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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 29, February 3, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Uncertain Truce
Guest Writer: Yubaraj
Ghimire in Kathmandu
Editor, Kantipur
It has been
a time of the most extraordinary developments in Nepal.
First, the cold blooded murder of Nepal's Armed Police Force
(APF) Chief Krishna Mohan Shrestha was unlike any other
incident of violence that this Himalayan kingdom has witnessed
during the Maoist
insurgency that has plagued it for the past seven
years. The APF was raised two years ago to combat the 'Maoist
terrorists', much against the rebels' protests, as the Government
felt that the civil police was not adequately trained to
counter the guerrillas. Shrestha (56) was silenced with
a burst of bullets in his face, along with his wife Nudup
Shrestha, a teacher in the prestigious Lincoln School. His
bodyguard, Surya Regmi, also died in the attack during Shrestha's
routine morning walk on January 26, 2003. The message that
raced across the country was that the Maoists were now going
to target individuals occupying high positions in the capital,
and that the Maoists had clearly abandoned the option for
a dialogue.
In an apparently dramatic reversal, however, the killing
of one of the most respected men in uniform was followed
by an announcement by the Government and the Maoists on
Wednesday, January 29, that a cease-fire would be observed
to facilitate the commencement of a peace process. The government
readily agreed to remove Maoists off the list of terrorist
organizations, and to erase reward fixed on heads of certain
Maoist leaders. The government would also notify the international
community, including INTERPOL, that the red-corner notices
issued against some Maoist leaders should be annulled.
Just before the ceasefire announcement, Norway had offered
to mediate in the conflict if both sides sought its role,
at the same time threatening a drastic cut in assistance
if the prevailing violence endangered the country's fledgling
democracy. The sudden truce and possible dialogue, however,
remain essentially a bilateral domestic effort at present.
The sudden ceasefire, which generated astonishment, disbelief
and euphoria all at once, was engineered by Narayan Singh
Pun, Minister for Physical Planning in the present Government.
A retired colonel of the Nepal Army and a pilot, Pun also
runs a private airline service. He belongs to the same ethnic
background as the most admired and feared guerrilla commander,
Ram Bahadur Thapa alias Badal, as well as most guerrillas
from Maoist ruled pockets of mid-west Nepal. His army background
puts him in the category whose loyalty to the king and the
security forces cannot be suspect. "I had series of deliberations
with Maoist supremo Prachanda and with Badal," Pun disclosed
soon after the two sides announced the cease-fire, "We all
agreed that sovereignty and nationalism have to be saved
at any cost, and that peace was the best instrument to achieve
this."
A measure of skepticism, however, still prevails. The past
experience with cease-fires and dialogues has not been very
encouraging. Even before Sher Bahadur Deuba took the oath
of office following his election to the post of Prime Minister
way back in July 2001, the Maoists agreed to his proposal
for a cease-fire and a peace initiative "in deference to
the people's will". This was followed by three rounds of
talks between the two sides in which neither sides conceded
anything. The Maoists walked out of the negotiating table
in November and struck terror when its armed guerrillas
successfully raided a military barracks in Dang (western
Nepal), killing more than a dozen Army personnel and officers
and capturing the armoury of sophisticated arms and ammunitions
in what was, till that time, the first such attack on an
Army establishment. The state retaliated swiftly, bringing
the country under a state of emergency that lasted nearly
nine months, and deployed joint units of the Army, the APF
and the police to combat Maoists. The Maoists were also
branded terrorists thereafter and the 9/11 incidents in
the US brought them and their possible terrorist links under
microscopic observation by the US and its allies in the
'Global War against Terror'. The international community
promised more aid and military support (in terms of hardware,
logistics and training) to the Government of Nepal in its
fight against 'terrorism'. India, the US and Belgium have
already supplied weapons to the security forces. The seven
year long conflict, which witnessed the most intense and
mindless killings by the warring sides, has so far claimed
over 7,500 lives. The Maoists have forced the closure of
nearly three thousand schools all over the country through
'extortion terror' in some places, and by killing or threatening
teachers in others. Reports of large-scale recruitment of
children have been denied by the top Maoist leadership,
but there is hard evidence corroborated by the victims of
such 'abduction and forced recruitment'. The post-Emergency
phase also witnessed the gratuitous destruction of the country's
physical infrastructures, including drinking water projects,
for which the Maoists have now expressed remorse and pledged
not to repeat such acts.
