The Hizbul Mujahideen Ceasefire : Who Aborted It?

JE Menon & NM Komerath

In July-August 2000, the conflict in Kashmir came once again into sharp focus. A ceasefire was tentatively declared by the Hizbul Mujahideen (Party of Warriors; HM), hopes of peace rose, and then were shattered amidst machine-gun massacres of civilians, car bombings and other atrocities.

This article looks at the reports of these events, whose chronology is shown in Table 1, and attempts to throw some light on the dynamics behind them. The question of who aborted the HM ceasefire might help understand the reasons behind the continuation of bloodshed in Kashmir.

A month and over 130 victims of terrorism after the ceasefire, there are reports that the Government of India (GoI) and the HM branch in J&K are continuing efforts towards peace in Kashmir, and that the HM might renew the ceasefire offer, perhaps in November. Before we get to that, however, a backgrounder is necessary.

On July 24, 2000, Abdul Majeed Dar, the "operational commander" inside India of the HM, accompanied by his four "divisional commanders", announced from the outskirts of Srinagar, India, a unilateral ceasefire in their attacks against the Indian security forces. On August 8, the ceasefire was unilaterally withdrawn of the HM speaking from his headquarters in Islamabad, Pakistan.

WHO ARE THE HM?

The Hizbul Mujahideen is considered to be the largest secessionist terror group which claims roots among the indigenous population of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). As such it has the best network in terms of logistics and manpower in J&K. Headquartered in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), it maintains a liaison office in Islamabad, from where most of its statements emanate. According to Pakistani news sources, the HM claims that 90% of the attacks against the Indian military.¹

In interpreting this claims, we note that the vast majority of terrorist strikes in J&K are against the civilian population, as are 75% of the victims, and these are generally claimed by groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, (LeT) Hakat ul Mujahideen, (HuM) etc., which are dominated by Pakistanis, with roughly 40% imported Pakistan-sponsored mercenaries from Afghanistan and several countries in the Islamic World, including Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and so on.² We also note that numerous attacks in recent times against Indian security forces have been claimed by groups such as LeT.

As will be seen later, it is not unusual for HM to be allowed to claim "credit" for attacks after some other group has already made such a claim. Finally, recent squabbles have shown³ that there is serious contention for leadership of HM between the Kashmiris led by Salahuddin, and the Punjabis and other Pakistanis who form a part of HM. This dichotomy has been increasing in significance in the weeks following the ceasefire drama.

HOW WAS THE HM FORMED?
After the abortive Pakistani infiltration of armed irregulars in 1965, secessionist violence in J&K was taken over by the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). A former JKLF Organising Chairman and the hijacker of an Indian Airlines plane in 1971, Hasim Qureshi, is quoted⁴ as confirming that the ISI (The Pakistan government agency responsible for sponsoring terrorist activities) approached him in 1984 with the plan for the terrorist movement in J&K. By 1989, the JKLF⁵ had become disenchanted with Pakistan’s plans for post "liberation" Kashmir, declared its intention to seek true independence, and was promptly dumped by Pakistan, with its leaders arrested. HM was formed to fill the gap, after leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) (Pakistan) persuaded JeI (J&K) of the necessity for an armed wing to carry out the campaign of terror to be launched in Kashmir at the behest of the ISI.⁶ The end of the Afghan War in 1988 allowed Pakistan to devote more attention to unemployed Mujahideen with their modern weaponry, to create terror in Kashmir.² HM was formed in 1989 from a terror outfit started5 by Ahsan Dar in 1987, to take over the role that JKLF had abdicated. It was formed as the military wing⁶ of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), J&K branch, led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani. There are three wings of the JeI in the Indo-Pak theatre, the central one being the Pakistani wing led by Qazi Hussein Ahmed and another headed by Abdul Rasheed Turabi in POK. By 1993, Ahsan Dar and several other "commanders" were in jail, charged with torture and possibly murders.^5-9 HM losses have exceeded 675 members shot by security forces,⁹ and several hundred jailed. Training of members is generally done inside POK, with recruits¹⁰ taken across the borders and returned, armed, across the Line of Control (LoC).

WHO ARE THE OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS?

There are numerous groups created to conquer J&K, up to 150 at one point,¹¹ but many of them do little other than issue press releases and seek funding. In this paper we will note those that espouse violent jihad (holy war or struggle), as these form the last link in the chain of responsibility for the collapse of the ceasefire. Two main entities stand out in this regard: Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)^12-13 and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),^14-15 the latter already labeled as a terrorist formation by the US State Department^13-15 and the former well on the way to being designated as one. LeT was the group that first claimed responsibility for the murder of pilgrims and labourers in J&K on Aug1. (HM claimed responsibility as well, but few attach much HuM are composed mainly of foreigners, i.e. Pakistanis, Afghans and Mujahideen from an assortment of Arab and non-Arab Islamic countries. Two other groups with a relatively high profile include Al Badr and Jaish-e-Mohamed (JeM). The former is said to have just 25 members active in J&K. JeM is a new outfit created by Masood Azhar, one of the terrorists released by GoI in return for the safety of hostages in the Indian Airlines jet hijacked in December 1999. Very recently a "JKLA" has been formed. ¹⁶

WHAT LED UP TO THE CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCEMENT?

