The Kargil Review Committee Report:
Much to Learn and Implement

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh (Retd) AVSM

The Kargil Review Committee has done a very commendable job and equally commendable was the government's decision to table the report in the Parliament.

In the last few weeks there has been much comment in the media bringing to the attention of the nation various inadequacies, some of them of long standing, either glossed over or dealt with in a very perfunctory manner.

The two hundred and twenty eight page report of the Subrahmanyam Committee and its forty one page executive summary of the report is with me and it is necessary to quote from it both for erudition and emphasis. For example, it has been recorded that the Indian intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection and reporting that goes to build up the external threat perception by the one agency, namely, R&AW which has a virtual monopoly in this regard, it is neither healthy nor prudent to endow that one agency alone with multifarious capabilities for human, communication, imagery and electronic intelligence. Had R&AW and DGMI spotted the additional battalions in the FCNA region that were missing from the ORBAT, there might have been requests for ARC flights in winter and these might have been undertaken, weather permitting. As it happened, the last flight was in October 1998, long before the intrusion, and the next in May 1999, after the intrusions had commenced. The intruders had by then come out into the open.

The report states elsewhere that there is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. The assessment process has been downgraded in importance and consequently various agencies send very junior officials to JIC meetings. The DGMI did not send any regular input to the JIC for two years preceding the Kargil crisis. The JIC was not accorded the importance it deserved either by the Intelligence agencies or the Government. There are no checks and balances in the Indian intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is his due.

The Findings bring out many grave deficiencies in India's security management system. The framework Lord Ismay formulated and Lord Mount batten recommended was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management. There has been very little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle, the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory, the growing nuclear threat, end of the cold war, continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs. The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in time of war and proxy war. The Committee strongly feels that the Kargil experience, the continuing proxy war and the prevailing nuclearised security environment justify a thorough review of the national security system in its entirety.

Such a review cannot be undertaken by an over-burdened bureaucracy. An independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient, is required to conduct such studies which must be undertaken expeditiously.

The National Security Council (NSC) formally constituted in April 1999, is still evolving and its procedure will take tome to mature. Whether its merits, having a National Security Adviser who also happens to be Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, can only be an interim arrangement. The Committee believes that there must be a full time National Security Adviser and it would suggest that a second line of personnel be inducted into a system as early as possible and groomed for higher responsibility.

Members of the National Security Council, the senior bureaucracy servicing it and the Service chiefs need to be continually sensitised to assess intelligence pertaining to national, regional and international issues. This can be done through periodic intelligence briefings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with all supporting staff in attendance.

The Committee had drawn attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalised mechanism for co-ordination or objective-oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is not mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their equality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. These are all standard features elsewhere in the world. In the absence of such procedures, the Government and the nation do not know whether they are getting value for money. While taking note of recent steps to entrust the NSCS with some of these responsibilities the Committee recommends a through examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to remedying these deficiencies.

All major countries have a mechanism at national and often at lower levels to assess the intelligence inputs received from different agencies and sources. After the 1962 debacle, the then existing JIC under the Chiefs of Staff Committee was upgraded and transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat. It was further upgraded in 1985 with the Chairman being raised to the rank of Secretary to the Government. The Committee finds that for various reasons cited in the Report, the JIC was devalued. Its efficacy has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat. However, its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of overall reform of the system.

Pakistan's action at Kargil was not rational. Its behaviour patterns require to be carefully studied in order to gain a better understanding of the psyche of its leadership. In other countries, intelligence agencies have developed large 'White Wings' of high quality analysts for in-house analysis. They also contract studies with university departments and think tanks with area specialisation. This is sadly neglect in India. The development of such country/region specialisation along with associated language skills is a time consuming process and should not be further delayed. A generalist administration culture would appear to permeate the intelligence field. It is necessary to establish think tanks, encourage country specialistion in university departments and to organise regular exchange of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. the Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers, especially in relation to future equipment and force postures. Most of their time, is however, devoted to the operational role, as is bound to happen. This has led to a number of negative results. Future-oriented long time planning suffers. Army Headquarters had developed a command rather than a staff culture. Higher decisions on equipment, force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broadbased. The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters. Most opposition to change comes from inadequate knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the world and a reluctance to change the status quo and move away from considerations of parochial interest. The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the armed forces, which is not a real issue. In fact, locating the Services' headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy.