Launched in 1996 February, the Maoist movement initially
envisaged a 'republic of Nepal'. But Maoists now appear
keen on an elected Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution,
which could allow the constitutional monarchy and an all
party government to remain in place if the negotiation results
in luring the Maoists into the fold of main-stream politics.
At this stage, however, such an outcome remains quite doubtful.
Another widespread apprehension is whether the Maoists are
going to use the present truce to rebuild their organisational
and communication networks which have been substantially
destroyed during the Emergency, to strike again once they
have recovered.
Most Maoist leaders fled the country during the Emergency,
most likely across the open border with India. The menace
of the guerillas within the country, however, did not diminish.
They ravaged half a dozen District Headquarters, moving
gradually closer to the capital. IGP Shrestha's assassination
last week was proof and a message that the capital was no
longer safe from terror-strikes.
The truth is, what Maoists have been able to do has largely
been made possible by the confusion among the country's
political parties and their growing confrontation with the
King. On October 4, 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his government, on grounds
of 'incompetence' when Deuba sought to defer Elections to
the House of Representatives a year beyond the scheduled
date in November 2002. Deuba had argued that elections were
not possible in view of the widespread Maoist terror and
the violence unleashed by them in different parts of the
country. Deuba had, in fact, been advised by all political
parties to seek postponement of the Elections, as the democratic
formations in the country were not in a position to field
candidates and to mount an election campaign for fear that
the Maoists would target them. The Maoists, in short, held
the key even to the parliamentary elections.
The King nominated Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the Prime Minister
a week after Deuba's dismissal, tasking him with the creation
of a 'conducive atmosphere for elections at the earliest'.
A weak and timid Chand, however, may not have been the right
person for this daunting assignment. Minister Narayan Singh
Pun appears to have 'saved his reputation', though it is
too early to say that the Prime Minister's chair is safe.
Political parties who have been crying themselves hoarse
and calling for the rectification of the 'unconstitutional
move' of October 4, 2002, have not yet recognised the legitimacy
of the Chand government. A negotiation with the Maoists,
which keeps other political forces out of the scene would,
consequently, just be a 'deal between the state's Army and
the rebel forces', and the political parties fear that the
consequences of such a deal would be disastrous for democracy.
Even Pun concurs: "All of us have to be party to this national
task."
Whether such a participatory approach will be encouraged
by the King, who is now at the actual helm of affairs, will
largely decide whether the present ceasefire and the anticipated
peace process can result in a durable peace.
Tripura: A Bloody
Prelude to Elections
Guest Writer: Sekhar
Datta in Agartala
Principal Correspondent, TheTelegraph
The massacre
of eleven non-tribal civilians in the night preceding India's
54th Republic day celebrations revived memories of the bloody
run-up to the 1988 assembly election in the north eastern
State of Tripura. Once again, the prelude to the assembly
elections slated for February 26 promises to be a violent,
blood-soaked affair, in keeping what has become the 'tradition'
in Tripura over the past two decades.
Pre-election insurgent violence had first rocked the state
in December 1982, weeks before the Assembly Elections of
January 5, 1983. That was the heyday of the erstwhile Tribal
National Volunteer (TNV) militants led by Bijay Kumar Hrangkhawal,
the key man behind the tribal insurgency in Tripura and
a prime accused in the ethnic carnage of June 1980. Shortly
after the riots, Hrangkhawal bought peace with the Left
Front Government through the then Chief Minister, Nripen
Chakraborty, and was living a happy family life at his residence
at Kamalacherra in Dhalai district, after receiving generous
government bounties. However, his erstwhile followers kidnapped
Hrangkahwal and his family in August 1982, forcing him to
lead the renewed insurgency in Tripura. The killer squads
of the TNV had chosen the eve of the 1983 Assembly polls
to pull off a series of ambushes on the security forces,
including one on the escort vehicle of legendary tribal
leader and former chief minister Dasharath Deb of the Communist
Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M), and a succession of attacks
on civilians as well. 'Greater things' were, however, to
follow.