In 1994, the JKLF, disenchanted with revelations of Pakistani plans for Kashmir, declared a ceasefire with India, and many of its members joined mainstream democratic politics, including cabinet minister Lone.⁵ Ahsan Dar, interviewed in jail¹⁷ in 1997, appeared to be in good spirits, with an attitude which surprised readers, considering his background of bitter violence. In Fall 1999 he was released⁵ "and made no comment to the press". This action generated considerable criticism of the government in the Indian press.

By 1998, rivalries and disagreements between the Kashmiri – and the Pakistani Punjabi – factions of HM inside Pakistan had risen to murder levels. A massacre of 21 people in a village just inside POK, was realised to have been a part of this fratricide among the HM.³ Salahuddin, leader of the Kashmir faction, was placed under house arrest by the ISI. Clearly the HM was becoming very uncomfortable with the rapid mercenaries and Punjabis brought in by the ISI, all at the cost of the youth of Kashmir, who were, in the HM’s and the JKLF’s opinions, being used as cannon ^folder4 by the ISI.

The abortive and disastrous Kargil invasion by Pakistani forces in 1999, and the following increase in violence in Kashmir, drove the local population further away from secessionist goals, as people were tired of the unending violence. The beginning of the shadow play, which led up to the HM ceasefire offer, was the visit of US President Bill Clinton to India. On the day his visit began, March 20, 2000, gunmen rounded up the 35 men of the Sikh community in the village of Chithisinghpora in Kashmir, and machine-gunned them to death.¹⁸ Villagers recognised among the killers a "guide" from a neighbouring village. The HM, given that it provides most of the logistical and networking assistance for the foreign mujahideen active in J&K, had little doubts as to who the killers were.

Soon after the massacre, according to more than one report in the Indian press,¹⁹ the HM commander protested to the chief of the LeT for targeting Sikhs – a community until then untouched by the terrorist groups. The rift between HM and LeT widened rapidly from then on, reportedly amid quarrels related to arms and money. Indeed, one Pakistani daily has been quoted as saying that the decision to offer a ceasefire was taken in March itself at a meeting of the HM Command Council in Islamabad.²⁰ (Differences between militants from Indian Kashmir and foreigners have always been a problem, but the negative feelings have increased in recent years because, after a decade of fighting, the locals have nothing to show for it).

After the Kargil war, India conducted elections in September 1999, despite threats from the terrorist to kill anyone who voted. In 2000, the APHC began overtures to the GoI, and found that they were eagerly received. This appears to have created insecurity, not only among the State government of Abdullah, who started an "autonomy resolution", but also among the HM, who found themselves being marginalised by both the foreigners in POK, and those who were joining mainstream Indian politics.

The Chithisinghpora massacre appears to be the straw that broke the camel’s back from the perspective of the HM. From then on, it was a matter of the Indian intelligence agencies expanding contacts and the HM reaching positively. The process was undertaken with considerable secrecy, which explains why there is no certainty about who among the main parties were aware of the ceasefire offer before it was made. While some on the Pakistani side had reason to deny foreknowledge, this problem did not apply on the Indian side. The ceasefire offer was welcomed virtually across the Indian political spectrum and media, and most importantly by the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government.

Events moved fairly rapidly after contacts were initiated. From various media reports, it has emerged that (a) HM’s Supreme Commander Syed Salahuddin (real name Mohammed Yousuf Shah) was brought into Kashmir in April, with security assured by India’s external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW); and (b) in the same month, HM’s Operations Commander Abdul Majeed Dar secretly visited New Delhi for talks with officials of RAW and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), India’s domestic intelligence agency. It is evident that RAW and IB played a key role in the months leading up to the ceasefire offer, with the Special Frontier Force (formerly 2-2) of RAW assisting with the logistics.²¹

Secretly parleys also reportedly took place between HM and Indian officials in Dubai. In the US, the Kashmiri Muslim expatriate community, under the aegis of a "Kashmiri Study Group", was becoming active once again with proposals for a solution. In the meantime, the All People’s Hurriyat Conference (APHC) – an umbrella organisation including various Kashmiri Muslim parties – had been sending out feelers to the government; coincidentally, the chairmanship of the APHC had passed on from Syed Ali Geelani to Abdul Ghani Bhatt. The latter is considered in Pakistan as being "soft" on India and it is said Islamabad does not have "too" much leverage" with him.²²

In May 2000, Mansoor Ijaz, an investment banker of Pakistani origin well connected to the Clinton administration, made a discreet visit to J&K, again under escort by RAW and the Indian military establishment. He met various government officials and local political figures in Kashmir. (It is to be noted that Ijaz is also said to have visited Pakistan at the time for talks with Pakistani Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf).

