J&K: The Writing on the Barrel
of the Gun
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
In Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K), bullets don't just bear death: they are
also a medium of political communication.
In November 2002, just after Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad
Sayeed took office, two grenades went off outside his home
on the outskirts of Srinagar. The grenades were not intended
to kill, but to forcefully remind the new Chief Minister
of the need to honour his party's promises of dialogue with
Islamist groups and a scaling back of offensive counter-terrorism
operations.
Sayeed refused, at the time, to leave his home for more
secure quarters. In a grand gesture, he even brought down
security barriers on Gupkar Road, home to the residence
of his predecessor Farooq Abdullah as well as top functionaries
of the Border Security Force, Intelligence Bureau and the
Research and Analysis Wing. The opening of Gupkar Road,
along with Sayeed's media-hyped visits to downtown Srinagar,
was a visible symbol of the new 'healing touch' agenda.
Over the next months, however, the real-world limitations
of the 'healing touch' became evident. Although there were
some prisoner releases, their scale was nowhere near adequate
to satisfy the Islamist Right, which had backed his People's
Democratic Party (PDP). Unabated violence and pressure from
the PDP's coalition partners also ensured that no generalised
cutback in counter-terrorist operations could be realised.
Sayeed began spending increasing amounts of time outside
Srinagar and, when he was present there, often chose to
spend the night at the Dachigam wildlife sanctuary. This
wasn't, of course, the consequence of a new interest in
nature, but of blunt warnings from intelligence and police
officials of the likelihood of an assassination attempt.
The J&K Government also began constructing a new fortified
residence for the Chief Minister on Mohammad Ali Road, which
he occupied last month after vacating his family residence.
It is important, then, to consider the political meaning
of the murderous October 17, 2003, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
attack on the new official residence especially prepared
to shield Sayeed from such dangers. As J&K Government spokesperson
Kul Bhushan Jandial has pointed out, the Chief Minister
was not at home when the attack took place. In this sense,
he was obviously not its target. Yet, it is profoundly unlikely
that the terrorists who executed the attack would not have
taken care to monitor the Chief Minister's movements - something
they could have done simply by walking up and down the pavement
on the busy public road that runs along his house.
It is at least possible that the attack was not intended
to kill but, just as in November 2002, to send a signal.
Top PDP functionaries have held meetings with senior figures
of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
in recent months. One such meeting, held in late August
near Pahalgam, involved the HM's central Kashmir 'commander',
Abdul Rashid Pir. The meetings followed complaints by the
HM, which not-so-tacitly backed the PDP's election campaign
last year, that the ruling party had failed to deliver on
its end of their deal. While the unpopular Special Operations
Group (SOG) had been disbanded by the PDP, operations by
the Army, paramilitaries and police continued apace. 205
terrorists were killed last month, a record level of success.
Soon after the Pahalgam meeting, Pir left for Pakistan,
and the HM ended an undeclared truce that had commenced
after the elections. On September 6, 2003, the Hizb targeted
an Army convoy passing by the Parimpora Fruit Market on
Srinagar's outskirts, following this attack up with a succession
of similar offensive operations. Although the PDP had been
calling for the inclusion of the Hizb in a political dialogue
on the future of J&K, the terrorist organisation was making
clear that it wanted more than mere polemical support.
Sayeed has, in the past, responded to Islamist concerns
by using the limited leverage available to him. Earlier
this month, for example, he called on the Union Government
to replace its official interlocutor on J&K, N.N. Vohra,
with someone more acceptable to the secessionists. His daughter,
the PDP's star campaigner Mehbooba Mufti, has not once congratulated
the security forces for successes against terrorism, and
remained silent even after the elimination of the terrorist
who organised the assault on Parliament House, Shahbaz Khan
alias Ghazi Baba. PDP legislators and functionaries, any
security official in J&K will testify, routinely call up
demanding the quick release of arrested suspects.