Before the 1988 Assembly Elections, the erstwhile TNV insurgents
got in touch with the Congress party led Central Government
headed by prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, through the then
Mizoram chief minister Lalthanhawala, for a settlement of
the problem through negotiations. In reply to the TNV's
letter delivered by Lalthanhawala, the then Union Home Minister,
Buta Singh, had categorically said that unless a Congress-led
government was installed in Tripura, the Centre would not
take any initiative on peace talks. An implicit arrangement
appears to have been reached at this stage, and was followed
by an unprecedented bloodbath, as groups of TNV insurgents
massacred a record 102 non-tribals in a series of attacks
all over the State during the week preceding the Election
of February 2. The State had also come under the Disturbed
Areas Act on January 29, three days ahead of the polls,
which also witnessed a majority (non-tribal) backlash, and
lead to the installation of a Congress - Tripura Upjati
Juba Samiti (TUJS) coalition government by a wafer-thin
majority of 31-29 in the sixty-member Assembly. A few months
before the tripartite Peace Accord was signed in Delhi on
August 12, 1988, ending the TNV's insurgency, the entire
correspondence between the TNV and the Central Government
was published in an Aizawl-based daily newspaper in Mizoram.
The Congress Government, which still held sway over Delhi,
had to swallow a bitter pill even as the CPI (M)'s central
leadership launched an orchestrated tirade over the 'unholy
TNV-Congress nexus'.
For its part, the CPI (M) or, more correctly, the Left Front
retaliated in kind by floating the All Tripura Tribal Force
(ATTF)
in May 1990, ostensibly in order to protect the tribal-compact
areas under the Autonomous District Council (ADC) from encroachment
by non-tribals under the sponsorship of the ruling Congress-TUJS
combine, as well as to prevent mass rigging in the Elections.
After coming to power in February 1988, the Congress-TUJS
resorted to organised rigging to capture an Assembly seat
in a by-election in April that year, both the Lok Sabha
(Lower House of Parliament) seats in the State in the Elections
of December 1989. The ruling combine also dissolved, by
administrative order, all the elected panchayats (village
councils) and municipalities, and was preparing to rig the
election to the Autonomous District Council (ADC), which
held the key to political supremacy in tribal areas, scheduled
for July 1990. This, apparently, was why the CPI (M) leadership
decided to float its own militant front.
Thus formed, the ATTF selectively targeted Congress-TUJS
leaders and workers throughout the coalition Government's
rule till March 1993, and through the run-up to the Assembly
Elections of April 3, 1993, after a brief spell of President's
rule. The ATTF surrendered en masse on September 6 that
year, within five months of the installation of the fourth
Left Front government in the State, headed by Dasharath
Deb. A nucleus of the group led by Ranjit Debbarma, however,
remained underground and continues to operate under the
marginally changed banner of All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).
The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT),
initially comprising a group of surrendered commanders of
the TNV, had been launched in April 1989, and continues
to operate even now with the vague demand for a 'free holy
land of Tripura'. During the run-up to the assembly elections
held on February 16, 1998, the ATTF had pulled off a series
of killings, particularly in the CPI-M dominated Khowai
subdivison, and subsequently, in the Lok Sabha polls of
October 1999, both the ATTF and the NLFT carried out a series
of murderous operations against civilians and security forces.
It is now clear from all indications that these militant
groups - both banned since 1997 - particularly the NLFT,
will play a key role in the forthcoming Election.
The ATTF, in its new incarnation, continues to pay lip service
to its sole political demand: deportation of all non-tribals
settled in Tripura after October 15, 1949, when the State
merged with the Indian Union. The group has issued a call
for the boycott of the impending polls. On the other hand,
NLFT rebels have been actively campaigning for a Congress
- Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT) victory.
(The INPT is headed by former TNV leader, Bijay Kumar Hrangkhawal).
In the rural interior, gun-toting NLFT militants hold small
meetings to intimidate voters into supporting INPT candidates.
According to CPI-M State secretariat member Gautam Das,
they have also threatened at least one CPI-M candidate,
Nakshatra Jamatya, in the Ampi constituency of south Tripura,
with dire consequences unless he withdrew from the polls.
Das asserted that, in parts of Ampi, Kanchanpur, Chhawmanu,
Takarjala and Raima Valley constituencies spread over all
four districts of the State, CPI-M candidates were finding
it impossible to visit and approach voters as a result of
NLFT intimidation. The NLFT's refrain in its public meetings
in the villages is that the security forces deployed for
the Elections would not stay for long, and those who did
not vote for the INPT would be liquidated after the forces
go back. On the other hand, though the Left Front insists
that there will be 'no repetition of 1988' and of the ADC
polls of 2000, the pre-poll scenario clearly suggests possibilities
of large-scale violence.
