Political violence and terrorism in Assam entered their twenty first year in 2000, with a continuing atmosphere of political incoherence and administrative disorder. Of an estimated 33 terrorist groups in Assam 20 were reported to be operative. In all during the year 2000, 327 terrorists, 65 security force personnel and 366 civilians were killed. Among the civilians killed include the Assam PWD and Forest Minister Nagen Sharma (and four others) in Nalbari district on February 27 in an attack by United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) terrorists. Again on March 5, ULFA terrorists made a vain bid on the life of Minister of State for Veterinary, Hiranya Konwar. His car was blown up in a blast at Rangali Deogharia, Sibsagar district, but he had a providential escape.
Anti-insurgency operations in the State were intensified in 1999, even as the Central government made efforts to initiate a dialogue with major terrorist outfits, including the ULFA and the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF). On March 29, 2000, the Central government and the BLTF reached a ceasefire agreement and also agreed on establishing a Joint Monitoring Group to oversee the ceasefire. The ULFA, however, has steadfastly insisted on preconditions that are unacceptable to the Centre, and the effort to open up a dialogue with its leadership has, consequently, been entirely infructuous. Despite the leadership's intransigence, 705 cadres of the ULFA, largely of the middle and lower rungs, surrendered between January 1 and June 28, 2000.
NOTE: Figures for 2000 till June 28.
Civilians
Security Forces
Militants
Total
1992
80
34
19
133
1993
74
24
33
131
1994
173
35
63
271
1995
170
73
27
270
1996
302
87
62
451
1997
285
85
167
537
1998
531
72
180
783
1999
214
77
212
503
2000
366
65
327
758
2195
552
1090
In 1999, there were clear signs of decline, both in the levels of violence and the support base of terrorists outfits in the State, as compared to 1998. Instances of violent incidents decreased to 447 in 1999 as compared to 735 in 1998. These incidents claimed the lives of 503 persons in 1999, down from 783 in 1998. Of those killed in 1999 were 214 civilians, 77 security force personnel and 212 terrorists. The comparable figures for 1998 were 531 civilians, 72 security force personnel and 180 terrorists. There was a significant increase in surrenders too, 970 in 1999 as compared to 227 in 1998 . Arms looted in 1999 declined to 44 when compared to 125 in 1998. The total number of arms recovered in 1999 was 168 against 191 in 1998.
There are several indicators which suggest that despite an active campaign of terror, the influence of the major terrorist groups was weakening. Amidst continuing violence, elections to the thirteenth Lok Sabha (Parliament) were held in the State in October 1999. Despite ULFA's call for a boycott of these elections and its violent campaign to enforce the boycott call, voter participation was as high as 55 per cent - marginally higher than the national average.
A major target of ULFA's election related violence was local politicians. All political parties in the State had rejected ULFA’s conditional offer of support to their candidates if they accepted the demand for sovereignty and independence from India. The ULFA then launched a major offensive against local political leaders during the election process. ULFA terrorists shot dead a senior leader of the ruling Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in Nalbari on September 10. Dr. Panna Lal Oswal, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) candidate for the Dhubri Lok Sabha constituency was killed on September 24. The Assam Revenue Minister, Dr. Zoii Nath Sharma, escaped a bid on his life, but three AGP workers and a security guard were killed, and six others injured, during an ULFA attack on his convoy in Darrang district on September 30. A senior AGP leader was also killed in Nagaon on October 2.
Despite continuous efforts by the government, including offers of safe passage to the leaders of the ULFA to visit their homes, recalcitrant ULFA leaders have been scuttling all efforts to initiate a political dialogue by insisting on three pre-conditions for any talks: i) talks should be held in a foreign country; ii) Assam’s independence should be the only subject on the agenda; and iii) talks should be held in the presence of a United Nations observer. The Central government has rejected these terms, and insists on unconditional talks.