On June 26, the Chief Minister of J&K, Farooq Abdullah, got his autonomy proposal approved by the state assembly,²³ but this was summarily rejected by the Indian central government – a crystal clear hint to both APHC and HM about the boundaries of Indian negotiating redlines. Yet barely a month later, on July 24, in a dramatic move, Majeed Dar, speaking from the ourskirts of Srinagar in J&K, announced a unilateral ceasefire for three months, effective from July 25. Dar, who was accompanied by his four main divisional commanders, three of them without masks, stated that "we conducted grassroots surveys for two and a half months before taking this decision and we have the consent of the local people".²⁴ The move was promptly welcomed by the Indian government and Indian Army announced suspension of offensive operations (having already softened its approach to the HM since April). Preparations were undertaken for Home Secretary Kamal Pandey to visit Srinagar for talks with HM leaders on the modalities of the ceasefire for further broader negotiations. It subsequently became clear that Majeed Dar had been in touch with the Indian intelligence agencies, that he had visited Pakistan before the announcement for consultations with the HM Central Command, and that he had returned to Srinagar via Dubai or Kathmandu with help from the Special Frontier Force, a unit of RAW.²⁵ The urgency with which the offer was viewed in India may be glimpsed from news reports that the Delhi offices of the Home Ministry and Intelligence Bureau were deserted, the occupants mostly being out in Kashmir for the talks.

CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCEMENT – THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
The HM’s announcement of the ceasefire and its readiness for negotiations came as a surprise to the general public in both India and Pakistan. What was different was the reaction in either country. In India, the response was one of almost universal approval, with the media speculating that a window of opportunity may have opened for a solution to the troubles in J&K. The GoI welcomed the move almost immediately, again confirming to most observers that it had been aware of the impending ceasefire offer and that it had played a role in its genesis. This is a vital point to consider in understanding the events that followed.

The response from Pakistan was rather different. A summary assessment of media characterisation of the ceasefire offer showed that most of the press regarded the HM move as a betrayal of the Kashmir cause, initially by Majeed Dar, and then by Supreme Commander Salahuddin when he confirmed the offer. (There are parallels between the media reaction to the ceasefire and to the Lahore Declaration of February 1999, which was seen as a ground-breaking event opening a window of opportunity for Indo-Pak peace). At best, the Jang described the ceasefire as a "Scud" launched and out of control, with its effects quite unpredictable.²⁶

Speculation was rife as to who else knew about the ceasefire offer in advance, particularly given the initial reticent reaction of Government of Pakistan (GoP), the presence of the top JeI leader, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, in the presence of Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra in the US at a roughly the same time. But the radical Islamist formations grouped under the Mutahidda Jehad Council (MJC), a coalition of 16 organisations, blasted the decision at a July 25 press conference in Muzaffarabad (POK).

The irony was that HM Supreme Commander Salahuddin was at the time the chairman of the MJC; so on July 26 the MJC held another press conference and announced the suspension of HM’s membership in the coalition, thus automatically removing Salahuddin from the position of chairman as well. Also on July 26, the Amir of JeI (POK) Abdul Rasheed Turabi disowned the HM declaration and declared that jihad would continue until the liberation of Kashmir. The APHC on the same day held a meeting, presided over by the outgoing JeI (J&K) chairman Syed Ali Shah Geelani and attended by chairman designate Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt. The APHC declared that the HM ceasefire was "precipitous" (or "hasty" according to some translations). It was clear that groups in the MJC and the APHC – apart from HM – were not aware of the ceasefire offer before it was made.

On July 27, Qazi Hussein, at Lahore airport on his return from the US, blasted Dar and Salahuddin as traitors and said that Kashmir issue was neither initiated by a few people nor could "a handful of perpetrators" sabotage it.²⁷ (News media around September 9, 2000 reported that Hussein had taken over direct control of HM, relegating Salahuddin to bring a member of the council to oversee it).

Questions about the HM’s position were referred to their "liaison office" in Islamabad, rather than the headquarters in Muzaffarabad. The HM spokesman started complaining about the Indian position of holding talks under the Constitution of India. This was apparently smoothed out in the intervening days, i.e. July 27-July 31, as efforts to get the talks underway were on in earnest (see following reference to Vajpayee statement, August 7). It must be noted, however, that on July 30, Salahuddin for the first time introduced the condition that the proposed talks must be tripartite, i.e. including Pakistan.

The first blow to prospects for a solution based on the Dar initiative came on July 31: the LeT claimed responsibility for an attack on the Sunderbani Brigade headquarters of the Rashtriya Rifles in Bandipura, northern J&K, with its chief spokesman Abu Usama saying it was in retaliation for HM's ceasefire offer. On the evening of August 1, 31 pilgrims and their porters going to the Hindu holy site of Amarnath were killed at Pahalgam. A second attack at about midnight resulted in the murder of 18 sleeping labourers working at a brick kiln at Mir Bazar, near Qazigund (in Anantnag district of south Kashmir). A third attack in Sindhu Achabal village, also in Anantnag district, left another 9 labourers dead. The fourth attack was in the northern Kupwara district in which seven members of a family of a former militant were killed. The fifth attack was at Konda Pogal Paristan village, in Doda district of Jammu, where the homes of Hindu villagers were surrounded and 11 were mowed down. The sixth attack was also in the same district, with 8 members of a village defence committee killed in Kishtwar. More were to die later from injuries sustained.