None of this, terrorist groups are starting to realise,
actually adds up to much. Caught in a coalition whose constituents
cannot or will not be seen as being soft on terror, Sayeed's
room for manoeuvre is extremely limited. The near-tragic
attack on the Chief Minister's residence, it seems probable,
was intended to provide additional incentive for Sayeed
to deliver on his party's promises, whatever the consequences.
Like other Chief Ministers in similar situations of crisis,
Sayeed has two choices: he buckles in, or fights back. The
decision he makes will shape the course of events in J&K
in coming years.
Just as important, the assassination attempt should provoke
introspection among policy makers in both New Delhi and
Washington. The United States has been content to cajole
Pakistan's military establishment to keep violence in J&K
at levels that will not provoke a full-blown crisis. Although
violence is, indeed, at levels marginally lower than in
2001, the assassination attempt shows that terrorism simply
cannot be calibrated to avoid potentially crisis-inducing
events. The Government of India, in turn, needs to work
out just how it might respond to major acts of terrorism
- or might find itself floundering as it did in December
2001, after the attack on Parliament House in New Delhi.
Nailing a Lie
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
The U.S.
Treasury Department announcement on October 16, 2003, designating
Dawood Ibrahim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
under Executive Order 13224, has meant that he now joins
Osama
bin Laden and 320 others who hold a similar distinction.
Dawood Ibrahim alias Sheikh Dawood Hassan, an Indian Mafia
don currently located in Pakistan, is an accused in the
1993 Mumbai serial bomb blasts case in which at least 257
persons lost their lives. The designation freezes any assets
belonging to Dawood within the U.S. and prohibits transactions
with U.S. nationals. The U.S. is also shortly expected to
request that the United Nations (UN) put him on its list
of terrorists as well. A UN listing will require that all
its member-states take similar action, and it is this aspect
that is bound to generate attention in the immediate future,
since his fugitive status in Pakistan has been widely reported,
including by some sections of the Pakistani media. The designation
also brings to light the enormous challenge of confronting
the intricate and global web of organized crime and Islamist
terror.
On October 14, two days before Dawood's designation as a
Global Terrorist, the U.S. Treasury Department also put
the Pakistan-based Al Akhtar Trust International on the
same list. The Al Akhtar Trust is accused of being involved
in financing and supporting a network of international Islamist
terrorist groups, including the Al
Qaeda, raising money for Islamist extremists
attempting to infiltrate into Iraq, and maintaining links
with an individual alleged to have been involved in the
abduction and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel
Pearl. The trust, established in year 2000, has offices
in Pakistan, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Afghanistan.
The State Bank of Pakistan had frozen the bank accounts
of the trust in May 2003. The US administration reportedly
believes that the trust is closely linked to the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM).
A fact sheet issued with the October 16 notification said
that Dawood's syndicate is involved in large-scale shipments
of narcotics in the U.K. and Western Europe. Further, his
syndicate's smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle
East and Africa are shared with bin Laden and the Al Qaeda.
The fact sheet notes: "Successful routes established over
recent years by Ibrahim's syndicate have been subsequently
utilized by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly
brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes.
In the late 1990's, Ibrahim traveled in Afghanistan under
the protection of the Taliban." Citing his Pakistani passport
number (G869537), the U.S. notification further states,
"information, from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that
Ibrahim has financially supported Islamic militant groups
working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).
For example, this information indicates that Ibrahim has
been helping finance increasing attacks in Gujarat by LeT."
While the U.S. fact sheet further validates the now internationally
held opinion that the 'footprint' of every major act of
international Islamist terrorism invariably passes through
Pakistan, it also illustrates Pakistan's deception regarding
Dawood and indeed, several other fugitives who find safe
haven on its soil. Pakistan has been consistent in its denial
of links with Dawood, and President Pervez Musharraf had
himself stated in no uncertain terms to Indian Home Minister
L.K. Advani during his visit to India during July 2001 that
"Dawood Ibrahim is not in Pakistan". The citing of his Pakistani
passport by the United States indicates official Pakistani
complicity, something that India has consistently maintained
since the 1993 Mumbai blasts. The fact that Dawood Ibrahim
has been holed up in Pakistan has also been corroborated
by the Pakistani media. The Pakistani magazine, The Herald,
after a bomb explosion on September 19, 2003, at the tenth
floor of a high-rise commercial complex in Karachi, noted
that the business centre - Kawish Crown Plaza - was, according
to the Inspector General of the Sindh Police (IGP) "ostensibly
owned by Ahmed Jamal but actually belonged to Dawood Ibrahim."