The ULFA lost important ground during the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil (Jammu & Kashmir). During the inception of the Kargil conflict itself, ULFA openly declared its support for the Pakistani cause and described Pakistani soldiers and foreign mercenaries fighting in Kashmir as ‘freedom fighters’. The group also intervened in the conflict directly to support Pakistan by providing information to Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) on army movements from the Northeast to the country’s western and northwestern borders. Several attacks including the early July 1999 blast at the New Jalpaiguri railway station, which killed three security force personnel and injured 19 soldiers bound for Kargil, were engineered by the ULFA to disrupt the movement of army personnel and heavy artillery to operational areas in the Kargil sector. The ULFA also called upon Assamese soldiers in the Indian Army to defect to the Pakistani side.
This, by and large, was a major miscalculation on the part of the terrorist group. As the bodies of Assamese soldiers who lost their lives in the Kargil conflict were returned to their villages with full ceremonial honours, there was a widespread and spontaneous outpouring of grief and condemnation of the ULFA position. When the Indian Army launched a recruitment drive in the State in September, 1999, 10,000 candidates turned up to compete for just 350 vacancies. The ULFA lost many of its cadres and supporters during this phase, including a substantial section of its middle-level leadership, as they sought to distance themselves from ULFA's official position on the Kargil conflict and its growing association with Pakistan. The President of the Asom Sahitya Sabha (Literary Council), Chandra Prasad Saikia, opined that "Whatever little sympathy ULFA had among some sections of the Assamese was greatly reduced when it supported Pakistan. No Assamese, even in the remotest part of the State, will help Pakistan and support ULFA’s support to it."
ULFA’s association with ISI and the latter's growing presence in the State has, however, added immensely to instability and the potential for violence in the region. ISI’s gameplan goes well beyond support to the ULFA. The emergence of Islamic terrorism is progressively becoming another major threat to security in the Northeast. The arrest of four ISI operatives by Assam Police on August 8, 1999, confirmed Pakistan’s increasing involvement in the subversive activities in the State. Interrogation of the arrested operatives revealed that they had been sent by ISI "to train Muslim youth and launch a jehad to liberate Assam and establish an Islamic country comprising Assam and parts of Northeastern India." They planned to use the ULFA and other terrorist groups to create disturbances by various means, including planting explosives in public places, market places, railway stations and tracks.
In the State Assembly, Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta presented a 16-page statement on ISI's involvement in Assam’s militancy on April 6. The statement included a photocopy of ULFA's Commander-in-Chief, Paresh Baruah’s fake Bangladeshi passport obtained with the help of an official of the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka.
The Chief Minister indicated that the ISI had a six-fold objective: promoting indiscriminate violence in the state by providing support to local terrorist outfits; creating new terrorist outfits for instigating violence between ethnic and religious groups; supplying sophisticated arms and explosives to various terrorist groups; causing damage to oil pipelines and other vital installations and communication lines; promoting fundamentalism and militancy among local Muslim youth by preaching jehad ; and carrying on an inflammatory propaganda to heighten communal tension between Hindus and Muslims.
The Chief Minister added that the police had arrested 101 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) activists and 60 persons belonging to other outfits during 1998 and 1999. He provided details of 17 arrested Muslim terrorists along with their photographs and gave details of their stay in Bangladesh and Pakistan and the type and quantity of explosives brought by them. Police also seized audio cassettes of "highly inflammatory and communally sensitive" speeches by Maulana Masood Azhar (one of the terrorist released during the IC 814-hijack incident).
To destabilise the region and create a Kashmir-like situation, the ISI is now funding and training several Islamic terrorist groups, including the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), MULTA, Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA), United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA), Muslim Volunteer Force (MUF) and Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA). Intelligence sources indicate that the ISI plan includes bringing all Muslim organisations under one umbrella, creating a divide in the Northeast on ethnic and religious lines, establishing alliances between Muslim fundamentalist organisations and Northeastern terrorists outfits and maintaining, if not increasing, existing levels of insurgency. Interrogations of arrested ISI operatives revealed that over 300 activists of various organisations had been trained by the ISI before August 1999.
