Nepal Assessment 2007

Deception, political maneuvers and desperate struggle to conserve, secure and seize power marked year 2006 in Nepal. The wanton violence of the past years has been contained within the framework of a ‘peace process’, with at least two of the principal parties in conflict – the dominant Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) that has cobbled together a Government at Kathmandu – engaged in negotiations. It is, however, far too early for celebrations, and the endgame is still to manifest its contours in the Himalayan Kingdom.

The most significant development is, without doubt, the cessation of hostilities and the ensuing efforts to manage the peace. That said, the consequent political developments, essentially oriented to a consolidation of Maoist dominance, are bound to be complex and uncertain. The pace of consequences of the April 2006 Jana Andolan (People’s Movement) against King Gyanendra’s ‘direct rule’ has been, rightly or otherwise, far too swift and complex for orthodox political forces to evaluate. While the average Nepalese exults over the current state of play, the proximate future may well prove to be the most perilous and critical phase for contemporary Nepal.

The evident peace of the post-April 24, 2006 period across Nepal, with fatalities falling steeply and the Government-Maoist détente holding, has exponentially fed hope in the war-wracked nation. There is, nevertheless, substantial residual cause for pessimism, especially in view of Nepal’s own past trajectory on negotiations, as also the rather dismal record of cease-fires and peace processes in South Asia – the Sri Lankan case being an immediate and tragic reminder.

On December 15, 2006, the ruling SPA and the Maoists finalised a Draft Interim Constitution, which relegated the King to the margins. Maoist negotiator Dev Gurung declared: "Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala will act as the head of the state till the elections to the Constituent Assembly to be held in mid-June next year... The King will remain suspended till that period and his fate will be decided by the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly."

While King Gyanendra – and with him, Nepal’s doomed monarchy – gradually becomes history, the ultimate winners in the long-drawn contest for power will be the Maoists. The current regime in Kathmandu, with not inconsiderable assistance from other quarters – including India and a bemused ‘international community’ – has allowed the Maoists to dictate terms. As a result, the insurgents’ roadmap to power is being significantly implemented. Essentially, the Maoists are consolidating through negotiations what they had secured through violence in their ten-year "peoples’ war" in which at least 13,000 lives were lost. The current and unbalanced equation of power in Kathmandu is a direct consequence of the insurgency the Maoists have sustained since 1996.

The current ‘peace process’ crystallized on August 9, 2006, when the Government and the Maoists arrived at a Five Point Agreement to seek the assistance of the United Nations (UN) in the peace process and ‘to create a free and fair atmosphere for the election to a Constituent Assembly’. The five points agreed to were:

• the Government and Maoists will continue human rights monitoring through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal;

• they will assist in the monitoring of the Code of Conduct during the cease-fire;

• on the basis of agreement to seek UN assistance in the "management of arms and armed personnel of both the sides", qualified civilian personnel will be deployed to monitor and verify the confinement of Maoist combatants and their weapons within the designated cantonment areas. Later, modalities for all arrangements, including of arms and munitions, will be worked out among the parties and the UN;

• to monitor the Nepali Army to ensure that it remains in its barracks and its weapons are not used for or against any side. The modalities will be worked out among the parties and the UN, and

• Election to the Constituent Assembly will be observed in consultation with the parties.

Thereafter, in the wake of hectic and often tense negotiations, Prime Minister G.P. Koirala and Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal a.k.a. Prachanda signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 2006, on November 21, bringing the decade-long armed insurgency officially to an end and promising to chart a new destiny for a "peaceful and democratic" "new Nepal". The ten-point CPA included provisions on human rights, civil and political rights, arms and army management, socio-economic transformation, et al. Koirala declared: "Beginning today, the politics of killing, violence and terror will be replaced by the politics of reconciliation." But Prachanda’s endorsement of the CPA was more combative and triumphal: "The continuity of 238-year-old tradition has been broken now. This is the victory of Nepalese people and the loss of regressive elements."

After another five days of deliberations, the two sides – represented by the Coordinator of the Government’s talks’ team, Home Minister Krishna Prasad Situala, and Maoist Chief Negotiator, Krishna Prasad Mahara – signed a further ‘Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies’ on November 28, at Kathmandu. The salient features of this Agreement included:

Maoist army combatants and their weapons shall be confined within designated cantonment areas; there will be seven main cantonment sites and 21 satellite cantonment sites on the basis of three per main cantonment site. The satellite sites will be clustered no more than two hours driving distance from the main sites unless otherwise agreed by the parties;

• the normal Maoist army chain of command, control, communication and information will be utilised to control the Maoist army cantonment, using the normal Maoist army structure in administration of the sites;

• the designated seven main sites will be under command, control, communication and information of the Maoist army site commander and the satellite sites by the designated satellite commanders;

• the parties agree upon the safe storage of all Maoist army weapons and ammunition, in the seven main cantonment areas under UN monitoring, except as provided for perimeter security purposes;

• a single lock provided by the UN will secure each storage container. The key will be held by the designated main cantonment site commander;

• the Nepal Army shall remain in its barracks and its arms are not to be used in favour of or against any side. UN monitors will have access to any and all NA barracks for purposes of monitoring whether Nepal Army forces or weapons are being used for or against any party;

• the Nepal Army is to store arms in equal numbers to that of the Maoist army, to seal it with a single-lock and give the key to the concerned party;

• the Council of Ministers will control, mobilise and manage the Nepal Army as per the Army Act of 2006 (Sainik Ain 2063) or its successor legislation.