During the ADC polls of 2000, NLFT rebels had actively campaigned
for candidates of the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura
(IPFT, now part of the INPT), intimidating voters and abducting
several CPI-M candidates and their relatives. As a result,
the IPFT snatched a neat majority in the 28 member Autonomous
District Council (ADC). Exactly what happened during the
ADC polls can best be seen in the fact that the erstwhile
TUJS, an established tribal-based regional party since June
1967, was forced to opt out of the contest because of threats
and intimidation from the NLFT and its overground agents.
Current evidence suggests that the militant group is trying
to re-enact the drama that preceded the ADC polls, using
the same tactics.
Having already lost more than two hundred party leaders
and workers to the NLFT's bullets over the past few years,
the CPI-M led Left Front has tried to strengthen security
in the hilly interior areas by setting up more than a hundred
new camps manned by the Tripura State Rifles (TSR) to prevent
movement of NLFT guerrillas. Whether this will be sufficient
to cope with the emerging situation remains to be seen,
as the NLFT is also desperate for a Congress-INPT victory,
which it views as a passport to an honourable settlement
of the insurgency through negotiations. The ongoing peace-talks
between the government of India and the National Socialist
Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
leaders has made their condition the more desperate, since
the NLFT has always looked towards the NSCN, not only for
inspiration and moral support, but for material backing
in the form of arms and ammunition as well. Once the NSCN
reaches a settlement with the Government, groups like the
NLFT will be in dire straits.
Over the past years, both the ATTF and the NLFT have spurned
repeated appeals made by Chief Minister Manik Sarkar to
enter into negotiations and 'join the mainstream'. Shortly
after the ADC polls of year 2000, the NLFT also rejected
a proposal for surrender to the Assam Rifles Colonel A.K.
Sachdeb. Informed sources indicate that the NLFT is banking
heavily on a Congress-INPT victory for an honourable way
out of their jungle life. The only way this can be secured
is is by engineering a total polarisation on ethnic lines
and by strong-arm tactics in the twenty tribal reserve assembly
constituencies.
As for the ATTF - the group thought to be soft on the Left
Front - its cadres are likely to indulge in violence in
their areas of hegemony in the Sadar (North) and parts of
Khowai subdivision to enforce their call for a boycott of
the Elections. Official sources say the ATTF was 'not soft
on the Left Front or any other front, but they will never
want to do anything that will help their arch rivals, the
NLFT.' The dissident NLFT group led by Nayanbasi Jamatya
also has pockets of control in parts of Takarjala, Golaghati
and Charilam constituencies under Bishalgarh subdivision,
and they are also likely engage in violence during the run-up
to the polls. The Nayanbasi group of the NLFT is yet to
clarify its stand vis-à-vis the Elections, but they are
also likely to issue a boycott call with an expected impact
on some Assembly constituencies in west Tripura in the form
of violence and disruption of electoral processes.
Mounting Tensions
over Illegal Migrants and Terror Bases
Sanjay K. Jha
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Tensions
between India and Bangladesh have mounted over attempts
by India's Border Security Force (BSF) to deport a number
of Bangladeshis who have been staying illegally in India.
The Bangladesh government maintains that the alleged illegal
migrants are Indian citizens, and has consistently maintained
that 'there are no Bangladeshis in India'. Dakha now insists
that India is just trying to throw out Bengali-speaking
Muslims from their country by branding them Bangladeshi
migrants. At a weekly press briefing in Dhaka on January
30, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Shamsher Mobin Choudhary
said that, since January 22, 2003, the BSF has made 30 'push-in
attempts' through several border points into Bangladeshi
territory. The Bangladesh government also issued an aide
memoire regarding repeated 'push-in attempts' to the Indian
Deputy High Commissioner in Dhaka.
The Indian government, on the other hand, has rejected as
'baseless and absurd' the allegation that India was trying
to push in Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims into Bangladesh.
Speaking to media persons in Delhi on February 1, 2003,
the Director General of the BSF, Ajai Raj Sharma, rejected
the charges and asserted that it was 'established practice'
that, whenever police took action against them, the migrants
were taken to the borders, and the BSF 'handed them over'
to Bangladesh. The Indian Government has asked Bangladesh
to recognize the gravity of the problem of illegal immigration
and to cooperate in tackling the issue. On January 30, 2003,
the Indian Government summoned Bangladesh's Acting Deputy
High Commissioner to New Delhi, Shahadat Hussain, and conveyed
to him Indian concerns over "illegal immigration of Bangladeshi
nationals into India".