Clearly, this was a calculated escalation aimed at derailing the nascent peace process. Nevertheless, the GOI stated that it would pursue the HM ceasefire offer and would not let terrorism succeed in derailing the potential for peace. Formal talks were held for the first time between the GOI, represented by Home Secretary Pandey, and the HM delegates at the heavily guarded Nehru guesthouse at the foothills of Zabarwal on Aug 3. Later, at a press conference, Pandey announced that GOI and HM had formed a committee to implement the modalities of the ceasefire. HM nominated a four-member team led by Khalid Saifullah and the GOI team was to be headed in the committee by Special Secretary (Home) MB Kaushal. On the same day, Salahuddin, speaking from Islamabad, issued an ultimatum that India must agree to tripartite negotiations including Pakistan by Aug 8. This was promptly rejected by India, as it was not part of the unconditional talks envisaged in the original ceasefire offer.

Still, India continued, in the following days, to make positive confidence-building overtures to the HM. On Aug 4, the 4 Rashtriya Rifles unit and a team comprising HM members played a game of cricket at Khipora, in the frontier district of Kupwara, an area had in the past seen bloody encounters between the armed forces and the HM. In this encounter, HM won by 24 runs. No meeting took place between GOI and HM representatives on Aug 5, apparently because HM commanders had to go to the field for an "on-the-spot assessment" of the situation" on the ground.²⁸ it appears that the assessment was favourable, because on Aug 6, although HM claimed the Indian Army had violated the ceasefire in certain places, the group said talks would continue. But no date was set.

Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee went a step further on Aug 7 in an address to the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament). For readers to make their own judgement, extracts of the statement (as provided by the Press Trust of India) are reproduced: "We will talk within the constitutional framework. But while we talk, if certain issues arise outside that framework, as has been happening in the case of Nagaland, would we stop talking? No conditions have been attached to the talks". In other words, the Indian team would negotiate in the constitutional framework, but if extra-constitutional issues arose, the Indian delegation would not stop talking. To make it clear, he added: "Whether talks are held within the Constitution or not is not so important". It is impossible for any democratically-elected leader to go beyond this statement to satisfy the demands of unconditional talks. (It is assumed that an elected government cannot negotiate outside the bounds of its constitution. As such, the expectation that Indian should declare readiness to negotiate outside the constitution was itself a pre-condition, in this case a pre-condition which India fulfilled as fully as possible).

Perhaps what is more important is the fact that Vajpayee's statement came after Salahuddin's ultimatum that Pakistan must be included in the talks. On the same day, Majeed Dar, in his first statement after the ceasefire offer, declared from Srinagar (J&K) that the HM Command Council (based in Muzaffarabad, POK) had been authorised to take a decision on further talks. Although he was critical of the GOI, Dar was subtly assigning responsibility for whatever happened thereafter to the Command Council. it is also noteworthy that Dar, in an interview with the BBC's Urdu Service on the night of Aug 7, declared his wish that the talks should continue, pointing out that the first round of talks had shown "a ray of hope".

The statement by Vajpayee was interpreted in exactly the opposite way - i.e. as a reiteration that India would talk only within the confines of the constitution. The withdrawal of the ceasefire offer was announced at a press conference by Salahuddin. He added: "There would be more escalation and our activities might spill over to other parts of India from Kashmir".²⁹

THE SABOTEURS & THEIR RATIONALE
As soon as it became evident that the ceasefire had collapsed, the governments of both India and Pakistan held each other responsible. Pakistan's broad argument was that India had undermined the nascent peace process by imposing "conditions" - namely, the issue of talks within the Indian constitutional framework.

However, the sequence of events and a reading of the statement by Prime Minister Vajpayee to the Rajya Sabha lent more credence to the Indian argument that the Pakistani leadership was to blame. This reading of the situation was buttressed by the US State Department, which was also clear-cut in its assessment. Spokesman Richard Boucher said on Aug 9: "It's not helpful for the Hizbul Mujahideen to insist on a new condition after the ceasefire and offer of dialogue was announced and accepted by India. Specially, the Aug 8 deadline for tripartite talks, including Pakistan, was added afterwards". The British Foreign Office also deplored the withdrawal of the ceasefire.

It was noted that while the ceasefire was offered in Srinagar, the withdrawal was imposed from Islamabad. There have been numerous reports claiming Salahuddin was under pressure from the ISI to include the condition that Pakistan must be involved in the talks - condition that Pakistani leadership knew India would reject because of New Delhi's stated position that cross-border terrorism must end before talks with Islamabad can be held. Once again, it must be recalled that Salahuddin imposed the condition on July 30, and the killings began on July 31.

