Nepal Assessment 2001

Maoist insurgents jettisoned the four month-old cease-fire that they had announced on July 23, 2001 and launched co-ordinated countrywide strikes on the night of November 23, 2001. These attacks have been the most violent since the onset of Maoist insurgency in 1996. The government responded by declaring a countrywide emergency and deployed armed forces personnel in counter-insurgency operations on November 26, 2001. Currently in his second term, as Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, addressing the nation on November 27, appealed to the citizens to unite for the sake of public interest, monarchy, the present constitution, multi-party democracy and the welfare of Nepal and remain committed to root out terrorism. Significantly, it was only after the November 23 attacks, that the government began terming the Maoists as terrorists. Prime Minister Dueba, who assumed office in July 2001, had also headed a committee, which had submitted a report on the Maoist insurgency in November 2000.

Even before the November 23, 2001 attacks, the insurgents’ leader, ‘comrade’ Prachanda had given indication that a campaign of violence would soon be resumed, when he reportedly asked his cadres to resume, what he called, the "resistance movement’ in the wake of the government asking him to call-off a rally planned for in the capital Kathmandu, on September 21. The rally was planned for at a time when the government and the insurgents commenced negotiations to find a solution to the over six-year old insurgency.

Three round of talks were held on August 30, September 13-14 and November 13. Subsequently, on November 21, Prachanda announced that the Maoists were not willing to continue negotiations as they did not foresee a "positive political" result. Within two days of the announcement, the insurgents launched simultaneous attacks in different parts of the country, which had as on November 26, claimed at least 300 lives taking the total number of lives lost in the insurgency to approximately 2100. In the light of the critical nature and scope of attacks, the government, on November 26, clamped an Emergency throughout the Himalayan Kingdom. The King, constitutional head of Nepal, granted permission for Army deployment in countering the insurgents. Among the significant targets of the insurgents since November 23 night include a hydelpower station, an airfield and most importantly, the Army barracks in Ghorai. The last of them was stormed on November 23, leaving 14 troops dead and 30 more injured and fetching the insurgents a large haul of 99 Self-Loading Rifles (SLR) and several rounds of ammunition.

Initial reports have indicated that the counter-offensive launched by government forces has begun to yield results. Several significant successes were reported including the killing of 70 Maoists who were preparing to ambush security forces in the Salyan district on November 28. In a separate operation on the same day, 11 Maoists were killed by army troops at Tribhuvan in the Dang district. Defences Ministry reports added that some arms and ammunition looted by the Maoists were recovered in counter-insurgency operations across the country. In one such operation, a large cache of explosives, cash and some incriminating literature was seized during a raid at Karmasingh in the Gorkha district on November 28. Reports on November 29 said that troops had encircled a large group of Maoists at Nuwa village in Rolpa district. This assumes significance, as pointed out by Defence Secretary, Padma Kumar Acharya, since the rebels had agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations in July 2001, only when the army, for the first time, launched operations against them in Rolpa. Similarly, unlike the past when internal differences within the political establishment have brought to naught all attempts to quell the insurgency, a consensus currently exists on the present government measures including the curbing of civil liberties under the Emergency Ordnance. All factions of the ruling Nepali Congress and the major Opposition party, Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) have endorsed the proclamation of Emergency and counter-insurgency measures launched by the government.

In the early part of 2001, the Maoists had launched a weeklong campaign of violence in different parts of Nepal to coincide with the sixth anniversary of the movement on February 13, 2001. Unprecedented security arrangements were made in the capital, Kathmandu on the occasion. However, the Maoists did not create any disturbances there, restricting themselves to public rallies through their front organisations. However, elsewhere in the country, they attacked several police stations and posts as well as government offices, and caused moderate to extensive damage.

Emboldened by the fact that the political establishment was divided over evolving an appropriate response to the insurgency, the Maoists have begun to run a parallel government in some districts, including Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and Salyan. It was the first three of these districts in which the insurgency began in 1996. At the onset of the year 2001, the insurgents made their presence felt in varying degrees in 68 of the total of 75 districts that constitute Nepal. Of these, 32 are presently regarded as Maoist strongholds. In terms of electoral constituencies, the insurgents are known to be operating in 165 of the 205 parliamentary constituencies. Available reports have indicated that in the aftermath of the current counter-insurgency operations, there has been a considerable decrease in the number of districts being controlled by the Maoists. Furthermore, the operations have also led to a considerable number of Maoists’ surrendering to the official authorities.

Faced with an unenviable situation, the government asked the Army to impart training to the police. The Army trained approximately 1,000 personnel in 1999 to tackle the insurgency. Furthermore, the government while forming the National Security Council also decided to develop a para-military force, the Armed Police Force, which would eventually have a strength of 25,000 personnel.

At a particular juncture, the government had even considered inducting the Royal Nepalese Army to tackle the insurgency. But, this move did not eventually materialise. However, Army units have been stationed in 25 district headquarters and reports suggest that the administration in another 25 districts has sought a similar presence.

In year 2000, Nepal established special courts to try those accused in insurgency-related offences. One of the key persons who vehemently argued the case for establishing these special courts, the Chief Justice of Nepal, Justice Keshav Prasad Upadhyay, narrowly escaped an ambush laid on his convoy by the Maoists on February 3, 2001, at Chhyasatti, Surkhet, 500 km west of Katmandu. Six others, including a judicial officer, were injured in the incident.

