South Asia Terrorism Portal
IS-KP: Dramatic Spike Giriraj Bhattacharjee Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On April 22, 2022, at least 33 people, including children, were killed and another 43 persons were injured in a bomb blast during Friday prayers, inside the Malavi Sikandar mosque in the Imam Sahib District of Kunduz Province.
On April 21, 2022, IS-KP claimed responsibility for four attacks:
On April 20, 2022, at least six people were killed in two separate explosions at the Abdul Rahim Shahid High School in the Dasht-e-Barchi area, a Hazara Shia dominated area, under Police Distrcit-18 of Kabul.
On April 1, 2022, five Shia civilians were killed while 22 others were injured in twin blasts in Jibril town under Police District-13 of Herat city, Herat Province.
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) claimed responsibility for each of these attacks.
The spate of attack is being carried out under campaign “Conquest of Revenge for The Two Sheikhs” initiated by the IS-Central on April 17, 2022. IS-Central spokesperson, Abu-Omar al-Muhajjir, announcing the campaign, declared, “We announce, relying on God, a blessed campaign to take revenge”. On February 3, 2022, US Special Operations Forces carried out a raid targeting IS ‘caliph’ Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi aka Hajji Abdullah,in Atme town, in the Idlib Province of Syria. During the raid, the IS leader detonated a suicide vest, killing himself, his wife and children. IS-Central spokesperson Abu Hamza al-Qurayshi was also killed in the raid.
Abu Ibrahim had replaced the first IS-Central ‘caliph’ Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, who had blown himself up during a similar raid carried out by US Special Operations Forces in Barisha village in Idlib Province, Syria, on October 26, 2019.
Though the IS-KP justifies these recent attacks in the name of a “revenge campaign”, it is significant that the group is violently engaged in opposing the Taliban since its return to power in August 2021.
According to a United Nation Human’s Rights Council (UNHRC) report, released on March 6, 2022, out of 397 civilians killed in attacks in Afghanistan between August 15, 2021 and February 15, 2022, more than 80 per cent were killed by the by IS-KP. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), another 151 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan since February 16, 2022, of which 87 killings have been attributed to or claimed by IS-KP (data till April 22, 2022).
During the same period (August 15, 2021-April 24, 2022), IS-KP has killed 23 Taliban fighters. On April 24, 2022, two Taliban men, including Mawlawi Abdul Fattah, Acting Head of Mines, were killed in an explosion in Bagh Shah area of Faizabad city, the provincial capital of Badakhshan
During the preceding comparable period (December 5, 2020 – August 14, 2021), IS-KP had killed 124 civilians. No Taliban cadre was confirmed killed by IS-KP during this period.
Also, according to a United Nation (UN) report on the situation in Afghanistan, released on January 28, 2022,
Another UN report released on the same day read,
The IS-KP recruitment has also spiked due to poor economic and humanitarian conditions since the Taliban take over in August 2021. According to an April 13, 2022, World Bank report on Afghanistan's economy 'Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery',
A December 16, 2021, report quoted a resident of the Kunar Province saying, "Daesh is offering 30,000 to 50,000 Afghanis (about USD 270-USD 450) a month to join them in the Kunar province.”
Moreover, the IS-KP is trying to spread beyond its traditional stronghold in Nangahar in Eastern Afghanistan. An article published on March 17, 2022, claimed that “Islamic State is trying to broaden its appeal in Central Asia,” and argued that, to this end, IS-KP was focusing on Northern Afghanistan and has increased operations there. These areas are largely populated by Uzbeks and Tajiks – ethnic groups largely shut out of the Taliban government. This makes IS-KP recruitment from these ethnic groups much easier.
Yet, public posturing by Taliban leaders has sought to play down the IS-KP threat. On February 14, 2022, Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob asserted, “Da’esh is not a threat to Afghanistan. Our intelligence has dismantled 85-90 percent of the group.”
Indeed, the Taliban had initiated a countrywide campaign to counter the IS-KP threat, in order to gain international legitimacy. Some prominent incidents in such operations included:
January 10, 2022: Taliban forces killed three IS-KP fighters in an operation in Police District-5 of Kabul. Two suspected IS-KP members were also arrested during the operation.