Respected Western and Indian analysts have pointed the finger at hardline generals behind Pakistani Chief Executive Musharraf as the main obstacle of the peace talks getting off the ground.³⁰ While the overwhelming media characterisation within Pakistan has been a repetition of the official line, there are rare exceptions bold enough to lay the blame at the door of the Islamists. One example is Brig (Retd) AR Siddiqi who wrote: "While the reported violations of ceasefire after the Hizb's declaration would be normal even under a UN-mandated and manned one, the concerted attack on an Indian army/police camp near Bandipura, on July 31, was the first major attempt at aborting the Hizb ceasefire".³¹

Yet those who choose to exonerate the Pakistani leadership of their responsibility for the collapse of the ceasefire would point to a number of factors which do not, at firs glance, seem to fit into the thesis that Islamabad sabotaged the ceasefire. Why, for instance, did Pakistan initially respond in a moderately positive way to the ceasefire offer? Why did they not criticize it from the beginning if the intention was to sabotage the offer? Further, if their perspective of the ceasefire was negative, why did the Pakistani leadership not prevent the offer from being made in the first place?

To throw some light on these seeming logical inconsistencies and to understand why events developed the way they did, the following questions must be answered.

Was the Pakistan Leadership Aware of the Offer Before it was Made?

It is quite remarkable that in the hours soon after the ceasefire offer by the HM there was no outright criticism from the Pakistani government. It is possible, as the initial response suggests, that at the very least some elements in the leadership assessed that others were aware of the offer before it was made and, therefore, were restrained in their own responses. Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar said that while Pakistani support for Kashmiris was permanent, Islamabad would go along with whatever Kashmiris decided. The initial response of the government was as a posture of reluctant acquiescence (a Pakistani columnist called it "exceedingly altruistic"³²). In any event, the atmosphere in Islamabad was one of doubt and suspicion, with the Pakistani media chipping in on the offer.

There is no indication that the mainstream "secular" political parties (the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party) were aware of the deal or in a position to do anything either positive or negative about it; as such they have remained out of the equation. These parties were initially quite as well, probably hedging their bets in case the government was involved. (But how they reacted later is an indicator of who knew about the deal and who sabotaged it as will be explained later).

This leaves the military establishment and the Jel (Pakistan), which has managed to adapt well to the changes since the Oct 12, 1999 coup. The Jel leader Qazi Hussein was in the US at the time of the ceasefire, and one of the official he met there was the Clinton administration's anti-terrorism chief Michael Sheehan. However, on his return to Pakistan, Qazi Hussein was strongly critical of the "betrayal" by Dar and Salahuddin.

It is quite possible that Qazi Hussein was in on the deal but retained the option to deny any knowledge of it. This is because, given his Islamist credentials, it was virtually impossible for him to support the ceasefire in view of the JeI's domestic political compunctions. Apart from the fact that a collapse of the ceasefire would seriously undermine his personal credibility as well as his future electoral prospects, if he was seen to be involved, Qazi Hussein's association with what was (and still is) seen in Pakistan as a plot orchestrated by the US would have been disastrous for his credentials as a senior Islamic leader.

Moreover, the nature of internecine rivalries among the various radical Islamic members of the MJC necessitated a hardline public stance from Qazi. His main rival within Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) was quick to use the ceasefire as a political weapon against the Qazi Hussein and JeI. Other groups followed suit.

Yet is it hard to swallow the notion that neither JeL (J&K), of which HM is essentially the military wing, nor JeI (Pakistan) was aware of the plans by Dar and Salahuddin. Indeed, there were reports in the Pakistani media that Salahuddin had discussed the issue with the JeI leadership, including Qazi Huseein.³³ Nevertheless, while there is a high probability that the JeI leader was aware of the offer before it was made, there remains the tiny possibility that he was not.

Within the military establishment, it is quite clear that at the very least the Chief Executive Gen Musharraf and the Director General ISI Gen. Mahmood Ahmad had to know about the offer. The DG ISI is in charge of Kashmir and Afghan operations. Very little goes on among the ISI-sponsored groups, including the HM, that the agency does not including the HM, that the agency does not know about. One noted Pakistan columnist put it thus: "Had the Hizb pulled this off on its own, panic buttons would have been pushed in ISI headquarters in Islamabad".³⁴ But would they? Given that the HM inside the Indian side of the LoC wanted the ceasefire, what could the ISI have done to prevent them from going ahead, without triggering internal strife?

In Pakistan's "CEOcracy" it is simply inconceivable that the CEO was not informed of such a major development, as soon as Pak Intelligence found out. The ISI had to be aware of the negotiations between the HM and the Indian RAW, given the extent of cross-border trips undertaken by the HM leaders. Nor could the HM have held a Command Council meeting in Muzaffarabad (POK) without being monitored by the ISI. That ISI allowed Dar to go ahead suggests it was willing, or was obliged, to allow the offer to be made. Based on how events turned out, it may well be that Gen. Ahmad was a reluctant player acting under Musharraf's orders - but this is not certain.