Amidst these allegations and counter allegations, tension
continues to mount at several border points, particularly
in the State of West Bengal. On January 31, 2003, for instance,
the BSF intercepted 213 Bangladeshis forcibly pushed in
by the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) into India at Satgachi outpost
in West Bengal's Coochbehar district. Since then these Bangladeshis
are squatting on the zero line at the Indian side, exposed
to rain and the exceptional chill of this year's winter.
A BSF spokesperson at Kolkata disclosed on February 1, 2003,
that the BDR had conspired to infiltrate Bangladeshi nationals
into India, and that such movements had been occurring along
both the southern and northern frontiers over the preceding
10 days.
The current crisis is the manifestation of fundamental differences
between the two countries over critical issues such as illegal
migration and the use of Bangladeshi territory for terrorist
and subversive activities against India. In the recent past,
there has been a growing realization within the Indian establishment
that the threat posed by illegal migration and terrorist
and extremist Islamist groups operating from or within Bangladesh
had serious security implications for India. At the end
of the two-day meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Working
Group in Dhaka on January 23, 2003, India had conveyed its
concerns over the presence in Bangladesh of training camps
of terrorist groups operating in India's Northeast (and
had earlier identified 99 such camps and their location).
India also asked Bangladesh to hand over 88 prominent insurgent
leaders currently living in Bangladesh. Earlier on January
7, 2003, India's Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, during
a conference of Chief Secretaries and Directors General
of Police in Delhi, observed that there were approximately
15 million Bangladeshis staying illegally in India, and
that they posed a serious threat to the country's internal
security. It was during this meeting that it was decided
that the identification and deportation of foreigners staying
in India illegally was to be assigned the highest priority.
To facilitate the process, the meeting agreed that the Government
would launch the Multi-purpose Identity Cards scheme as
a pilot project in 13 States from April 1, 2003.
India's porous 4,095-kilometre border with Bangladesh is
prone to large-scale illegal immigration, smuggling, drug
trafficking, gun running and cross-filtration by terrorists.
Unofficial estimates put the number of illegal Bangladeshi
immigrants even higher than the official figure, and there
is clear evidence of the demographic destabilization of
a large swathe of territory all along the Indo-Bangladesh
border. One estimate assesses the illegal influx at about
300,000 persons per year. Demographic transformations have
been brought about in the border belts of West Bengal, Bihar,
Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya as a result of largescale migration,
and according to one estimate, illegal immigrants are in
a position to influence the electoral outcome in 25 Parliamentary
and 125 Assembly constituencies in the country. Apart from
illegal immigration, the porous India-Bangladesh border
also fuels smuggling, the drug trade and proliferation of
small arms. Available evidence suggests a collusive network
between smugglers, a section of illegal migrants and terrorist
groups operating in India's Northeast. However, the most
serious threat to India's security is the increasing use
of the Indo-Bangladesh border by Pakistan's external intelligence
agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), for its larger
design to destabilize India through a range of subversive
movements.
The Indian Government has, on a number of occasions, stated
that the ISI makes direct use of Bangladeshi territory to
infiltrate its agents and saboteurs across the border into
India, and that it is assisted in this task by the Directorate
General of Field Intelligence (DGFI) and other state agencies
of Bangladesh. Speaking in the Lok Sabha (the Lower House
of Parliament), on November 27, 2002, India's External Affairs
Minister, Yashwant Sinha, had explicitly stated that the
Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka had become the nerve
center of ISI activities in promoting terrorism and insurgency
in India. He also asserted that "Some Al Qaeda elements
have taken shelter in Bangladesh… the foreign media has…
reported several such instances, our own sources have also
confirmed many of these reports."
A number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, including
the Al
Qaeda, are now known to have established a presence
in Bangladesh in alliance with various militant fundamentalist
organisations there. The Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh
(HuJI-BD)
was created with direct aid from Osama
bin Laden in 1992. The group has linkages with
Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT).
