI and the cessation of attacks against Pakistani government targets, in return for access to safe havens in Pakistan.

The Combating Terrorism Centre Report of March 2020 also noted that, unlike in Afghanistan,

In Pakistan, the majority of ISK's [IS-KP] losses have been incurred in the form of individuals captured (440) instead of killed (104). The data also shows that police raids have dominated the Pakistani state's strategy in tackling ISK [IS-KP] across all four years, although there were some limited ground operations and airstrikes.

Conspicuously, these covert Pakistani machinations are now being exposed with Afghan Security Establishment bringing the truth out in the open.

Afghan Security Forces on April 4, 2020, arrested the emir of IS-KP Mawlawi Abdullah aka Aslam Farooqui, on charges of orchestrating the attack on the Kabul Gurdwara on March 25. Mawlawi Abdullah, a Pakistani national (from the Orakzai agency), who became the emir of IS-KP in April 2019, was earlier associated with the LeT. 19 others, including IS-KP leaders Ali Mohammed from Islamabad and Salman from Karachi, were also arrested. An unnamed senior Afghan counter-terror official stated,

The ISKP [IS-KP] is just a demon child of Pakistan's ISI, which is designed to hit at targets for larger tactical purposes of Rawalpindi GHQ. Among those arrested include terrorists (sic) from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Nangarhar, Quetta, Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, Karachi and Kunar Province. This is the biggest achievement of Afghan security forces to date.

The ISI has progressively imposed a Pakistani leadership on IS-KP, culled from ‘loyal’ Pakistani terrorist formations such as LeT. IS-KP cadres are also increasingly dominated by Pakistani nationals from such ‘reliable’ formation, including LeT and JeM, creating a decisive secondary influence in Afghanistan. 

Slowly and steadily the Taliban is moving towards capturing political power in Kabul. The ISI needs another instrumentality on Afghan soil, as they do not trust the Taliban if it is restored to power in Kabul. IS-KP also provides an instrument to maintain pressure on the US as a bargaining tool. IS-KP is the new weapon in the ISI armory. The ISI will continue to nurture it and seek to transform it into a formidable force in the foreseeable future, unless the international community led by the US takes some drastic counter-measures; a prospect, in their current state of panic and flight, that is highly unlikely. 

INDIA

 

   

Assam: Interloper in Karbi Conflict
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On June 11, 2020, a People's Democratic Council of Karbi Longri (PDCK) militant was arrested from Therebasa in Karbi Anglong District. One pistol was retrieved from his possession.

On June 6, 2020, a joint team of the State Police and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) arrested four PDCK militants, including 'finance secretary' Francis Terang aka David Mukrang, from Therebasa. The other three arrestees were identified as 'sergeant' Naman Rishi Rengma aka Akhabi Rengma, Roosevelt Engti, and Angtong Rongpi. Security Forces (SFs) recovered two 7.65 mm pistols with two magazines, cash worth INR 301,000 and nine SIM cards from their possession.

On February 27, 2020, SFs arrested an unidentified PDCK militant from Bilaspara in Dhubri District.

On February 2, 2020, SFs, in two separate operations, arrested four PDCK militants, identified as Clarbong Teron, Jirsong Hanse, ‘lance corporal’ Armung Terang aka Cling Terang (25), and ‘private trainer’ Longkam Dera aka Mohen Fangso, from Virvar Sai Teron Gaon and Langbongkroi areas in Karbi Anglong District.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), SFs have so far arrested 11 PDCK militants (10 of them in 2020, one in 2019) since the formation of the outfit on October 27, 2016.

No PDCK militant has been killed by SFs so far. No cadre of the outfit has surrendered. Moreover, PDCK has not been found involved in any incident of killing so far.

However, the outfit was found involved in some insurgent and disruptive activities. These include:

July 21, 2018: An inspecified number of PDCK cadres were injured in an encounter with the Police at Bokaram Tokbi Gaon under Dolamara Police Station in Karbi Anglong District.