The Pakistani media has reported that the CEO had met secretly with American emissaries with origins in Pakistan (Mansour Ijaz) and Kashmir (Farooq Kathwari).³⁵ Ijaz visited J&K in May, with an escort from RAW and the Indian Army, while Kathwari (whose son was killed in the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad) is also believed to have visited the region this year. It is quite possible that they stopped over in Pakistan as well.

The Pakistani media has reported that the government had ordered, since June 25 or June 27, a no-shoot first policy for its posts on the LoC dividing J&K and POK.³⁶ This would have been impossible without Musharraf's knowledge, and that of Chief of General Staff Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan, but the latter may not have know the precise reason for the policy - or, like DG ISI Gen. Ahmed, may have gone along with it reluctantly up to a point.

Why Musharraf could neither reject the ceasefire, nor allow it to take root.
Having taken power in a coup in October 1999, promising dramatic change, Gen. Musharraf has little to show for it. The economy remains a shambles,³⁷ the anti-corruption drive is running into brick walls especially where army personnel are concerned, foreign policy initiatives have not yielded the desired results, radical Islamic movements have enhanced their domestic political standing and relations with India have markedly worsened - all to the alarm of the big powers. In short, the situation has certainly not noticeably changed for the better from that of the Nawaz Sharif era.

Musharraf has been well aware for some time that, to halt the drift, he needs legitimacy abroad and political space for decision-making at home on economic and social issues. He also knows that is impossible without monetary assistance from IMF and debt rescheduling by the major creditors, both coming up for review before Dec 31, 2000. Washington has not been reluctant to use these levers to apply pressure for movement on issues that concern it, namely Islamabad's reluctance to sign Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the issue of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy and the terrorist Osama Bin Laden, (reportedly a protege of Musharraf) and the level of violence in Kashmir. Indeed, there have even been rumours that the US had threatened rejection of a visa for Musharraf to address the UN General Assembly in September if there was no movement on these issues.

In this environment, being seen to reject the best chances for peace since the Lahore Bus Trip, would have been impossible for Musharraf. Unlike the acts of possibly handing over Bin Laden or signing the CTBT, a ceasefire could always be sabotaged, and hence there was no immediate pressure to be seen to reject it. Pakistani leaders, both military and civilian, are past masters at such tactics - especially in their dealings with the US. The way they are co-operating in the "drug war" ^38-39 by turning over minor players to the US while keeping the processing factories in the North West Frontier Province and on the Afghan side of the Durand Line operating, is one example. Another example is the manner in which terrorists linked to Bin Ladin, several of whom somehow end up in Pakistan, are arrested and turned over to the US while the groups that offer them logistics and training are freely operating in the country.

There is a more generous reading of Musharraf's actions, which is not wholly implausible. Perhaps Musharraf did view the HM ceasefire offer as a possible route to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute in a manner that does not appear to be defeat for Pakistan. However, extending that line of logic leads to a dead end. Musharraf had the leads to a dead end. Musharraf had the opportunity to jump on the ceasefire and bless it, which would have made it impossible for India to NOT invite the newly-friendly TSP to the discussions, at least as an observer. Imagine the headlines: "PAKISTAN SUPPORTS KASHMIR CEASEFIRE PLAN; REQUESTS PARTICIPATION." Musharraf could even have cried for help in rehabilitating all the unemployed jihadis, and the US, if not the IMF, would have weighted in with a few billion dollars to revive the Pakistani economy. It would have been great victory for TSP, since no Indian Prime Minister would have been able to resist the upswell of optimism in India, let alone the world, demanding that the government jump on the opportunity for lasting peace.

Instead what came from the Paksitan Government were weak statements that Pakistan would be pleased if the dispute was settled according to the wishes of the Kashmiris.

A less altruistic motive in allowing the ceasefire proposal to be made, may have been that the HM had become a liability to the ISI. The generals may have allowed the HM to think they were backing the ceasefire proposal, knowing that it would undermine the HM. In this sense, they have succeeded because the collapse of the ceasefire has seriously damaged the credibility of the HM, in favour of groups like the LeT, HuM and JeM. All these are comprised predominantly of non-Kashmiris, while the HM's cadres inside India had no stomach for the continued killings of Kashmiri civilians by the imported mercenary terrorists such as the Let and Harkat ul Ansar. In effect this is a repeat of what happened to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1989, when its pro-independence stance (as opposed to pro-Pakistan) was regarded by the ISI as undesirable. There is irony in the fact that the HM was created in order to marginalise the JKLF.

How was the Ceasefire Sabotaged?
The answer to this question is very simple: the Pakistani military leadership, by errors of omission and commission and finally by deliberate intrigue, ensured that the ceasefire offer by the HM never really had a chance to be implemented.

