Violence in J&K
Complexities & Pathways
Jyoti Trehan*

 

 

In the aftermath of partition and independence, the 500-odd princely States which had a direct relationship with the British Empire were required to integrate with either India or Pakistan — the successor states. The process of integration was not without its highs and lows, and the cases of Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) were complicated by the inclinations of their rulers, the religious composition of the local populations and the competing  interests of the two successor states, India and Pakistan. The cases of Hyderabad and Junagarh were favourably and clearly resolved in India’s favour. However, the integration of J&K with India was far from smooth, and the consequences are still reverberating through the sub-continent. Subsequent to the Pakistan-aided forces, including its army, invading J&K, the erstwhile ruler of the State signed the instrument of accession in India’s favour, giving the country the locus standi to protect this territory by military means. The salvage operation of evicting the Pakistan-aided forces could not be accomplished fully, since India agreed to a cease-fire under pressure from foreign powers, in the hope that the United Nations (UN) - to which the Kashmir dispute was to be referred - would help in the resolution of the issue within the accepted legal framework which was in India’s favour. India’s experience with the UN, however, was a great disappointment. Indeed, India had invested so much faith in the UN that it even agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir to resolve the dispute, subject to the condition that Pakistan vacate the illegally occupied areas of J&K. At that stage, such a condition did not have to be conceded within the legal framework on the basis of which the integration of other princely States with the successor States was carried out, but was accepted because of India's abiding faith in democratic principles. Till date, Pakistan has not vacated what is now known as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Moreover, in 1962, China occupied a large part of Kashmir in the Northeast, on the basis of a boundary dispute raised with India, which is yet to be resolved. To make matters worse, Pakistan ceded a part of PoK to China. The situation, as of today, is that 45.7 per cent of the 2,22,336 square kilometres of the area of Jammu & Kashmir is with India, 35.1 per cent is with Pakistan, and 19.2 per cent is held by China. Apart from a war with China, two full-scale wars have been fought with Pakistan over Kashmir: the 1965 War, which was confined to the Western theatre; and the 1971 War which was fought primarily in the East, though significant engagements also occurred in the West. The 1965 War was brief and an agreement was arrived at, with Soviet mediation, which more or less restored the status quo ante without any advantages accruing to the concerned parties. India gained significant advantages consequent upon the 1971 War, since East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan and emerged as the independent nation of Bangladesh. Crucially, this act of secession exploded the two-nation theory on which the very creation and existence of Pakistan was based, and as a result of which the sub-continent was partitioned into the two successor states. During the 1971 War, India captured 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and also made large territorial gains by occupying certain strategic positions on the Western front. From this position of strength in 1971, India decided that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved bilaterally without any foreign intervention, a doctrine to which Pakistan also subscribed at that point of time. India approached the bilateral talks, whose outcome was the Shimla Agreement [1] , in a spirit of magnanimity and decided to return to Pakistan the 90,000 prisoners of war. It also agreed to a fresh demarcation of the Line of Control (LoC), including a withdrawal from several strategic positions, on the unwritten understanding that the LoC so demarcated would - over a period of time, based on good neighbourly relations and supplemented by economic ties - be mutually accepted as both the de facto and de jure border. Officially, however, India's stated position continues to be that the whole of J&K is its integral part. At present, the 1971 Shimla Agreement with Pakistan constitutes the principal plank for the settlement of the Kashmir issue on a bilateral basis.

 

International terrorism and its impact on India

 

In the 1970s, low intensity conflicts emerged within the contours of international terrorism. In military parlance, this meant waging of wars by unscrupulous and unprincipled states, at minimal costs to achieve core geopolitical objectives. In India, the spectre of Sikh terrorism and the movement for Khalistan emerged in the western sector in the early 1980s. This campaign was soon transformed by Pakistan into a proxy war against India. In the absence of widespread and mass support, however, Sikh terrorism was eventually crushed with a heavy hand. [2]

The collapse of the Berlin Wall – the ultimate symbol of the Cold War between USSR and USA – that resulted in the unification of East and West Germany also signalled the imminent collapse of the Soviet 'Empire'. This cataclysmic event was followed by critical developments in Eastern Europe and the erstwhile USSR, which were virtually inconceivable even a few years earlier. The East European countries rejected the path of communism and adopted the democratic route, and the former Soviet republics declared themselves independent states. Following these developments, it was felt in certain quarters in Pakistan and Kashmir that, perhaps, an opportune moment had come to either secure independence for J&K or its merger with Pakistan.

