Bangladesh Assessment 2002

Barring a few sporadic incidents, the first three months of the year 2002 remained largely peaceful and free from terrorist violence for Bangladesh. However, increasing use of Bangladeshi territory for terrorist and subversive activities of religious extremists and pan-Islamic terrorist outfits and insurgents operating in India’s Northeast remain the most serious threat to political stability and internal security in the country. Rising discontentment in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT), where the Accord of 1997 promised lasting peace and stability, has once again become a matter of serious concern. Since the elections of October 2001, and the installation of a new right wing regime headed by Begum Khalida Zia, and backed by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), communal tensions and Islamist extremist mobilisation have also risen dramatically. The militant and pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami has 16 members elected to the Bangladesh Parliament. The Jamaat, which has two Ministers in the new government, has also allegedly received support from the ISI, which includes funding arms flow, and technical and training support. During the election campaign, the Islamist organizations had declared that if voted to power, they would make Bangladesh an Islamic state. There has also been a sudden escalation in atrocities against minorities in Bangladesh since the BNP came to power, leading to increased distress migration into the Indian State of Tripura.

A number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda, have established a presence in Bangladesh in alliance with various militant fundamentalist organisations there. Investigations into the January 22, 2002, terrorist attacks on the American Centre in India’s Kolkata, brought these linkages to the fore. The self-styled Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), which claimed responsibility for the January 22 attack, is essentially a criminal group allied to the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD). The HuJI-BD has very close links with Pakistan’s external intelligence agency the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The arrest of Aftab Ansari alias Aftab Ahmed alias Farhan Malik, the prime accused in the American Centre attack, led to further disclosures regarding the international linkages between the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and HuJI based in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Ansari is reportedly linked to the ISI and to Omar Shiekh, a prominent leader of the JeM and prime accused in the abduction and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl, in Pakistan. Ansari was reportedly taken to Islamabad in August 2001 and asked by Omar Sheikh to provide cover and logistical support for terrorist operations from Bangladesh.

HuJI-BD was established with direct aid from Osama bin Laden in 1992, and is led by Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid. Imtiaz Quddus is the General Secretary of the organisation, which has an estimated strength of about 15,000 cadres and seeks to establish Islamic hukumat (rule) in Bangladesh. HuJI-BD is reported to maintain six camps in the hilly areas of Chittagong, where cadres are trained in the use of weapons. Several hundred recruits have also been trained in various training camps of Afghanistan. The cadres are recruited mainly from students of various madarsas and call themselves the ‘Bangladeshi Taliban’. Harkat activists regularly cross over into several Indian States and maintain links with terrorist groups there, including those in India’s Northeast, such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and a number of marginal Islamist organisations that have mushroomed along the borders with Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is reported to support HuJI-BD.

Sources indicate that Bin Laden maintained links with Islamist militant organisations in Bangladesh through an organisation called the ‘Servants of Suffering Humanity International’, Dhaka, which bin Laden funded. It is also reported that a 25-member team of the Taliban arrived in Bangladesh in June 2001 from Afghanistan, to train HuJI-BD cadres. HuJI-BD reportedly receives financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh, including Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin. Operational linkages also exist with a number of foreign Islamist organisations and militants. For instance, in the latter half of January 1999, police in Bangladesh arrested five HuJI members suspected of plotting the January 18, 1999, assassination-attempt on celebrated poet Shamsur Rahman. Over the following days, information provided by these activists led to the detention of an interesting melange of people, including, apart from two more Bangladeshis, an Afghan, a Pakistani and two South Africans.

HuJI-BD was assigned the task of recruiting Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims to fight in Jammu and Kashmir under the command of HuM. In Bangladesh, HuJI terrorists have been active against secular politicians and intellectuals. The professed objective of this Islamic group is to turn Bangladesh into a Dar-ul-Islam or a land of believers. The previous Awami League government had introduced some measures to curb the activities of the group and had arrested several of its leaders and cadres. Evidently, the new right wing regime created a more favourable context for the operation of extremist forces in the country.

However, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and increasing pressure on Islamist terrorist outfits to curb subversive activities, the BNP regime has been cautious in dealing with extremist forces in the country. Despite pressure from the Jamaat and other Islamist extremist forces, the new regime has portrayed itself as an ally of the US and decided to uphold the decision taken by the caretaker government to support the US-led alliance forces in global war against terrorism. As a result, there has been a lull in terrorist activities, in part because of declining international tolerance for terrorism, and partly because the imperatives of internal anti-state violence declined after Islamist extremist groups such as the Jamaat gained a share in the State structure.