There were several reasons why the ceasefire was predestined to be stillborn. One is that the other radical groups in the MJC were kept out of the loop. The only people who could have brought them into the loop ahead of the offer was the military establishment. Alternatively, if it was necessary to keep them out of the loop to prevent premature publicity and failure (given these groups' sentiments on the issue), then the military establishment was the only entity that could have controlled their response after the offer was made.

It is clear that the MJC was neither brought into the loop, nor controlled once the ceasefire was announced. There is no indication of even an effort being made to control these groups after HM's ceasefire announcement. On the contrary, various leaders were freely blasting the ceasefire decision as a betrayal. There were both vague and specific threats of an escalation in J&K, which were soon to be carried out. The irony of it was all the more telling because HM Supreme Commander Salahuddin was the chairman of the MJC until July 26, when the HM was expelled from the MJC.

Given the well-publicised agenda of these groups, i.e. jihad in Kashmir until its "liberation", it would be the height of self-delusion to assume that the military establishment for some unknown reasons judged that the MJC would support the ceasefire. And given the track record of the Chief Executive in submitting to the demands of the Islamic parties - often supported by the "bearded generals", notably CGS Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan - it would be the height of optimism to believe that Musharraf felt he could whip the jihadis into line once HM declared the ceasefire.

Equally important, the Pakistani Government did not commit itself to the dialogue process. It took what was essentially a neutral posture, i.e. that it would agree with whatever the Kashmiris wanted. This demonstrated a curious ambivalence about the ceasefire offer, considering that the main plank of the HM is accession to Pakistan, a position it has not rescinded and was not asked to do so by New Delhi. (This in itself is clear cut indication that New Delhi was prepared to work outside constitutional parameters).

In sum, all the developments since the ceasefire was announced point to the strong possibilities that (a) Musharraf had gone along with the budding peace process primarily to satisfy the US, and (b) his key subordinates DG ISI Ahmad and CGS Aziz Khan were reluctant participants, if at all. For Musharraf it was convenient, therefore, that the Mujahideen immediately stepped up their jihad activities in J&K. His purpose had been served. He had appeared to the US as someone willing to compromise on Kashmir, or at least to countenance a peace process which did not involve direct Pakistani involvement to begin with.

The condition that Pakistan be involved in tripartite talks did not come from a government official but from Salahuddin, on July 30, on the sixth day after the ceasefire offer. The massacres in J&K followed on July 31 and Aug 1. These killings seriously affected the generally pro-negotiation public opinion in India, but not enough to derail the process or to give pause for thought to the Vajpayee government. In fact, Vajpayee insisted that government. In fact, Vajpayee insisted that India would not give in to terrorism and the talks would be held; and they were, on Aug 3.

In all probability, this turn of events caused panic among the military leaders in Pakistan, because the Indian response to the massacre of over a 100 people was likely not anticipated. Thus they were forced to show their hand: while the first round of talks were being held between Indian and HM representatives in the Nehru Guest House near Srinagar, the final nail on the coffin of the ceasefire proposal was hammered in, with the issue of an ultimatum from Islamabad by Salahuddin that India must agree to tripartite talks involving Pakistan by Aug 8.

There were reports that, in the meantime, Salahuddin had been put under house arrest by the ISI and that he was under intense pressure to issue the ultimatum. One unconfirmed report said his residential telephones had gone dead and that his house was surrounded by ISI agents.⁴⁰ He then wrote to foreign missions in Pakistan urging them to apply pressure on India to involve Pakistan in the talks. For the first time, Islamabad's Foreign Office joined in by issuing a statement that it must be involved in the talks.

Yet Dar, in Srinagar, until Aug 7 did not insist on Pakistani involvement in the talks. In an interview with the BBC's Urdu Service on Aug 7, he refused to make any statement on Salahuddin's ultimatum saying merely that it would be decided by the Command Council. for his part, Salahuddin avoided giving a direct reply to the BBC when asked why he had to issue the ultimatum while Dar had declared the ceasefire. Hours before the ultimatum expired on Aug 8, the ceasefire was withdrawn by Salahuddin.

Can Pakistan's CEOcracy Survive Peace?

No matter how one cuts it, the developments leading up to and after the ceasefire declaration by the HM suggest that the Pakistani military leadership played a critical role in its collapse. While it could be plausibly argued that Gen. Musharraf was genuinely interested in positive movement on the Kashmir question, and that the real saboteurs (in varying degrees) are CGS Gen.Aziz Khan and DG ISI Ahmad, one should remember that Pakistan is not a democracy, but a military dictatorship. Some recent developments in Pakistan might indicate dissent and suspicion in the senior Army officer corps, notably the reshuffle at the highest ranks of the military. Both Gen.Aziz Khan and Gen. Ahmad have been shifted.

However, the authors of this paper do not believe that to be the case. There is every possibility that the reshuffle may, once again be designed more to buttress the military government's image building exercise in the US; note that the reshuffle was effected just five days before Musharraf's departure for the UN General Assembly gathering of heads of state in the US. While there has reportedly been a growing rift in recent months between Gen. Aziz and Gen. Musharraf, there is not yet sufficient evidence to suggest that they have come to the point of a serious rivalry. On the other hand, the reshuffle on the eve of a foreign trip, might just be insurance against the possibility of a coup: Musharraf himself came to power through a coup.