Events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics also had ramifications for India in terms of cross-border terrorism. They coincided with the worsening of the terrorist scenario in Punjab in 1989. Pakistani authorities also decided that this was an opportune time to achieve their ultimate aims in J&K, and extended the theatre of the new form of low intensity warfare into this State as well. In J&K, terrorism was ushered in through a spectacular event – the kidnapping of the daughter of no less a person than the then Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. [3] The genesis of the current phase of cross-border terrorism in J&K can be traced to this event.

The fact that terrorism in Punjab was effectively controlled by the end of 1992 pushed the Pakistani establishment to further escalate the terrorist movement in J&K in order to keep their proxy war with India simmering at a certain level [4] .

The most sinister manifestation of militancy in J&K, so far, has been the Kargil intrusion by Pakistan-backed militants and army regulars, which led to an undeclared, though limited, war in May 1999. The Kargil intrusion had the potential of turning into a full-fledged war with Pakistan, with the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, an eventuality that Pakistan threatened to realise on several occasions during the course of this conflict. The Kargil intrusion was finally neutralised by a fight-back by the Indian armed forces as they recovered peak after peak at a tremendous cost in terms of human life. The final stages of the Kargil conflict saw Pakistan withdraw from several of these heights because of difficulties in sustaining supply lines to the intruders, and also due to the mounting international pressure.

 

Operational strategy of cross-border terrorism in J&K

 

Though terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir is largely confined to the valley, it has also affected the Rajouri and Poonch districts bordering Pakistan, the Peer Panjal Range and the region stretching down to Doda. The Jammu region is also affected by cross-border terrorism.

Although at one point of time the number of terrorist groups in Kashmir was proliferating at a rapid rate, there are at present just half a dozen principal terrorist groups operating in Kashmir: the Hizb-ul- Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Al-Badr, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (earlier Harkat-ul-Ansar), Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islam (HuJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), [5] recently formed by Maulana Masood Azhar, who was released as a part of the prisoner-swap against the passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC 814 from Kathmandu to Delhi. [6] Each of these terrorist outfits are affiliated with various overground political factions. Thus, the political wing of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is the Jamaat-e-Islami and that of the Lashkar-e-Toiba is the Markaz-ud-Dawaa-Wal-Irshad. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen cadres are mainly of Kashmiri origin. Other organizations have come to be progressively dominated by militants of foreign origin, including Pakistanis. Over 60 per cent of militants currently active in J&K are believed to be of foreign origin, a proportion that has increased from a mere six per cent in 1989. [7] Upto 90 per cent of the foreign militants are from Pakistan. Of late, a sprinkling of militants from several Islamic countries including Afghanistan and Sudan, has also been noticed. [8] Of the total strength of militants operating in the State, as many as 80 per cent may be of Kashmiri origin - that is, they belong to Kashmir or to PoK.

The strategy of these terrorist groups is to create terror through bomb explosions, indiscriminate firing at innocents, targeting VIPs and important functionaries of the government, and attacks on security forces. Lately, several attacks on security establishments by suicide squads or fidayeen have also been executed. [9]

With regard to the tools of terror, seizure figures from January 1990 to  June 30 2000 indicate that these are sufficient to arm at least three divisions of the Army (Table 1). Explosives have also been used extensively, and the volume of seized explosives is an index of the destructive potential the terrorists currently possess (Table 2). On the communications front, the fact that as many as 2,798 wireless sets had been seized from the terrorists (up to October 2000) is an indication of their effective organisational strength. [10]

 

Table 1: Arms Seizures

 

Source:      Crime records of State police.