November 29, 2021: Three IS-KP militants were killed when Taliban fighters raided their hideout in the Zangoy area under Police District-1 of Jalalabad city, capital of the eastern Nangarhar Province.
Meanwhile, according to the UNSC January 26, 2022, report, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan received credible allegations of the extrajudicial killing of at least 50 individuals suspected of affiliation with IS-KP.
The Taliban, has meanwhile, claimed that at least 351 IS-KP terrorists have surrendered to ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ (IEA) forces since August 15, 2021. Some recent incidents of surrender include:
February 5, 2022: At least 50 IS-KP militants surrendered to IEA forces in Nangarhar Province.
March 4, 2022: Abdul Rahim Muslimdost, one of the founders of the IS-KP, renounced the group and joined the Taliban. He claimed that IS-KP had been suppressed in the country.
However, the recent spike clearly suggests that the Taliban’s claim of IS-KP being decimated is far from the truth.
It is, moreover, pertinent to recall that the IS-KP has shown itself a resilient organization. Significantly, IS-KP suffered major losses in 2019, but had subsequently reorganized under Shahab al-Muhajir aka Sanaullah after his appointment in June 2020 by Islamic State-Central, to lead IS-KP. Al-Muhajir also heads the Al-Sadiq office of the Islamic State, which covers the ‘Khorasan’ region, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Central Asian States. The reorganization certainly helped the group and there was an intensification of its activities.
There is a strong likelihood that the Taliban regime will face an increasing threat from IS-KP. The outfit may succeed in making further inroads inside Afghanistan and has the potential to emerge as a force that could destabilase not only Afghanistan, but the countries around it as well.
Divisive Dangers Ajit Kumar Singh Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah addressing the inaugural session of the 48th All India Police Science Congress in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, on April 22, 2022, declaring,
Significantly, since May 26, 2014, when Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi took oath, India, according to partial data compiled the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) has recorded a total of 5,944 fatalities (1,450 civilians; 1,140 Security Force, SF, personnel; 3,346 terrorists/insurgents and eight in Not Specified Category). During the corresponding preceding period, there were a total of 11,200 fatalities (3,883 civilians; 1,950 Security Force, SF, personnel; 5,159 terrorists/insurgents and 208 in Not Specified Category). Evidently, the level of violence has come down considerably. The number of incidents which caused these deaths came down from 5,543 to 3,219. The number of districts reporting deaths came down from 103 in 2013 to 68 in 2022.
According to the latest data made available by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D), the number terrorism/extremism affected police districts in Indian has varied since 2011: 2011 (188), 2012 (176), 2013 (173), 2014 (170), 2015 (172), 2016 (181), 2017 (188), 2018 (174), 2019 (161).
Analysis of theater-wise data on violence comparing the year 2013 and 2021 provides interesting insights.
In the Northeast, insurgency-related violence led to 252 fatalities (reported from 20 Districts) in 2013, as against 72 fatalities (reported from 38 districts) in 2021. Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-related violence resulted in 418 fatalities (reported from 47 districts) in 2013 as against to 237 fatalities (reported from 33 districts) in 2021. Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) reported 172 deaths in 2013 (reported from 14 districts) as against 274 fatalities (reported from 13 districts) in 2021.
These datasets indicate that UHM’s assessment that India under his Government “has achieved a huge success in finding a permanent solution to three problems - terrorism in Kashmir, Left Wing Extremism and Narcotics and Armed Groups in the North East…” is somewhat hyperbolic. While there has been definite improvement in some theatres – essentially realizing the trajectory that had been established in the decade past, none of these problems appear to be close to any ‘permanent solution.’ The UHM’s assertions are in keeping with his government’s persistent and deliberate neglect of facts and figures in almost all spheres of administration.
Notwithstanding the theatrics surrounding ‘surgical strikes’ and Article 370, there has been little genuine effort at policy level to resolve the issue of Pakistan-backed terrorism in J&K. Rather, the politics of polarization has been brought centerstage and has jeopardized earlier gains secured at the cost of extreme sacrifices made by the Security Forces (SFs). Indeed, Kashmir had established trend of continuously declining fatalities between 2002 and 2012, and there was no reason why this trend would not have continued, were it not for the increasing stridency and divisiveness of politics thereafter. From a low of 121 fatalities in 2012, fatalities were pushed up to a high of 452 in 2018, and were still more than double, as compared to 2012, in 2021 when 274 were recorded.
