J&K: Elections,
Again.
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline Magazine
Campaign 2004 has already claimed its first life. On March
18, Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat went for a walk near his Srinagar
home. A police van brought his body back late that evening.
Security force officials in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) are
hoping the assassination isn't a sign of things to come
- and are asking for some 56,000 additional troops to make
sure their worst fears aren't realised.
No one is certain just who killed Bhat, a one-time terrorist
who renounced violence and joined the youth wing of the
Janata Dal (United). His killing, however, comes in the
context of a wave of terrorist attacks on mainstream politicians
and their families. Two days before Bhat's killing, terrorists
executed a grenade attack on the home of the daughter of
the Kulgam Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) and
Communist Party of India (CPI) leader, Mohammad Yusuf Tarigami.
A People's Democratic Party activist, Ghulam Hassan, and
a former MLA, also named Ghulam Hassan, were targeted on
the same day. Soon after, terrorists ambushed former Jammu
and Kashmir Minister and National Conference leader Abdul
Rahim Rather.
For politicians in J&K, such violence is routine. The 2002
Assembly elections, hailed across India as free and fair,
cost the lives of 41 political workers in the month of September
alone. The bulk of the victims were members of the National
Conference, targeted by the Islamist right in an effort
to bring down the party they saw as their principal enemy.
In all, 99 political workers died in 2002. 1999, the year
of the last Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) elections,
saw the deaths of 49 political workers; 1998, the year of
the previous Lok Sabha elections, saw 41 killed; 1996, the
year of the previous Assembly elections, saw 69 such deaths.
The numbers indicate just how violent the 2002 elections
were, notwithstanding ill-informed but widespread claims
that the massive Indian military build-up that began the
previous year had coerced Pakistan into deescalating support
for the terrorists' anti-election campaign.
Despite considerable media hype about recent and dramatic
acts of terrorism, however, figures compiled by the Union
Ministry of Home Affairs show that violence has been declining
since 2002. Combat fatalities peaked in September last year,
true to the regular seasonal cycle of violence in J&K, and
have since been in steady decline. Military officials, however,
have warned New Delhi that the elections will be taking
place in the summer, when Pakistan could lift restraints
on cross-border infiltration, allowing terrorist groups
to replenish their cadres. Although few security experts
take the J&K Government's demands for enormous numbers of
additional troops at face-value, most agree that some additional
forces will have to be found to secure the State as elections
approach.
Interestingly, February 2004 saw a marginal increase in
violence compared with the same month of 2003. There were
60 attacks on security forces last month, compared with
53 in February 2003. 183 people died in terrorism-related
violence, compared with 126 the previous year - although
this was partly the result of killings of terrorists by
security forces, which stood at 86, in February 2004, compared
with 71 in February 2003. It is, of course, hard to draw
conclusions from these figures, although they do, at face
value, seem to suggest that the escalatory cycle that begins
in J&K each spring has set in again. Indian intelligence
officials also note that wireless stations operating from
terror camps across the Line of Control have been telling
their operatives to step up efforts to escalate violence
during the election process. Election-time violence will
confront Indian security forces with a dilemma: whether
to allow voters to be coerced into staying away from the
elections, or to use troops to encourage polling, and attract
charges of counter-coercion.
During the 2002 elections to the J&K Assembly, politicians
proved only too willing to engage in coercion and counter-coercion.
Posters were put up in several parts of southern Kashmir
by the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM),
for example, asking voters to oppose the National Conference.
In areas like the Mendhar and Surankote Tehsils (administrative
unit) in Poonch, for example, various terrorist groups used
their leverage to block voters from the Gujjar community
from exercising their franchise, and to aide candidates
from specific villages. Last year, senior South Kashmir-based
People's Democratic Party leader Abdul Aziz Zargar was even
accused by the National Conference of having recruited Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT)
terrorist to target the campaign of his rival, Sakina Itoo.
The allegations followed claims made by an arrested LeT
terrorist that Zargar's village home was used to plan a
terrorist attack on the famous Akshardham temple in Gandhinagar,
the capital of Gujarat.