 

 

Table 2: Explosive Material seized

 

Source :     Crime records of State police.

 

The extent of funding of terrorism in J&K depends primarily on the estimate of the number of terrorists operating in this region and there is no unanimity amongst the various security forces and intelligence agencies operating in J&K on this figure. The army tends to down play the number of terrorists and has put their estimate at 2000 - this low estimate on the part of the army is one way of projecting its efficiency with regard to curbing infiltration along the border/LoC. The police forces on the other hand put the figure at 5000, trying to play up the looseness of the security forces in checking infiltration on the border/LoC. Intelligence agencies provide a cautious and conservative figure of 3000-plus or 4000. According to this author's interactions with several persons, a figure of 4000 could be a conservative estimate.

As stated, there are six principal terrorist groups currently operating in J&K. Within a specific hierarchy, these groups are further sub-divided into numerous gangs of varying membership strength. Operationally, these terrorist outfits function in small gangs of three to four. In carrying out attacks of a larger intensity, for instance, the attacks on Amarnath Yatris, [11] several small operational gangs unite. Most of the terrorist outfits operating in J&K receive substantial funds. All terrorists get a certain down payment on recruitment, apart from a monthly remuneration and other incentives for terrorist acts of larger intensity and a certain amount as end of tenure - usually two years - payment. According to various computations by intelligence agencies, on an average Rs. 300,000 per annum is spent on funding a Kashmiri terrorist and up to Rs. 500,000 on a foreign terrorist. If one assumes an average expenditure of Rs. 400,000 per terrorist over a force of 4,000, it results in a staggering amount of Rs. 16 billion. These figures also factor in the larger remuneration paid to the 'top level' terrorists. The structure of funding would also include other expenditure incurred on administrative machinery, media relations, training, relief expenditure, a one time ex-gratia payment to the kith & kin of the terrorists killed, and earning the goodwill of the local populace, an objective that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is ensuring that the terrorists pursue. [12]

 

Table 3: Funds given to terrorists operating in J&K

 

		Foreigners (includes Pakistani)	Kashmiris
1.	Upfront money given at the time of recruitment	Upto Rs. 50,000	Upto Rs. 25,000
2.	Monthly payment	Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 12,000	Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 10,000
3.	End of tenure payment	Rs. 2,00,000 to Rs. 2,50,000	Rs. 1,00,000 to Rs.1,50,000
4.	For a spectacular act of terrorism	Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 2 lakhs
5.	Payment given to a supremo or top leader	Upto Rs. 50,000/- per month

 

 

 

The army has separately computed the various sources of funding of terrorism in J&K. Army sources disclose that the proportions are as follows:

 

Straight funding from Pakistan	20%
Funding from narcotics	25%
Funding from illegal sale of arms	20%
Funding through counterfeit currency	10%
Funding through Zohat (An Islamic tax)	5%
Funding from international Islamic organisations	5%
Funding from “Organisation of Islamic countries”	5%
Funding through extortion	5%
Funding through donations	5%

Source:      Interaction with various agencies.

 

Table 4: Cost of weapons & explosives

 

 

Jamait-e-Islami, a political wing of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is reported to have collected Pakistani Rs. 2.5 billion in Pakistan by way of donations.

Source: Interaction with various agencies.

 

There are several sources of funds that have been utilised by terrorist outfits in J&K. The most significant channel is, of course, direct funding by the ISI, with terrorists crossing the border being provided with both genuine and counterfeit currency. Though the counterfeit angle is being played up by several agencies and the media, this author does not subscribe to the notion that counterfeit currency is significant to the terrorists' funding mechanism. On the contrary, counterfeit currency, rather than earning goodwill for the terrorists, is gradually leading to hostility on the part of the locals against the terrorists due to the punitive enforcement action the local population has to face from the state agencies on discovery of such currency.