The difficulties that confront the arms management scheme are manifold: identification of insurgents and ‘irregulars’; detecting and defining the Maoist chain of command; the two sides have to provide information on the number of ‘fighters’, who they are, what their chain of command is – a system fraught with risk, since Maoist good faith cannot be taken for granted, and the Nepalese Army’s structure and personnel are clearly documented; managing the Maoist combatants within the camps and keeping them engaged, etc. Further, the storage terms clearly favour the insurgents, imposing parity with the Nepalese Army. An immense quantum of faith has evidently been placed on the Maoists and the manner in which they choose to utilize their access to arms. The Maoists have repeatedly violated the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement in the past, and it is not clear that they would abruptly change to accommodate the letter and spirit of the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies. The tremendous challenges of arms and cadre management have tended to be underplayed by all players in the present ‘peace process’, but these are more than evident, for instance, in Sri Lanka and even in Nagaland in India’s Northeast. In Nagaland, the problems of managing barely 700 armed cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (actual strength of around 2500) in four designated camps have proven insurmountable even for a stable and powerful state like India. How a weak and volatile Kathmandu will meet the challenges of cease-fire supervision remains to be seen. The truth of the various ‘agreements’ in Nepal lies in their small print: As long as the Maoists retain their armed capacity, they will continue to exercise decisive influence on the political process, and will secure a defining role in the future of Nepal.

Amidst the hectic negotiations and politicking, for instance, the Maoists, on the ground, continue to recruit and extort. Kantipur reported on November 15, 2006, that the Maoists were undertaking fresh recruitment drives in the districts of Ilam in far eastern Nepal, Sankhuwasabha in the north-east and Surkhet and Rupendehi in western Nepal. General Secretary of the Nepali Congress, Ram Chandra Poudel, said the Maoists were luring youths by offering monetary rewards. The Maoist recruitment slogan, according to Kantipur, was "Peace has returned to our country. Join our army and get 7,000 rupees (100 US dollars) a month." The Kathmandu Post quoted a security official in Sankhuwasabha District as stating that the Maoists planned to recruit 525 people from the District as they failed to meet the target of 5,000 insurgents to be housed in a UN supervised cantonment in Ilam in eastern Nepal.

Significantly, the ‘peace process’ is yet to rid the country of violence and intimidation. 43 persons were reportedly killed during the first six months after the reinstatement of Parliament on April 24, 2006. A report released by the National Human Rights Commission on December 11, 2006, said the state was responsible for the killings of 11 persons whereas the CPN-Maoist was responsible for 15. Five persons were killed by 'retaliation' groups, seven by local villagers and unknown groups and five persons were killed in stray bomb explosions. The report said "security forces were involved in beating and intimidating the public transport staffers. Similarly, the CPN-Maoist were also found continuing with tortures under different pretexts in various Districts including Kailali, Nepaljung, Bhaktapur, Dolakha, Rupendehi, Kaski." A continuous chain of abductions, forcible recruitment – including child recruitment – and other violations of the cease fire terms, blatantly justified by various Maoist leaders, have regularly marred the ‘peace’.

The Maoists have also intensified their efforts to stop the relocation of police posts (initiatives are underway to relocate police posts that were displaced in the past) in several parts of the country. Insurgents reportedly declared that they would not allow police post relocation till an Interim Government including them is formed. Maoists are currently obstructing such relocation in the Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Sindhupalchowk, Kavre and Sankhuwasabha, Doti, Kanchanpur and Achham Districts. The Maoists are also barring Village Development Committee secretaries from returning to their respective villages.

It is evident that the Maoists do not plan to squander away the ‘rewards’ that they have seized through the ‘barrel of the gun’, and will certainly not barter away their stronghold on the ground (all 75 districts are Maoist-affected) for an equal place in the democratic process. Under the circumstances, only the incurable optimist could doubt that the Maoists would continue to seek to enforce their agenda on Nepal. It is useful, within this context, to remind ourselves that the constituent elements of the SPA leadership have a miserable record of governance and bickering, and are largely responsible for the turmoil in Nepal. Unless an unexpected consensus visits the SPA and non-Maoist political spectrum in the country, no solution – other than one eventually imposed by the Maoists – can be permanent.

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