Pakistan, of course, has good reason to allow - or even
encourage - terrorists to proceed with their anti-election
coercion. For all the apparent India-Pakistan bonhomie,
broadcast ably by politicians on both sides during the ongoing
cricket series, Pakistani strategic planners seem nervous
about losing political leverage within J&K. Members of the
Abbas Ansari-led centrist faction of the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC)
met India's Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, on March
27, and Pakistan has made no secret of its displeasure at
this event. Significantly, this faction of the APHC has
now indicated that it would not call for a boycott of the
elections, as it has done for each of the elections in the
past. Pakistan has clearly rejected this faction's credentials,
and has put its weight behind the hardline Syed Ali Shah
Geelani-led splinter as the 'sole representative' of the
people of Kashmir. The Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi
described the anti-talks Islamist, Geelani, as the 'Hurriyat
chairman' in its invitation for the Pakistan Day celebrations
here on March 23; centrist leaders like Ansari, Abdul Gani
Bhat, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq and Bilal Gani Lone were referred
to only as 'Kashmiri leaders.'
What Pakistan chooses to do, of course, depends on just
how much pressure the international community is actually
able to bring to bear on it. It is at least possible that
the recent institutional encouragement offered to Pakistan
by the United States of America could translate into a more
aggressive posture on J&K.
Failing State
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Through
two major attacks within a span of 20 days, the Maoist
insurgents have put the entire Himalayan Kingdom
on notice. On March 20-21, 2004, in their biggest strike
since the beginning of the 'People's War', insurgents ransacked
Beni Bazaar, headquarters of the Myagdi District, completely
destroying the district administrative offices, police station
and army barracks. Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) sources claimed
that, out of the 5,000 insurgents involved in the attack,
500 were killed, and that security forces have foiled the
Maoists attempt to 'capture the city'. According to official
records, 207 dead bodies had been recovered so far, including
128 Maoists, 51 security force personnel and 28 civilians.
But the Maoists 'supreme leader', Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias
Prachanda, claimed that only 40 insurgents were killed in
the incident. The insurgents have also captured 33 persons,
including security force personnel, the District Officer
and Deputy Superintendent of Police, and other bureaucrats,
during the operation, and have raised the demand for the
release of three Maoist leaders in return for these officials.
Earlier, on March 3, some 1,500 Maoists overran the Nepal
Telecommunications Office, District Administration Office
and a branch of the National Bank at the Bhojpur District
headquarters, where at least 29 security force personnel
and more than 50 insurgents were killed, and 10 SF personnel
were abducted as 'war captives'.
Through these two attacks, the Maoists have clearly demonstrated
that they had not weakened after the collapse of the ceasefire
on August 27, 2003, as was widely presumed, and that they
remain capable of major operations in any part of the country,
including strong Army positions and security installations.
While the Maoists' losses have been significant, the damage
they have caused has also been heavy. Both sides are now
claiming 'victory', but the incidents have clearly demonstrated
the Maoists' capacity to unleash a new round of escalating
terror in Nepal.
The attacks in the Myagdi and Bhojpur districts exemplify
a pattern that had been common in the mid-western districts
before the beginning of the peace talks in 2003. Though
significant casualties were inflicted on the Maoist cadres,
the scale and impact of these incidents brings into question
the entire concept of joint mobilization (Unified Army)
and the effectiveness of attempts to increase the strength
and deployment of Armed Forces. The intensification of violence
is also being seen as an effort to disrupt the emerging
process for elections in the country, as well as pressure
to restore talks for a negotiated solution. Prachanda has
called on the United Nations (UN) and international human
rights organisations to monitor the conflict situation and
help conduct a 'peaceful' dialogue with the Government.
The Government, on the other hand, has categorically rejected
the Maoists' call for talks, stating that they would not
give the Maoists another chance to further consolidate their
military strength under cover of a 'peace process'. The
Government is also firm on not permitting any third-party
mediation, including efforts by the UN, in its internal
conflict. Meanwhile, the Maoists have warned the Government
that they would continue with the current series of 'military
actions'.