Another important source of terrorist funding in Kashmir is the Hawala route, also known as the underground or parallel-banking channel. The Hawala route is used by the ISI and several other fundamentalist outfits based in countries grouped under the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to send money to terrorist groups in J&K. Hawala funding is done through a network of dealers which extends all the way to Delhi, Mumbai and other places in India. Many of these Hawala dealers have begun genuine wholesale/retail businesses as fronts to divert money to the J&K militant groups. It has been reported that Kashmiri carpet dealers throughout the country under-invoice their exports to Islamic countries and the balance of the under-invoiced value is diverted to the terrorist groups through the Hawala route. [13]

Legal remittances to educational and religious institutions, with an element of over-invoicing, are another source of funding. For example, of the money received by Jhelum Medical College, the cost of building etc., were inflated and the difference between the inflated cost and the actual cost was siphoned off to the terrorist groups. In recent times, a number of Madarsas that have emerged in J&K and in other parts of India, especially in northern UP, are receiving large amounts of legal funding from the member countries of the OIC. A large amount of money is also being provided to the terrorists directly by the Pakistan High Commission. There have been reports that leaders of the All Party Hurriyat Conference have been receiving funds from the Pakistan embassy in New Delhi. [14]

An analysis of terrorists' funding mechanisms must also take into consideration Pakistan's capacity to fund terrorist groups through the smuggling of narcotics. The squeeze on international funding to Pakistan as a consequence of the Chagai nuclear explosion has led to 90 per cent of that country's budget being utilised for debt servicing and maintenance of the administrative machinery, including the army. [15] With dwindling official resources, Pakistan is increasingly resorting to financing terrorism with proceeds from the smuggling of narcotics. High quality opium is harvested from Afghanistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and refined into heroin in highly sophisticated laboratories located in Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Narcotic smugglers based in Pakistan and controlled by the ISI are reported to be earning U.S$ 2.5 billion in the illegal trading of narcotics. The current harvest has been estimated at 5000 tons of opium by various countries and international agencies. [16] It is through the illegal trading of narcotics that Pakistan is supporting the Taliban Government in Afghanistan and financing terrorist outfits in Jammu & Kashmir. It is alleged that the Kargil war was also financed by Pakistan from money gained through the smuggling of narcotics. [17]

Terrorists' have also dextrously exploited the route from Pakistan to Nepal by air and the porous border between India and Nepal to receive funds. Moreover, there being no restrictions on the movement of money and people from Nepal to India, this route is generally chosen by the top leadership of the terrorist groups to enter India.

The terrorist outfits in J&K also resort to extortion from the local populace, especially corrupt officials, to augment their funds. Various sympathisers of the terrorist groups, especially in the Valley, also contribute to the terrorist kitty in the form of donations. It is alleged that the Jammu and Kashmir Bank has played a fairly dubious role in channelling terrorist funding in Jammu & Kashmir. [18]

According to a conservative estimate, the terrorist funding in Kashmir is reported to be in the region of Rs. 2.5 billion, a substantial portion of which emanates from Pakistan (See Table 3). Pakistan's cost-benefit calculations vis-à-vis financing terrorist groups in its proxy war against India in J&K are influenced by calculations of the much heavier expenditure that India has to incur by way of diverting scarce economic resources to its security apparatus.

 

Terrorism and its impact on economic activity in J&K

 

There has been a large-scale distortion in the economic base of  J&K due to cross-border terrorism. Tourism, the mainstay of economic activity in the State, was estimated to generate Rs. 2 billion per annum. By this calculation, the J&K economy has suffered a damage to the extent of Rs. 20 billion over the last decade in tourism industry alone. [19] Currently, the handicraft industry is reported to be flourishing in the State with the handicraft dealers getting better returns. The handicraft dealers are directly approaching the markets in big towns, eliminating middleman in the process. Conventional farming, commercial vegetable gardening and fruits are the other significant sources of income. As a State afflicted by terrorism, the J&K economy also manifests certain paradoxes. One of these is that, despite the uneven growth of a major economic activity like tourism, there is all-round economic prosperity in the State. Evidence of this can be adduced from the fact that 20 brick kilns are operating in the vicinity of Srinagar, and massive mansions are being built, both within Srinagar and in the countryside. A study on the flow of major items of consumption like food and fuel into J&K carried out at the barrier on the Banihal Pass has revealed that there is a substantial increase in the flow of such items into the State. [20]