"The IGP's statement was backed the same day by the de facto
Sindh Home Minister, Aftab Sheikh, who told reporters that
the Mumbai mafioso had a 'network from Mumbai to Karachi
and was working in both countries'," the report added. Much
earlier in September 2001, the Karachi-based Newsline, in
its report "Karachi's Gang Wars", had recorded, "Karachi's
two rival underworld gangs, both working for the notorious
Mumbai don, Dawood Ibrahim, are now settling their scores
on the streets of Karachi. Dawood Ibrahim and his team,
Mumbai's notorious underworld clan including his right hand
man Chota Shakeel and Jamal Memon, are on India's most wanted
list for a series of bomb blasts in Mumbai and other criminal
activities. After the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, the gang
have made Karachi their new home and base of operations.
Living under fake names and IDs, and provided protection
by Government agencies, they have built up their underworld
empire in Karachi employing local talent like Shoaib and
Bholoo."
Evidently, Pakistan's emergence as a 'frontline state' in
the war against terrorism is yet to produce the anticipated
changes in terms of internal reform, the containment of
terrorist groups, and the fulfillment of various promises
made by President Musharraf in the wake of the 9/11 attacks
in USA.
The expected UN listing on Dawood would mean that Pakistan
and Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
would also be required to initiate action against his network.
The UAE has been the hub of the Dawood syndicate's criminal
enterprises, with settled operations in places like Dubai
for well over a decade. "We are calling on the international
community to stop the flow of dirty money that kills. For
the Ibrahim syndicate, the business of terrorism forms part
of their larger criminal enterprise, which must be dismantled,"
said Juan Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, in a statement accompanying
the notification. Past experience, however, has shown that
such appeals have not produced any significant action. Even
the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which proclaims
that "…all States should prevent and suppress the financing
of terrorism, as well as criminalize the wilful provision
or collection of funds for such acts," has largely gone
unheeded. Pakistan's lie may have been nailed, but - given
its past record of inaction against other groups listed
as terrorist entities - it remains improbable that this
will provoke effective action against the Dawood gang, which
has long been regarded as a critical asset by the Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) in its covert war of attrition
against India.
A Government Divided
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, Sunday Times and Daily Mirror,
Colombo
A cart pulled
by two bulls, each trying to go in a different direction
- this metaphor exactly fits the Sri Lankan Government today.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga heads an executive that
comprises a Cabinet dominated by her rival party, the United
National Front (UNF), which heads a majority alliance in
Parliament. The result is that that governance has sadly
become a matter of conflict rather than consensus. Whether
it is the peace process or state policy, the President and
her party, the People's Alliance (PA), hold a position that
is not congruent with the stand taken by Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe's UNF Government.
This was illustrated, for instance, by the diametrically
opposed positions the President and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's
administration took with regard to global trade. Commerce
Minister Ravi Karunanayake, who represented the Government
at the recent trade talks in Cancun, Mexico, broke ranks
with the developing countries and backed the rich nations,
especially the United States. In sharp contrast to this
position, President Kumaratunga on October 14, 2003, addressing
the World Economic Forum's East Asia summit in Singapore,
blasted the rich nations, declaring, "The principles and
underlying positions on trade must definitely be the same
for the developed and the developing nations." This is not
their only point of disagreement; the President and her
party have condemned the Prime Minister's United Nations
(UN) speech, which gave a tacit nod to the US invasion of
Iraq.
The result of this two-way governance is that confusion
reigns. The politics of conflict is not strange to Sri Lanka,
but the politics of consensus certainly is. Neither politicians
nor the body politic have sufficiently matured to nurture
the politics of cohabitation, which is seen as the sine
qua non for the progress of the peace process. An oft-repeated
complaint voiced by the President is that she has been kept
in the dark with regard to the peace process. The mutual
suspicion the two parties entertain towards each other is
giving birth to crisis after crisis in what has been described
as a cohabitation miscarriage.
The opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the main
constituent party of the People's Alliance, has already
started a process to topple the Government with the help
of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or the People's
Liberation Front. A section of the SLFP believes that an
electoral alliance with the JVP is the only way the UNF
could be defeated at a general election. The SLFP has never
won a general election under its own steam. In the past
it had always relied on the support of leftist parties to
prop up its electoral strength. With the traditional left
parties such as the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and the Communist
Party being pushed into political oblivion, it is only on
the JVP - a party that derives its strength from unemployed
youths and is credited with significant organizational capabilities
- that the SLFP can rely to ride back to power. However,
the hitch is that the JVP is an ardent opponent of the peace
process. It advocates a military solution to the North-East
conflict and believes devolution of power is not the formula
to solve the national question.
The first round of talks between the SLFP and the JVP collapsed
recently largely due to disagreement over devolution as
a solution to the ethnic problem, though moves are now underway
to resume talks. However, it is still not clear how the
two parties will iron out their differences over the devolution
issue. In spite of this fundamental disagreement, they have
intensified their campaigns, together and separately, against
the Government's approach to the peace process. Both parties
are in agreement that the UNF Government's approach to peace
will eventually lead to the creation of Eelam, the separate
state the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
has been campaigning for.
The 20-month-old ceasefire, however fragile it might be,
has contributed towards the growth of the economy. The stock
market has made significant gains in recent months while
the rupee has appreciated against the dollar. But ironically,
the gains made on the economic front have not significantly
buttressed the peace process. This is because questions
arising from the uncertainties surrounding the peace process
still remain unanswered. Fears that were expressed at the
time the UNF Government signed the ceasefire agreement in
February 2002 have still not been allayed.
On the contrary, the apprehensions have been consolidated
by the LTTE's ceasefire violations, its intransigent stand
with regard to contentious issues, especially the row over
the Manirasakulam camp, its continued efforts to regroup
and rearm itself and its scant regard for the opinion of
the international community and rulings by the ceasefire
monitors. With regard to the Manirasakulam camp in Trincomalee,
the LTTE has stood its ground, refusing to bow to the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission ruling that the rebels had set
up the camp in a Government-controlled area, which was not
long ago occupied by Muslims.
The LTTE's disdain for the international community as far
as the ground reality is concerned was also seen in its
continued conscription of children despite the assurances
it gave to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).
Recently, the LTTE released about 40 child soldiers for
a UNICEF-sponsored rehabilitation programme, but before
the ink on the papers they signed was dry, some 40 parents
in Valachchenai, an eastern town close to Batticaloa, complained
to the UNICEF that their children had been abducted by the
LTTE.
Besides, the LTTE is also known to have acquired modern
weaponry during the 20-month-old truce, a fact Defence Minister
Tilak Marapana grudgingly admitted in Parliament during
an adjournment debate on the security situation in the country.
"It is true that, with the ceasefire agreement, many opportunities
have been afforded to the LTTE to strengthen itself. But
that I believe is the price we have to pay if we are to
pursue the peace process to a permanent solution of the
problem. We knew that when we signed the ceasefire agreement,"
Marapana told Parliament in response to an opposition tirade
against the Government's soft approach to the LTTE's confidence-shattering
measures.
The UNF Government's never-say-die approach to the peace
process, in spite of LTTE intransigence, is commendable,
for it has helped keep alive the hopes of reactivating the
negotiations that were suspended in April. It is against
the backdrop of this optimism that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe
this week told the Foreign Ministers of the Indian Ocean
Rim countries that the very fact that the LTTE was presenting
its counter-proposals to a Government draft on the creation
of an interim administration for the Northern and Eastern
Provinces was itself an achievement in the ongoing peace
process.
The LTTE's constitutional affairs committee, which met recently
in Dublin, has apparently finalized its counter-proposals
to be handed over to the Government by the end of this month.