Structural reforms could bring about a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services. The Committee is of the view that the present obsolete system, bequeathed to India by Lord Ismay, merits re-examination. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue, taking account of the revolution in military affairs and threats of proxy war and terrorism and the imperative of modernising the Armed Forces. An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage, except in 1962. The country can no longer afford such ad hoc functioning. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganised.

The Committee's review brings out many lessons that the Armed Forces, Intelligence agencies, Parliament, Government, media and the nation as a whole have to learn. These should stimulate introspection and reflection, leading to purposeful action. The Committee thrusts that its recommendations will be widely discussed and acted upon expeditiously so that the sacrifices made will not have been in vain. The best tribute to the dedication of those killed and wounded will be to ensure that "Kargils" of any description are never repeated.

There is both comfort and danger in clinging to any long established status quo. There will be many who suggest the most careful deliberation on the report. Procrastination has cost nations dear. Others will no doubt advocate incremental change. Half measures will not do; synergy will be lost. The Committee has, after very wide interaction, sign-posted directions along the path to peace, ensuring progress, development and stability of the nation. How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its Security-Intelligence-Development shied to meet the challenge of the 21st century is for the Government, Parliament and public opinion to determine. There is no turning away from that responsibility.

As a former member secretary of the apex intelligence organisation at the national level, the Joint Intelligence Committee, I was able to obtain a ringside view of much on this front. I saw not as an operator but as an assessor "fed" with so-called intelligence from the home ministry (including the Border Security Force), defence ministry, ministry of external affairs, R&AW, IB and defence headquarters. The assignment of Chairman JIC (Additional Secretary status) is not particularly sought after by any bureaucrat for it offers responsibility without power. And for this reason I also held the fort on many occasions and for many months.

Until 1967, the intelligence bureau catered to all our intelligence requirements - both internal and external. There was no shortage of resources and the legendary B N Mullick exercised complete sovereignty over the intelligence empire for decades. This very hardworking officer indeed because an institution and was the guide and mentor of Jawaharlal Nehru for decades. But occasionally, he too blundered with some markedly obtuse intelligence assessments.

After the 1965 Indo-Pak war, a separate agency for our external intelligence requirements (Research and Analysis Wing) was created. It soon developed into a very powerful organisation and resources were no constraints. The IB had to do considerable "power shedding" and it was reduced to playing second fiddle thereafter. We detached ourselves from this era temporarily after a decade or so and with the coming to power of the Janta regime in 1977, Morarji Desai effected major reductions in the power of R&AW and it was not longer the all powerful organisation which it had developed to be.

In his autobiography (The Story of My Life, vol. III, page 44) Morarjibhai says:

• "This agency was created in 1967-68 with my consent as finance minister, I had not then realised the real intention of Shrimati Gandhi and agreed with the proposal. I cannot forgive myself for my stupidity in not seeing the possible implications of that seemingly innocent action. This was the instrument of coercion, which Shrimati Gandhi used against all who came under her surveillance including members of her own Cabinet."

R&AW was later restored to its former all pervasive power.

Intelligence gathering can be a very difficult and arduous task. It is the result of patience, liaison, 'logical' thought and clear exposition in making the maximum use of all sources and methodically piecing together very scrap of information. That any intelligence agency or organisation anywhere will have its grey areas is indisputable; and that the intelligence experts do not have Nostradamic attributes is also an accepted fact. But there is the very relevant question of accountability. Does it exist? And if it does should it not come into play at times, particularly when we have witnessed so many failures and serious inadequacies both on nation and regional levels?

Eventually, the paper was prepared. The JIC steering committee, which had to meet at least once in three months to provide guidelines to the JIC for effecting improvements, commended the study. The then Cabinet Secretary, BD Pande (later Governor of Punjab) chaired the meeting. But sadly, I have to also record here that during my seven-year tenure, I was not able to arrange more than four or five meetings and R&AW always presented itself as the major roadblock.

R&AW deliberately enfeebled the JIC. I quote here some observations of a former director of R&AW in a national daily: "I agree that the JIC is lightweight and moves tardily. Whether its chairman comes on transfer from the NDMC, the Army or the police in its present form it is an unwanted redundancy. The services, the foreign ministry or the home ministry have to get on with the job. So they make their own quick assessments of intelligence, which reaches them directly, and go into action. Meanwhile the JIC debates the placement of a comma on the most noncommittal phraseology suitable for its assessment. If the customer waits for the JIC's assessment, his home would have burned down". It was a game of one upmanship all the time!