In all fairness, any ‘permanent solution’ to the terrorism problem in J&K is unlikely as long as Pakistan keeps the jihadi pipeline flowing. Moreover, at the policy level, unless the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Union Government, which also controls the Union Territory through the Lieutenant Governor of J&K, adopts policies and initiate action to ensure that the present patterns of polarizing politics are suppressed in the Union Territory, even as efforts to restore the democratic set-up commence at the earliest, there can be little hope of any enduring solution. The steady campaigns that have been deepening communal fault lines can only help Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its terrorist proxies to keep a level of turbulence going in J&K.
In terms of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), overall fatalities had come down to a low of 256 in 2015, but increased sharply in 2016, to 434. They dropped to 335 in 2017, and pushed back up to 412 in 2018. Since then, fatalities have been on a downward trend, and were at a new low of 237 in 2021. Nevertheless, several movements remain a significant threat, despite the broad trends to gradual containment. Indeed, an official 2021 release read,
Clearly, there are at least 25 Districts in the country that are still deemed to be at considerable risk, and a number of others where Maoist stragglers remain active.
While the biggest gains have been made in terms of insurgencies in northeast where fatalities came down at the lowest ever, 27, in 2020, there was a spike in 2021, with fatalities increasing to 72. In particular, in the civilian category, fatalities increased from a low of five, to 21, the highest since 2017, when there were 35 civilian fatalities. More worryingly, the threat from the mother of all insurgencies in the Northeast, the Naga movement, still persists, as talks between the Government and Naga groups drag on, with no signs of any foreseeable resolution. The other potent terrorist formation, the United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I), after a brief unilateral ‘ceasefire,’ has returned to terror tactics.
An enormous price has been paid by the SFs and the people of the Northeast to secure the relative peace that presently prevails, but the current political dispensation has displayed a lack of wisdom. Political opportunism has undermined its ability to bring permanent solutions to the lingering challenges of the region, even as the politics of polarization alienates many who were close to integration with the mainstream. Tripura is, in fact, the best example, where insurgency was almost completely wiped out by a strategic campaign led by Tripura Police. However, the polarized politics surrounding Citizenship Amendment Act/National Register for Citizens (CAA)/NRC, as part of core Hindutva agenda, has given rise to a retaliatory demand for tribal unity and the creation of ‘Greater Tipraland.’ Indeed, the anti-CAA/NRC issue had engulfed a large part of the region and people had come onto the streets in large numbers. As violent protests intensified and reports of popular disenchantment became frequent, the Central Government was forced to go slow on the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act. On April 8, 2022, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) sought another six-months (the fifth such extension) from both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, to frame the rules of the CAA. The protests also came to a halt as Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with militant ethnic groups such as the Bodo and Karbi were signed, with the Government conceding that it would allow the Inner Line Permit system of restricted entry to be extended to Manipur, and, possibly, other States of the Northeast as well.
Even as the impact of the earlier polarizing campaigns has been contained for the time being by these mechanisms, the Union Government has released its latest salvo, by trying to make Hindi a compulsory subject up to Class 10 in all states, including the Northeast region. Various organisations across the Northeast have dubbed the move 'cultural imperialism,' and have promised to resist its implementation. The Axom Sahitya Sabha, an Assam-based literary organization, declared,
Meanwhile, Islamist terrorism outside J&K has been kept under check. While 2013 had recorded 31 fatalities from four districts, no fatality was recorded in 2021. Yet, the threat from this form of terror continues, as is evident from the regular reporting of the discovery and neutralization of sleeper cells from across India. At least 67 Islamist terrorists have been arrested outside J&K in 2021.
More worryingly, the situation in Punjab, where the ISI has intensified its activities, has become more tense under the current regime at the Center. In the eight years since Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed power, Punjab has recorded 53 fatalities (18 civilians,11 SF personnel and 24 terrorists) in 20 incidents of killing. During the preceding comparable period, there were four incidents of killing in which 13 people (seven civilians, two SF personnel and four terrorists) had died. Moreover, the issue of the ‘controversial farm laws’ provided the US-based Sikhs for Justice, a banned terror group in India, a base to project its separatist agenda and play the communal card. Though SFJ’s campaign was explicitly rejected by the protesting farmers, and the group largely failed in its design, its propaganda campaigns secured much wider circulation, even as Hindutva groupings as well as some ruling party proxies sought to project the farmers’ agitation as a ‘Khalistani plot.’ Significantly, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) has been assigned 16 cases relating to alleged Khalistani terrorism since 2019, including one in 2022. Communal volatility, which has been brought to the centerstage across India, is also likely to be exploited by Pakistan and by radicalized elements in the Sikh Diaspora, to further fund and incite violence, as well as to exploit any emerging disorders.