Although the contents of the counter-proposals have not
been made public, sources close to the LTTE say that the
Tigers were insisting that police, land and financial matters
should be exclusively vested in the LTTE-dominated interim
administration.
The Government may not fully agree with the LTTE counter-proposals,
but this will offer the two sides an opportunity to sit
together and iron out or minimize their disagreements. One
cannot be over-optimistic, however, given the other factors
that are directly linked to the ethnic question. For instance,
fears entertained by Muslims about the interim administration
have not been allayed, either by the Government or LTTE.
The LTTE's continued harassment of Muslims is giving rise
to a situation that may lead to Muslims taking up arms to
defend themselves and even President Kumaratunga has warned
of this eventuality.
Tripura: Creating an Unenviable
Record
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
Terrorism
continues to bleed Tripura. First, it was the National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB), which categorized Tripura as the
most violent State in the country, and subsequently, the
State Government has provided figures to underline the gradual
undermining of the State's ability to deal with essentially
four insurgent groups, the combined strength of which is
not estimated to be over 4500.
Speaking in the State Legislative Assembly, on October 12,
2003, Chief Minister Manik Sarkar, who also holds the Home
portfolio, mentioned that, during the first six months of
his Government (between March 10 and August 30), a total
of 112 fatalities were recorded, including 85 civilians
and 15 security force (SF) personnel, who fell prey to terrorist
attacks. A total of 66 people were also injured in these
incidents, and 55 civilians were abducted. It is clear that
the surrender of 196 insurgents, a figure from which the
State Government appears to derive tremendous satisfaction,
has failed to blunt their firepower.
Official figures also disclose that the impact of insurgency/terrorism
has been phenomenal in terms of the internal displacement
of civilian populations. Nearly 19,468 families have been
displaced between March 1, 1998, and February 28, 2003,
in the State. Subdivisions like Bishalgarh in West Tripura
district suffer the most, with a recorded displacement of
12,106 families. The Khowai, Sadar, Udaipur and Belonia
subdivisions also recorded high volumes of such displacement.
Tripura remains a theatre of conflict where the fatalities
among SF personnel have remained at a significantly high
level. Between 1998-2002, 158 SF personnel have been killed
in the State. In 2003 alone, till October 19, 34 SF personnel
had been killed in terrorist violence.
Over the past years, the State Government has been categorical
on two points:
- Terrorism in the State
will not stop till the time support continues to be provided
to the insurgent groups by Bangladesh.
- The Government of India
must provide a greater number of central SF personnel
to deal with the situation. (There are already 134 companies
of central forces operating in the State)
All the four
insurgent outfits operating in Tripura - two factions of
the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT-
headed by Nayanbashi Jamatiya and Biswamohan Debbarma),
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)
and Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT) - have their
camps in Bangladesh in districts including the Chittagong
Hill Tracts, Sylhet, Comilla, Moulavi Bazar and Habiganj.
According to the Tripura Government's estimates, 47 such
camps exist in Bangladesh. Top militant leaders such as
Joshua Debbarma and Biswamohan Debbarma live openly, albeit
under pseudonyms, in Dhaka and operate thriving hotel and
transport businesses. Their stay has also given rise to
a nexus with Bangladeshi criminal elements that have gradually
been encouraged to jointly engage in subversive activities
across the border. As recently as on October 12, 2003, two
villagers were abducted from the Bagmara village of Kamalpur
sub-division in Dhalai district near the border by Bangladeshi
criminal elements understood to be linked with the NLFT-N
faction.
NLFT-N chief Nayanbashi Jamatiya has been accused of operating
under the direct diktats of the Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) of Pakistan. A Christian, he was married for the third
time to the daughter of Abu Mian, a notorious criminal of
the Sylhet area, and has since converted to Islam. Unconfirmed
reports suggest that, through Abu Mian, the Jamat-e-Islami
Bangladesh (JeI-BD) is also influencing the NLFT- Biswamohan
Debbarma faction. The NLFT, which originated and grew with
the active support of the National Socialist Council of
Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
is now devoid of overt support from that group due to the
latter's peace parleys with the Government of India. As
a result, the NLFT leadership, principally Christians, despite
their religious reservations, maintains links and work under
the instructions of the ISI, possibly in tandem with Islamist
terrorist groups - some of them linked to the Al Qaeda -
known to have a free run in Bangladesh. The porous border
with India, particularly at points in the Sonamura subdivision
in Tripura's West District, is the traditional route used
by militants into Tripura.