A shift in strategy is visible in the present pattern of
Maoist operations, with increasing focus on large scale
operations in the plains areas, as against the earlier pattern
of attacks in rural and hilly areas. There is a clear effort
to demonstrate operational capacities throughout the country,
and to create a stronghold in the Terai, as well as to strengthen
their presence in the Eastern and Western Regions. In addition
to the large scale attacks in Myagdi and Bhojpur, the insurgents
have been engineering a continuous succession of almost
daily bomb attacks and landmine explosions virtually across
the country; there have been at least 164 such attacks since
the renewal of hostilities on August 27, 2003, and these
have contributed enormously to a pervasive atmosphere of
insecurity among the general public and a loss of confidence
in the security forces and the Government.
Reports from the Beni Bazaar incident have shocked the security
forces. The insurgents are said to have made use of a range
of modern weapons, including 81mm mortars, rocket launchers,
M16 and AK-47 rifles, machine guns and hand grenade. Most
of the M-16 and AK-47 rifles, rocket launchers and machine
guns had been looted from the Army in earlier operations.
During the ceasefire period, the Maoists had reportedly
also acquired arms and ammunitions from the Indian weapons
black markets in Uttar Pradesh, through their contacts with
Indian left-wing extremist groups, and had smuggled these
through the Terai districts in Western and Mid- Western
border areas. The Humla, Darchula and Baitadi border districts
in the Far-Western Region have been used for their arms
traffic.
The Home Ministry's latest report, released on March 13,
discloses that that 2,178 persons have been killed, including
1534 Maoists, 365 security force personnel and 279 civilians,
since the breakdown of the ceasefire in August 2003. Further,
160 policemen, 147 RNA soldiers and 58 Armed Police Force
(APF) officials were killed. More than a third of the 4,000
Village Development Committee (VDC) buildings in the country
are also reported to have been destroyed. Post offices,
bridges and telecommunication and power stations in almost
all the districts have been bombed. Telecommunication repeater
stations in most of the hill districts have been damaged
and are inoperative. The Maoists have attacked schools and
colleges as well, declaring these as 'instruments of the
state'. According to a Nepalese organization, Community
Study and Welfare Centre, the violence has resulted in the
displacement of some 350,000-400,000 persons. The Maoists
have also 'conducted elections' in various areas under their
control, including the Achham, Kalikot and Bajura districts
in Mid-Western Nepal, in January 2004. Apart from declaring
these as 'autonomous regions', the Maoists have created
a structure of parallel governments called 'people's governments'.
A majority of developmental projects and large-scale business
establishments operate in these areas with the permission
of these people's governments and pay 'tax' to them.
Major donor countries and International development projects
are now threatening to revoke assistance if the conflict
continues at the present pace, and observers have warned
Nepal that it was evolving as a classic example of a 'failed
state'. Within this broad scenario of chaos, there appears
to be little prospect for a coherent political response
from any of the mainstream political parties, who continue
with their confrontation with King Gyanendra. The King has,
in the meanwhile, broken their agitation for the restoration
of Parliament, and, with the political parties completely
alienated from mainstream politics, there appears to be
little possibility of popular participation in the country's
destiny, which remains, for the time being, at the mercy
of the Army and the Maoists.
Assam: Karbi-Kuki
Clashes
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
Suspected insurgents of the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)
are reported to have killed at least 34 Karbi villagers
in three separate places in the Karbi Anglong district of
Assam on March 24, 2004. In the first incident, a group
of about 30 KRA cadres raided Uden Tisso and Sarpo Terong
villages under Bokajan police station jurisdiction and killed
28 persons and wounded eight others. Separately, another
group of KRA cadres attacked Jari Teron, a Karbi village
under Manja police outpost, and killed another six Karbis.
Inspector-General of Police (Special Branch), Khagen Sharma,
said that the attacks were carried out by separate hit squads
of the KRA, who also set fire to many houses in these villages.
In what suggests the beginning of a sustained campaign,
the Kukis struck again on March 27, 2004, killing five Karbi
villagers and setting 60 houses on fire in remote villages
of the upper Deopani area under the Bokajan police station.
On the surface, the conflict appears to be a case of innocent
civilians being caught in the crossfire of a battle of attrition
between two insurgent groups, the United Peoples' Democratic
Solidarity (UPDS)
and KRA. However, the discord is inherently rooted in the
growing schism between two communities at a time when local
politics in the district has witnessed significant transformations.