Available evidence prior to the October 1, 2001, general elections suggested increasing involvement of Islamic fundamentalist organisations in terrorist and subversive activities in Bangladesh. On January 20, 2001, there were two separate bomb blasts in Dhaka in which an estimated six persons were killed and 50 others injured. The then Home Minister Mohammad Nasim held the Jamaat-e-Islami and its associated organisations responsible for the blasts. The Water Resource Minister Abdur Razzak blamed the ISI for its complicity in this incident. In the same month, an alliance of Islamic fundamentalist groups, Islamic Okiya Jote (IOJ) [the Islamic Unity Front], another member of the new ruling alliance, had intensified its campaign against a December 2000 High Court verdict banning two fatwas (religious edicts). The alliance declared the two judges, Golam Rabbani and Nazmun Ara Sultana, who had delivered the verdict, as murtad (enemies of Islam) and pronounced death sentences on them. The IOJ had also declared a jehad against the United Forum of Citizens, a group of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) which supported the High Court's action of banning the fatwas. A series of strikes had been organised by the BNP alliance in protest.

On April 6, 2001, over 100 persons were injured in Jamaat-e-Islami—police clashes in Dhaka. The next day, two leaders of the Awami League’s youth and student front were killed by Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) cadres at Satkania. The ICS is the the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Two days later, nine activists of the ICS were arrested in Stakania in connection with the April 7 killings. On April 14, 2001, at least eight persons were killed in a bomb blast at a Bengali New Year cultural function in Dhaka. Later, police arrested four persons including Maulana Mohammad Akbar Hossain, Vice Principal of Siddirganj Madrassah, for their alleged involvement in the blast. On April 23, 2001, four bomb explosions were reported in Dhaka in which two police personnel were injured. In the same month, Indian and Western intelligence agencies reportedly informed Bangladesh of a plot by army officers responsible for the 1975 coup, the ISI and the Jamaat, to assassinate the then Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed. On May 28, 2001, 15 madrassa students and suspected Taliban activists were arrested from Balurmath area of Labonchora in Khulna. Ten persons were killed and 25 others injured in a bomb blast at a Catholic Church mission church at Baniachar, Gopalganj district, on June 3, 2001. Again on June 15, 2001, an estimated 21 persons were killed and over 100 injured in a bomb blast at the Awami League party office at Narayanganj town. The then Foreign Minister had stated that the unholy nexus of extreme religious zealots and fundamentalist elements with organised international terrorist groups was responsible for the blast. On June 29, 2001, police arrested an ICS activist for his alleged involvement in the Narayanganj blast.

On September 24, 2001, eight persons were killed and over a hundred injured in a bomb blast at an election rally at Mollarhat, Bagerhat district. Again, on September 25, 2001, four persons were killed in an explosion near the venue of an Awami League election meeting at Shullah, Sunamganj district. On the same day, two persons were killed in another explosion in Sylhet town.

Various terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast continue to find safe havens and operating bases on Bangladeshi territory for subversive activities against India. Recent reports indicate that Northeast terrorist groups operating from Bangladesh have started regrouping and shifting several of their camps from Bhutan to the bordering areas in Bangladesh. Outfits like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have now been emboldened by the new BNP government in Bangladesh, which in its previous term was seen as supportive of these terrorist groupings. Many leaders of the ruling party are reported have direct business linkages, including partnerships with corporations and financial operations that are run by or co-owned with leaders of such terrorist organisations. During its previous regime between 1991 and 1996, the BNP is reported to have provided these groups with unhindered facilities, such as training camps, bank accounts, arms purchases, and so on. As a result these terrorist groups, on the run in India’s Northeast due to persistent Army operations, found a much-needed breathing space to regroup and re-launch their offensive against the Indian state

According to Indian government sources, terrorist groups such as the ULFA, All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) run several base camps in the jungles of Sylhet and the CHT areas of eastern Bangladesh. These camps are reportedly used for training of cadres and to hold hostages abducted for ransom. ULFA also reportedly runs a transit camp at the Senaibati area in Sherpur district of Bangladesh. Available evidence also indicates close linkages between the Northeast terrorist groups and Islamist terrorist outfits in Bangladesh. Some of the ULFA camps situated in the CHT along the Tripura-Bangladesh borders are reportedly being run by the HuJI. Some of these camps were activated after the October 1, 2001, general elections. Reports also indicate that the ULFA relocated some of their bases from Bhutan to Bangladesh via Meghalaya after the Bhutanese government gave an ultimatum to the ULFA to wind up its camps by the end of December 2001.