One of the principal reasons for the economic prosperity of J&K is that certain ancillary sectors have benefited from the presence of 250 battalions of security forces located in J&K (150 of the Army and 100 of the para-military forces). Occupancy in J&K hotels has increased due to the large presence of security forces. These battalions also generate a lot of revenue in terms of other related economic activity. The Union Government is also reported to be liberal in sanctioning security related expenses for these forces. In order to pitch tents for a Border Security Force (BSF) battalion, for instance, the Government sanctions Rs. 15,000, which the farmer is only too glad to receive, considering that he will generate an income of barely Rs. 5,000 if he were to till the land. Moreover, J&K being a highly subsidised State, there are no surcharges levied on electricity and food grain is available at relatively low rates. Terrorist funding to the extent of Rs. 2.5 billion through various channels, alluded to earlier, has also contributed substantially to economic prosperity. Corruption, which is at an all time high in J&K, has led to most of the developmental expenditure finding its way into the pockets of politicians, bureaucrats and other vested interests in the private sector.

 

Terrorist incidents and action by enforcement agencies

 

During the period between January 1990 and June 2000, there have been 45,586 incidents of terrorist violence; of these 16,844 have been directed against the security forces. Terrorism was at its peak during the period 1993-96, when on an average there were 5000-6000 terrorist incidents per year. Another peculiar feature of terrorism, during the last decade is that, up until 1995, processions and demonstrations in the Valley were the order of the day, whereas from 1996 onwards, hartals and strikes based on calls given by militants are the dominant feature. A possible explanation for this could be the fact that, till 1995, as a result of the events in Europe since 1989, the people of J&K were hopeful of seceding from India. Subsequently, when these hopes were belied, normal and routine activity has been suspended only on the dictates of the militants. Terrorism in J&K has taken a very heavy toll in terms of loss of life in the last decade. Over 22,000 persons have lost their lives in terrorist related incidents in the State, including more than 8,398 civilians. Another 11,361 civilians have suffered injuries in the conflict. The number of security personnel killed stands at 2,255, with another 6,535 injured. 11,479 militants have also lost their lives as a result of counter-terrorism operations and 3000 militants have surrendered. In the last decade 35,059 militants/suspects have been apprehended by the security forces; of these 19,313 were released after preliminary interrogation and 15,726 were arrested under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act (TADA) and other substantive laws. Many of the arrested persons have been released on bail and, at present, only 332 persons are in judicial custody while 480 persons have been detained under the preventive sections of the law. [21]

 

Dialogue as a solution

 

Evidently, violence in J&K is far from forcing any resolution to the advantage of any of the parties to the conflict. Dialogue, under the circumstances, becomes an imperative. This process of dialogue can be initiated at two levels: The first, with the Kashmiri people; and secondly, with Pakistan. Such a dialogue could be based on the possibilities of granting a greater degree of autonomy to the Kashmiri people within the framework of the Indian Constitution. However, this autonomy should not mean buckling down to unreasonable demands under the threat of violence, and should be in consonance with the scope of autonomy being considered for other States of India. The dialogue process would also need to be backed up by an effective programme for socio-economic development. The objectives of a meaningful dialogue, moreover, can only be achieved by cultivating and nurturing a proper leadership structure in Kashmir.

The dialogue with Pakistan would have to be bilateral and based on a spirit of accommodation, as envisaged under the Shimla Agreement of 1972. Ground realities would have to be acknowledged by both the countries - in the present instance, the “Line of Control” which is at present the de-facto border, could eventually form a de-jure border with Pakistan. Political parties on both sides, and the military establishment in Pakistan- which has ruled Pakistan for considerable intervals of time since its inception - would no doubt find it inconvenient to sell such a line to their