South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Shades of 'Grey'
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
 

Marcus Pleyer, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) President, at a virtual press conference held on October 23, 2020,  after the three-day (October 21-23) virtual Plenary meet, declared, “Pakistan remains on our increased monitoring list [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring], the so-called gray list.” He stated that FATF would consider sending its team for an “on-site visit” to Pakistan, once it completes all 27 items of its action plan, to review progress and determine whether to remove the country from the ‘grey-list’ or not. He, however, pointed out, that there was "another process going on in the Asian Pacific Group [APG]" where Pakistan's case is being evaluated.

When asked if Pakistan still faces the risk of being moved to the FATF’s High-Risk Jurisdictions or ‘black-list’, he stated that though Pakistan has “now completed 21 of 27 items of its action plan... the six outstanding items are very serious deficiencies that still have to be repaired” and Pakistan consequently still faced the risk of being moved to the ‘black-list’.

Meanwhile, in a release on October 23, 2020, FATF, stated, that "as all action plan deadlines have expired, the FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by February 2021". In the release it asked  Pakistan to

Earlier, on September 30, 2020, the APG released its 1^st  Follow Up Report (FUR) on Pakistan’s  Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) adopted in October 2019. According to the FUR, out of 40 FATF recommendations, Pakistan was found non-complaint on four recommendations, partially complaint on 25, largely compliant on nine, and compliant on only two recommendations. There are four possible levels of technical compliance: compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant and non-compliant.      

The Report at the end concluded,

There are three categories of follow-up based on mutual evaluation reports: regular, enhanced and enhanced (expedited).

In the MER 2019, which provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Pakistan at the date of the on-site visit in October 2018 (October 8 to 19), Pakistan was found non-complaint on four recommendations, partially complaint on 26, largely compliant on nine, and compliant on only one recommendation.

In the meantime, Pakistan made several last-minute attempts to come out of the ‘grey-list’. A total of eight  Bills were passed to meet the FATF demand. These include: the Islamabad Capital Territory Waqf Properties Bill, 2020; the Anti-Money Laundering (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020; and the Anti-Terrorism (Third Amendment) Bill 2020; on  September 16, 2020; the Limited Liability Partnership (Amendment) Bill 2020 and the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2020, on August 20, 2020; the Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matter) Bill, 2020, on August 6, 2020; the United Nations Security Council Amendment Bill, 2020 and the Anti-Terrorism Act Amendment Bill, 2020, on July 30. Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on July 26, 2020, had said that that the Government has prepared eight bills for legislation on anti-money laundering and terror financing with a view for Islamabad to move out from the FATF’s ‘grey-list’.

On September 16, Federal Law Minister Farogh Naseem confirmed that Pakistan had “completed all FATF-related legislation before the deadline… There were no more amendments required for now.” He added that Pakistan would pass new laws or further amend the existing ones if required in future.

Further, the Parliament was informed on September 16 that the Provincial Home Departments have frozen the 964 properties of proscribed organizations under United Nations Security Council (Freezing and Seizure) Order, 2019, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These included a total of 611 properties of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)/Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) and eight of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Punjab; 108 of JuD/FIF and 29 of JeM in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; 80 of JuD/FIF and three of JeM in Sindh and 30 of JUD/FIF and one of JeM in Balochistan; 17 of JuD/FIF and four of JeM in Islamabad Capital Territory; and 61 of JuD/FIF and 12 of JeM in Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

On August 18, 2020, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued two Statutory Regulatory Orders to enforce UN Security Council sanctions against hundreds of terrorists, including those of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), JeM, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network and Islamic State, as well as 93 terrorist groups and entities. The First Statutory Regulatory order listed 88 entities, including terrorist groups. It also included JuD chief Hafiz Saeed, JeM chief Masood Azhar, and Dawood Ibrahim in their individual capacities. The second notification listed prominent Taliban and Haqqani Network leaders such as Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Siraj Haqqani, Bakht Gul and Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. The two notifications ratified the UN Security’s Council’s call for freezing the assets of the terrorist individuals and terror entities, banning the travel of the terrorist individuals and ensuring that they cannot access any weapons, ammunition and military equipment.