There is, however, much more to the complexities of insurgency
in Tripura than the bases and camps in Bangladesh and the
overt or covert support by foreign powers to these agents
of terror. A deep political nexus with terror has created
critical power centers within Tripura, which are too strong
to be broken by seemingly hardening political postures against
terrorist violence. In addition to the hit and run attacks
from Bangladesh, militants continue to operate deep inside
Tripura's territory and far away from the international
borders. Just 35 kilometres from the State capital Agartala,
private and Government vehicles on National Highway 44 move
in convoys under the protection of armed Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) personnel. The result is that a distance
of little over 650 kilometers to Guwahati in Assam is covered
in not less than 25 hours. Terrorist bases also exist on
Tripura's territory, in the Takarjala and Jampuijala area
of the West district. Groups such as the BNCT, which were,
till recently regarded as little more than fringe groupings,
have made the Dhalai District's southern hilly area bordering
the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh their stronghold.
Intelligence reports also suggest alignments and alliances
between terrorist groups in order to strengthen their operations.
Towards the second half of August 2003, for instance, leaders
of the NLFT-B and NLFT-N met in the Burmatilla area in West
Tripura to discuss operational cooperation.
Faced with mounting opposition, there are signs of confusion
in the State Security Force set up to counter insurgency.
In the month of September, reports disclosed that a soldier
from the Tripura State Rifles (TSR), Rahid Mian, gave final
shape to plans for an NLFT attack on a TSR camp on September
23, 2003, in Shermun Tilla area of Dharmanagar subdivision,
in which three SF personnel were killed and the terrorists
escaped with arms. Reports indicate that Rahid Mian, in
spite of his junior position, enjoyed the confidence of
higher echelons in the State Police and was given a free
hand to effect surrenders of non-descript insurgents, even
though his own past record was dubious.
The Administration appears to be heading nowhere on the
counter-insurgency front as well. This year, till August
2003, 10 Special Police Officers (SPOs), considered vital
in providing details of insurgent activities, had deserted
with their weapons. A number of active SPOs have been involved
in crimes such as rape. Similarly, police claims of eliminating
terrorists have often been found grossly exaggerated. In
the month of August alone, five cases of killings of alleged
terrorists were reported to have been false, with the victims
identified as innocent civilians - a fact conceded by the
members of the ruling Left Front.
Nevertheless, small yet significant incidents have begun
to indicate the growing unrest among the tribal population
against the very forces that claim to be fighting for their
rights. On October 12, 2003, tribal villagers of Shantinagar,
under troubled Kalyanpur Police Station of West district,
lynched a BNCT cadre. However, people also remain disinclined
to cooperate with the Administration. In 1997, the State
Government announced rewards ranging from Rupees 50,000
to Rupees 500,000 on the heads of 34 NLFT and ATTF terrorists.
Only one of these 34 was killed in an encounter based on
information provided by the people. This time around too,
in the aftermath of the August 14, 2003, massacres at Kamalnagar
and Baralunga in Khowai subdivision, the State Government
has announced a reward of Rupees 100,000 each for information
on nine ATTF militants. The response is not expected to
be any different, as public apathy persists.
Surprisingly, in this context, Chief Minister Manik Sarkar,
in spite of his repeated tirade against the Bangladesh Government,
did a sudden volte face during his Dhaka tour in
September 2003, absolving Dhaka of blame for supporting
insurgency. This led to strong protests in Tripura. Indeed,
such ambivalence has been the hallmark of Tripura's fight
against terrorism, and unless a clarity of purpose is firmly
established in the political leadership, the State will
continue to suffer the torment of terrorism.