Another source of violence in Assam is the Bodo insurgency. While the BLTF had conducted a terrorist campaign, until the March 29, 2000 ceasefire, demanding a separate State of Bodoland within India, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) continues to do so for an independent Bodoland. The two outfits intensified their campaign of terror in the State during 1999. Unlike the ULFA, which emphasises targeted attacks either on security force personnel or on local politicians, the Bodo groups often resort to indiscriminate killings, planting explosives on railway tracks, trains and buses and killing civilians. The ethnic situation in the Kokrajhar and Dhubri districts remained tense. Armed Bodo terrorists launched a series of attacks on non-tribal communities, killing 36 persons (as against 20 in 1998).
In response to these attacks, the Bircha Commando Force (BCF), Adivasi Security Force (ASF), All Assam Adivasi Suraksha Samiti (AAASS), Gorkha Tiger Force (GTF) and the Bengali Tiger Force (BTF) had been formed for the protection of the Santhals, Nepalis and the Bengalis, respectively. The issue of demarcating the boundary of the Bodoland Autonomous Council remained unresolved, with the non-tribal population opposing the inclusion of villages where the Bodos comprised less than 50 per cent of the population, and the demand for a separate Bodoland gained momentum during the year.
Another terrorist group termed Dima Halim Daoga (DHD) (formed in 1993, demanding that a separate Dimarangi - land of the Dimasa tribe - be carved out of areas comprising the North Cachar Hills district and some adjoining areas) too has been active. With barely 50 well-trained members, the DHD is reported to have been extorting taxes from government employees, businessmen and traders in the district. Intelligence sources indicate that DHD rebels have developed links with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM). DHD terrorists killed 17 people, including six security force personnel between February and May, 1999. However, the group suffered a major setback when its self-styled Commander-in-Chief, Bejoy Nandung, was arrested in Cachar district on July 3, 1999.
Two terrorist outfits operating in the adjoining Karbi Anglong district - the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and Karbi People’s Front (KPF) – were responsible for several incidents of violence leading to loss of life and property in 1999. In early 2000, the two outfits floated a joint body called the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS). The UPDS terrorists unleashed a violent campaign in Karbi Anglong district, killing as many as 33 persons between January 1 and June 28, 2000. Reports suggest that the UPDS terrorists have also been extorting taxes and abducting civilians for ransom.
Apart from these groups, the NSCN-IM had remained active in North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong districts adjoining Nagaland. This group had indulged in extortion, kidnapping and several other violent acts during 1999, including the kidnapping of two tea garden executives and their driver from Dilkush tea estate in North Cachar Hills district in September.
Despite the cost in terms of lives and development opportunities, existing terrorist groups and their activities do not constitute the gravest long-term danger in Assam – or, indeed, in the whole of India’s Northeast. Illegal migration on a large scale across the border from Bangladesh is, in fact, the most potent single factor in the destabilisation of the region and is the underlying cause of most insurgencies. The Governor of Assam, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.K. Sinha, submitted a report, on November 8, 1998, to President K.R. Narayanan asserting that the unchecked influx of Bangladeshi infiltrators may lead to the severing of the entire land mass of the Northeast from the rest of the country, and that perceptible changes in Assam's demography might spur Islamic fundamentalists to work towards "the long cherished design for a greater Bangladesh". In the absence of firm data on the actual extent of migration, the Governor placed the total volume of this infiltration at as much as six million people – deriving this number from population projections and Bangladesh census records. According to the Census of India, the Muslim population of Assam had risen from 24.68 per cent in 1951 to 28.42 per cent in 1991. Most of this increase is concentrated in a few areas, with a dramatic impact on the local demography and, hence, politics. According to Lt. Gen. Sinha’s report, four districts of Assam - Dhubri, Goalpara, Barpeta, Hailakandi – had been transformed into Muslim majority districts by 1991 as a result of this mass infiltration from Bangladesh. Another two districts – Nagaon and Karimganj – would have had a Muslim majority since 1998 and yet another district, Morigaon, is fast approaching this position.