Interestingly, however, a Taliban delegation led by Baradar was invited by Pakistan for talks on August 24, 2020. When it was reported widely that Pakistan has enforced new sanctions, the Foreign Office on August 22, 2020, responded that no new sanctions had been imposed on the individuals and outfits under the two Statutory Regulatory Orders of August 18. The Foreign Office spokesperson, in a clarification argued, “Comprehensive SROs [statutory regulatory orders] are issued from time to time as per routine. Such SROs have been issued in the past to meet global obligations. The last SRO was issued in 2019.” He, however, did not explain why the earlier statutory regulatory orders were not uploaded on the Ministry’s website then, while the August 18, 2020, was uploaded just after its release. Reports indicate that all earlier Statutory Regulatory Orders were uploaded in 2020, clearly establishing the fact that Pakistan is doing all that is possible to formally comply with FATF’s requirements to come out of the ‘grey list’, but is evading any real changes in the freedom of operation it provides to designated terrorist formations and individuals.

Pakistan’s formal compliance is clearly superficial and FATF is rightly of the opinion that Pakistan  needs to do much more to deal with “very serious deficiencies”.

While Pakistan has taken strong measures against domestically-oriented terrorist groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), it remains a safe haven for terrorist groupings threatening world peace, particularly groups which are directed against India and Afghanistan in what are essentially Pakistan state-backed proxy wars. These terrorist formations continue to enjoy the open support of the Pakistani establishment.

The Inter Service Intelligence’s (ISI)’s direct and present link with Syed Salahuddin, ‘chairman’ of the United Jehad Council and ‘chief’ of Hizbul Mujahideen, has been further reconfirmed. A letter issued to Salahuddin certifies that he is a bona fide official of the Directorate of Intelligence and is working for the Inter Service Intelligence. The letter suggests that he has been "security cleared" and should not be "unnecessarily stopped". The certificate is valid up to December 31, 2020.

Acknowledging the threat, William E. Todd, Nominee to be Ambassador to Pakistan, told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 22, 2020, that “to truly reduce regional tensions, and rebuild a strong relationship with the United States, Pakistan must take sustained and irreversible action against terrorism”. He said that Pakistan has “committed publicly to ensure terrorists cannot use Pakistani territory to operate” and that it “needs to continue that work.”

While Islamabad has failed again to deceive the FATF, it is believed that it will continue with such efforts in future as well. No real transformation on the ground is expected. FATF will, consequently, have to act with far greater determination if it really wishes to end Pakistan’s direct support to and sponsorship of terrorist groups and activities.

BANGLADESH

CHT: Factional Clashes
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On October 20, 2020, Ratan Chakma (24), a member of the MN Larma faction of the Parbatya Chattogram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS–MN Larma) was shot dead by unidentified assailants in the Babupara area of Baghaichari Upazila (Sub-District) in Rangamati District of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). PCJSS-MN Larma blamed the members of the Santu Larma faction of the PCJSS (PCJSS-Santu Larma) for the murder.

On October 15, 2020, Sa U Pru Marma, a former Union Parishad (Local Government Body) member, was shot dead in the Rowangchhari Upazila of Bandarban District in CHT. He was a supporter of the PCJSS–MN Larma. Locals said that he might have been a victim of long-standing factional clashes between the PCJSS–MN Larma and PCJSS-Santu Larma.

On October 10, 2020, Bachmong Marma (45), an activist of PCJSS–MN Larma, was shot dead at a tea stall at Jamchhari Bazar under Sadar Upazila in Bandarban District. Locals said that the victim was pulled out of the tea stall and shot dead at point blank range in front of the local people.

CHT is spread across 13,189 square kilometers and consists of three Districts – Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Bandarban. The region experienced two decades of insurgency, between 1977 and 1997, over the ethnic tribals’ demand for autonomy and land rights. More than 6,000 Government soldiers and rebels, as well as 2,500 civilians, were killed during the conflict. Though the insurgency terminated with the signing of the CHT Peace Accord on December 2, 1997, between the Government and the undivided PCJSS led by Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larmaaka Santu Larma, violence in the region continued due to rivalry between splinter groups of PCJSS.

