ASSESSMENT

NEPAL

Tentative Progress on Negotiations
Guest Writer: Deepak Thapa
Kathmandu-based Journalist and Editor

It seemed like the event of the season when a five-member negotiating team of the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) made its first public appearance on March 29, 2003. The wide street outside the Birendra International Convention Centre in Kathmandu, the venue of a Press Conference by the team, was packed with hundreds of media persons and expectant onlookers, and with good reason too. This was to be the first time in seven years that the country was going to see and hear Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the architect/urban planner-turned-revolutionary, who is a member of the standing committee of the CPN-M's politbureau and convenor of the United Revolutionary People's Council of Nepal (URPC), which has been called the 'embryonic Central People's Government Organising Committee', i.e. the Maoist government that is to supplant the existing order.

Dr. Bhattarai is leading a high-powered team formed a few days after the ceasefire announcement between the government and the Maoists on January 29, 2003. The other members of the team are Ram Bahadur Thapa, member of the standing committee of the politbureau; Krishna Bahadur Mahara, politbureau member and vice-chairman of the URPC; Dev Gurung, politbureau member and secretary of URPC; and Matrika Prasad Yadav, alternative politbureau member.

Ever since it was announced, the composition of the Maoist delegation had given hope that - unlike the previous occasion in 2001 when a four-month-long ceasefire was spent in just sizing up each other - the rebels are serious about dialogue this time around. A more powerful group would be well-nigh impossible to assemble short of including the CPN-M chairman, Prachanda, himself. The restive ethnic minorities are well represented, and so are the Southern Tarai plains, as Dr Bhattarai pointed out at the Press meet (although the absence of women and Dalits - the 'lower' castes of the traditional Hindu order - is jarring). Most significant, of course, is the inclusion of Ram Bahadur Thapa. As the driving force behind the Maoist 'People's Liberation Army' (PLA), Thapa's presence projects the impression that the party and the PLA stand together on the question of negotiating with the government. 'The army is led by the party, and it is not the other way around,' Thapa said at the Press Conference.

That it took nearly two months for the team to come 'above ground' after its composition was announced on February 2, attests to the rocky road ahead for all sides concerned. The first stumbling block was the code of conduct to be followed by both sides during the ceasefire. The Maoists had demanded that the Nepal Army, which has been conducting operations against the rebels since November 2001, be recalled to the barracks. The government, for its part, remained adamant that the Army was necessary to ensure peace and security throughout the country.

Ultimately, when the code was announced on March 13, it was clear that the two sides had reached a compromise. The Nepal Army would still be out, but would desist from acting against the Maoists, while the latter would not hold armed rallies and indulge in other activities that could be construed as breaking the peace, such as extortion and kidnappings, and neither would they announce bandhs (general strikes or shut-downs). Most importantly, it was agreed that neither side would pull out of the agreement and that any misunderstandings would be resolved through talks.

Two ranking Maoist leaders, including Mahara, began doing the rounds in Kathmandu in March, meeting leaders of political parties. At one such meeting, the intent to work closely with the mainstream Left Parties was also declared. All in all, this seemed to be a pressure ploy on the government. The political parties - out in the cold with Parliament dissolved and sidelined in the dealings with the Maoists by a government that derives its legitimacy and power directly from the monarchy - seemed to be scrambling for a role in the upcoming peace talks. To their credit, the Maoists have consistently emphasised a role for the political parties in any future arrangement by claiming that the balance of power is now three-pronged with the Maoists, the Parties, and the Palace ranged against each other. But at the same time, they leave no doubt about who the dominant of the three are - the Maoists and the Palace, both with standing armies.

But the much-awaited talks seemed nowhere in sight even after the code of conduct was agreed upon. The Maoists insist that they are waiting for a 'conducive atmosphere' before talks could begin, and claim that the government was delaying further progress. Allegations of violations of the code of conduct have also been levelled by each side against the other. The government charges the Maoists with continued extortions and kidnapping, as well as the holding of mass rallies. The Maoists, on the other hand, were unhappy that their cadre were being re-arrested following their release ordered by the courts, and also because the army is still out in strength.