The apex Kuki organisation in Karbi Anglong, the Kuki National
Assembly (KNA), has been demanding an autonomous regional
council for the Kukis, living predominantly in the Singhasan
Hills area. Since 1992, when the demand was first raised
through a memorandum to the State Government, the KNA has
grown from strength to strength, mainly through two rounds
of negotiations with the State Government in 1997 and 1998.
Even though the KNA's original demand for the establishment
of an autonomous region in the district has been long renounced,
it's acceptability among the Kukis and also among non-Karbi
organisations struggling to carve a niche for themselves
in the district, remains paramount.
However, as things stand currently, KNA's demand finds little
support among influential political entities in the district,
mostly dominated by the Karbis. This opposition however,
needs to be placed in the larger context of the autonomy
movement for the Karbis. The autonomous Karbi Anglong district,
constituted under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution,
has been aspiring for an autonomous State status since 1986
under article 244A of the Constitution, a provision created
through the 22nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1969. The demand
for autonomy is curiously intertwined with local politics,
mostly represented by the Autonomous State Demand Committee
(ASDC), the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML)
and the Congress party. Interestingly, Karbi Anglong had
decided not to be a part of Meghalaya, which was created
as an autonomous State in the year 1970, as it would have
meant renunciation of its autonomous district status.
Today, the movement for an autonomous State stands at the
crossroads, in the aftermath of the split in the ASDC in
July 2000. Internal contradictions, which once threatened
to obliterate the movement altogether, led to the creation
of two factions, the ASDC-Progressive (ASDC-P, aligned with
the CPI-ML) and the ASDC-United (ASDC-U). The split has
also divided the once influential Karbi Students' Association
(KSA) into three units, aligned with the two different factions
of the ASDC and with the Congress Party, which rules the
Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council (KAADC) today.
The July 2000 split in ASDC was a major turning point in
the course of the KNA's autonomy movement. The ASDC-U, in
a bid to expand its support-base, signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with the KNA in December 2000, not only
recognising the distinct historical rights of the Kukis
in the district, but also promised a common effort to fulfill
their political aspirations. The MoU states: "The ASDC is
firmly committed to recommend and ensure the creation of
a Regional Council for the Kuki tribe within the framework
of the Sixth Schedule provision of the Indian constitution."
Such a stand would have been unimaginable in the ASDC's
pre-split era. The ASDC-U also entered into two controversial
deals, one with the 'Banner organisation' of the Bodo Kacharis
in the district in April 2001 and the other with the Meghalaya
Government in July 2001. In the present context, all these
agreements are seen as distinctively against the interest
of the Karbis as they accommodate aspirations of non-Karbi
tribes in the district. In a changed political environment,
where compulsions are less demanding and any adherence to
such agreements presents adequate vote generating opportunities
to other political groupings, the ASDC-U prefers to overlook
these agreements, on one pretext or the other. For example,
with regard to the agreement with the KNA, ASDC-U now maintains
that, since the KNA representative L. Singson, who had put
his signature on the MoU, is dead, the agreement stands
void. In the words of the ASDC-U President, Holiram Terang,
"The agreement has become redundant. It died with Singson.
The character of the KNA has changed since then."
The ASDC-U's stand, in a recently published leaflet titled,
'Problems of Unrestricted Influx into Karbi Anglong: The
Karbi-Kuki Dimension: An Overview', is interesting in this
context: "The KNA, acting as the apex organisation of Kukis
in Karbi Anglong, has been aligning with various political
formations, mainly with the anti-Karbi axis, taking part
in electoral activities and at the same time championing
the Kuki political cause prompted by the Manipur based Kuki
Revolutionary Army (KRA).'