According to reports, till June 2020, more than 600 people have been killed in CHT in such clashes, since the signing of the Peace Accord in 1997. These include over 200 members of PCJSS-Santu Larma, 312 members of parent United People’s Democratic Force (UPDF), 85 members of the PCJSS–MN Larma, and 10 members of UPDF-Democratic.

After the signing of the Accord in 1997, factionalism became rampant in PCJSS ranks and the group witnessed multiple splits. The first split came in 1997 itself, when Prasit Bikash Khisa formed UPDF-Prasit Khisa, after leaving PCJSS in protest against the Accord. The second split occurred in 2007, when a faction led by Sudha Sindho Khisa formed PCJSS-Reformation. The parent group split again, into PCJSS-MN Larma and PCJSS-Santu Larma, in 2010. In the meantime, UPDF-Prasit Khisa also suffered a split with the formation of UPDF-Democratic, led by Tapan Jyoti Chakma aka Borma aka Jalwa in November 2017. All these splinter groups are currently working as regional political parties. The other regional political parties active in CHT are Somo Adhikar Andolon (SAA) and Parbattya Bangalee Chattra Parishad (PBCP).

Meanwhile, according to locals of the region, all factions are involved in extortion from the wood trade, kitchen markets, cattle markets, transport and others. Intelligence sources indicate that these groups are collecting millions of BDT from people from all walks of life in CHT and are buying weapons with part of this money. According to law enforcement and intelligence sources, all factions have special armed wings, with sophisticated arms like rocket launchers, automatic sniper rifles and heavy machineguns.

On October 13, 2020, two members of the Prasit Khisa faction of the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF-Prasit Khisa) were killed and a Bangladesh Army soldier was injured in a gunfight in Rangamati District's Naniarchar upazila. The incident took place in the Burighat area of the Upazila, when an Army patrol went to the spot to arrest some armed extortionists of UPDF-Prasit Khisa.

Meanwhile, these regional parties are gradually losing control over CHT politics. In the last General Elections held on December 30, 2018, the Awami League won all three constituencies in the CHT. The Awami League-backed candidates also won the majority of the chairman and vice-chairman seats during the Upazila Elections held in five phases on March 10, March 18, March 24, March 31 and June 18, 2019. In the earlier General Elections held on January 5, 2014, PCJSS senior leader Ushatan Talukdar defeated the Awami League-nominated Dipankar Talukder in the Rangmati Hills, though the Awami League bagged the Bandarban and the Khagrachhari seats.

In another sign of their weakening political status, the UPDF-Democratic and PCJSS–MN Larma formed an alliance with the Awami League on December 16, 2018. This created a sense of panic among the other factions of the PCJSS, as they feared losing their long-standing political influence in the area, apprehending that Awami League's increasing influence would further diminish their long-standing sway in CHT. These developments have made the various factions jittery, contributing to escalating tensions and violence between the splinters.

However, Dhaka's failure to implement the 1997 Accord in a timely manner has also provided these groups with the grounds to 'justify' their actions. On December 1, 2019, Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma aka Santu Larma, President of PCJSS-Santu Larma, at a press briefing on occasion of the 22nd anniversary of signing the CHT Peace Accord alleged,

There are 72 articles in the CHT Peace Accord.

Echoing similar sentiments, on August 6, 2020, Bangladesh Adivasi Forum General Secretary Sanjeeb Drong asserted,

Land disputes are the main issue in CHT. Even if all the provisions of the CHT Peace Accord are implemented, without a solution to the land disputes, the locals insist, everything else would be meaningless.

The core issue is that Bengali settlers have grabbed land of the indigenous Jumma people. According to the Census of 2011, CHT has a population of around 1.6 million, including around 845 thousand indigenous Jumma people and 752 thousand Bengali Muslim settlers. In 1947, the Jumma population was 98 per cent and Bengali population was around two percent of the total population of CHT. According to the CHT Peace Accord, the land occupied by the Bengali settlers was to be given back to the indigenous Jumma people.

Strong action by the Security Forces against the armed factions is, of course, necessary to contain their violence and restore peace to CHT. However, unless the issues of land disputes and the full implementation of the 1997 Accord are addressed, the tensions and resentment of the indigenous people is likely to translate into periodic upsurges and violence. Dhaka’s fulfilment of its promises to the tribal people of CHT is a necessary condition for an enduring peace.