On operational level, the security establishment still lacks adequate manpower and facilities, particularly in the Police force, the first line of defense against such threats. According to the latest data made available by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D), as on January 1, 2020, India’s actual police-population-ratio (policemen per hundred thousand population) was at 155.78 as against the sanctioned strength of 195.39, which itself is inadequate. The actual Police-area ratio stood at 63.63 as against the sanctioned of 79.80.
The sanctioned strength of Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers, the apex decision making body, was 4,982 at the all-India level, whereas 4,074 officers were actually available. Further, 376 officers were on deputation with the Central Government. Moreover, 17,436 Police personnel were actually deployed in Criminal Investigation Department/Crime Branch against the sanctioned strength of 23,823.
In terms of facilities available, transport facility (number of vehicles) available per 100 sanctioned police personnel was 7.74 in the year 2019 at the national level, marginally lower than 7.89 in the previous year. In all, 202,925 vehicles were available with State/Union Territory Police Force in 2019, while there were 204,807 in 2018.
The overall security situation the country has certainly continued to improve due to the work done by the SFs on the ground, over the past decades. However, no genuine initiatives have been introduced in good faith to secure an enduring solution to any one of the problems flagged by UHM Shah. Indeed, political opportunism and sustained polarization for short term electoral gains have created an environment that has the potential of undermining the extraordinary work done the SFs.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia April 18-24, 2022
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
NS
Total
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Jammu and Kashmir
INDIA (Left-Wing Extremism)
Jharkhand
India (Total)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
KP
PAKISTAN (Total)
Total (South Asia)
50 worshipers killed in an explosion in a Shiite Mosque in Balkh Province: On April 21, an explosion left 50 worshipers dead in the Sih Dokan mosque, a Shiite Mosque, in Mazar-e-Sharif, the provincial capital of Balkh. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has claimed the responsibility for the incident. Hasht e Subh Daily, April 22, 2022.
33 civilians killed inside a mosque in Kunduz Province: On April 22, at least 33 people, including children, were killed and 43 others injured in an explosion inside a mosque in the Imam Sahib District of Kunduz Province. Tolo News, April 23, 2022.
Taliban Spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid denies existence of TTP in the country: Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid denied the presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistani (TTP) in Afghanistan. "We do not admit the existence of TTP, we do not allow anyone to use Afghan territory against another country or threaten our territory against Pakistan. Even if there are problems in difficult mountainous areas, they should be resolved jointly, not by bombing and attacks," said Mujahid. Ariana News, April 20, 2022.
Avoid ethnic and racial discrimination, says Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada: Taliban Amir (supreme leader) Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada recently ordered officials to avoid discrimination by race, ethnicity, region, or language. Tolo News, April 18, 2022.
Ceasefire agreements with three Naga militant outfits extended: On April 19, Government of India (GoI) extended the ceasefire agreement signed with three Naga militant outfits for one more year. In a statement, Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) stated that ceasefire agreements with Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Kitovi Neopak (NSCN-NK) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Reformation (NSCN-R) were extended for a further period of one year with effect from April 28, 2022 to April 27, 2023. It was extended from April 18, 2022 to April 17, 2023 with National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khango Konyak (NSCN-K2). East Mojo, April 21, 2022.
Afghan Taliban shifting terrorists away from Pak-Afghan border after Islamabad warning: The Afghan Taliban-led interim Government has started taking steps to shift terrorist groups away from Pakistan-Afghan border regions to other parts after a series of recent cross-border attacks drew strong reaction from Islamabad. Officials familiar with the development told The Express Tribune on April 24 that Pakistan after recent spate of cross-border terrorist attacks conveyed to the Afghan Taliban in clear terms to take action against terrorist groups or face the consequences. The Express Tribune, April 25, 2022.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
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