The growing number of the Kukis is also perceived to be
a threat to the aspiration of the Karbi groups. Even though
Kukis claim themselves to be the 'aboriginal tribes of the
district', living in contiguous areas in Diphu, Bokajan
and Howraghat before the creation of the district, a look
at their growing population brings out the essentially mobile
character of this tribe. According to the 1951 census, only
15 respondents in Karbi Anglong returned their mother tongue
as Kuki. The number grew to 2,914 by 1961. The 1971 census
suggested that there are 21,034 Kukis in Assam. However,
by 1991, only 21,883 Kukis were said to be living in the
State. Thus, where as till 1971, Karbi Anglong witnessed
an inward migration of Kukis, the 20 years time between
1971-1991 points to an outward migration.
The approach of the political organizations in the district
towards the Kuki population remains varied. While the ASDC-U
is willing to provide 'son of the soil' status to the some
of the Kukis, who lived in the district before 1951 (the
year in which the Karbi Anglong district was created), the
ASDC-P does not accept this line. According to its finance
secretary, Daniel Teron, "There were no Kukis in the district
before 1951 and all of the present inhabitants are essentially
migrants." Both factions suggest that the growing number
of Kukis (said to be 35,000 by the KNA, according to a 'voluntary
census' conducted in the mid-1990s) is due to migration
from Manipur and Nagaland, following the Naga-Kuki and Kuki-Paite
clashes there.
The result is that the polarisation along ethnic lines is
duly complimented with political divisions among the communities.
In addition to the larger issue of Kuki autonomy, which
has very little chance of garnering support from the dominant
Karbis, basic issues of livelihood and economic opportunities
have also been marked, and the consequent standoff has benefited
the insurgents.
Since its origin in 1999, with the avowed objective of establishing
a land for the Karbis, the UPDS has pursued a systematic
campaign of cleansing the area of non-Karbis. As a result,
the Kukis, like the Bodos, Nepalis and the Hindi-speaking
people in the district, become natural targets. Over the
last two years, the UPDS has targeted the ginger-producing
Kukis in the Singhasan Hill range for systematic extortion.
According to the General Secretary of the KNA, ginger-laden
vehicles are forced to pay anything between Rs. 5,000 and
Rs. 20,000 to the outfit. The UPDS, in spite of the split
it underwent in May 2002 on the question of negotiating
with the Government, continues to announce economic blockades,
primarily targeted at prohibiting the ginger trade. In January
2003, for example, the UPDS's armed wing, the Karbi Anglong
North Cachar Hills Peoples' Resistance (KNPR) announced
a seven day-long economic blockade starting January 12 to
protest against the alleged destruction of forests by ginger
cultivators. On several occasions, its armed cadres have
set ginger-laden vehicles on fire.
The Kukis over the years have resisted such attempts at
extortion, thereby infuriating the UPDS. Recently, the UPDS
came up with a notification announcing a ban on ginger cultivation,
terming it a 'threat to the environment of Karbi Anglong'.
Ginger cultivators, with the slash and burn mode of Jhum
cultivation are alleged to have destroyed the forest cover
in the hill areas, a charge which can also be leveled against
the Karbi cultivators who have settled in the lower part
of the same hill areas.
The UPDS' concern for the environment has found favour among
various Karbi organisations in the district, primarily with
the ASDC-U and the section of the KSA aligned with the Congress
party. In the words of the KSA President, Hanuram Engti,
"The UPDS demand for environment preservation is a genuine
one. The Kukis must stop cultivation of ginger. They have
destroyed out environment." In a State like Assam, which
is gradually losing its forest cover, Karbi Anglong is no
exception. Reserved forest area in Karbi Anglong East has
declined from 111,855 hectares in 1993-94 to 72,720 hectares
in 1996-97 and further to 48,042 hectares in 2000-2001.
It will however, be difficult to relate the depletion to
ginger cultivation alone.
The UPDS action against the Kukis has brought the KRA, primarily
a Manipur-based outfit, into the scene opening up another
and most violent front of conflict. The group, with a declared
objective of protecting the interest of the Kukis, is seen
to be a serious challenge to the militancy of the UPDS,
which till recently enjoyed a local monopoly over violence.
Both these groups have clashed repeatedly, and have not
only targeted each others' armed cadres, but also civilians,
conveniently projected as the rival's sympathizers. The
result is that the district has come to witness significant
internal displacements, mostly into Nagaland and Manipur.
More importantly, the rising violence has pushed the KNA's
autonomy demand into the background.