The Maoists continue to emphasise their three 'core demands': a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution; an interim government and a roundtable conference. At the March 29 Press Conference, Dr Bhattarai said the CPN-M would not compromise on the issue of a Constituent Assembly and called on all parties "to settle for ever the political debate that has been going on for half a century in the country" through such an Assembly. He also clarified that his party would not be part of any interim government formed under the present Constitution. Dr Bhattarai said that the CPN-M was ready to begin talks as soon as 'a conducive atmosphere' is created.

It is now up to the government to make its move. Since appointing the minister who had brokered the breakthrough leading to the ceasefire, Narayan Singh Pun, as the government negotiator, there has been no step towards constituting a negotiating team. Pun has said that 'goodwill' talks will be held first, most likely on April 3. Things were in a limbo mainly because King Gyanendra was on a pilgrimage tour of India, but with his return on March 30, new developments are likely, including, possibly, the formation of an all-party government to talk to the Maoists.

The country has wearied of war after seven long years. It was this realisation that Dr. Bhattarai underscored when he said that they have come to the negotiating table in deference to public opinion. He said there are those who would like to disrupt talks, but "we have come with the conviction that the talks will succeed." That, at least, gives reason to hope for a more permanent peace.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Andhra Pradesh: A Blow to the Bastion, but Naxalites Still a Force
P.V. Ramana
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Left-wing extremists - Naxalites - of the proscribed People's War Group (PWG) suffered a major blow in the Southern Indian State of Andhra Pradesh (AP) with the killing of Polam Sudharshan Reddy 'Ramakrishna' or 'RK' in an encounter with the Police on March 25, 2003, in the Lakshmipur forest, Adilabad district. Four other cadres also died in the incident. Ramakrishna was a member of the North Telengana Special Zone Committee (NTSZC) and secretary of the Karimngar West - Nizamabad division. He had a meteoric rise in the rebels' ranks beginning his association with the Maoist group - which is engaged in an armed insurrection modeled on the lines of the Chinese revolution - as a student activist. Said to be a sound military strategist, Ramakrishna was an accused in 1,042 criminal offences, including 114 murders, the sensational but failed attack on a police station in Hanamkonda town on December 24, 2001, and the 1994 landmine blast in which a Security Forces' (SF) vehicle was blown up, killing 14 policemen.

The PWG has a presence in varying degree - from negligible to formidable - in all of Andhra Pradesh's 23 districts. Within Andhra Pradesh, the PWG claims that it has established 'special guerrilla zones' of domination in North Telengana, South Telengana, Nallama and the North Coastal regions. Despite these claims, however, in North Telengana - Khammam, Warangal, Karimnagar, Nizamabad and Adiliabad, its former stronghold - it is battling for bare survival in some areas, while it struggles to revive activities in parts from which it has been totally ejected. The group has made fresh ingress in the Palandu region of Guntur district in South Coastal Andhra and the rebels are challenging the SFs in the Nallama forests and in North Coastal Andhra - including East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram and Srikakulam. Within the organisation, weeding out 'coverts' (police informers) and retaining cadres has been a major challenge for the rebels.

Earlier, in June 2002, a short-lived peace process was initiated between the Government and the PWG. Three rounds of 'talks about talks' were held between the PWG and Andhra Pradesh Government representatives on June 5, June 9 and June 20. The peace process collapsed on mutually conflicting perceptions on the types of activities that could be undertaken or, more specifically, not undertaken, during the peace process. The rebels wanted to continue to propagate their cause and move about with arms, even as they demanded that the Police should be instructed not to act against them. The Government, on the other hand, accused the guerrillas of indulging in widespread extortion and intimidation, and insisted that, while the Police would not be 'pro-active', it could not be inactive in the face of the PWG's illegal activities. The PWG formally withdrew from the talks on July 19, through a statement issued by its Andhra Pradesh State Committee secretary Akkiraju Haragopal 'Ramakrishna'.