A significant change in the operational tactics of the insurgents in year 2000 was the increasing size of the groups, with bands of over 100 cadres moving together, against much smaller groups in the past. In all, approximately 2100 persons have been killed in insurgency-related violence since its onset more than five years ago. This includes at least 231 policemen killed by the Maoists, who have lost 980 of their own fighters and supporters since 1996. 249 civilians have also lost their lives in the conflict. Over 300 persons have been killed in the ongoing violence.

The fallout of the insurgency for the polity has been critical. A Prime Minister had to step down from office, and over 110 million rupees-worth of property has been destroyed over the years. The Maoists have indulged in a series of crimes ranging from abductions to looting banks and engaging the police in violent and long-drawn encounters. In a country where infrastructure in far-flung areas is considerably weak, its sudden expansion has worked to the advantage of the insurgents, and the Maoists have begun to take advantage of the widening telecommunications network to issue extortion threats to businesses and public persons.

The top leadership of the ruling Nepali Congress has been split on the issue of countering the Maoist challenge, and as some commentators put it, manipulate this issue for their own political gains. The then Prime Minister, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai had, in December 1999, appointed a Maoist Resolution Committee, headed by the present Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba to hold talks with all the prominent political forces as a prelude to the resolution of Maoist insurgency. The Maoists promptly responded ruling out any talks with the Committee.

After a series of allegations and counter-allegations on the degree of support that the government was lending to the Maoist Resolution Committee instituted to talk to the insurgents, its chairman and present Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba submitted a report to the government on November 7, 2000. Its contents are yet to be made public. However, available information suggests that the report has asked the government to modernise its security forces while pursuing negotiations with the insurgents to end the conflict. Deuba and his colleagues further emphasized that peace could not be restored in Nepal without a dialogue with the insurgents. Sher Bahadur Deuba has been accused of having made only a half-hearted attempt at holding talks with the insurgents.

In early April 2001, Deuba indicated that he was holding talks with the representatives of the insurgents to prepare the ground for official talks between them and the government. However, these did not make much headway. Thereafter, the government issued repeated calls to the insurgents to participate in the talks. Finally, the Deputy Prime Minister had led the government at the informal talks, in the last week of October, which were conducted away from public glare. These talks were held parallel to the efforts of the Deuba Commission. However, these, too, collapsed as the insurgents demanded information on a ‘new set’ of detained colleagues, two of them Central Committee members. The government accused the Maoists of dragging their feet to buy time and fortify themselves and stated categorically that it would ‘not fall into the Maoists trap again’, and added that talks would, in the future, be held only if the Maoists did not set any pre-conditions.

During the year, there have been isolated incidents of surrender by the insurgents. Nearly 50 insurgents, including women cadres, surrendered to the authorities in different parts of the insurgency-hit districts. A third of the Maoist insurgents are women, who had in the past traditionally kept away from public life, limiting themselves to casting their vote in the elections.

The exact numbers of those involved in the insurgency is difficult to comprehend. However, available information suggests that approximately 2,000 persons are actively involved in the insurgency while there are an estimated 10,000 reserves. Tens of thousands of educated, unemployed rural youth offer themselves as prospective cadres for the future.

Among the major terrorist incidents in the year 2000, was the attack in March by about 300 militants on a police post. The attackers used bombs and grenades. The Maoists also made at least three unsuccessful attempts, on January 24, February 13 and March 14, 2000, to capture an airstrip in a remote part of the country, at Salle, Musikot district.

In April, Maoist insurgents abducted a former Deputy Minister and a member of the ruling Nepali Congress, Reg Bahadur Subedi and his son, but set them free more than 10 weeks later.

In a major attack at Dunai in the Dolpa district, a large group of Maoist insurgents killed 12 police personnel and injured 36 others in the last week of September. The attackers also looted a bank, forcibly set free 17 inmates of a local jail and exploded a bomb in the office of the Chief District Officer. An unspecified number of Maoists were also killed in this incident. In another attack, the insurgents killed eight police personnel in a raid on a police post in Lamjung.

Towards the end of August, Maoist insurgents struck in the capital Kathmandu and blew up the Police Club besides setting afire several vehicles. The insurgents also indulged in violence in Kathmandu in November by setting off explosions.

In another incident, Maoists killed 11 police personnel and injured seven others in a four hour-long encounter in Kalikot district on November 30.

With a view towards restricting the mobility of the security forces, Maoist insurgents captured a helicopter in the Solukhumbu district in early December and also coerced the passengers to sign an 'agreement' that the helicopter would not be used by security force personnel.

It remains to be seen if the current counter-insurgency measures would succeed in quelling the Maoist insurgents. In the past, the insurgents have been able to garner substantial public support primarily due to the mis-governance and internal rancour that has enveloped the political establishment. Political ambitions of individual leaders have prompted them to use the Maoist issue to score political points and consequently hampering counter-insurgency measures. Even as the political establishment is currently united in countering the Maoist offensive, it is plausible that faultlines within the political establishment could reassert themselves and restore the status-quo ante that prevailed in Nepal before November 23, 2001.

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