On the co-ordination of civil and military intelligence agencies - a vital requirement - we have had committees in the past making suitable recommendations. B G Desmukh, a former Cabinet Secretary and principal secretary to the Prime Minister, has recorded in a national daily on 26 April 1993 that: "As there is little co-ordination among intelligence agencies, there is often duplication of work and consequent wastage of resources. Efforts to evolve a co-ordination mechanism have not succeeded in the past but its need cannot be over emphasised."

I would also like to quote here the views of one of our divisional commanders in Sri Lanka during the IPKF operations a decade ago. Says Lt. Gen. S C Sardeshpande:

• "We heard little from the representatives of R&AW. Perhaps R&AW saw us as not quite ripe to deserve sharing their findings. As events forced themselves from mid-1989 onwards, we differed with their assessment, sometimes radically, as our faculties remained glued to the ground-wave. They seemed to permit themselves the luxury of over-enthusiasm, over-optimism and the virtue of meeting other demands and compulsions better known to them. Our 'pulse' of the people proved right in the end. Intelligence inputs from agencies depend predominantly on their perceptions as well as insight and the milieu in which they operate. Contributions from R&AW, IB and the Indian High Commission were limited and seldom helped us".

On integrational weakness the divisional commander has recorded:

• "Despite four decades of independence, three decades of insurgency, five wars and a continuum of a series of security crises, integration of intelligence agencies, there optimum exploitation, harmonious functioning and complementarily have still remained a far cry, instead of making them a war cry".

A watch dog for our intelligence agencies is imperative if the Steering Committee is dysfunctional. We also have to ensure that no intelligence agency becomes alarmingly powerful and here I quote Jaswant Singh, the present Minister of External Affairs. This is what he said in a national daily on 30 December 1994: "The Intelligence Bureau has over the years acquired the unsavoury image of being an extension of the political interests of the ruling party as a specialist in surveillance over the Opposition…."

A one page report on action initiated by the Government has also been tabled in the Parliament and the last paragraph states: "After due consideration of the recommendations, a thorough review, through an appropriate body, of the national security system in its entirely, including the areas covered by the above recommendations of the Committee, is being ordered by the Government." One hopes this is undertaken with utmost expedition for delay which usually occurs in the implementation of various reports, can have a deleterious effect on the vital subject of national security.

II. THE KARGIL REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT

Much to Learn and Implement

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh (Retd) AVSM

The Kargil Review Committee has done a very commendable job and equally commendable was the government's decision to table the report in the Parliament.

In the last few weeks there has been much comment in the media bringing to the attention of the nation various inadequacies, some of them of long standing, either glossed over or dealt with in a very perfunctory manner.

The two hundred and twenty eight page report of the Subrahmanyam Committee and its forty one page executive summary of the report is with me and it is necessary to quote from it both for erudition and emphasis. For example, it has been recorded that the Indian intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection and reporting that goes to build up the external threat perception by the one agency, namely, R&AW which has a virtual monopoly in this regard, it is neither healthy nor prudent to endow that one agency alone with multifarious capabilities for human, communication, imagery and electronic intelligence. Had R&AW and DGMI spotted the additional battalions in the FCNA region that were missing from the ORBAT, there might have been requests for ARC flights in winter and these might have been undertaken, weather permitting. As it happened, the last flight was in October 1998, long before the intrusion, and the next in May 1999, after the intrusions had commenced. The intruders had by then come out into the open.

The report states elsewhere that there is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. The assessment process has been downgraded in importance and consequently various agencies send very junior officials to JIC meetings. The DGMI did not send any regular input to the JIC for two years preceding the Kargil crisis. The JIC was not accorded the importance it deserved either by the Intelligence agencies or the Government. There are no checks and balances in the Indian intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is his due.

The Findings bring out many grave deficiencies in India's security management system. The framework Lord Ismay formulated and Lord Mount batten recommended was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management. There has been very little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle, the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory, the growing nuclear threat, end of the cold war, continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs. The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in time of war and proxy war. The Committee strongly feels that the Kargil experience, the continuing proxy war and the prevailing nuclearised security environment justify a thorough review of the national security system in its entirety.

Such a review cannot be undertaken by an over-burdened bureaucracy. An independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient, is required to conduct such studies which must be undertaken expeditiously.

The National Security Council (NSC) formally constituted in April 1999, is still evolving and its procedure will take tome to mature. Whether its merits, having a National Security Adviser who also happens to be Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, can only be an interim arrangement. The Committee believes that there must be a full time National Security Adviser and it would suggest that a second line of personnel be inducted into a system as early as possible and groomed for higher responsibility.