It also maintains very close links with the ISI. Reports
also suggest that the ISI, in collaboration with the Directorate
General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and extremist Islamist
groups, has networked and coordinates activities with insurgent
groups in India's Northeast and Islamist extremist elements
in Bangladesh. India's list of 99 terrorist training camps
in Bangladesh includes the facilities provided to groups
such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT),
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)
and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).
The current Bangladesh National Party (BNP) government,
led by Begum Khaleda Zia has been insisting that her government
would not allow anti-India activities from its soil. However,
the internal political situation in the country provides
a favourable context for Islamist groups to operate. Since
the elections of October 2001, and the installation of the
new right wing regime, backed by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami
(JeI), Islamist extremist mobilisation has also risen dramatically.
The militant and pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami has 17 elected
members in the Bangladesh Parliament and two Ministers in
the new Government. The JeI also receives support from the
ISI, which includes funding arms flows, and technical and
training support. The current regime in Bangladesh, moreover,
is regarded as being much 'closer' to Pakistan than its
predecessor, and the linkages between the Bangladesh Army
and intelligence apparatus, on the one hand, and their Pakistani
counterparts, on the other, are known to be strong, and
growing stronger.
It is, consequently, not surprising that Bangladesh refuses
to acknowledge the presence of very large numbers of its
citizens staying illegally in India, or to accept the covert
subversive activities directed against India from Bangladeshi
soil. In the past, successive Indian governments have been
slow to act decisively on these issues due to the electoral
compulsions of political parties at the helm of affairs
at the Centre and in the affected States. Although it would
be premature to say that the current engagement with Bangladesh
is part of a comprehensive strategy to deal with the issue
of illegal migration and use of Bangladeshi territory for
anti-India activities, the preliminary steps in this direction
appear now to have been taken. Policy reversal, however,
can never entirely be ruled out in the habitual vacillation
of the Indian political leadership, and an unconfirmed media
report, citing intelligence sources, indicated on February
1 that a truckload of illegal migrants, who were being transported
to West Bengal for deportation to Bangladesh, were already
on their way back to Delhi.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in
South Asia
January 27-February
02, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
INDIA
|
13
|
8
|
27
|
48
|
Assam
|
5
|
0
|
3
|
8
|
Jammu &
Kashmir
|
6
|
3
|
18
|
27
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
4
|
2
|
6
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Mumbai
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
3
|
25
|
28
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
India
asks government to hand over 88 wanted
terrorists: At the recently concluded
meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Working Group (JWG) in Dhaka, India
asked Bangladesh to hand over 88 Indian
terrorists currently living in that
country, media sources reported on January
29, 2003. The list includes Sanjiv Debbarma
of the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF),
and Anup Chetia and Paresh Barua of
the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA). Turning them in would send a
clear message to all terrorists that
Bangladesh does not welcome anti-India
activities on its soil, India said.
It also asked Bangladesh to shut down
terrorist training camps in that country.
Times
of India, January 29,
2003.
INDIA
Naxalites
set ablaze four police personnel in Chhattisgarh:
Four police personnel including a company
commander, were burnt alive when left-wing extremists
- Naxalites - of the People's War Group (PWG)
set ablaze a private bus near Basagura in the
Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh on February
2, 2003. Indian
Express, February 3, 2003.
Terrorists kill editor in Srinagar, J&K:
The editor of a local news agency, News
and Feature Alliance (NAFA), Parvaz Mohammad
Sultan, was shot dead by an unidentified terrorist
at his office-cum-residence in Press Enclave
in Srinagar, capital of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
on January 31, 2003. According to official sources,
Parvaz Sultan, a resident of Bijbehara, was
also editing the prominent Ikhwani (counter-insurgent)
Javed Shah's Urdu daily, Wattan, for over a
year and also contributing to the Congress party's,
Qaumi Awaz, and some vernacular newspapers.
A media report said that NAFA had been prominently
carrying reports of the internal feud in the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) group for the last two
weeks. These reports had mentioned that the
Valley-based faction led by senior Hizb functionary,
Abdul Majeed Dar, had now overthrown the Pakistan-based
faction of Syed Salahuddin. No terrorist group
has claimed responsibility for the assassination
thus far. Daily
Excelsior, February 1, 2003.
All Tripura Tiger Force gives poll-boycott
call in Tripura: A media report of January
28, 2003, said that the proscribed All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF) has asked the public to boycott
the February 26 Legislative Assembly polls in
Tripura. The outfit in a statement reportedly
said, "Anyone violating the poll boycott would
face dire consequences." Sentinel
Assam, January 30, 2003.