November 4, 2017: PDCK called for a 24-hour total bandh (shutdown) starting from November 7, 2017. In a press note, PDCK 'red army's’ 'chief of army staff', David Mukrang, claimed that the bandh had been called in protest against "atrocity and torture committed against its functionaries Raju, Engleng, and Logsing Teron, by Indian occupational forces.” No untoward incident was reported during the bandh.

August 14, 2017: Seven armed militant formations, including PDCK, called a 12-hour bandh on Independence Day (August 15), in the entire North East India, to ‘ban’ celebration of Independence Day. Other militant formations were Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Kanglei Yowel Kanna Lup (KYKL), Saoraigwra faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland NDFB (NDFB-S), and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT).

PDCK also tried to force some ‘social reforms’ that included ‘death sentence’ for rapists and molesters, and promised ‘dire consequences’ for those who sell pornographic content and intoxicants like alcohol and tobacco products near educational institutions, clubs and churches. On July 1, 2017, PDCK ordered people from the Karbi tribe not to marry people from other tribal and non-tribal communities, claiming that such alliances bring evil practices such as the dowry system and rape into Karbi culture. The group declared a fine of INR 500,000 for those violating this diktat, and also proposed severe physical punishment as a deterrent. Announcing the decision, PDCK’s ‘chief of army staff’ David Mukrong warned,

In olden times, the Karbis never mixed with people of alien culture, talking to and sharing food with others used to be seen as an offence. If the Karbi do not follow the path of our forefathers, a day will come when our rich culture and tradition is distorted.

However, none of these ‘directives’ could be enforced by PDCK due to lack of sufficiently trained cadres, besides pre-emptive efforts undertaken by SFs.

PDCK was formed in October 26, 2016, by I. K. Songbijit. He became the ‘chairman’ of the outfit. The other leaders of the outfit included ‘General Secretary’ & ‘Publicity Secretary’ Nongme Tungjang; ‘Finance secretary’ and 'chief of army staff', Francis Terang aka David Mukrang, and ‘Home Secretary’ Mir Ang Sir Ang.

PDCK’s stated aim is sovereignty for Karbi people and its area of operation is the Karbi Anglong District.

Soon after, on October 31, 2016, the then Karbi Anglong Superintendent of Police, Debojit Deuri, had asserted,

He [Songbijit] is definitely trying to cash in on the vacuum. In the past, all Karbi insurgent outfits were raised with the objective of securing statehood for the Karbis. This is for the first time that Songbijit's group is talking about sovereignty. We have no doubt that it is backed by the NSCN-K.

Further, on November 2, 2016, the then Additional Director General of Police (ADGP-Special Branch), Pallab Bhattacharjee disclosed,

We have already received inputs that the outfit has been formed in Karbi Anglong and is being led by IK Songbijit. When the KPLT [Karbi People's Liberation Tiger] entered into a ceasefire, other insurgent groups like ULFA [United Liberation Front of Asom] and NSCN-K [National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang] desperately needed a foothold in the hill district. This new outfit formed by Songbijit has got the support of both ULFA and NSCN-K.

The then ‘chairman’ of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland – IK Songbijit faction (NDFB-IKS), IK Songbijit, who was reportedly responsible for the December 2014 massacre of Adivasis [tribals from Central India brought by British to work in Tea gardens] by NDFB-IKS militants, was forced out of NDFB-IKS in 2015. Subsequently, B. Saoraigwra became the leader and the NDFB-IKS was renamed as NDFB-S and became irrelevant. An unnamed source aware of the developments, disclosed on January 9, 2017, 

Ever since the genocide of Adivasis in 2014, Songbijit got reportedly unpopular among the Bodos for his barbaric ways. Sidelined and pushed to Myanmar, the rebel leader formed PDCK with Karbi youths drawn from the NDFB [IKS] faction."

Songbijit himself belongs to the Karbi tribe.