The previous Awami League regime in Bangladesh had taken steps against the use of the country’s territory by terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast. On February 18, 2001, Anup Chetia, former general secretary of the ULFA, who was arrested in December 1997, was sentenced to three years in jail for illegal possession of foreign currencies by a special tribunal in Dhaka. Paresh Barua, who runs his headquarters from Dhaka, is reported to have escaped three attacks in the Bangladesh capital in 2001, though details on these are not available. After the attacks, he was reportedly aided by the ISI in fleeing to Karachi. Barua has several business interests in Bangladesh. These include a tannery, department store, garment factories, travel agencies, transport companies and investments in the capital market.

Despite the overwhelming international consensus evolving against international terrorism, reports suggest that Bangladesh is yet to curb some of its overt support to terrorist groups operating in India. The Directorate of General Forces Intelligence (DGFI) is reported to use these groups for ‘offensive intelligence’ activities, and is said to have continued to sheltered leaders of these groups despite strong government pressure during the erstwhile Awami League regime. A strong factor in such support is link between the DGFI, a section of Bangladeshi army, and the ISI. Even if the BNP government now decides to withdraw covert support to these terrorist outfits under international pressure, it remains to be seen how much control the government can exercise over such renegade elements within the state apparatus.

Resentment against the Chittangong Hill Tracts (CHT) Accord of December 1997, which resulted in relative peace in the region, intensified in 2001. The accord promised the tribal restitution of their land, greater participation in government, greater participation in government and a reduction in the Bangladesh military presence in the CHT. However, the accord did not solve many outstanding questions and its implementation ran into snags so that its full potential for peace, development and coexistence between the tribal and settler segments of the region’s inhabitants remained practically unrealised.

The reclamation of land by returning tribal remains a contentious issue. Much of the land cultivated by the indigenous population never had formal ownership. Thus in the absence of formal documentation, the indigenous may be unable to contest rights to land they had previously occupied and cultivated. The land commission, which would have an essential role in the reclamation of land of returning refugees and internally displaced, is still not operational.

Apart from the land question, other parts of the accord remain unimplemented, the most serious being that most of the non-permanent army camps have not been shut down. Moreover, the tribal population feels frustrated over slow implementation of the accord. The Chittagong Hills Tract Regional Council, which was created after the peace accord, is also not happy with the pace of implementation. The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) allege that the government is failing to implement the Peace Accord and threatens to go back to armed struggle. On May 13, 2001, a four-member team of the CHT Regional Council met CHT Affairs Minister Kalpa Ranjan Chakma in Dhaka to expedite the process of the full implementation of the 1997 Accord. On May 18, 2001, the team met the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. On July 1, 2001, after a meeting between the PCJSS chief and CHT Regional Council Chairman Jyotindra Bodhipriya Larma and the CHT Task Force Affairs Chairman Dipankar Talukdar, the government and the PCJSS agreed to jointly work for the quick implementation of the CHT Accord.

The major source of mutual distrust is that there is almost no reconciliation between the indigenous people and the Bengali settlers. To ensure a truly sustainable peace, the animosity that was built over two decades of insurgency needs to be overcome. The Bengali settlers have great expectation from the new BNP government. The BNP has always held that the accord discriminates against the Bengali population in the CHT. n its election manifesto, the party had promised that if voted to power, they would review the terms of the Accord. After coming to power, the government has reiterated this intent, and has promised to assess whether the Accord has guaranteed the rights of the tribal people within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh. On December 11, 2001, a delegation of the PCJSS met the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Barrister Moudud Ahmed, and was assured that the Accord would undergo a review.

Within the tribal community there is a persistent tension between pro- and anti-peace accord groups. On February 16, 2001, three foreign nationals – one British and two Danish engineers were abducted in the Naniarchar forests of the Rangamati Hill District, Chittagong, reportedly by suspected activists of the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). The UPDF, however, denies its involvement in the abduction. The UPDF was formed by former associates of Shanto Larma, with whom the government signed the 1997 Accord. The group now opposes the 1997 Accord, and has declared that they would continue to struggle for full autonomy for the CHT. The hostages were released following a commando action on March 17, 2001. Throughout the year there were a number of clashes between the pro- and anti-Accord groups. On October 31, 2001, a delegation of the Pahari Chhatra Parishad (PCP), a student front aligned to the PCJSS, submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister through the Deputy Commissioner of Khagrachhari, demanding an end to the terrorist activities by some tribal groups who oppose the CHT Accord of 1997.

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