NEPAL
Government,
Maoist insurgents announce truce; Talks to commence
soon: In a signed statement sent to media
houses in Nepal on January 29, 2003, Maoist
insurgents' leader 'comrade' Prachanda announced
a cease-fire and said he was ready for negotiations
with the government. He disclosed that the government
had agreed to pre-conditions for talks, including
de-listing the insurgents as terrorists, lifting
Interpol Red Corner notices, forming an interim
government and halting all offensives against
the insurgents. After a Cabinet meeting, the
government said that a truce has been agreed
upon and Minister for Physical Planning, Narayan
Singh Pun, would be the government's co-ordinator
at the talks. Nepal
News, January 30, 2003.
PAKISTAN
28 Pakistanis
arrested in Italy for suspected Al Qaeda links: The Italian
police arrested 28 Pakistanis from an apartment in central Naples
on January 29, 2003, for suspected links to the Al Qaeda. Police
arrested all the 28 persons staying in the apartment after finding
800 grams of explosives, 70 metres of fuse and various electronic
detonators hidden behind a false wall. "The men have been arrested
and charged with association with international terrorism, illegal
possession of explosive material, falsification of documents
and receiving stolen goods," a statement from the Naples police
headquarters said. Religious texts, photos of Jehad martyrs,
false documents, maps of the Naples area, addresses of contacts
around the world and more than 100 mobile telephones were also
found in the apartment, police said. An unnamed judicial source
was quoted as saying in a report that the maps had various targets
marked out on them, including the headquarters of NATO's southern
European command, the US consulate in Naples and a US naval
base at Capodichino. Jang,
February 1, 2003.
US designates Lashkar-e-Jhangvi as Foreign Terrorist Organisation:
The United States said on January 30, 2003, that it had
designated the Pakistani sectarian group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. The LeJ, alleged to have
links with the Al Qaeda, has been named as a suspect in the
abduction-cum-murder in Pakistan of US journalist Daniel Pearl.
A Bulletin from the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued
by the State Department confirmed putting LeJ, a Sunni group
already proscribed in Pakistan, as an entity on the terrorist
bodies' list. "Today I am taking another important step in our
campaign to eliminate the scourge of terrorism… I am designating
the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under
US law. The Government of Pakistan has already designated the
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi a terrorist organisation, and we look forward
to working with Pakistani authorities to shut this group down,"
said Secretary of State Colin Powell. Nation,
January 31, 2003.
21 HuM terrorists freed in Peshawar on NWFP Chief Minister's
orders: According to a media report, 21 arrested terrorists
of the proscribed Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) were released on
January 30, 2003, following North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
Chief Minister Akram Khan Durrani's expression of displeasure
at their detention. They were released at Dera Ismail Khan city,
200 miles south of Peshawar. The NWFP Chief Secretary Shakil
Durrani, on behalf of the Chief Minister, ordered the immediate
release of the terrorists, who had been arrested on January
28 by the Dera police. The HuM is reportedly operating under
a new group name - Jamiaat-ul-Ansaar. Daily
Times, January 31, 2003.
Osama bin Laden is dead but no proof, says President Musharraf:
President Pervez Musharraf was quoted as saying in an interview
with Panorama, an Italian magazine, that his intelligence services
believe Osama bin Laden is dead, but they have no proof. "It's
an assessment, not a proven proof," Musharraf was quoted as
saying. "It's a guess of my intelligence services. With all
the bombing taken place (in Afghanistan), bin Laden could not
be roaming around with 100 bodyguards for a long time. Furthermore
he is tall and recognizable," he added. Musharraf while ruling
out the possibility that bin Laden could be in Pakistan, said,
"If he is alive, he is in Afghanistan." Jang,
January 31, 2003.
|
Political activists killed in Tripura
by NLFT and ATTF,
January 1, 2002 to February 2, 2003
|
Outfit
|
Political
activist killed
|
2002 |
NLFT |
31
|
|
ATTF |
3
|
Total |
34
|
2003 |
NLFT |
18
|
|
ATTF |
2
|
Total |
20
|
*
|
NLFT
= National Liberation Front of Tripura; ATTF = All Tripura
Tiger Force
|
*
|
Compiled
from English language media sources.
|
|
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