It is important to note that the relationship that Musharraf has with both Aziz and Ahmad goes back many years. There is also room to doubt the general perception that Musharraf is far more liberal than the pro-Islamic Aziz. While Aziz is certainly regarded as the "Mullahs' general"⁴¹, Musharraf is by no means Pakistan's "Ataturk", at least in religious matters. His frequent and vigorous defence of jihad - a term equated with terrorism in West - should be a pointer in this direct. He was also known to be particularly close in the 1990s to the HuM (formally Harkat ul Ansar), a group labeled as a terrorist organisation by the US.

Moreover, Musharraf has replaced Aziz as CGS with Gen. Mohammad Yousaf, someone who is of the same mould. Both Aziz and Yousaf are known to detest the media glare, and both have identical views on security and internal affairs. The two men also had an affinity for the deceased dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq as well as for former ISI chief Gen. Hamid Gul, whose anti-India and anti-US views are well known. Yousaf and Aziz are also said to be equally close to Musharraf.⁴²Yet it cannot be ruled bout that a rift is developing between Aziz and Musharraf, perhaps partly because the latter appears more sensitive to US perceptions than the outgoing CGS. If the reshuffle and Aziz's posting as Corps Commander at Lahore is the result of that rivalry, than it means the first blow has been struck by Musharraf. Whether this will develop into something more confrontational remains to be seen.

Ultimately, the Pakistan military acted to prevent peace. They may well have remained silent at the beginning to see if India walked into the trap of committing to talks, then being forced to call them off by a set of vicious attacks on civilians. When India refused to derail the talks, even after the massacres, this scheme, like Musharraf's elaborate Kargil invasion, unraveled in disarray. New conditions were imposed: first that India agree to discuss items outside its Constitution, then the naked "ultimatum" to include Pakistan in the talks, followed by a hasty repudiation of the ceasefire.

Why is the Pak military afraid of peace? The answer is obvious. With its economy essentially destroyed, its middle class reduced to seeking construction jobs, and its youth unemployed and undereducated, Pakistan depends on the arms, drugs and bigotry trades to bring wealth to its leaders. Money collected by the terrorist organisations from the drug trade in the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe and the US forms the bulk of the Pakistani economy, running into billions spent each year. This compares with Pakistan's total foreign exchange reserves, reported to be under $500 million in late August 2000.

The recent circus performance by its government, where they advetised rules for public sales of nuclear, radioactive material and equipment, is an example of the chaotic nature of economic decision making in Pakistan today. Peace in Kashmir would destroy the raison d'etre of Pakistan in generals in particular.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

• The ceasefire originated in the India-based wing of the HM, while was in touch with the people of Kashmir. Their "grassroots survey" told them that support for terrorist violence was very low among the people, and they saw their chances of ever entering the mainstream of political power in India disappearing. The release of Ahsan Dar, originator of HM, may be relevant to the issue of how the local personnel of the HM were persuaded.

• Salahuddin, the commander of the Kashmiri faction of the HM inside POK, was persuaded by his India-based operations commander Majeed Dar and some of his subordinates to agree to a ceasefire and talks. He had no choice, because he depends on the support of these commanders to maintain his position as nominal head of the HM, in the face of stiff competition from the Punjabi faction.

• The GOI had known of the impending ceasefire offer for a long time, with RAW having played, and continuing to play a big role in the negotiations with various parties.

• The ceasefire with the local wings of the HM may still be in force. Those who offered the ceasefire have not outright rejected it, and several of their followers may well have surrendered on Indian Army units. Reports of killing of HM fighters in J&K in recent weeks are mostly the results of actions against a few HM units that opposed the ceasefire.

• Rivalries and power struggles in terrorist movement have come out in the open, as JeI (POK) has taken direct control of the POK wing of HM.

• The Musharraf government found out too late to head off the ceasefire announcement. Having realised that a ceasefire had been announced, they expressed cautions, noncommittal support for "the will of the Kashmiris" (not Pakistan's own support for the peace process), even as they set the wheels in motion for the brutal massacres that followed.

• More than 130 innocent civilians died, and thousands more may did, because Musharraf, his military and the Jihad cannot afford to have the peace while ceasefire would bring.

As a final remark, the authors wish to point out that there is one basic assumption in this paper, i.e. that Musharraf knew about the ceasefire offer before it was made. However, it is important to note that even if somehow, against all understanding of the way in which the Pakistani military establishment operates, he was surprised by the HM offer, the analysis of who killed the nascent peace process still stands. The only difference would be that in the case of foreknowledge the abortion of the ceasefire is equivalent to premeditated murder.

Courtesy: BR Monitor, Vol 3(2), Sep-Oct 2000.

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Table 1: Chronology of Events Related to the Hizb ul Mujahideen Ceasefire