Members of the National Security Council, the senior bureaucracy servicing it and the Service chiefs need to be continually sensitised to assess intelligence pertaining to national, regional and international issues. This can be done through periodic intelligence briefings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with all supporting staff in attendance.

The Committee had drawn attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalised mechanism for co-ordination or objective-oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is not mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their equality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. These are all standard features elsewhere in the world. In the absence of such procedures, the Government and the nation do not know whether they are getting value for money. While taking note of recent steps to entrust the NSCS with some of these responsibilities the Committee recommends a through examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to remedying these deficiencies.

All major countries have a mechanism at national and often at lower levels to assess the intelligence inputs received from different agencies and sources. After the 1962 debacle, the then existing JIC under the Chiefs of Staff Committee was upgraded and transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat. It was further upgraded in 1985 with the Chairman being raised to the rank of Secretary to the Government. The Committee finds that for various reasons cited in the Report, the JIC was devalued. Its efficacy has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat. However, its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of overall reform of the system.

Pakistan's action at Kargil was not rational. Its behaviour patterns require to be carefully studied in order to gain a better understanding of the psyche of its leadership. In other countries, intelligence agencies have developed large 'White Wings' of high quality analysts for in-house analysis. They also contract studies with university departments and think tanks with area specialisation. This is sadly neglect in India. The development of such country/region specialisation along with associated language skills is a time consuming process and should not be further delayed. A generalist administration culture would appear to permeate the intelligence field. It is necessary to establish think tanks, encourage country specialistion in university departments and to organise regular exchange of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. the Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers, especially in relation to future equipment and force postures. Most of their time, is however, devoted to the operational role, as is bound to happen. This has led to a number of negative results. Future-oriented long time planning suffers. Army Headquarters had developed a command rather than a staff culture. Higher decisions on equipment, force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broadbased. The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters. Most opposition to change comes from inadequate knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the world and a reluctance to change the status quo and move away from considerations of parochial interest. The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the armed forces, which is not a real issue. In fact, locating the Services' headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy.

Structural reforms could bring about a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services. The Committee is of the view that the present obsolete system, bequeathed to India by Lord Ismay, merits re-examination. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue, taking account of the revolution in military affairs and threats of proxy war and terrorism and the imperative of modernising the Armed Forces. An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage, except in 1962. The country can no longer afford such ad hoc functioning. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganised.

The Committee's review brings out many lessons that the Armed Forces, Intelligence agencies, Parliament, Government, media and the nation as a whole have to learn. These should stimulate introspection and reflection, leading to purposeful action. The Committee thrusts that its recommendations will be widely discussed and acted upon expeditiously so that the sacrifices made will not have been in vain. The best tribute to the dedication of those killed and wounded will be to ensure that "Kargils" of any description are never repeated.

There is both comfort and danger in clinging to any long established status quo. There will be many who suggest the most careful deliberation on the report. Procrastination has cost nations dear. Others will no doubt advocate incremental change. Half measures will not do; synergy will be lost. The Committee has, after very wide interaction, sign-posted directions along the path to peace, ensuring progress, development and stability of the nation. How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its Security-Intelligence-Development shied to meet the challenge of the 21st century is for the Government, Parliament and public opinion to determine. There is no turning away from that responsibility.

As a former member secretary of the apex intelligence organisation at the national level, the Joint Intelligence Committee, I was able to obtain a ringside view of much on this front. I saw not as an operator but as an assessor "fed" with so-called intelligence from the home ministry (including the Border Security Force), defence ministry, ministry of external affairs, R&AW, IB and defence headquarters. The assignment of Chairman JIC (Additional Secretary status) is not particularly sought after by any bureaucrat for it offers responsibility without power. And for this reason I also held the fort on many occasions and for many months.

Until 1967, the intelligence bureau catered to all our intelligence requirements - both internal and external. There was no shortage of resources and the legendary B N Mullick exercised complete sovereignty over the intelligence empire for decades. This very hardworking officer indeed because an institution and was the guide and mentor of Jawaharlal Nehru for decades. But occasionally, he too blundered with some markedly obtuse intelligence assessments.

After the 1965 Indo-Pak war, a separate agency for our external intelligence requirements (Research and Analysis Wing) was created. It soon developed into a very powerful organisation and resources were no constraints. The IB had to do considerable "power shedding" and it was reduced to playing second fiddle thereafter. We detached ourselves from this era temporarily after a decade or so and with the coming to power of the Janta regime in 1977, Morarji Desai effected major reductions in the power of R&AW and it was not longer the all powerful organisation which it had developed to be.