Since the year 1998, the PWG's strength has certainly been steadily declining in the NTSZ area, which it showcased to the world as its greatest success. Intense operations by SFs in all the five districts of the NTSZ have resulted in the liquidation of several rebel cadres and leaders. The PWG initially failed to assess the SFs' determination in countering the rebels, and its cadres were comparatively poorly trained. It consequently failed to make a tactical retreat when SF pressures mounted, with the result that many cadres were lost in clashes with the SFs. Attrition was high, particularly during summer, because the Naxalites moved in the vicinity of water points, a pattern that was quickly detected by the SFs and counter-insurgency operations were focused on these areas. This time around, even as summer begins to set in now, the PWG has asked cadres to retreat deep into the forests. It also has plans to relocate them to safer areas within the State, and even to some of the other Indian States where it has a significant presence - Chattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. These areas lie along the stretch over which the PWG envisages the creation a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) extending between the Dandakaranya forests along the Andhra Pradesh - Orissa - Chattisgarh border and Nepal [Sanjay Jha, "India - Nepal: The Compact Revolutionary Zone," SAIR 1.34]. The quest for a CRZ seeks to bring together Maoist groups operating in various States in Central and East India, as well as the Maoist insurgents of Nepal, with whom the PWG first established linkages in 1995.

While the PWG has suffered several body blows in the NTSZ area, its activities have been on the rise in other parts of Andhra Pradesh - especially in North Coastal Andhra, Palandu in Guntur district (from which the AP State head of the PWG Haragopal 'Ramakrishna' hails) and in the Nallamala forests. The most sensational of these was the simultaneous attack on two police stations, Anakapalle and Chodavaram, for the first time in the plain areas of North Coastal Andhra, on August 23, 2002. The PWG had also looted weapons and had taken five policemen hostage, of whom one was subsequently killed, the remaining four were released. In another incident, they had taken two constables hostage in Guntur district on December 19 and later swapped them for 13 jailed Naxalites.

In Palandu, moreover, a spate of resignations by grassroots-level political leaders was reported in February 2003, in compliance with a rebel directive. The objective of the PWG is to paralyze the local administration and encroach upon the vacated political space to consolidate their influence in the area. To counter the rebels, the State Government, though belatedly, has sought to reinvigorate the civil administration with a view to ensuring that the structures of civil governance did not cede such space to the PWG. The Minister from the district, Kodela Sivaprasada Rao said, during a visit to Guntur on January 10, 2003, "We ourselves gave opportunity to unlawful activists by not responding to the people's appeals in time. We will try not to repeat the old mistakes, for which we are paying [a] heavy price now." Yet another reason for the PWG flourishing in Palanadu is that the SFs are ill prepared to deal with the guerrillas. A senior police officer, on conditions of anonymity, stated that "The officers and men here are not realising that they are already engaged in a do-or-die battle. It is a question of life and death for them. While the PWG is working out several equations to organise an operation, the police do not seem to be prepared even to discuss how to go about tackling the problem." The PWG's acts of violence and vandalism have, moreover, hindered industrial growth and development in the State. Speaking in Warangal district, on November 19, 2002, State Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu said, "The State is unable to achieve the expected development and growth due to their [the PWG's] anti-government stance."

On the other hand, the PWG's coffers are ringing in huge amounts. Informed sources estimate that they collect a phenomenal 700 million rupees in extortion annually. The rebels serve extortion notices on landowners, corrupt government employees, professionals and businesses in all their pockets of influence. The PWG's strong-arm methods have also resulted in the poor quality of public works, with a substantial proportion of funds siphoned out by the extremists. Further, businesses have either stayed away or moved to safer areas. In Karimnagar and Warangal districts tendu leaf (similar to tobacco) contractors either did not bid for the annual contracts to collect the leaves, or chose to do business in neighboring Chattisgarh. Collecting tendu leaf, a seasonal job, is a major source of income for the tribals in forest areas, and they have - ironically, since the PWG claims to be fighting for the rights of the weaker sections of society - been adversely affected as a result.

The PWG's fortunes have, however, been negatively impacted by frequent and sizable desertions in recent times. In Nizamabad district alone, between 2001 and March 2003, 122 cadres had surrendered, while efforts to draft new recruits have met with negligible success. The PWG's support base in the State also appears to be rapidly eroding. Ramakrishna's death will inflict further damage, severely denting the rebels' prospects of reviving their activities in the Nizamabad - West Karimnagar division, where they are already on the run, as in the NTSZ area.