Songbijit, a veteran militant leader, who for most part of his militant career fought for the ‘Bodo’ cause, despite being a Karbi himself, now wanted to create legitimate grounds for himself among the Karbis. And he had a cause ready to be exploited. In a March 27, 2017, in an interview with a private TV channel, Songbijit explaining the rationale behind the formation of the outfit, stated,

I have been witnessing factionalism and inconsistencies in the Karbi revolutionary organisation's principles and ideologies. Our issues have been compromised again and again in the name of peace parleys. Therefore, we have formed PDCK to fulfil the aspiration of Karbi people.

Bodo outfits like Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) were demanding that the Government accord Scheduled Tribe (Hills) status for Bodos settled in Karbi Anglong. This was bitterly opposed by Karbi civil society groups as well as Karbi armed outfits. Songbijit realised that, as most of the Karbi outfits, like the Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF) and KPLT were more or less inactive, there was a void to exploit.

According to reports, non-tribals comprise 46 per cent of around 960,000 population of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC). Naturally, PDCK tried to play on the demographic fears of the Karbi community, and the loss of its political edge to ‘outsiders’, in order to gain legitimacy in tribal politics. On January 2, 2017, PDCK issued ‘quit notices’ to Bengali and Hindi speaking residents in Karbi Anglong,

It is the British and not India that invaded Karbi country and annexed it into the then British empire. It is a historical accident and a mistake that, Karbi Kingdom swallowed in by the Indian union. Nowadays, colonialist Government of India continues to pursue a dishonest policy to suppress the Karbi and Dimasa people. They know very well that the strong identity of Dimasa and Karbi people cannot be destroyed easily and consequently, keeping them under Indian administration for long will not be easy too. So, India has been adopting one crooked policy after another to vaporize the strong identity of Dimasa and Karbi people. They have adopted the semi-violent policy of demographic aggression, the violent policy of physical killing and manipulative policy of creating social disharmony amongst indigenous people. For example, during the leadership of Indira Gandhi in 1967-71, many thousands of Bangladeshi Bengali refugees were rehabilitated in Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao and in addition to it, thousands of Hindi speaking people from mainland India were brought in to make our people a helpless minority.

Further, on October 27, 2019, PDCK ‘chairman’ Songbijit, disclosed that the group would declare independence, and also ‘asked’ the Indian Army to leave,

…PDCK would like to appeal to the government of India to agree to holding a referendum to solve the Karbi-India conflicts peacefully… If India fails to respond to our proposal positively, we will not hesitate to declare independence of Karbi Longri by 2022… The Indian Army has been doing some developmental works in Karbi Longri from the last two years. PDCK appreciates their laborers (labours). However, we would like to earnestly ask them to leave our land at earliest.

Operating out of Myanmar, Songbijit, however, faced a setback  when the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) in February-March 2019 launched operations against the Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) based in Myanmar and severely restricted the ability of ULFA-I and the Yung Aung faction of the NSCN-K (NSCN-K-Yung Aung) to provide sanctuary for other militant groups, thus foiling PDCK plans. The NSCN-K split  took place in August 2018. 

Nevertheless, even as favourable external factors supporting militancy have since been downgraded, chances of internal mobilisation on safeguarding Karbi identity and political rights have received a fillip, especially after the January 27, 2020, Bodo Agreement  potentially benefiting now dormant armed groups in the region. Indeed, on February 19, 2020, KLNLF ‘general secretary’ Thong Terong Kabi warned, “The identity of Karbis will come under threat if Bodos who live in the hill areas [along with Karbis] are also given a Scheduled Hill Tribe status.” 

PDCK would also have been trying to exploit this situation.

SFs, meanwhile, have been assertive in their plans to wipe out this insurgent outfit. On June 3, 2020, Assam Director General of Police (DGP) Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta urged the PDCK leader Songbijit to join the mainstream, cautioning that the group was under surveillance. The DGP asked Songbijit to surrender or be ready to face consequences.

Counter Insurgency (CI) operations by SFs against marginal entities like PDCK will continue, in order to preserve the relative peace established in the undivided Karbi Anglong District and also to deter militant groups from neighbouring states from using them as proxy forces.

NEWS BRIEFS