In his autobiography (The Story of My Life, vol. III, page 44) Morarjibhai says:

• "This agency was created in 1967-68 with my consent as finance minister, I had not then realised the real intention of Shrimati Gandhi and agreed with the proposal. I cannot forgive myself for my stupidity in not seeing the possible implications of that seemingly innocent action. This was the instrument of coercion, which Shrimati Gandhi used against all who came under her surveillance including members of her own Cabinet."

R&AW was later restored to its former all pervasive power.

Intelligence gathering can be a very difficult and arduous task. It is the result of patience, liaison, 'logical' thought and clear exposition in making the maximum use of all sources and methodically piecing together very scrap of information. That any intelligence agency or organisation anywhere will have its grey areas is indisputable; and that the intelligence experts do not have Nostradamic attributes is also an accepted fact. But there is the very relevant question of accountability. Does it exist? And if it does should it not come into play at times, particularly when we have witnessed so many failures and serious inadequacies both on nation and regional levels?

Eventually, the paper was prepared. The JIC steering committee, which had to meet at least once in three months to provide guidelines to the JIC for effecting improvements, commended the study. The then Cabinet Secretary, BD Pande (later Governor of Punjab) chaired the meeting. But sadly, I have to also record here that during my seven-year tenure, I was not able to arrange more than four or five meetings and R&AW always presented itself as the major roadblock.

R&AW deliberately enfeebled the JIC. I quote here some observations of a former director of R&AW in a national daily: "I agree that the JIC is lightweight and moves tardily. Whether its chairman comes on transfer from the NDMC, the Army or the police in its present form it is an unwanted redundancy. The services, the foreign ministry or the home ministry have to get on with the job. So they make their own quick assessments of intelligence, which reaches them directly, and go into action. Meanwhile the JIC debates the placement of a comma on the most noncommittal phraseology suitable for its assessment. If the customer waits for the JIC's assessment, his home would have burned down". It was a game of one upmanship all the time!

On the co-ordination of civil and military intelligence agencies - a vital requirement - we have had committees in the past making suitable recommendations. B G Desmukh, a former Cabinet Secretary and principal secretary to the Prime Minister, has recorded in a national daily on 26 April 1993 that: "As there is little co-ordination among intelligence agencies, there is often duplication of work and consequent wastage of resources. Efforts to evolve a co-ordination mechanism have not succeeded in the past but its need cannot be over emphasised."

I would also like to quote here the views of one of our divisional commanders in Sri Lanka during the IPKF operations a decade ago. Says Lt. Gen. S C Sardeshpande:

• "We heard little from the representatives of R&AW. Perhaps R&AW saw us as not quite ripe to deserve sharing their findings. As events forced themselves from mid-1989 onwards, we differed with their assessment, sometimes radically, as our faculties remained glued to the ground-wave. They seemed to permit themselves the luxury of over-enthusiasm, over-optimism and the virtue of meeting other demands and compulsions better known to them. Our 'pulse' of the people proved right in the end. Intelligence inputs from agencies depend predominantly on their perceptions as well as insight and the milieu in which they operate. Contributions from R&AW, IB and the Indian High Commission were limited and seldom helped us".

On integrational weakness the divisional commander has recorded:

• "Despite four decades of independence, three decades of insurgency, five wars and a continuum of a series of security crises, integration of intelligence agencies, there optimum exploitation, harmonious functioning and complementarily have still remained a far cry, instead of making them a war cry".

A watch dog for our intelligence agencies is imperative if the Steering Committee is dysfunctional. We also have to ensure that no intelligence agency becomes alarmingly powerful and here I quote Jaswant Singh, the present Minister of External Affairs. This is what he said in a national daily on 30 December 1994: "The Intelligence Bureau has over the years acquired the unsavoury image of being an extension of the political interests of the ruling party as a specialist in surveillance over the Opposition…."

A one page report on action initiated by the Government has also been tabled in the Parliament and the last paragraph states: "After due consideration of the recommendations, a thorough review, through an appropriate body, of the national security system in its entirely, including the areas covered by the above recommendations of the Committee, is being ordered by the Government." One hopes this is undertaken with utmost expedition for delay which usually occurs in the implementation of various reports, can have a deleterious effect on the vital subject of national security.